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FOREWORD
The development of democratic institutions in the
Latin American Republics has been retarded b y the continuous
appearance of "the man on horseback," or the caudillo.

This

type of an illiterate or semi-literate leader usually comes
from the military class and possesses a magnetic and forceful
personality.

The caudillos rule with dictatorial powers,

sometimes under the guise of a more or less democratic c o n 
stitution.

In most instances,

the majority of the people

they govern are either partially or totally illiterate and
follow the dictates of their leader without pondering the
violation of the principles he professes to uphold.

The

pattern for this type of government was initiated throughout
most of Latin America after the end of the wars for inde
pendence from Spain.

In Venezuela,

the government of the

"man on horseback" began the very day that nation became an
independent Republic,

and it was embodied in the person of

JosA Antonio PAez.
The translating and editing of the Autobiografla del
General JosA Antonio PAez. Volume I, and a study of General
PAez's life,

reveal the many facets involved in the de v e l o p 

ment of caudillo government.

To begin with,

it clearly

pictures masses of ignorant men o f mixed blood w h o do not
iii

understand,

or even seem to need to understand,

involved in democratic government.

the principles

It delineates the

economic conditions which force these men to be so involved
in the process of eking out a meager existence,

that they

have no time to formulate thoughts on government.
it portrays PAez himself as the resolute,

strong,

Finally,
and likable

caudillo who assumed the reins of the Venezuelan government.
He was a simple man who,

although very much aware of his

intellectual limitations,

accepted his country's mandate to

rule not only because of his personal ambition, but also out
of a sincere belief that he best suited his country's needs.
PAez ruled his country like an autocratic father would rule
his family.

The progress and development of all institutions,

including the Church to a certain extent, depended on his
personal wishes and whim rather them on the intellectual and
social growth of the populace.

Thus General PAez set the

stage for the dictators who were to govern Venezuela in the
future.

Unfortunately,

few if any of these men had the

interest in their country and fellow citizens that PAez had;
consequently,

none ruled so benevolently as he did.
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T RAN S L A T O R - E D I T O R 1S NOTE
Translating and editing the Autobiografia del General
Jos& Antonio PAez, Volume I, posed several questions.

The

first of these concerned the whereabouts of the original
manuscript,

for perhaps it could offer clues as to whether

General Jose Antonio P&ez wrote the manuscript himself, w i t h 
out editorial supervision; whether he wrote the manuscript
and later submitted it for editorial corrections; or whether
he dictated the material to a secretary who edited it.
Unfortunately,

no information can be found regarding the

whereabouts of this original manuscript,

and it can only be

assumed that it was either destroyed or lost after pub l i c a 
tion.

Therefore,

any answers to the queries about the

original manuscript necessarily have to be conjecture to a
certain extent.

It is known that P&ez had limited funds on

which to live in N e w York,

so limited in fact that he was

forced to leave for Argentina the year after he wrote his
manuscript in order to work as a commission agent for a
cattle company.

This suggests that he could not afford a

secretary or editorial supervision for any extended period
of time.

Furthermore,

judging from the style of writing,

and the length of some sentences and paragraphs,

it is safe

to venture that General P&ez wrote his autobiography himself
with limited assistance.
v

The second problem concerned the type of translation
to be made, either literal or free.
tion,

After much considera

the translator decided on a literal translation in so

far as grammar and readability permitted.
manner,

Perhaps in this

P A e z 's charm and candor could more readily be seen.

However, when the sentences or paragraphs were too long and
involved,

the editor divided them,

m e aning and spirit of the original.

always trying to keep the
Necessarily,

the

capitalization varies somewhat from that used by PAez.
The matter of handling footnotes posed still another
difficulty,

for PAez had footnotes in his manuscript,

translator-editor had many footnotes to interject.

and the

This

raised the question of h o w to distinguish between the two.
It was solved by stating first, before giving the citation,
when it was PAez's footnote.

All the other footnotes are

those written by the translator-editor.
Toward the middle of the first volume.

General PAez

began to add material and documents that either did not add
substantially to the text, or were already reproduced e l s e 
where.

The translator-editor deleted these which include

the following!

in Chapter XI the long list of names of the

m e n in the patriot army who fought at Queseras del Medio in
1819; in Chapter XIII the lengthy official decree issued by
the Colombian Constituent Congress expressing thanks to the
victors of the Battle of Carabobo;

in chapter XV the articles

of capitulation whereby the Spanish Colonel Manuel de Carrera
vi

y Colina surrendered Puerto Cabello to General P A e z ; in
Chapter XVIII P A e z 's official letter to the Liberator
explaining his conduct in 1826, printed in many collections
of documents and letters;

in Chapter XXI PAez's official

letter to the Liberator in 1827,
collections;

also reproduced in many

and in chapter JOCIV a varied assortment of

letters which General PAez inserted.

Other deletions made by

the translator-editor are indicated in the text by the use
of a footnote.
There are two editions of the Autobiografla del
General JosA Antonio P A e z .

The first edition was published

in N e w York by Hellet and Breen in 1869.

A copy of this

edition is in the United States Library of Congress in
Washington, D. C.
Elliot & Co.,
York in 1946.

The second edition was published by H. R.

Inc., w i t h printings in Caracas and in New
These printings are exact reproductions of the

first edition except for the fact that the following items
were added;

two pictures of General JosA Antonio PAez; a

copy of a painting of Queseras del Medio;

the L i b e r a t o r ’s

proclamation to the Bravos de A p u r e ; and the Prologues.

The

Prologue of the Caracas printing was written by Doctor Juan
Oropesa, Rector of the universidad Central de V e n e z u e l a ;
the Prologue of the N e w York printing,

by JosA Marti,

precursor of the Cuban independence movement.
of the first edition are almost extinct,

the

Since copies

the translator-

editor used the Caracas printing of the second edition.
vii
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ABSTRACT
The wars for South American independence have p r e 
sented a panoramic,

but often neglected,

view of man's

willingness to endure any and every type of hardship in p u r 
suit of that most elusive ideal— freedom.

The leaders of

this movement range from the intellectuals of Simdn Bolivar's
stature to the almost illiterate.
native of Venezuela,

JosA Antonio PAez,

a

is illustrative of the latter category.

In his later years while he was in exile in N e w York,

after

he had acquired an education, he wrote a two-volume auto
biography, which gives a vivid picture not only of his life,
but also of the wars for independence in Northern South
America.

This dissertation is a tramslation and editing of

the first volume of Autobioqrafla del General JosA Antonio
PAez.

It covers the years 1790 to 1829.

The author included

innumerable letters and documents relative to this period in
his life.

Some of these have been deleted because they do

not add substantially to the material in the text or because
they m a y be found elsewhere in their original form.

My

introduction to the Autobioqrafla is a review of P A e z 's life
from the beginning until his death in 1873.

It depicts his

role as a military leader in the wars for independence; his
political career as President of Venezuela

xi

(1831-35; 1638-42),

as the power behind President Vargas

(1835-38)

Soublette

(1861-62); and some

(1843-47),

and as dictator

and President

aspects of his personal life.
This volume reveals JosA Antonio PAez's inauspicious
beginnings as an ignorant llan e r o . or cowboy, on the Vene
zuelan l l a n o s . or plains.

It tells h o w when the war for

independence from Spain broke out in 1810, he enlisted in
the patriot army.

After enduring indescribable hardships,

he became the undisputed leader of the llanero army that was
the scourge of the seasoned Spanish troops.

His military

prestige now made his friendship indispensable to the L i b e r a 
tor, Simbn Bolivar.

PAez not only led his fellow Venezuelans

to victory over Spain, but also eventually to a rejection of
Bolivar's ideal of a unified Latin America.

When Venezuela

could no longer tolerate domination from BogotA in 1829,
PAez was on hand to take over the reins of an independent
Venezuelan government.

Thus he became Venezuela's first

constitutionally elected President.
There are two main interrelated questions that arise
concerning PAez's career.

The first is his personal loyalty

or disloyalty to his Commander-in-Chief,

Bolivar.

The

second concerns his attitude toward Venezuelan nationalism.
Did he ever give anything but a token fealty to B o l i v a r 's
Republic of Graun Colombia?
both questions.

This volume attempts to answer

It reveals PAez as being loyal to Bolivar

to the point where it would have been foolhardy for PAez to
xii

ignore his country's requests.

P A e z ’s fealty to Gran

Colombia in the beginning was as sincere as his loyalty to
Bolivar.

Although his mental horizons were circumscribed to

a great extent by the llanos more than by Venezuela itself,
he seems to have respected Bolivar's opinions.

It was only

when public opinion showed itself markedly opposed to union
with Colombia,

that PAez yielded to Venezuela's request for

i n d e p e ndence.
The translation and editing of this first volume m a n i 
fest General PAez to be not only the dominant figure in
Venezuela both prior to independence and the period immedi
ately succeeding it, but also one of Bolivar's most important
Generals.

Without PAez and his llanero army, the war for

independence in Northern South America might have presented
a different picture and seen Spain victorious for an
indefinite period of time.
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INTRODUCTION
Some men are born,

live,

the waters of existence:
rents.

and die and barely ruffle

others plunge in and alter the c u r 

Such a man was JosA Antonio PAez.

Born of humble

parentage in the western Venezuelan province of Barinas,
without the benefit of a formal education,

this man became

the scourge of seasoned Spanish troops in the battles for
South American independence and eventually became president
of the country he helped to liberate and create.

The stories

about h o w PAez attained these achievements are abundant and
m u c h intermingled with myth and legend.
about his life, however,

are even more interesting than a n y 

thing legend could create.
every sense of the word.

The cold, bare facts

PAez was an exceptional man in
Physical and mental feats that

w ould have daunted a lesser man merely served as a challenge
to him.

And yet, very much aware of the limits placed on

h i m by his lack of schooling, he could be as humble and
trusting as a child.

True to his Hispanic background, he was

a victim of flamboyance and grand gestures.

There is one

main fact that shines throughout all the actions of his life
and compensates for his shortcomings and mistakes.

This was

his zest for living and his sincere love for and belief in
his fellow m a n .

It mus t have been very difficult to k n o w

h i m and not like him.
1

2
JosA Antonio PAez was born June 13,
near the Curpa River bank,

1790 on a farm

close to the town of Acarigua in

the Araure District of B a r i n a s .

He was the seventh son of

Juan victorio PAez and Marla violante Herrera.
hair and a fair complexion,
sides."

for he was

He had reddish

"white on all four

Since his father was employed in a government tobacco

store in the town of Guanare and his mother,

for some u n e x 

plained reason, did not live with him, young PAez had an
unusual childhood.
fixed abode.

Sefiora PAez and her sons never had a

Despite this when he was eight years old his

mother sent h i m to a school which was operated by Seftora
Gregoria Diaz.

Here he learned the rudiments of Christian

doctrine and h o w to read and write.^

He was delivered from

There is considerable divergence of opinion relative
to P A e z 1s literacy (or illiteracy).
R. B. Cunninghame Graham,
JosA Antonio PAez (London, 1929), 2, states that at the age
of eight PAez attended a "hedge school" and probably learned
the basics of an elementary education.
Later, on page 114,
Cunninghame Graham propounds that PAez "must have been over
twenty years of age before he learned to read and write."
General Daniel F. O ’Leary describes PAez as "completely
illiterate," Memoriae del General Daniel Florencio 0 1L e a r v .
3 vols. (Caracas, 1952), 1, 451.
Jesus Marla Henao and
Gerardo Arrubla (Fred Rippy, t r a n s . and ed.), History of
Colombia (Chapel Hill, 1938), 310, state that "he received
but little education."
Sir Robert Ker Porter, first British
consul and charge d'affairs to Venezuela (Walter Dupuoy, ed.),
Caracas D i a r y . 1825-42 (Caracas, 1966), 119, describes PAez
as "being totally uneducated. . . . Feeling this inferiority,
and anxious to improve, he has within these very few years,
applied himself to reading and writing; which acquirement
until then, he was totally ignorant of."
What m a y be deduced from all this is that JosA Antonio
PAez could probably barely read and write when he became
President of Venezuela in 1830.
At this time he seems to
have started a campaign to improve himself culturally because
he was soon able to read and write French, English, and a
little Italian, in addition to his native Spanish.

3
Senora D i a z 's rather harsh teaching methods by his brother-inlaw, Bernardo FernAndez, who employed h i m as a sales clerk in
his mercantile store.
tasks; consequently,

PAez proved fairly proficient at his
an uncle, Domingo PAez, hired him and

one of his brothers to come to the town of San Felipe to
assist h i m in the management of his varied business interests.
Shortly after this, when PAez was barely seventeen
years old, his mother sent for h i m to come to Guanare to run
an important family errand in the neighboring province of
Barquisimeto.

This errand proved to be the event that was to

alter drastically the pattern of P A e z 1s life and subsequently,
the pattern of Venezuelan and Gran Colombian history.
the details of this mission are not known.

All

What is known is

that in June of 1807 PAez set off with certain documents and
a sum of money to present to a lawyer who lived in Patio
Grande,

and that he did accomplish his mission successfully.

On his return trip home,
local stores.

PAez stopped at one of the small

Obviously impressed with his attainment, he

brandished his money purse.

This act caused him to be

accosted later on the road by several of the local ruffians.
In the affray which ensued, he shot and killed one of the men.
Panic seized PAez when he thought of the consequences which
m ight result from this act, but he managed to reach home and
said nothing except to one of his sisters,
transpired.

about what had

Tormented by the fear of being accused of murder,

and without saying a word to his family, he headed toward the

4
l l a n o s , where then as now,

a man m a y hide himself from the

whole world.
Henceforth the llanos

(the great Venezuelan plains

that stretch north from the Guiana Highlands and the Orinoco
to where the Andes skirt the Caribbean Coast,

and west through

the Apure in Venezuela and Casanare in N e w Granada,

to the

Andes in N e w Granada) were destined to dominate JosA Antonio
P i e z 1s existence.
grass,

They represented a great inland sea of

broken only by small islands of slender palms, which

were inundated six months out of the year when they became a
huge lake.

"The climate of the Llanos with its temperature

of ninety-two,

the snakes,

electric eels,

the stinging rays,

woods,

the boas,

the crocodiles,

caribes,

the inundations and the droughts,

the

the tigers in the

the ever present

insect plague, made life in the great plains a constant
battle to the

i n h a b i t a n t s

^

Consequently,

the inhabitants

of this vast, wild region were a distinctly separate breed
of men.

Mostly Indians or men of mixed blood,

the inhabi

tants that survived in this environment were exceptionally
h a r d y — immune to heat, cold,

and hunger,

daily dangers with equanimity.

and able to face

This was the world and the

men with w h o m PAez was thrown when the Venezuelan independence
movement began thus making Venezuela the bloodiest battle
ground in Spanish America.
When PAez had penetrated deep into the l l a n o s , he went

^cunninghame Graham,

PAez,

17.
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to the cattle ranch of La C a l z a d a .
Leon Manuel Pulido,

It was owned by a Don

and here PAez worked as a cattle peon at

th3 salary of three dollars a month.
forced to make was tremendous.

The adjustment he was

He had nothing in common,

either in blood or upbringing, with the swarthy llaneros who
nicknamed him "El_ C a t i r e .” meaning fair in their dialect.
To add insult to injury,
like of Manuelote,

Piez immediately incurred the d i s 

the big Negro overseer of the ranch.

He

gave young PAez every impossible task to perform and then at
night would force h i m to come wash his feet.

It was these

experiences that tempered the steel of P & e z 's character and
body and were destined to make him the undisputed leader of
the llanero hordes.
As fortune would have it, the foreman Manuelote
decided to take PAez to El Paguey to assist h i m with the
branding of some cattle.

While he was there,

Pulido, owner of the ranch.

PAez met Don

The latter was immediately taken

with young PAez and sent h i m to sell cattle at the nearest
town.

PAez discharged this task so well that Pulido decided

to keep h i m close by.
business,

He gradually taught PAez the cattle

and PAez started buying some cattle on his own and

prospered a little.

In 1809 he married Dominga Ortiz.

Other

than being the mother of his only legitimate son, Manuel
Antonio, Dominga must have had very little,

if any,

influence

6
on PAez,

for he seldom mentions her in his autobiography.

This seems particularly unusual considering that she accom
panied h i m on all his campaigns until 1821, when he deserted
her.4

However,

autobiography,

PAez does not mention Barbara Nieves in his
and she was his reason for abandoning Dominga.

According to John G. A. Williamson,

the first diplomatic

representative of the United States to Venezuela, PAez lived
with Barbarita after he deserted Dominga "with all the
apparent care prudence & circumspection of a married m a n . "5
RamOn Diaz SAnchez later wrote that in P A e z 's love for his
lovely and spirited mistress,

"there was not only voluptous-

ness and carnal jealousy, but superstition, mysterious magic.
'She was my good s t a r , 1 he sobbingly said when death snatched
h er away from him in 1845."®
When PAez was eighteen, Napoleon Bonaparte was near
the zenith of his power.

In 1808 he invaded Spain and after

the abdication of Charles IV and Ferdinand VII, proclaimed
his brother Joseph Bonaparte King of Spain.
possessions refused to recognize Joseph.

Spain's American

They established

3A1 though PAez had several illegitimate children later,
Manuel Antonio remained his only legitimate heir.
John G. A.
Williamson (Jane Lucas de Grummond, ed.), Caracas D i a r v .
1835-1840 (Baton Rouge, 1954), 268.
V i c e n t e DAvila, Diccionario BioarAfico de Ilustres
Prbceres de la Independenc ia Suramericana. 2 vols. (Caracas,
1926), II, 52.
^Williamson, Caracas D i a r v . 241.
Poder

®Ram6n Diaz SAnchez, Quz m A n , Elipse de una Ambicidn de
(Caracas, 1950), 173-74.

7
juntas to govern themselves in Ferdinand's name.
province of Barinas and six others
garita,

P&ez's

(Caracas, Cumana, M a r 

Barcelona, Mftrida, and Trujillo}

called themselves

the American Confederation of Venezuela.

It was not until

July 5, 1811, however,

that this n e w nation declared its

independence from Spain.

It promulgated a constitution which

changed a monarchical form of government to a republican,

and

created a new federal state known as the Confederation of the
States of Venezuela.

This early independence movement was

not a popular movement.

The masses h a d little or no interest

in securing their independence.
monarchy and the church.
MorOn states:

They remained loyal to the

The Venezuelan historial Guillermo

"The people,

the Venezuelans,

stand or desire Independence.

did not u n d e r 

It h a d to be imposed on t hem."7

Keeping these facts in m i n d makes it easier to understand the
wars for independence in Venezuela during which m e n and
armies changed sides and loyalties with amazing rapidity.
This was the w a y to survive; and after all, they were m e r e l y
changing their leaders, not their principles.
P&ez was twenty years old in 1810 when he enlisted in
the revolutionary cavalry and served under his old master Don
Manuel Pulido in the province of Barinas.

There is no record

to show that he saw much service in this first enlistment.
When the First Republic came to an end in 1812 w i t h Francisco

7Guillermo Mordn (John street, trans. and ed.).
History of Venezuela (London, 1964), 91.

8
Miranda's capitulation to Domingo Monteverde,

PAez retired

from the revolutionary army with the rank of sergeant and an
indefinite leave.®

He must have been living quietly at his

small cattle ranch when he received an order from the Spanish
General, Don Antonio Tiscar,
them to Barinas.

to round up cattle and deliver

Although PAez claims to have always been a

patriot at heart, he was wary of openly defying the Spanish
General.

It was only when the Spaniards issued him a C a p 

tain's commission and command of a cavalry troop,

that PAez

seized the opportunity to flee to Santa Barbara.

There he

rejoined Don Pulido who had been commissioned a Lieutenant
Colonel b y the Republicans.

It was then that the temporary

patriot government of the Second Republic offered PAez the
rank of Captain as compensation for the rank he had refused
to accept from the Spanish.
On June 15, 1813 in Trujillo,
his Decree of War to the Death.

Simdn Bolivar issued

Within two months he had

swept east to Caracas and reestablished the Republic of
Venezuela.

It was during this time that PAez had his first

success as a military leader.

He surprised and defeated a

Spanish detachment of four hundred men led by Commander
Miguel Marcelino at Las Matas (kierrerefia, parish of canagua,

®One of the major factors leading to M i r a n d a 1s c a pitu
lation was the earthquake which occurred on Good Friday,
March 26, 1812, along the Venezuelan coast.
Caracas was
almost completely destroyed, and the clergy used this natural
phenomenon as antipatriot propaganda, claiming that it was
God's punishment for the Venezuelan declaration of inde
pendence .

in the Apure Department.

When PAez was returning with the

prisoners he took to Barinas, he met a soldier who informed
h i m that the Spanish had taken the town of Barinas.
learning this,

PAez's men deserted him.

On

Hence, he was forced

to wander for days, hiding from the Spanish and enduring all
sorts of privations, until finally he was able to communi
cate with Don Manuel Pacheco,

an old friend who was the

Spanish military commander of Canagua.

PAez conceived the

plan of joining the patriots in Sam Carlos by securing a pass
port to Barinas from Commandant Pacheco,

and getting amother

passport there from another friend, Don JosA Maria Luzardo,
the Spanish governor of Barinas,

under the pretext of going

to present himself to Colonel JosA YafSez y Tiscar at his
headquarters in G u a n a r e .

While attempting to carry out this

plan, PAez was seized and imprisoned by the Spamish.
Following almost unbelievable escapee from two executions,
he was freed and rejoined the patriots.
Republic had n o w disappeared,
caudillo,
llaneros.

However,

the Second

for in 1814 a n e w Royalist

JosA TomAs Boves, had risen to lead the formidable
Together they had defeated the patriot leader

Vicente Campo Elias in February of 1814; amd in June,

Bolivar

and Samtiago M a r i n o 's combined forces at the Second Battle of
La Puerta.

Boves swept into Caracas amd then to the east,

but Bolivar and Marifto managed to escape h i m and flee to
Cartagena.
When PAez rejoined the patriots.

Commander Ramdn

Garcia de Sena made him commander of his cavalry.

In time.
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PAez, disgusted with Garcia do Sena's treacherous actions,
transferred his loyalty first to Governor Juan Antonio
Paredes and later to Captain Antonio Rangel.

Still later in

1814, he joined General Rafael Urdaneta in MArida in western
Venezuela.
In the summer of 1814 Urdaneta with the Venezuelan
Army of the West and many patriot families fled by the
MArida-CAcuta route into N e w Granada and established his
headquarters at CAcuta.

PAez refused to follow h i m because

of a disagreement with one of U r d a n e t a 's officers, commander
Rafael Chavez.

Then PAez decided to carry out a scheme he

had been pondering for a long time,

especially after he heard

of B o v e s 1s death in December of 1814.

This was to take p o s 

session of the Apure region and win its fierce inhabitants,
the llaneros, over to the patriot cause.

PAez k n e w from

experience that these men would fight only if they found a
leader whose personal courage and qualities they could
respect.

He also was aware that his zest for fighting and

total disregard for personal safety had already made h i m
famous among them.

With his wife and child, he n o w made the

dangerous crossing of the Andes from MArida to the plains of
Casanare.

PAez finally arrived at Pore,

the capital of

Casanare.

There the Venezuelan Commander w h o had been

appointed Commander-in-chief by the Casanare government,
General Francisco Olmedilla, welcomed h i m amd immediately
gave him command of a cavalry regiment.

With their guerilla

forces they carried the war east into the Apure where PAez
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and Olmedilla won the Battle of Guasdualito in 1814.
Except for the guerrilla pockets of resistance in the
llanos defended by men like Olmedilla and PAez, most of
Venezuela was back under Spanish control at the beginning of
1815.

Bolivar was in Cartagena where he explained to the

Congress of N e w Granada w h y his campaign in Venezuela had
failed,

and why once again Colombia must help liberate his

native state.

The Granadan Congress promoted Bolivar and

sent h i m to subject the rebellious state of Cund i n a m a r c a .
H aving accomplished this mission, he was made Captain General
of the Armies of the Confederation.

His next assignment was

to free Santa Marta from the Royalists, which would enable
h i m to invade Maracaibo and thus reenter Venezuela.
tunately,

Unfor

Bolivar fell afoul of the governor of Cartagena,

General Manuel del Castillo.

The latter refused to supply

arms and munitions for the Santa Marta campaign; and after
failing to force Castillo to conform, Bolivar resigned his
command on May 8, 1815 to prevent further bloodshed of
patriots.

The next day he sailed to Jamaica;

and on May 14,

he reached Kingston where his host. Maxwell Hyslop, was most
gracious but unable to secure any help from England for
Bolivar's cause since England and Spain were allies at this
time.
M e a n w h i l e , the Cortes had restored Ferdinand VII to
the throne of Spain. He quickly nullified the Liberal Constitu
tion of 1812 and the decrees of the Cortes. He then organized
an expedition of more than ten thousand veterans from the
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Napoleonic Wars for the purpose of subduing his rebellious
colonies.

He put General Pablo Morillo in command, and the

esqpedition landed on the eastern coast of Venezuela on April
3, 1815.

Morillo swept west through Venezuela and then began

a two-pronged attack against N e w Granadat

one by sea to

Cartagena and south to B o g o t a ; the other over the Andes to
Bogota.
Bolivar left Jamaica on December 10,
for H a i t i . 9

He landed first at Aux Caves

1815 and set sail

[Los C a v o s ) and

then went to Port-au-Prince on December 31,

1815.

Here he

was welcomed by President Alexandre Petidn and destined to
get invaluable help.

With P e t i d n 's assistance,

Bolivar

organized an expedition of two hundred and forty men which
sailed in seven small vessels to the island of Margarita,
still p artly under the guerrilla control of the patriot Juan
Bautista A r i s m e n d i .

Together Bolivar and Arismendi subdued

the island and went on to the mainland,
by Francisco Tom&s Morales,

only to be defeated

one of Morillo's lieutenants.

Once again Bolivar was forced to return to Haiti.
During this time P&ez and other guerrilla chiefs c o n 
tinued to operate in the llanos against the Royalists.

^Writers such as Madariaga state that Bolivar at this
point h a d set sail for Cartagena and decided to go to Haiti
only when he learned that Cartagena had been captured by
Morillo.
The latest scholarship, however, affirms that when
Bolivar left Kingston he had no intention of going to C a r t a 
gena, but rather was headed for Haiti.
This is revealed in
a newly-discovered letter Bolivar h a d written to President
Petidn.
Alfredo Boulton, M i r a n d a , Bolivar y S u c r e . Tres
Estudios Iconogr&ficos (Caracas, 1959), 51.
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Unfortunately,

Olmedilla became too hard-pressed by the early

patriot reverses and decided to move his family and all the
men who would follow him to San Juan de los Llanos,
town in what is now Colombian territory.

a frontier

P&ez considered

this tantamount to a desertion of the patriot cause and
refused to follow him.

Instead he joined N. Solano,

patriot governor of Casanare.

the n e w

Under the latter's orders,

it

became P&ez's painful duty later to arrest Olmedilla for his
desertion.

Shortly afterwards,

P&ez joined General Joaquin

Ricaurte's forces.
At the end of 1815 the province of Casanare, which was
the only part of N e w Granada that Morillo had not conquered,
was invaded by the Spanish General Sebastian de Calzada.
With an army of three thousand infantrymen,
cavalrymen,

five hundred

and two pieces of artillery, he penetrated to

the region of chire.

There the llanero troops were waiting

under Ricaurte's command; and on December 31, 1815 at the
Battle of Chire P&ez as cavalry commander helped Ricaurte
and Ramdn Nonato P6rez,
Casanare,

the most powerful caudillo from

to defeat General Calzada and to completely rout

the Spanish troops.

It was on this occasion that P&ez had

the first of the curious nervous attacks which were destined
to plague him in the future before a battle.

Several c o n 

temporary writers noted these strange seizures and credited
them either to epilepsy or violent nervous excitement.
describing these fits, Cunninghame Graham statesi
is certain,

In

"One thing

that for the time being, he used to behave like
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a m a n possessed,
mouth,

brandishing his lance,

and foaming at the

till he fell off his horse."
It was shortly after this fit or attack, on February

16,

1816,

that the Battle of Mata de la Miel, which looms so

prominently in Venezuelan history,

took place.

P&ez had

been left in command of the small army defending Guasdualito
after its commander.

General Francisco Guerrero,

fled with

his staff and several companies of soldiers on hearing that
the Spanish were advancing with superior forces and artillery.
P&ez left Guasdualito with only five hundred cavalrymen to
find the enemy forces led by colonel Francisco L6pez,
Spanish governor of Barinas.

the

Encountering them at Mata de

la Miel, he ordered a charge at dusk.

This was good strategy

since night rendered their powerful artillery fire harmless.
The Royalists fled before P&ez's inspired attack, which
k illed or wounded four hundred of their m e n . ^

This was a

total defeat of the Royalists and was the first time that
the llaneros routed regular soldiers armed with artillery.
It was also the occasion when P&ez emerged from obscurity to
display his skillful leadership and for which he was promoted
to Lieutenant colonel.

Henceforth, his name became known

throughout the country.
N o w immigrants from N e w Granada fleeing Morillo's

lOCunninghame Graham,

P i e z . 92.

11Vicente Lecuna, Crdnica Razonada de las Guerras de
Bolivar. 3 vols. (New York, 1950), I, 484.
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oppression begeun pouring into the Apure.
Urdaneta,

Generals P&ez,

and Santander had already moved east to escape the

Spanish General Miguel de la Torre.

In Arauca,

the Commandant

General Miguel Valdez called a meeting of officials and
notable persons to constitute a government and name the chief
of arms.

This junta named Fernando Serrano,

Francisco Javier Yanes,
Santander,

President;

Secretary; and Francisco de Paula

General in Chief.

Santander immediately sent

P£ez on an expedition to round u p horses.

However,

the

llaneros refused to acknowledge Semtander as their commander:
so when P&ez returned from carrying out Santander's order, he
discovered that his army had “m u t i n i e d , " demanding that he
dissolve this government and assume control of both civil
and military command.

P&ez yielded to the entreaty of his

troops in September of 1816.
"In reality his election,

Vicente Lecuna states that:

in that environment of practical

and primitive customs, without any further law than that of
force, was inevitable.
After the Spanish reestablished the Sarinas division
in 1816, Colonel Francisco Ldpez, who was La Torre's second
in command,

invaded the Apure region again as far as Mantecal.

Ldpez's troops occupied and won command of the Lower Apure,
but fearful of attacking P&ez in the Upper Apure, he retired
toward Nutrias.

P&ez, ha v i n g just been elected Commander-

in-Chief of this area, decided to invade the Lower Apure,

12 i b i d . , 485.
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which h a d greater available resources than the Upper Apure.
He divided his troops into three columns under the orders of
Generals Urdaneta,

Santander,

and Manuel de Serviez.

On

October 8, 1816 they attacked and defeated L d p e z 's more
numerous troops at the Battle of Y a g u a l .

PAez and his

generals then pursued a fleeing L6pez to Achaguas.
After L6pez had finally set up his headquarters on
the shores of the Apure, he carelessly fell prisoner to
PAez's troops.

PAez ordered Ldpez beheaded,

and "with this

political blow he affirmed his power in those immense
l la n u r a s .

The llanero chieftain now determined to send

General Urdaneta to Barinas while he himself led the siege
on San Fernando,

the control point on the Apure.

(It was at

this time that Nonato PArez evacuated Casanare and left it
to the Spanish General La Torre while he proceeded to set up
his headquarters in the Upper A p u r e .)

When PAez discovered

that General Salvador Gorrin was marching to relieve San
Fernando,

he set out to encounter him.

in battle at El Palital on December 18.
defeat Gorrin,

The rival forces met
PAez was unable to

and the latter entered San Fernando peacefully

while PAez returned to Achaguas in the Apure to concentrate
and train his cavalry to meet Morillo, who was also marching
to the Apure.

Meanwhile Calzada was approaching MArida from

N e w Granada with three times as many troops as the patriots
had.

13I b i d . , 486.
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On December 31 of 1816 Bolivar's second expedition,
organized in Haiti,

landed at Barcelona.

fled Barinas ahead of calzada,

Urdaneta, who h a d

first returned to PAez's

headquarters and then went to join the Liberator early in
1817.

On his w a y to Barcelona

(along the Guayana Province

and the llanos of San Diego de Cabrutica) many patriot men
and officers who could not tahe the hardships of life in the
Apure joined Urdaneta.

This necessarily reduced the size of

P A e z 's f o r c e s .
In January of 1817, with the Liberator still ignorant
of PAez's contributions to the patriot cause in the Apure,
the llanero chieftain ordered Nonato PArez to attach La
Torre.

Unfortunately,

Calzada*s troops,

PArez insisted on first fighting

stationed in Guasdualito.

The battle that

ensued on January 4, was a total defeat for the patriots.
In fact, PArez lost so many men that he could not challenge
L a Torre as scheduled.

Consequently,

PAez was not able to

prevent Morillo and La Torre from marching across the plains
of Mucuritas and joining forces.

Then PAez immediately

joined Nonato P A r e z 's forces and they confronted the Royalists
at Mucuritas on January 28.

In several brilliant tactical

cavalry maneuvers PAez outwitted La Torre, who h a d to w i t h 
d r a w from the battle zone that night.

Lecuna asserts that

"this brilliant victory confirmed PAez's titles as lord of
the A p u r e . " 1 4

14Ib i d . , II, 5.
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After their defeat,

the Royalists marched in the

direction of San Fernando, by way of Banco Largo and Achaguas,
clinging to the edge of the forests.

PAez inarched parallel

to them on the open plain and tried to draw them into battle
at Achaguas.

The Royalists refused to give battle and p r o 

ceeded to San Fernando.

From here Morillo sent La Torre with

troops and supplies down the Orinoco to reinforce Angostura,
which had been beseiged by General Manuel Carlos Piar since
January 18.

Morillo left a force at San Fernando and moved

east to the valleys of Aragua.

As for PAez, he began

detailed preparations to enable his refugee families and
troops to survive the rainy season which was about to begin.
PAez also divided his forces and spread them to occupy almost
all of the Apure and part of the territory of B a r i n a s .

He

set u p his headquarters first at El Yagual and later in
Achaguas.

When his line of communication was interrupted by

a Spanish regiment of three hundred men commanded by Jacinto
Perera at San Antonio,

on the bank of the Apure, he sent

Vicente Pena to rout it.
heavy lossest
Perera; but he,

Commandant Peffa was repelled, with

so PAez personally led another attack on
too, was defeated.

It was while PAez was at his headquarters in El Yagual
in July of this year that he received commissioners from
Mariffo and Bolivar, both asking to be recognized as the
supreme authority.
and attributes,

Cognizant of Bolivar's superior abilities

PAez chose to recognize h i m as supreme chief.

With all the troops he could muster, he swore his allegiance
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to Bolivar before Father Ramfln Mendez,

later Archbishop of

Caracas.
By this time Morillo had abandoned Angostura,

and a

few of the Royalists h a d escaped down the Orinoco and north
to Caracas.

Bolivar set up his headquarters at Angostura.

It was not until the end of the year 1817 that Bolivar h a d
enough supplies to move up the Orinoco and join forces with
PAez.

Finally,

on January 30,

the first time at Cafiafistola.
awaited meeting,

1818 Bolivar and PAez m e t for
It was a warm and long-

but PAez could not help but express his

amazement later "that Bolivar's outward appearance, his weak
frame,

accustomed from infancy to the comforts of a home,

provided quite a contrast to that of the inhabitants of the
ll a n o s .

On the sixth of the following month Bolivar

expressed his amazement at the llaneros when they captured
the enemy launches he needed at the mouth of the Cople River.
Knowing that Bolivar wanted these vessels to move his army
across the Apure River, PAez had ordered two parties of his
ll a neros. with twenty-five men each, to swim alongside their
horses and capture them.
plished its mission,

When this "water cavalry" accom

Bolivar was pleasantly surprised.

He

immediately ordered the first squadron to cross the river
and attack the Royalist detachment at Guayabal.

The patriots

did this successfully and were able to keep anyone from

^Sjosfi Antonio PAez, Autobioqrafla del General JosA
Antonio P A e z . 2 vols.
(New York, 1869), I, 140.
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escaping and informing General Morillo in Calabozo about what
h a d transpired.
With his army safely across the Apure, Bolivar ordered
the march to Calabozo.

By February 12 of 1818 his forces had

obliged Morillo to evacuate Calabozo and move north.
suing the Spanish General,

Pur

Bolivar made a thrust at Caracas

which was unsuccessful, partly because PAez,

General Manuel

Cedefto, and Colonel Antonio Ranjel had outvoted Bolivar in
favor of remaining in Calabozo and using it as a base to take
San Fernando,

a besieged city they believed was bound to fall.

Bolivar returned to Calabozo and on February 22 named PAez
Governor and Commandant General of the Barinas Province.
PAez still seemed to be obsessed by San Fernando,
w hich according to Salvador de Madariaga was an obsession
lfi
"due to the lure of booty to be w o n t h e r e . W h a t e v e r his

ulterior reason, PAez did leave Calabozo and besiege San
Fernando.

The siege was successful,

for on March

6

the

Spanish troops evacuated it, and PAez personally led his
forces in their pursuit.

After this victory,

PAez retired

to Achaguas, where he received news this same month of
Bolivar's defeat at La Puerta by M o r a l e s .1 7

^ Bolivar

(New York,

1952),

The llanero

306.

17General Morales, w h o was seriously wounded in this
battle, was made Marques de La Puerta as a result of the
victory.
With Morales wounded, General La Torre assumed
command of the Spanish forces here, and General Francisco
LOpez became second in command.
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chieftain then,

in answer to Bolivar's entreaties, went on

to meet the Liberator at Ortiz.

On M a y 21, 1818 the Royalists

recaptured Calabozo, with PAez himself suffering a defeat by
La Torre's troops at Cojedes.
Angostura,

Bolivar now returned to

leaving PAez in the Apure.

Although the year 1818 had been a sad year indeed for
the patriot cause,
to morale.

it had one redeeming feature with respect

This was the arrival of English officers and

troops who, out of work after the Napoleonic Wars,
seek their fortunes by aiding the patriots.

came to

In August of

1818, Colonel Gustavus Hippisley, with a regiment known as
"The First Venezuelian Hussars," joined PAez's forces.

The

English officers and men took an immediate liking to the
llanero chieftain.

So much so,

m onth they had joined him,
Belford H. Wilson,

in fact,

that on the same

one of the Englishmen, Colonel

led a movement in San Fernando de Apure

to promote PAez to be the Commander-in-Chief.

Although

there were insinuations that PAez had instigated the m o v e 
ment himself, he denies it fervently in his autobiography.
At any rate,

PAez states that he refused to accept the

"commission" of government given h i m and sent Wilson to
Bolivar in A n g o s t u r a . 1 8
Bolivar remained in Angostura until December of 1818,
busy w i th the operations of his Army of the East.

He had

lsBolivar arrested Colonel Wilson and later expelled
h i m from the territory of Venezuela.
Madariaga, B o l i v a r .
315.
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sent Santander to prepare forces and supplies in Casanare,
for the Liberator was planning to invade N e w Granada.

When

the military details of this invasion h a d been worked out to
his satisfaction, he turned his attention once again to the
organization of a government for Venezuela and issued r e g u 
lations for convoking a congress.

On December 21 Bolivar's

expedition sailed up the Orinoco to meet PAez again to win
his support for an attack on Morillo.
vitally necessary for Bolivar,
it was Piez,
troops.

PAez's support was

for in this San Fernando area

and not Bolivar, who was in command of the

On January 17, 1819 he reviewed PAez's troops at

San Juan de Payara, but failed to get P A e z 's support for an
immediate attack on Morillo.

Then Bolivar received news on

January 21 of the arrival of numerous English volunteers in
Angostura whom he was most desirous of incorporating in his
army.

He also wanted officially to install the delegates

from Venezuela and N e w Granada meeting in Angostura;

conse

quently, he left General PAez in command of the troops in
the Apure and returned to Angostura.
Angostura met on February 15,

The Congress of

and on the following day

Bolivar was elected President and Francisco Antonio Zea,
Vice-President.

This Congress also organized N e w Granada and

Venezuela as the Republic of Gram Colombia.
Me am while General Morillo h a d decided to invade the
Apure and end the patriot resistance there once and for all.
He started his march into this area on January 1, 1819.
Fortunately for the patriot cause,

PAez had foreseen this
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invasion as early as December of the previous year.

He

determined to defend the Apure b y using his cavalry to wear
out the enemy cavalry with continuous attacks and to save
his infantry by moving it to the island of Urbana.

He put

this scheme into operation and drew Morillo's troops deeper
into the l l a n o s .

Morillo soon divined PAez's plan.

The

Spanish General k n e w that his cavalry could not defeat the
llanero chieftain's cavalry in the plains.

When Morillo

realized that he could not overtake PAez with his infantry,
he decided to suspend his pursuit of the llaneros and retire
north of the A r a u c a . 1 9

Morillo thus divided his forces in

order to cover distant points and thus maintain himself in
the Apure on the defensive.

Thus the Spanish General

established his headquarters on the north side of the Arauca,
while PAez was on the south side.

Such was the military

situation in this area when Bolivar arrived unexpectedly on
March 10 with a force numbering three thousand infantrymen
and fifteen hundred c a v a l r y . B o l i v a r

felt that now was

the most opportune time to attack and destroy Morillo c o m 
pletely; consequently,

the Liberator's forces provoked

Morillo, who had closeted his forces in Achaguas,
six consecutive hours.

for thirty-

But Morillo refused to be baited,

and Bolivar had to retire south along the Arauca and set u p
his headquarters at Potreritos M a r r e r e n o s .

1 9 Lecuna,
2 0 I b i d ..

Crdnica R a z o n a d a . II,
269.

263.
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Morillo was soon joined in Achaguas by the fifth
Spanish division under the command of La Torre and Calzada.
Then he left this town and crossed the Apure Seco River,
determined to give the patriots battle.

By April 2 the

Royalist forces were camped across from Bolivar's at Queseras
del Medio,

separated only by the Arauca River.

PAez asked

Bolivar's permission to cross the Arauca and attack Morillo.
Gaining the Liberator's approval,

PAez and his one hundred

and fifty cavalrymen on April 3, 1819 defeated Morillo by
brilliant guerrilla tactics.
Spanish morale,

The defeat proved fatal for

and Morillo withdrew first to Achaguas,

and

then crossed the Apure and returned to Calabozo on M a y 12.
Bolivar appears to have been undecided at this point
over what course of action to follow.

It seemed that at

first he wanted to pursue Morillo across the Apure,

and then

thought it more prudent to gather cattle for wintering in
Barinas.

PAez states in his autobiography that he was

against going to Barinas,

and that he thought the Liberator

should march on to M e w Granada through the plains to Caaanare.^

Bolivar's decision was made easier when Colonel

Jacinto Lara arrived to inform Bolivar that Santander had
everything in readiness for a revolt in M e w Granada.

21

PAez, A u t o b i o q r a f l a . I, 191.
Madariaga states that
"this m a y be an after-the-event attempt b y PAez to deprive
others of the glory of having thought first of the Andes
expedition; but it sounds true to life.
PAez always thought
of operations that would send Bolivar as far away as
possible."
B o l i v a r , 341.
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Thereupon Bolivar called a general council of war which
unanimously approved the plan to transfer operations to N e w
Granada.

Bolivar left the Apure to direct these op e r a t i o n s ,

while PAez was both selected and elected to remain in the
Apure and hold this area at all costs.

During the period of

reorganization which followed, Bolivar got his Army of the
W e s t ready,

and it left the Mantecal area headed for N e w

Granada on May 27.

By June 22,

1819 this army had reached

Pore where it joined Santander's division.

The combined

forces started the hazardous ascent of the Andes along the
Pisba Moor early in July.
skirmishes,

After the descent and several

Bolivar defeated the Spanish forces under JosA

M a r i a Barreiro in the famous Battle of BoyacA on August 7,
1819; and so "exactly six months from the opening of the
campaign in Apure,
from El Mantecal,
ferings,

and within seventy-five days of marching
enduring all types of hardships and suf

the victory delivered to the hero the main part of

the viceroyalty of N e w G r a n a d a . O n

August 10 Bolivar

triumphantly entered Santa FA and spent the next few weeks
establishing control in the heart of N e w Granada.

The

Royalists had been pushed north to Cartagena and south to
PopayAn.
Except for the battalion of llaneros he had given
Bolivar, PAez had refused to collaborate in the N e w Granadan

^Lecuna,

CrOnica R a z o n a d a . II,

349.
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v e n ture.^3

Not only had he failed to occupy the valleys of

Cdcuta as Bolivar h a d asked him to do, but he also refused
to even deliver horses to Bolivar.

At this point, he would

neither leave the llanos nor deplete any of its resources.
PAez spent most of his time late in 1819 and early in 1820
either at Achaguas or at his Yagual ranch training an infan
try corps destined to be known as "'Los Bravos de A p u r e ."
Having found a good Vice-President for N e w Granada in
Santander,

Bolivar left the capital to return to Venezuela on

September 20, 1819,

and arrived in Angostura December 11.

Almost immediately, he called a meeting of the Congress of
Angostura to verify a plan he had brought all the w a y from
Santa FA:

the union of Venezuela,

one single constitution,

Colombia,

and Quito under

congress obliged Bolivar,

and on

December 17 passed the bill which founded the Republic of
Colombia.

In this way,

the Liberator hoped to impress

foreign powers and secure recognition of the nascent s t a t e .
Fourteen days after his arrival in Angostura, Bolivar
left for the Apure and arrived in Sam Juan de Payara on
January 10, 1820, hoping to head P & e z 'a fresh army against
Morillo's main force.

This hope was thwarted by the fact

that PAez's cavalry had been rendered unfit for warfare due
to an epidemic among the horses, while his infantry had been

^ T h i s battalion was known as the "Bravos de P A e z .”
Madariaga states that "when the llaneros beheld the Andes,
they looked on such stupendous heights with awe and wonder,
and marvelled at the very existence of lands so different
from theirs."
As a result many of them deserted.
Bolivar.
344.
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weakened by desertion.

Furthermore,

PAez thought that

Morillo wanted to draw Bolivar into a fight in the mountains,
where the Spanish General felt stronger; so he would not yield
to Bolivar's request to move his army.

Bolivar,

on the other

hand, did not want to delay attacking Morillo for fear that
it would give him time to receive the reinforcements he h a d
asked for from Spain.

The irreconcilable temperaments of

the two strongest men in Venezuela clashed in this argument.
"Bolivar knew only too well that he could not master the
indomitable L l a n e r o .

What was he to do?

Exactly what he

h a d done a year earlier in the same situationi
city,

another army,

seek another

another mem he would be able to control.

He decided to give up his Venezuelem campaign and go to rule
N e w Granada over the head of Santa n d e r . " 2 4
Meanwhile in Spain,

the troops that were destined to

reinforce Morillo and permanently subjugate the colonies
rebelled against the power of the King on January 1, 1820.25
With all hopes of receiving aid from the Peninsula dashed,
the Royalist cause in America was dealt a tremendous blow.
Bolivar was freed of the necessity of attacking Morillo
immediately,

and instead concentrated his efforts on making

the patriots more secure in the interior by pushing the

2 4 I b i d ..

366.

2 5 Lecuna, Crdnica R a z o n a d a , II, 377.
Lecuna states
that this revolt, part of a general liberal movement was
brought about in part by the effect which the patriot victory
at BoyacA, which h a d quickly liberated the rich provinces of
N e w Granada, had had on the Spanish populace.
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Royalists closer to the Caribbean coast.

The Liberator also

took advantage of the order issued General Morillo by the
Spanish Cortes to arrange an armistice with the patriots,

to

m e e t and confer with the latter and sign the Treaty of
Trujillo on November 26,
a six months*

1820.

This famous Treaty declared

armistice and regularized the conduct of war,

ending the "war to the death" which had been mercilessly
practiced by both sides.

The armistice proved to be a moral

victory for the patriots and gave them the time needed to
effectively reorganize their forces.

It also gave the

patriots an added advantage in that it helped General Morillo
come to the decision to return to Spain.

Spurred on by the

belief that the war in the colonies was lost unless o v e r 
whelming reinforcements were received,

the Spanish General

sailed for Spain on December 16, 1820.

He left General La

Torre,

a much less capable man,

in his place.

This in itself

represented a victory for the patriots.
Before the end of the six months'
h a d felt the need to end the armistice.

interval,

Bolivar

His troops were

being decimated everywhere by disease and want,

for the

cattle of the Apure were being diverted, under the protection
of the armistice,

from military use to peaceful trade.

Following the attack on Maracaibo by Urdaneta's men,
ended April 21, 1821.

Bolivar set his forces in motion*

had P&ez in the Apure; Urdaneta,
in Barinas.

the truce
he

in Maracaibo; and he himself,

General Jos 6 Francisco Bermddez was ordered to

attack and take Caracas before the end of May.

Bermtidez
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fulfilled these orders on May 14, with the Spaniards taking
refuge in Puerto Cabello.
By June all parties,

both patriot and Royalist, were

converging on the plains of Carabobo.

Both sides realized

that this next campaign would seal the fate of Venezuela,
and consequently employed their most experienced troops.
The rival forces led by Bolivar and La Torre met on June 24
at Carabobo.

Since the Spanish artillery commanded the

valley through which Bolivar had to pass in order to reach
the plain, he sent P&ez and his cavalry to use an unfrequented
path through the hills to the west and enter the plain to
the rear of the Spaniards.

P&ez accomplished his mission,

reaching a hilltop from where he could see the Spanish army
two miles away.

In his autobiography,

states that from this hilltop,

the llanero chieftain

"The Apure Battalion v i g o r 

ously resisted the enemy infantry fire while descending into
the woods and crossing a riverlet.

It maintained its fire

until the British Legion arrived under the command of its
gallant Colonel

(Thomas)

back farther north.

Farriar. " 2 6

Later P&ez sent his men

Here, under the cover of brush and

trees, he and his llaneros were able to reach the plain and
attack the Spaniards from the rear just as Bollver's main
force arrived by the direct road.

La Torre lost control of

his troops and soon the Royalist army was routed.
commanding the llanero cavalry,

2 6 P4ez,

P&ez,

the infantry division known

Auto b i o g r a f i a . I, 206.
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as

11Los

Bravos de A p u r e ." and the British Legion, had ren

dered such an important contribution to this victory,

that

Bolivar promoted h i m on the spot to General in Chief.
"However correct,

the Liberals chiefly attributed the victory

at Carabobo to the valor and military skill of General

PAez."27

Though the victor,

PAez had a miraculous escape

during the battle.
General Morales,

La Torre's second in command, n o w

retreated with what was left of the Royalist army and shut
h i mself up in Puerto Cabello.
Caracas on June 29.

Bolivar and PAez entered

Here Bolivar organized the Venezuelan

government under republican forms but on a military basis.
"He knew full well that the actual boss would be PAez; but
this leader of cowboys was not yet presentable, nor reliable
either.

So Bolivar put at the head of the State as Vice-

President his henchman Soublette,

an urban and even urbane

general; while PAez, promoted to the rank of general in
chief, was given the military and civil command of the
Provin ce."2®

This action was taken at a time when JosA

Antonio PAez represented "almost the only permanent fixture
in the regional

g o v e r n m e n t

29

27Henry R. Lemly, B o l i v a r . Liberator of V e n e z u e l a .
C o l o m b i a . Ecuador, Perfl, and Bolivia (Boston, 1923), 248.
28Madariaga,

B o l i v a r . 398.

29oavid Bushnell, The Santander Regime in Gran C o l o m 
bia (Newark, 1954), 294.
PAez and Soublette disagreed so
markedly during this period about general policies, p a r 
ticularly the expulsion of Spaniards from the territory, to
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Bolivar left Caracas for Bogota on August 1, 1821.
He was invited by the Congress which had been meeting in
Cucuta since M a y

6

of this year to join i t . 3 0

The purpose

of the invitation was to offer h i m the Presidency of the
Republic of Colombia.

Bolivar finally accepted this post on

October 3, and Santander was made Vice-President.

The

Liberator almost immediately turned his gaze to the war in
the south,
Quito.

and on December 14 left to direct operations in

He would not return to Colombia until the end of 1826.
General Morales,

except for occasional forays, was

still holed up in Puerto Cabello.
decided to besiege the fortress.

In M a y of 1822, PAez
At times he was forced to

lift the siege either by the need to go quell a revolt,

or

because of malignant fevers that played havoc with his men.
It was during these withdrawals that General Morales,

in

command of the Spanish troops since General La Torre had

which PAez was strongly opposed, that Soublette handed over
the departmental intendancy to the MarquAs Francisco R o d 
riguez del Toro, an old-line aristocrat.
He and PAez got along
somewhat better, chiefly because he, too, was anxious to sus
pend the expulsion of Spaniards.
When the MarquAs retired to
private life, he was succeeded by General Juan Escalona.
The disagreements between PAez and Soublette seemed to
disappear after PAez became President in 1831.
From this
year until 1847 they alternated in the presidency, with
Soublette riding PAez's coattail.
Williamson, Caracas D i a r v .
234.
30

The Congress of Angostura had dissolved on January
15, 1820.
The n e w congress ratified the Fundamental Law of
the Republic which formally adopted the union of Venezuela
and N e w Granada to constitute the Republic of Colombia.
The
constitution it promulgated differed but little from that of
Angostura and proclaimed a centralized, popular, and repre
sentative government.
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been named Captain General of Puerto Rico,
forced P&ez to fight several skirmishes.
always victorious,
these occasions,

sallied forth and
Although nearly

Piez suffered serious losses.

On one of

reinforced by the Anzo&tegui Battalion, he

p ushed Morales further into the hills.
returned to Puerto Cabello then,

left it under the command

of General Sebasti&n de la Calzada,
siderable force for Maracaibo.

But the latter

and embarked with a c o n 

Morales seized the San Carlos

Fortress and the city of Maracaibo.
In the meantime,
force to attack Morales.

P&ez had been raising a considerable
When he arrived in Trujillo he

learned that the San Carlos Fortress had been given up w i t h 
out a blow by its cowardly commander,
Villasmil,

Colonel Natividad

and that the Spanish squadron h a d crossed the

sandbar into the inland sea.

P&ez then countermarched to

Valencia and sent word to General Soublette that the patriot
fleet was needed at Lake Maracaibo.

Soublette sent General

J o s 6 Padilla with his small patriot fleet which outmaneuvered
and defeated the superior Spanish fleet on July 24, 1823.
Morales,

attacked on every side,

capitulated to Padilla and

surrendered the fortress at San Carlos, Puerto Cabello,

and

the remainder of the Spanish fleet.
On August 15,
Thus,

1823 General Morales set sail forHabana.

after a thirteen-year struggle,

the last high-ranking

official representative of Spain left the country.
tunately,

Unfor

General Calzada, whom Morales had left in charge

at Puerto Cabello,

refused to recognize the capitulation.
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PAez was forced to lay siege of Puerto Cabello once again in
September.

After resisting some of PAez's most memorable

exploits, Calzada finally surrendered.

The Spaniards h a d

lost their last inch of Venezuelan territory,
independence was at am end.

and the war of

Venezuela was completely incor

porated into the Republic of Colombia.
After the fall of Puerto Cabello, PAez set out with
Generals Marifio and Bermudez for Caracas.
to be a long,

This turned out

triumphal march for the llanero chieftain.

After all, Puerto Cabello had resisted all patriot attacks
since 1812:

“Thus the joy at its fall was quite legitimate,

and all his countrymen naturally saw in PAez the incarnation
of their independence.

. . .

So for the moment he occupied a

position that he enjoyed for a brief period and to which he
never rose again throughout his long career,"3^
The following year,

1624,

saw General PAez's ra p 

prochement with the ultra-liberal group in Caracas.

Even

though the latter was violently opposed to everything m i l i 
tary which PAez embodied,

they looked on him as their only

support against Santander's tyranny.

PAez,

on his own part,

had very little in common with the liberal faction, but he
did have a concrete rivalry with the existing central regime
and its agents.

Later in the year two minor crises occurred

which hastened his alignment with the extreme liberal faction.
The first of these occurred when PAez issued a decree,

33-Cunninghame Graham,

P A e z . 211.

late
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in November,

declaring the Departments of Venezuela and Apure

in a state of siege because of the appearance of a French
squadron in the Caribbean.
French were not hostile,

When it became apparent that the

Vice-President Santander ordered

PAez to lift the state of siege.

The llanero General p e r 

sonally felt it necessary to continue the siege a little
longer because of n e w outbreaks of disorder within the
Department of Venezuela.

He was chagrined by Santander's

order and by Father JosA Antonio P A r e z 1s subsequent motion
to impeach PAez for declaring martial law without due cause.
Although this latter motion was rejected by an overwhelming
vote,

and Santander later reversed himself on this issue,

it

all served to foment PAez's disillusionment with legislative
procedures and civilian politicians in general, particularly
those in BogotA.
The second crisis was actually one of the reasons w h y
PAez's continuation of the state of siege was not unwarranted.
On December 9, 1824,

the town of Petare,

on the outskirts of

Caracas, was raided by a band of m e n armed with machetes
yelling,

"Long live the King and death to the whites 1" These

raiders seem to have been slaves from nearby plantations, who
had no association w i t h any preexisting guerrilla band.
raid produced very little damage; however,

The

the incident came

to be known as the Petare conspiracy and caused nation-wide
wrangling and dissension.

General PAez regarded the incident

simply as a small disturbance,
intendant,

but General Escalona,

the

considered the incident as having been fomented
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b y the Caracas liberals and consequently of a very serious
nature.

The Bogota government,

Santander,
P A e z 'si

led by Vice-President

chose to believe Escalona's version rather than

so Congress granted the Vice-President "extra

ordinary faculties"
the future.

for dealing with similar situations in

According to David Busnell,

"The Petare affair

together with its aftermath was thus one more reason for the
growing rift between P&ez and the Santander regime that
marked the year 1825."32

The Caracas liberals,

led by

Antonio L. Guzman and General Francisco Carabafio, took advan
tage of this opportunity to further win P & e z 's favor.
how,

Some

the llanero General failed to see that the ideals of

this liberal group were similar to those of the Santanderean
liberals w h o m he considered his e n e m i e s .
General P&ez was severely chastized again by the
Bogota government in 1926.

The Congress at Bogota,

alarmed

by the rumors of a Spanish expedition sent to recover the
lost territory and needing to provide troops for Bolivar's
war elsewhere against the Spaniards, had passed a decree to
raise a force of fifty thousand men.

The Caraquefios had

generally continued to resist the enlistment decree.
quently,

Conse

P&ez, unfortunately for his popularity, was given

the task of enforcing the decree.

As General Military C o m 

mander, he called a meeting of the citizens of Caracas to
enlist them in his army.

When only a few responded, he

32The Santander Regime in Gran C o l o m b i a . 302.

36
o r d e r e d his troops to arrest every man seen on the streets.
The M u nicipality of Caracas,

backed by General Escalona, p r o 

tested this action and instituted formal accusations against
Piez before the Colombian Senate.
accusations,

The Senate accepted the

instituted impeachment proceedings against the

llanero chieftain,
of the Department.

and suspended h i m as Military Commander
To add insult to injury,

General S a n 

tander then appointed Escalona to replace PAez while the
latter was ordered to BogotA to stand trial.
It is surprising that PAez even considered going
before Congress and commanded his troops to obey Escalona,
for the masses openly and enthusiastically supported him.
He pathetically asked Santander to use his great influence
in the Senate to win an acquittal.

PAez also contacted

Bolivar who begged h i m to be patient until 1831 at which
time the Constitution would be changed.
changed abruptly on April 30,
Valencia,

However,

the picture

1862, when the Municipality of

reportedly led by Dr. Miguel Pefia, ignored the

orders of the BogotA government and reappointed PAez its
Military Commander.
Department,

Other municipalities throughout the

including Caracas,

orders from General Santander,

resentful of having to take
a native of BogotA,

and p e r 

haps ’'urged" to do so by the presence of PAez's troops,
followed Valencia's example.

They all voted to keep PAez in

command until Bolivar returned to preside over the Convention
that was to be convoked in 1831 to deal w i t h national p r o b 
lems.

PAez was invested with the supreme authority,

in
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civil and military affairs,

and once more was President of

Venezuela in all but name.

In his autobiography P&ez states

apologetically,

"In a fatal moment for me,

I reassumed the

command that h a d been suspended so u n j u s t l y ."33

w h e n he was

sworn in at Valencia on May 14, 1826 it was understood that
he would not follow orders issued by the Bogota government.
Immediately P&ez restored the mint at Caracas and perhaps
foolishly prohibited the circulation of letters and papers
from neighboring departments.

He was really governing

Venezuela like a d i c t a t o r . 3 4

3 3 Autobioarafla.

I, 294.

34Following is an account of these events as reported
in the Philadelphia National Gazette and Literary Regi s t e r ,
June 20, 1826, reprinted from the Baltimore G a z e t t e , June 17,
1826.
"From the beginning of the month of M a y the inhabi
tants of this country, w h o have more or less property, have
been put under some dread, by a commotion which might have
been injurious to foreign traders in La Guayra, Puerto
Cabello and Caracas, if the genius of P&ez had not arrested
the fire of rebellion even from the commencement. . . .
" . . . The Cabildo of Caracas is against the G e n e r a l .
Santander, the Vice President, ordered w i t h great promptitude
that P&ez should be deprived of his military command.
P&ez
conformed to the order and transferred the command over to
Escalona, who, previously was Intendant of Venezuela.
When
this became public, the inhabitants perceived that there was
a great discontent among the population, but this discontent
sprang more from the desire which m e n without property have,
to draw some advantage from public disorders, than from
patriotic motives. . . . When it was known that the govern
ment of BogotA had deprived Piez of his command and trans
ferred it to Escalona, the troops of Valencia mutinied and
ransacked the Tobacco monopoly warehouse— a few murders were
committed, and in other places the signs of seditions of
armed people appeared.
For fear that things would grow worse,
the Cabildo of Valencia assembled and requested P&ez to r e 
sume the military command.
The cabildo of Caracas, more
afraid than the other, they being the accusers of P&ez, sent
a deputation also requesting h i m to resume the command.
From the moment in which he took the command tranquility was
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Meanwhile,

in Bogota and N e w Granada public opinion

as a whole was generally hostile to P&ez's "rebellion,"
known as the Cosiata.

Vice-President Santander condemned

the movement as wholly illegal and declared all its acts to
be null and void.

He immediately assumed his

"extraordinary

powers" to deal with the Venezuelan situation, but he did
n ot take any immediate action against the revolutionists.
Santander unleashed a bitter propaganda campaign against
P&ez.

However,

he believed that this revolt could be o v e r 

come by Bolivar's mere presence in Caracas and accordingly
wrote to h i m urging his immediate return.

Santander was

more than ever convinced that Bolivar should return when he
received reports that P&ez's strength was declining as a
result of the active opposition of Fernando Pefialver, Jos&
Francisco Bermddez,

and General Rafael Urdaneta.

Sim 6 n Bolivar when he first heard about the Congres
sional impeachment proceedings against P&ez, expressed strong
sympathy for the accused.

He appears to have regarded

S a n t a n d e r 1s appointment of Escalona as a major cause of the
revolt,

and had expressed only a perfunctory disapproval cf

P&ez's course of action.

It appears Bolivar was impressed

with P&ez's pledge not to introduce any reforms before his

restored and things went on as usual.
If you have heard
that P&ez has become Dictator or King, or wishes to separate
Venezuela from the general government and things like these,
do not believe them.
P&ez is a man of great natural genius,
and he could not commit the great faults which the timorous
and ignorant of this country would represent."
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own return to Venezuela.
Santander's requests,

Bolivar left Peru in the latter part

of 1826 for Venezuela,
Cundinamarca.
P&ez.

In compliance with both P&ez's and

leaving Santander in charge at

He maintained a conciliatory attitude toward

However, when P&ez announced to the Venezuelans that

the Liberator was coming as a mere citizen and not as P r e s i 
dent,

Bolivar became enraged.

He h a d also h e a r d reports that

P&ez was going ahead with his reorganization of Venezuela
without waiting for the Liberator.
The llanero chieftain sent Dr. Miguel Pena to inform
Bolivar that he m u s t either accept Venezuela's demands or
h a l t his march.

Unfortunately, Colonel William Fergusson,

who was Bolivar's aide de camp at the time,
and sent h i m to Trujillo as a prisoner.
arresting Bolivar's emissary,
1827,

arrested Dr. Pefla

P&ez retaliated by

Laurencio Silva.

On January 1,

P&ez sent Silva with a message to Puerto Cabello.

Bolivar used this gesture to effect a reconciliation.

He

issued a decree confirming P&ez as chief civil and military
authority in Venezuela;

and in return for a general amnesty

(a guarantee that P&ez and his followers would retain their
property,

rank,

and public offices),

and the promise of a

Great Convention for constitutional reform, P&ez recognized
the Liberator's supreme authority.
and P&ez m e t and embraced,

On January 4, 1827 Bolivar

for Bolivar had decided to win

over P&ez in his struggle against the "republic of lawyers"
led by Santander.

Together,

phantly on January 10.

they entered Caracas triu m 
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Then Bolivar left P&ez in command in Venezuela and
went to Bogotd where he reassumed the Presidency.

Bolivar

adopted a set of policies that made his open breach with
Santander inevitable.

Not content with the recent amnesty

he h a d given P&ez relieving him of any responsibility to
answer the charges made against h i m in Congress, he went on
to p r o c laim that the Venezuelan chieftain had "saved the
republic."

Bolivar heaped fire on the coals by rewarding

P&ez's leading supporters with jobs and f a v o r s . 3 5
The year 1828 which followed was a most unfortunate
year for P&ez.

The treasury was empty.

The soldiers were

unpaid and roamed the streets and countryside begging or
stealing.

Bolivar was ill and unable to dominate the C o n 

vention of Ocana which h a d been called in response to a
general demand for reform of the constitution.
because of Santander's powerful opposition,
the Convention.

Bolivar dismissed

It was now evident that there were two

strong parties in Colombiat
ists,

In fact,

the Santanderistas.

or federal

and the Bolivianos, or centralized republicans.

By

1829 P&ez was so disillusioned that he wanted to retire from
public life; however, his sense of duty to his native land
prevented him from doing so.
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During this period of rapproachment between Bolivar
and P&ez, despite the burden placed on them by governmental
policy decisions and problems in Bogot& and the Apure, the
two m e n spent m a n y hours planning the liberation of Cuba and
Puerto Rico.
In fact, P&ez devoted all of Chapter X X in the
first volume of his autobiography to discussing these plans.
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P&ez's love of music and drama, which h a d long been
semidormant,

came to the fore in the year 1929 when, despite

all his other preoccupations, he sponsored the presentation
o f Othello in his own home.
Othello;
Pena,

P&ez himself took the role of

General Carlos Soublette,

Iago.

Brabancio;

and Dr. Miguel

According to Francisco Gonz&lez Guinan,

accurately and vividly interpreted

O t h e l l o . 3 6

P&ez

Later his

interest in the fine arts led him to support and encourage
the first theatre in Valencia which was built by 1832 and
called

El. Teatro del Coronel C e l i a . ’
In November of 1829 P&ez presided over a convention

in Caracas that explicitly called for a separation of V e n e 
zuela from the Republic of Colombia.
caught on the horns of a dilemma.

P&ez was temporarily

On the one hand, his

admiration for and long obedience to Bolivar prompted him to
oppose this project.
local patriotism,

Yet on the other hand, urged by his

staunch Republicanism,

and his own personal

ambition, he was encouraged to accept the measure for separa
tion.

A conference was held at Cticuta to settle the d i f f e r 

ences between these two "countries."

It resolved nothing,

for it m e t mainly to please a dying Bolivar.
On January 13,

1630 General P&ez officially proclaimed

Venezuela an independent nation and set up a provisional
government with himself as head.

He appointed a Cabinet

with three Secretaries; of Home, Justice and Police; of

36Tradiciones de Mi Pueblo

(Caracas,

1954),

38.
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Finances;

and of Foreign Affairs, War and Navy.

these posts respectively Pefia, Urbaneja,

He named to

and soublette.

On

April 29 w o r d came that Bolivar had resigned the presidency
in his last message to the Congress at Bogota.

P&ez had

already called a constituent congress to meet on April 30 in
Valencia, which now became the capital.

This congress,

ignoring Bolivar's constitution, wrote a n e w one which p r o 
claimed a republican,
sible government.

popular,

representative,

and respon

The legislature was divided into a Senate

and a House of Representatives, with each province electing
two Senators and a number of Representatives proportionate
to its population.

The Executive power was to be embodied

in a President elected for four years and not eligible for
reelection.

Both the electors and the elected had to be

males, over twenty-one years of age,
annual income from property,
profession.

literate, with a small

or exercising some trade or

In 1831 P&ez began his first term as cons t i t u 

tionally elected president.

Cunninghame Graham says of h i m

at this timei 3 7
P&ez, from the humblest origin, had n o w risen to be
the first citizen of the republic.
The wheel of for
tune had indeed come round full centre, and he who
once had washed the negro [sicl Manuelote's feet was
seated in the presidential chair.
Until the year 1647,
he dominated the public life of the republic, making
and unmaking generals at his will and ruling like a
patriarch.
The llanero President,

37

accompanied by Barbarita and

Cunninghame Graham, P & e z . 249.
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his n e w government, moved to Caracas.

His home was known as

La Vifieta. and Barbarita was its mistress.

Fair-complexioned,

slim, w ith dark brown hair cascading down to her hips,

this

w o m a n is said to have inspired P&ez with "a passion in which
the flesh is set on fire by the vibrations of pride," and
that he regarded her as a "living trophy which his prestige
has wrested from the prejudices of a society which still
shows itself scornful and stubb o r n , " and liked "to exhibit
her as if she were a medal w o n in the great war m a n e u v e r s . " 3 8
She h e lped h i m immeasurably n o w with his campaign for selfimprovement.

Some evenings she would read Kousseau,

tine, or Cervantes to him.

On other evenings she would hire

professional singers, preferably Italians,
La Vifieta.

Lamar

to come sing at

There were times when Barbarita would play the

piano and sing in her soprano voice while P&ez accompanied
her w i t h his robust baritone,

their spirits joined "by a tie

which is deeper than that of the flesh— by the love of art
and particularly m u s i c . " 3 8
General P&ez's first term as constitutional President
of Venezuela,

1831 until 1835, was relatively peaceful.

With Urbaneja as his Vice-President,

he was able to p u t down

General Josd Tadeo Monagas's revolt for the reestablishment
of the Republic of Colombia without bloodshed.
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S&nchez,

3 9 I b i d ..
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P&ez managed
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to avert a threatened w a r with Colombia and removed any final
danger of a Spanish attempt to regain power.

It is also to

P & e z ’s credit that he allowed freedom of the press and p e r 
mitted Congress to act independently.
During this first presidency,
tate for the abolition of slavery,

P&ez continued to agi

a passion which had

consumed him since the early days of the wars for independence.
He failed to w i n this battle, but he was successful in s ecur
ing legislation which forbade the selling of slaves out of
their district and the importation of n e w slaves.

He also

promoted education for N e g r o e s .
P&ez's relations with the Catholic Church during this
period may be summed u p by relating his difficulties with
the Archbishop of Caracas.

The Archbishop refused to take

the oath of fealty prescribed by the Venezuelan constitution.
P&ez tendered the oath to h i m several times unsuccessfully;
but finally,

at the end of the year 1831,

accepted the oath.

the archpriest

This did much to enhance P&ez's prestige.

Perhaps P&ez's greatest achievement in this first
term was in the field of public education.

Having been

denied the benefits of proper schooling in his youth, he was
moved by a desire to provide an adequate system of education
for his people.

Consequently, he supported and protected

Feliciano Montenegro in his efforts to establish primary
schools.

The pioneer of Venezuelan education, Montenegro

founded El. Coleaio de la Indeoendencia in Caracas.
By 1835, Venezuela was fairly prosperous and national
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finances w e r e improving slowly.

The two political parties

that w e r e dest i n e d to rule Venezuela's future h a d also
e m e r g e d - -the Mantu a n o s and the Democrats.
the p a r t y of the aristocrats,

The former was

and by a strange freak of f o r 

tune, P&ez h a d become their leader w h i l e Monagas,

a wealthy

and w e l l - e d u c a t e d man, was the cham p i o n of the Democrats.
The p r e s i d e n t i a l elec t i o n of 1835 was conte s t e d by
such strong candidates as General Carlos Soublette,
M a r l a Vargas,

and General Santiago MarifSo.

Dr. Jos&

Consequently,

no

c a n d idate gained the two-thirds m a j o r i t y of the Electo r a l
C o l l e g e n e c e s s a r y for a victoryx
the president.

so Congress h a d to elect

A l t h o u g h it w a s w e l l known that P&ez

Soublette, Congress chose Dr. Vargas,
fought in the w a r s for independence,
w a n t the office,

favored

a civi l i a n w h o h a d not
and w h o did not r eally

but was coaxed into accepting it by the

a n t i - m i l i t a r y politicians.
results of the election,

MarifSo, d i s s a t i s f i e d w i t h the

started a so-called p a r t y of r e f o r m

w h i c h w a s responsible for a m i l i t a r y revolt led b y a Major
P e d r o C a rujo w h i c h forced P r e s i d e n t Vargas to abdicate and
go into exile on June 10,
control of the country,

1835.

M a r i n o then assumed m i l i t a r y

called a P o p u l a r A s s e m b l y w h i c h c o n 

firmed w h a t h a d just taken place,
o f a N a t i o n a l Convention.

and recommended the c a l l i n g

The Reformists,

e j e c t i n g P&ez to

join them, named h i m p r o v isional Presi d e n t and MarifSo m i l i 
tary C o m mander in Chief.
unfortunately,
c l a i m e d a federation,

in the east Jos& T a d e o M o n a g a s p r o 
as he h a d done in 1831,

in an additional
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attempt to gain autonomy for his region.
of the old independence warriors,
and Arismendi,

At this point some

such as Generals Urdaneta

declared for the Constitution,

and in July an

exiled Vargas appointed P&ez his own Chief of Operations.
When the General accepted this commission,
end for the "reformers."

it represented an

Within fourteen days P&ez brought

about the submission of all the revolutionary leaders,
including Monagas.

Even though P&ez had not originally sup

p orted Vargas, he n o w reinstated him

in the presidency.

This represented a moral triumph for the llanero leader,
a step toward constitutional government in Venezuela.
appreciation for his services,

and

In

the Venezuelan National C o n 

gress n o w bestowed the title of Ciudadano E s c l a r e c i d o . or
Enlightened Citizen,

on General P&ez.

fame was spreading abroad,

By this time P&ez's

and in 1837 King William IV of

England presented h i m with a sword of honor.
on it rani

The inscription

"from William IV to General P&ez as a proof of

his admiration for his character,

and for the disinterested

patriotism that has distinguished his brilliant and vi c 
torious c a r e e r .
The Vargas government that P&ez h a d helped to reinstate
was short-lived.

Dr. Vargas and his supporters attempted to

bring a truly civilian government to Venezuela, but the
militarists quickly doomed this attempt to failure.

After

40Cunninghame Graham, P & e z . 275.
King William IV had
sent General P&ez this sword as a token of his appreciation
for the two white deer P&ez had sent him.
Porter, Caracas
D i a r v . 957.

47
defeating Monagas,

P&ez had proclaimed an amnesty which

allowed even Monagas and his officers to keep their ranks.
The Congress of 1836 would not tolerate the leniency and
summarily punished some of the rebels itself.
promised these men their lives and honor,
gress.

P&ez, who h a d

fell out wit h C o n 

President Vargas, caught between his loyalty for

General P&ez and his loyalty to his anti-militaristic C o n 
gress,

resigned his office.

The presidency n o w was filled

briefly by three other men until the end of this disastrous
term.
The standard of revolt was raised again in April of
1837 b y two llan e r o s . Juan Pablo and Francisco Farfan.

These

two brothers of gigantic stature, whom p&ez had earlier
expelled from his army because of insubordination, were
fighting for the reinstatement of the Republic of Colombia.
Knowing how quickly his fellow llaneros would join any
adventure, P&ez sped to the l l a n o s .

There he encountered

and defeated the rebels at the town of Payara.

Such was the

feat of arms he accomplished at this battle that it won h i m
the title of Ledn de Payara,

a name by which he is often

referred to by his countrymen.
many times during this struggle,
his fight on the Payara,

His life was imperiled so
that "P&ez always spoke of

as the most desperate of his l i f e . " ^

In 1838 Jos& Antonio P&ez was elected once again to
serve as president of his country.

^ C u n n i n g h a m e Graham,

This term of office was

P & e z . 273.
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considerably more peaceful them his first.

He turned his

attention n o w to the deplorable state of transportation
facilities in his country and saw to it that the first roads
since the expulsion of the Spanish were built.

Faithful to

the m emory of the Liberator, he brought his remains back to
Venezuela in 1842.
Two political parties,

Conservatives and Liberals,

were formed in 1840 from the remnants of the Mantuanos and
the Democrats,
parties.

and came to be Venezuela's two historic

In the 1842 election,

the Conservative Party backed

General Soublette while the Liberals supported both Santos
Michelena and Diego Urbaneja.

P&ez supported Soublette again,

and Soublette won and became President in 1843.

Although

the Liberals respected his election and his cabinet,

they

objected to the fact that General P&ez was still influential
behind the scenes,

for he was "still the a r b i t e r . " ^ 2

government filled out its term,
tion, Congress,

and the courts.

This

for it upheld the C o n s t i t u 
In fact, Mordn states that

this was one of the few honest governments which Venezuela
has had.*^
It was in December of 1846 that P&ez,

accompanied by

his son Ramdn, paid his last visit to his beloved llanos

* 2 Mordn, History of V e n e z u e l a . 158.

^ I b l d .^

159

.

44it was as a result of this trip to the llanos that
D on Ramdn P&ez wrote Wild Scenes in South America or Life in
the Llanos of Venezuela (New York, 1862), which contains
m a n y vivid and interesting descriptions of this region.
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And it was here that he refused the presidency for a third
term and gave his support to jos& Tadeo Monagas, his chief
opponent in the east d uring his previous administration.
P&ez retired n o w from public life and received outstanding
honors from France and the Scandinavian countries.

King

Louis Philippe made him a member of the Legion of Honor,

and

the King of Sweden and Norway made h i m Commendator of the
Order of the Sword.
The joys of private life were destined to be short
lived for the old warrior.

The Liberals, who h a d split their

vote between three candidates,
Blanco,

Antonio L. Guzm&n, Jos 6 Felix

and General Bartolom& de Salom,

election to P&ez's candidate, Monagas.

lost the presidential
President Monagas

began his government in 1847 with a Conservative cabinet and
officials,

but when the Conservatives objected to the p e r 

sonal ist rule that Monagas was setting up,

in direct

defiance of the Constitution, Monagas retaliated by replacing
them all w i t h L i b e r a l s .
Vice-President.

The Liberal leader Guzm&n became his

The Conservatives now pleaded with General

P&ez to rebel against the President's tyranny

(which included

forcing Congress b y means of armed threats to vote h i m d i c t a 
torial powers).

P&ez realized his error in supporting

Monagas,

and led a revolt which lasted from February to M arch

of 1848.

Defeated as much by trickery and disloyalty within

his own ranks as by force of arms,
to N e w Granada.

the old General retired

In Ju ly of 1849 he led another revolt in

conjunction with a Conservative uprising in Caracas.
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However,

this attempt was poorly coordinated!

m e t the government forces,

so when P&ez

led by the former leader of his

Guard of Honor, Cornelio Muhoz, he was soundly defeated
again.

General P&ez was captured and sentenced to exile

either in Europe or the United States, but he was promised
that the life and property of his followers were to be
spared.

Unfortunately,

the government,
for months

this capitulation was not honored by

and the llanero chieftain was kept in prison

"suffering the disillusionment of the old,

despised warrior when even his dignified protest to Congress
was, of course,

rejected. " 4 5

His imprisonment at the

Fortress of San Antonio de Cuman& must have been made even
more bitter for P&ez by the fact that his long-neglected
wife visited h i m and tended to his needs here religiously,
while his mistress,

Barbara Nieves,

stayed away completely.

Finally in 1850 General P&ez was permitted to go into
exile.

He chose to go to N e w York City.

public welcome,

Here he received a

and when he visited Philadelphia later in

the year he received another public welcome.

Following is a

description of this welcome from the Public Ledger on
October 3, 1 8 5 0 i
Reception of General Antonio P&ez.— This Venezuelan
h e r o was received in this city, yesterday, by the
M a y or and Council of the City.
On the arrival of the
steamer from N e w York, General P&ez was received by
the Philadelphia Greys, Lieut. Vance, and the W a s h i n g 
ton Greys, Capt. P. C. Ellmaker.
He was escorted to
Independence Hall, occupying an open barouche.
Here

4 5 Mor6

n, History of V e n e z u e l a . 163.
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he was received by Mayor Jones and the City Councils
on the part of the city.
The Mayor welcomed General
P&ez in an appropriate speech, to which the V e n e 
zuelan hero replied in Spanish, which was interpreted
by Sefior Percy.
Citizens were then introduced and
the General was escorted to his quarters, at the
Washington Hotel.
Shortly after he had entered, he
showed himself on the balcony, and was repeatedly
cheered by the crowd in front of the h o t e l .
P&ez was sixty years old now and well educated,

speaking both

English and French in addition to his native S p a n i s h . ^

He

decided to use H e w York as his headquarters while he traveled
extensively.

In 1851 he went to Baltimore where he received

public honors again.
h i m with acclamation.

In Mexico,

General Santa Anna received

When P&ez went to Europe, King Louis

of Bavaria also greeted h i m with public acclamation.
Meanwhile,

back in Venezuela another revolt against

the M o n a g a s 1s regime, now officially headed by jos& Tadeo's
brother, Jos£ Gregorio, had broken out in Valencia in 1853
and had spread throughout the country.

Jos& Gregorio helped

to quell this revolt by signing a law abolishing slavery in
1854 and thus winning over forty thousand slaves to his side.
This measure also helped to win the presidential election
again for his brother, jos& Tadeo,

in 1855.

Unfortunately,

Jos& Tadeo developed dictatorial ambitions and had Congress
draw up a new constitution which extended the presidential
term to six years with no prohibition against reelection.^7

^ C u n n i n g h a m e Graham, P & e z . 295.
Perhaps P&ez accepted
the services of an interpreter in Philadelphia out of defer
ence to his many listeners who would not be able to understand
his English spoken with a Spanish accent.
^ Constitucidn de 1 8 5 7 , Titulo XII, Jos& Gil Fortoul,
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He did succeed in getting elected to another term in 1857.
However, b y now the opposition of both the Conservative and
Liberal parties became intense.

Led by P&ez and his friends

in H e w York and Manuel Felipe Tovar in Venezuela,

the C o n 

servatives organized their forces while the Liberals were
following suit under the leadership of Guzm&n, Wencesleo
Urrutia,

and Joaquin Herrera.

These conspirators joined

forces in an effort to find a common leader.

Recognizing

that General P&ez could not be their choice since he was too
deeply committed to the Conservatives now,
the Governor of Carabobo,
was effected,

Julian Castro.

they agreed on
A successful revolt

and in 1858 Castro set up a government and

installed a National Convention in Valencia to write a n e w
constitution.
According to Guillermo Mordn,
July 24,

1863,

"From March 15, 1858 to

a wave of anarchy transformed the country,

as government after government wiltered,

and

the social and

political structure changed radically under the blows of war
and desolation.48

invited by Castro,

reappearance in Venezuela in 1859.49

P&ez made a brief
However, when Castro

Historia Constitucional de V e n e z u e l a . 3 vols.
1942), III, 401-402.
4 8 H1story

49

(Caracas,

o £ V e n e z u e l a , 169.

General McLellan had organized a parade
to bid General P&ez farewell. As fate would have
horse slipped and fell on h i m during the parade.
horseman sustained a leg injury in this incident
he never completely recovered, for he was almost
years old now.
Cunninghame Graham, P & e z . 297.

in N e w York
it, P&ez's
The famed
from which
seventy
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started negotiating with the Federalists,
left Venezuela again.

P&ez hurriedly

He was destined to return in 1860

when Manuel F. Tovar was elected President; Pedro Gual, VicePresident;
1861,

and he himself, Minister of War and Navy.

In

Tovar resigned and Gual assumed the Presidency.

P&ez tried to negotiate with the Federalists,
to resign.

Gual asked him

The Commander of the Caracas garrison retaliated

by arresting Gual and proclaiming P&ez chief.
10, 1861,

When

P&ez became dictator of his country.

On September
Unfortu

nately,

P&ez n o w fell under the influence of Pedro Josg

Rojas.

The latter's evil counsels pushed P&ez into acts

that destroyed his prestige.
Federalists;

He failed to conciliate the

so on June 16, 1863 P&ez signed the Treaty of

Coche which brought the Federalist leader.
Crisdstomo Falcdn,
years of bloodshed

to power.

General Juan

Federation triumphed after five

1

Once again in 1863 Jos€ Antonio P&ez left Venezuela.
This was destined to be his last exile.^0

Stripped of all

his property and goods except for a small grant from General
Falcdn, he returned to N e w York where he was received with
respect.

At age seventy-eight, poverty,

and the inducements

of greater prosperity offered by his friend, Domingo

Even though he was in exile, P&ez's son. Dr. Manuel
Antonio P&ez Ortiz, was able to get his name incorporated in
the list of Ilustres Prdceres de la Independencia SurA m e r i c a n a . with its corresponding salary, in July of 1867.
D&vila, Diccionario B i o g r & f i c o . II, 52.
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Faustino Sarmiento,

forced him to leave N e w Yorlc.^

He set

out for Buenos Aires to serve as a commission agent for a
cattle c o m p a n y .
When the old llanero leader arrived in Buenos Aires
in June of 1868, he was welcomed enthusiastically as a
legendary hero by all of the first families.

He took up

residence with the powerful Carranza family.

Dr. Adolfo

Carranza described him thus:

"Of medium height and muscular

body, he had lost his agility as a result of a fall from a
horse while leading a July 4 parade in Washington,

during

w hich President Grant served as his aide-de-camp."52
On October 12 of 1868 Sarmiento assumed the Presidency
of Argentina.

Consequently,

the Argentine Senate voted

General P&ez the rank of Brigadier General in its army with
the corresponding pay.

Perd followed this example by

granting him a substantial pension.

As a result,

P&ez was

able to live comfortably and happily in Buenos Aires.

It

was during these years that he revealed a relatively unknown
facet of his personality.

He composed music and wrote lyrics.

For the piano he composed a waltz entitled.
Retiro i

La Flor del

for the violin and piano, Escucha, be11a M a r l a . ^3

In 1870 General P&ez was forced to leave his haven b y
an outbreak of yellow fever.

He went first to Bolivia where

5 ^Sarmiento and P&ez became good friends while the
former was Argentine Minister to the United States and the
latter was in exile here by General Falcdn's orders. F r a n c i c o
R. Bello, P&ez en Buenos Aires (Caracas, 1941), 17-18.
52I b i d . , 20.
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he was received with acclamation.
and Colombia.

In 1872 he visited Perti

Finally, he returned to the United States and

died in N e w York on May 7, 1 8 7 3 . His ashes n o w rest in
the national pantheon at Caracas.

In 1905 General Cipriano

Castro ordered PAez's statue erected in the Plaza de la
Reodblica.5 5
It is difficult to judge or truly evaluate a man such
as josA Antonio P A e z .

Even his contemporaries, his fellow

countrymen as well as foreigners, varied greatly in their
opinion of him.

From among his countrymen,

let us consider

first Simdn Bolivar's opinion of General PAez.

Perhaps it

is impossible to capture Bolivar's true opinion of General
PAez,

for as Salvador de Madar i a g a points out in his b i o g 

raphy of the Liberator,

the latter "was always significantly

careful not to commit to paper any adverse opinion on his
chief adversary."5®

In fact,

the thought that he m a y have

entertained an adverse opinion is only suggested by a letter
written to Bolivar by his mistress, Manuela SAenz,
she s t a t e s t

in which

"I wish to God that all these devils on two

sticks such as Paula

(Santander), Padilla,

PAez would d i e . " 5 7

S4 m . Leonidas Scarpetta and Saturnino Vergara, Diccionario BiogrAfico de los Camoeones de la Libertad de Nueva
G r a n a d a . V e n e z u e l a , Ecuador i PerCt (BogotA, 1879), 426.
5 5 Bello,

PAez en Buenos A i r e s . 30.

5 ®Madariaga,

B o l i v a r . 613.

57Victor W. von Hagen, The Four Seasons of M a n u e l a . a
Biography (New York, 1952), 193.
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Contrary to this opinion,

a perusal of Bolivar's published

letters generally reflect the high esteem in which he
appeared to regard the llanero General.
on October 16, 1825 Bolivar told himx

In a letter to PAez
"I have written

General Santander naming you to serve as intendant in V e n e 
zuela.

. . .

1

, in truth, do not k n o w anyone better qualified

to rule h e r . "5®

yet in a letter Bolivar wrote to General

Francisco de Paula Santander on December 27, 1825,

after

mentioning his disapproval of Escalona for the post of
intendant of Venezuela,

Bolivar says regarding PAezi

a very touchy matter for PAez to

"It is

enter himself as a candidate

for an office he cannot h o l d . " 5 9
When the Liberator wrote General BartolomA Salom on
April 14, 1827 he advised him to "Get close to General PAez,
who is my best f r i e n d . " 5 0

On M a y 4, 1828 he wrote to PAezi

"I rely on you to be the m a n to guide Venezuela's destifi1
nies."°

In a letter to General

M a r c h 26, 1829, he cautioned h i m
General PAez,

Pedro Briceno

MAndez

on

to "always take care

of

for Venezuela's health depends on h i m . " 5 2

By

1829 when PAez'a break with Bolivar and Gran Colombia was
obvious,

the Liberator commentedt

"This country is beyond

58Vicente Lecuna (ed.), Cartas del Li b e r t a d o r .
correcidas conforme a. los o r i q i n a l e s , 11 vols.
(Caracas,
1929-48), V, 126.
59
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I b l d .. VIII,

274.
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helpi

"The m a n

Finally,

(PAez) wants o n l y to be absolute."®^

in 1630,

Bol i v a r said that h e

"did not w a n t to

begin another struggle like that bet w e e n PAez and Santander,
w h i c h in the end has d e s t r o y e d us all."°^
M a d a r i a g a claims that the root of Bolivar's p e s s i m i s m
in 1830

"was PAez,

the p e t t y tyrant of all colours and races.

PAez h a d b e e n the chief factor in his life;

. . . The

d r e a d e d c o w b o y h a d n e u t r a l i z e d or reduced to impotence,
servience,

sub

or futil rebellion all the V e n e z u e l a n generals

w h o h a d rema i n e d in the e a s t — Soublette,
M o n a g a s and the r e s t . C o n s e q u e n t l y ,

BermtLdez, Marino,
Bolivar's feelings

t oward PAez w e r e bound to h a v e some hostility.
of hostility,

however,

The degree

seems to h a v e been temp e r e d by the

L ibera t o r's awareness of P A e z 's strength and simple virtues.
B o livar k n e w that w i t h o u t PAez he could not control the
l l a n o s , and w i t h o u t the llanos V e n e z u e l a was lost to him.
It m i g h t be also that Bolivar d i d not break openly w i t h the
llanero General because he thought PAez w o u l d ne v e r be a
t h r e a t to h i m outside the llanos.
F r a n c i s c o de Pa u l a Santander, w h o s e life and fortunes
were as m u c h e n t e r t w i n e d w i t h those of JosA Antonio PAez as
w e r e the Liberator's,

S ^ I b i d .. IX,
D e c e m b e r 6 , 1829.
6

^ I b i d ., 389.

o p e n l y expre s s e d his d i s a pproval of

208.

Letter to General Rafael Urdaneta,

Letter to General Urdaneta,

1830.
® SMadariaga,

B o l i v a r . 647.

N o v e m b e r 16,

General PAez.

In September of 1826 he wrote to Bolivart

"Know that this is PAez's thought,
ator, or its regenerator,

to be Venezuela's liber

to be called its Washington, become

richer than what he is and satiate his boundless ambition.

"6 6

When he wrote to General Mariano Montillo in October of 1826
h e stated:

"It m a y be seen, that heads as poorly organized

as P A e z 's and hearts

so filled with self-love could only

think and feel that the

people would aspire to disorders

Venezuela to have a d i c t a t o r . " 6 7

and

Again writing to Bolivar

from Bogota on November 5, 1826, he expressed the belief
that "paez believes he has greater moral power than anyone,
and PAez is very a m b i t i o u s . " 6 6
that,

Santander warned Bolivar

"PAez is to be feared because of his ignorance and

ambition,

and everything possible should be done to diminish

his influence among the troops for the sake of order and
tranquility."6 ®

The polished,

Santander had little

educated,

and law-abiding

in common with the rough-hewn llanero

chieftain.
General Antonio JosA Sucre, one of the most capable
and most loyal to Bolivar of all the revolutionary leaders,
was guarded in the opinion he reflected on most everyone,
including JosA Antonio P A e z .

Perhaps this is w h y he seems

66Vicente Lecuna (ed.). Cartas de S a n t a n d e r .
(Caracas, 1942), II, 279.
67
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to have managed to keep intact his friendship with Bolivar
70

and w i t h other men. w

A perusal of his published letters

reveals but one instance in which he m a y be said to express
an evaluation of the llanero leader.
during the C o s i a t a .

This occurred in 1826

From Chuquisaca he wrote Bolivar the

following on August 12*

"I do not have enough data to judge

who is right; but 1 see that General PAez has acted violently
in the manner in which he has conducted himself in the u p 
rising in Valencia.

If he h a d complaints against Congress

he should not have avenged himself in a manner that damages
the credit and even the existence of the nation."71
tunately,

General Sucre was assassinated in 1830.

Unfor

Had he

lived during the next fifteen years, he might have been
prompted to reflect a stronger opinion.
The opinions expressed by foreigners who knew and
worked with General PAez were generally highly complimentary.
The exception to this was Daniel Florence O'Leary.

One of

Simdn Bolivar's most trusted and dedicated aides, O'Leary
wrote the Liberator that PAez was

"an immoral, malicious,

insidious man, unworthy of Your Excellency's p r o t e c t i o n . "7 2

7 0 Madariaga,

B o l i v a r . 421.

7 *Daniel F. O'Leary (ed.), Cartas de Sucre al Libertador (1820-1830), Biblioteca Ayacucho, X X X V I , XXXVII (Madrid,
1919), XXXVII, 78.
PAez weaves into his autobiography the
opinions and judgments of a N e w Granadan, the historian JosA
Manuel Restrepo.
7 2 0'Leary, M e m o r i a e . Ill, 69.
This quotation is c o n 
tained in a personal letter from O'Leary to Bolivar written
at BogotA on October 8 , 1826.
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O'Leary had previously described PAez in the following
manneri7 3
He was of middle height, robust and well shaped,
though the lower part of his body was not p r o 
portioned to his bust; his cheat and shoulders, very
wide, his neck short and thick, a big head, covered
with dark auburn hair, short and wavy; dark, quick
eyes, straight nose and wide nostrils, thick lips
and a round chin.
His clear complexion told his
good health, and would have been very white but for
the sun.
Caution and mistrust were the chief fea
tures of his physiognomy. . . .
As a guerrilla chief, he was without rival. . . .
Without organization, without knowledge, without
moral courage, he was void of effect in politics.
Inconstant in his friendships, he lavished neverthe
less, his confidence on the favorite of the moment
and allowed himself to be guided by his advice when
it did not clash directly with his interests. . . .
He coveted power, but absolute power, the power of
caprice and abuse.
This ambition and greed were his
dominant passions.
He was able to acquire an
extraordinary influence over the llaneros that made
up his army, by tolerating their propensity for
looting and relaxing military discipline.
Such was
the chief of the Apure.
Cunninghame Graham asserted that O'Leary was the only
British officer who came into personal contact with PAez and
disliked h i m . 7^

This assertion is substantiated in the

memoirs of George L. Chesterton and Colonel Gustavus Hippisley.

The latter,

General,

saidt

after his first meeting with the llanero

“It was impossible not to be impressed in

favour of this man.

Next to the padre before mentioned, he

was the only man I had seen who could inspire me with

7 3 I b i d ..

I, 451-52.

7^Cunninghame Graham,

P A e z . 155.
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feelings of friendship at a first interview . " 7 5

Later in

his n a r r a t i v e , Hippisley w r o t e : 7®
PAez is self taught and sprang u p all of a sudden
from nothing during the revolution. . . . His courage,
intrepidity, repeated successes and the number of
his followers speedily gained h i m a name.
His
followers too were all so m a n y PAezes, looking up to
their general as a superior being. . . . On the
parade or in the field, PAez was their general, and
supreme.
In the hours of rest from the fatigues of
a long and rapid march, or from conquest over the
adversary, and the retaliation rigidly executed,
PAez would be seen dancing with his people in the
ring formed for that purpose, smoking with them,
drinking from the same cup, and lighting the fresh
segar from the one in the mouth of his fellow soldier.
Chesterton in his account of proceedings in Venezuela
in 1819 and 1820 states that the British soldiers "Repre
sented PAez as a man willing to do more for them than any
other commander they were ever under; and described his
manners as amiable,

though r o u g h . " 7 7

Although he himself

never met the llanero chieftain, Chesterton recorded the
following impression of PAez given to h i m by fellow
B r i t i s hers : 7 8
PAez is a native of the Plains, and was formerly
a herdsman.
As I have before said, he is m u c h
respected, and always spoken of favourably.
Being
a mem, who, though uneducated, possesses much natural
talent, he is beloved by his men w h o do not desert
from him; and has been known to act on some occasions

7 ®Gustavus Hippisley, £ Narrative of the Expedition
of the Rivera Orinoco and Apure in South America (London,
1819), 391.

76Ibld., 416.
77George Laval Cheat.rton, ^ Narrative of Proceeding.
in Venezuela in the Years 1819 and 1820
78I b i d .. 143.

(London,

1820),

117.
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with much generosity towards the English officers.
The unknown British officer in the Colombian navy who
wrote Recollections of a. Service of Three Years During the
War-Of-Extermination has left b y far the most glowing British
description of General P&ez.

After mentioning P & e z 's solici7Q

tude over his wound, he goes on to describe him t h u s t 1

This heroic and noble-minded man has derived all
his ideas and virtues from nature.
Nurtured in a
country perfectly uncivilised, without the advan
tages of either birth or fortune, he has, by his own
personal merit, his prowess and undaunted courage,
raised himself, through the incidents which have
from time to time occurred to him during the revo
lutionary contest, to the command of by far the
most effective and useful native force of any in
the country. . . . He does not appear to have e n t e r 
tained any w i s h to aggrandise himself at this period,
nor indeed at any subsequent one, as his conduct has
ever been marked with a most perfect disinterested
ness and indifference, as to his own advantage, in
every action of his life. . . . He is particularly
fond of the English, calling them his brothers, and
ever advocating their claims to the gratitude of the
country with the greatest enthusiasm.
His intre
pidity rendered him equally beloved by them, and
excepting General Marino, he was the most popular
chief with them in Colombia.
He is,
certainly
there can
principal

above all things, a sincere patriot, and
a bright ornament to his country, which
be but little doubt he has been the
means of continuing thus long a R e p u b l i c .

Sir Robert Ker P o r t e r , Great Britain's first consul and
charge d'affairs to Venezuela, was also a most enthusiastic
admirer of General PAez.

Porter's editor, Walter Dupouy,

79[capt. cowie<?)] Recollections of a Service of
Three Years during the War-Of-Exterminat1on in the Republics
of Venezuela and C o l o m b i a . 2 vols.
(London, 1828), II,
173-87.
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states:

"Porter admired P&ez second to B o l i v a r . " 8 0

This

fact Porter easily and quickly reveals in his many references
to the llanero leader in his diary.

Speaking of an occasion

in 1833 When P&ez called on h i m to discuss several matters
of national importance.

Porter saysi

"On all which subjects

his good sense and liberality shone conspicuously."8^

in

January of 1835 Porter noted*8^
General P&ez has published his address to his
fellow citizens which does honour to his character
as the most unblemished patriot, and the most
unambitious of men - I mean u n a m b i t i o u s , because he
h a d both the means and the feeling of the leading
people, to continue in power - but he has shewn
h i m self [to be] what I always thought of, an
honest and pure hearted son of liberty and real
independence.
General P & e z 1s apparel and conduct,
of concern for some diplomats,

which were a cause

are favorably described by

this proper Englishman in the following m a n n e r *8 3
The General was dressed quite in his llanero
costume; a low-crowned broad brimmed straw hat,
white calzoncillos (a sort of short linen
trouser), black, unpoliBhed long leather gaiters
lacing up the sides, shoes with spurs, and over
his person a white linen (but much marked by
service) Cobija, ornamented round the edges and
corners with needle work.
A scarlet, broad belt
embroidered w i t h golden oak leaves crossed his
shoulder, from when hung his trustv sword*
He
looked what he really is, a Hero.
The llanero chieftain*s great increase in wealth
during the Presidency was also a topic of much discussion

80Sir Porter, Caracas D i a r v . lxviii.
81
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and concern.

The British diplomat explains it thus*8^

P4ez was originally only a simple herdsman, and
without one single h e a d of cattle he could call his
own.
N o w he is the greatest hero, one of the most
talent patriots in the country - and likewise, the
richest citizen, both in cattle and estates within
the Republic of Venezuela.
All, all gained
gallantly, gloriously, and honourably, for services
rendered to his country.
Sir Porter rendered PAez aficionados a great service
w h e n he noted in his diary what the people's feelings and
attitudes were toward General PAez.
wrote*

On June 20,

1826 he

"Several weekly papers of a single sheet are n o w

published - very abusive and personally violent against all
those at the seat of Gov*- who oppose or are supposed to be
inimical to PAez or the views of his party.

He is as much

adulated as the others are a b u s e d . " 8 8
Barbarita,

the General's mistress,

referred to as PAez's Madame P o m p a d o u r .8 8

Porter plainly
He describes her

as a "good expressioned person - d a r k i s h with fine eyes and
jetty hair - a n d I am told though fond of filthy lucre, yet
withall is very charitable and g o o d - hearted . " 8 7

In fact

Porter even painted a portrait of B&rbara and refers to this

84
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8 5 ifeid.,
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John G. A. Williamson, the first Ameri
can diplomatic representative in Venezuela, felt that B a r 
b arita was indeed fond of "filthy lucre."
He saidi
"The
Genla woman is said to be sensable and shrewd and cunning
like all animals in their native state, that she is c a l 
culating & worldly there is no doubt, as it is commonly
reported she has already secured a large sum in money &
investments of property, sufficient to enrich all her
c h i l d r e n — " Caracas Diarv. 251.
87
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painting thus:

"Finished some days ago PAez's Mad. Pompa

dour - which I sent [to his] home this day - a great nuisance
got o v e r . " 0 8

Surprisingly enough, Porter did not react

unfavorably to P A e z 's household arrangement as did o t h e r s .
Speaking about PAez's illegitimate children,
"The youngest, Juana,
seems proud of them,
excellent person.

he states:

is very graceful and well made - PAez
and la Sefiora BArbara also - who is an

What a fortunate thing it would be for

PAez as well as BArbara - if Madame PAez, was to be

'gathered

to her mothers M l * 1,09
Even after Porter's services in Venezuela were ter
mi nated at the end of 1840, he continued to extol General
P A e z 's virtues.

Having returned to Russia to be with his

daughter, he noted:

"1 had a very long discourse with His H.

the Prince about my part of South America and took good care
Cto] speak highly in praise of Gen. PAez and the excellency
of his Government and rationality of his Republic

in

1842 in speaking to the Russian Prince again about Venezuela
he said:

"I was not backward in bringing forward Venezuela

and its glorious c h i e f . " 9 1
John G. A. Williamson,

the first diplomatic represen

tative of the United States in Venezuela, who arrived in
Caracas in 1826, h a d different opinions about the llanero
chieftain.

88

In February of 1839 he wr o t e : 02

s ir Porter, Caracas D i a r y . 726.
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Called on G e n 1 PAez found h i m engaged in his
private cockpit preparing for his great fight some
day next month - he red me in a jackit & slippers
without cravat or vest. . . . A stranger would
scarcely have recognized the President of Venezuela
and the soldier in his present garb.
Gen 1 PAez is decidedly the democrat of the
Country. . . . He has so long commanded free as
the wind, that restraints of Law, Gov^ and c o n 
stitution, and I m a y say Civilization are yet but
threads in his hands, yet obeys and I think will
continue to do so perhaps for ever and make himself
the first Citizen of his CountryIn June of 1839 he unflatteringly depicted PAez
thus

*9 3

Gen 1 PAez is in peaceble possession of the Presi
dency, running horses, caring not a great deal about
any thing but his own private views and interests,
for certainly there is not a man in the Republic who
thinks more of his own individual interest in all
things touching money than he does W i l l i a m s o n ’s attitude relative to PAez's relations
with his mistress was rather harsh also.

In describing

President PAez's visit to the George Goslings on the coast
at Camburi, he s t a t e s : ^ 4
. . . he takes with h i m the mother and children of
his present family, she of course a ___________ and
the children all bastards - Mr. Gosling has cer
tainly but little respect for the feelings of his
wife to introduce to her society the Genls family
under these circumstances, and I should be glad to
learn she has maintained her dignity of mother &
wife by leaving the house to the possession of her
unprincipled husband and his guests.
Despite all this,

in 1840 the American diplomat had

the following to say about PAezi

"He had tallents, but

rather of the fiero nature kind instead of the Enlightened
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acquirements of the age - He however suits the Country and
the state of things that govern it.-"9®
Later writers and historians have had the same diver*
sity o f opinion concerning PAez that his contemporaries had.
Salvador de Madariaga, one of Simdn Bolivar's noted biogra
phers,

characterized PAez at thirty-five as a man "who, then

in perfect health, was capable of an untiring physical and
moral activity; who never complained;
was unbearable,

for whom no hardship

no march too long, no task too menial; who

would cheerfully load mules and canoes, or swim his horse
back and forth to help across the rivers weak soldiers or
w o m e n . " 9®

He states that when PAez became Boves's successor

as leader of the llaneroa. although PAez was a republican
and a patriot, he was destined to become "more of a scourge
for Bolivar than ever Boves had been."9?

He also states

that the llanero chieftain would eventually "oust Bolivar
not only from Venezuela but from life itself."9®
to Madariaga,

According

"PAez and Bolivar were hardly ever in agree

ment; and as soon as Bolivar arrived, discord broke out
again.

. . . PAez was as happy as a king warring about in

the Plains.

He was, of course,

as good a patriot as any;

but his chief interest was less to save the Republic than to
live the life of a warring chieftain of A p u r e . " 9 9 Madariaga
further propounds that PAez "had never been Bolivar's friend.

9

®I b i d .. 380..
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9 6 Madariaga,
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He was as ambitious as B o l i v a r , but lacked the magnanimity
and the intellect which justified, qualified,
Bolivar's ambition.

In their relationship,

always been the more generous,

and restrained

Bolivar had

the more reasonable, possibly

also the more afraid of a b r e a k . " 1 0 0
Henry Rowan Lemly,
biographers,
ignorant,

another one of Bolivar's important

depicts PAez as "of humble origin and somewhat

especially in the art of war; but he made up for

the latter by an astute cunning and by his dash and reckless
b r a v e r y . "101

in evaluating PAez's break with Bolivar and

the dissolution of Gran Colombia,

Lemly s t a t e s *102

The conduct of PAez, who had had every opportunity
of learning Bolivar's true sentiments, was full of
duplicity.
While pretending to the government at
BogotA that he would proceed in accordance with its
views, he dexterously availed himself of circum
stances, with a view to obtaining the first magistracy
of an independent state, by destroying the Colombian
union.
Guillermo MorOn,

a Venezuelan historian,

states that

"Both in 1826 and 1829 it was obvious that PAez wanted to
rule, and also that Pefla's gift for intrigue was at his
service."1®^

However, Mordn goes on to explain that

"Although Santander and PAez caused the dissolution of
Colombia and PAez and his friends made the revolution of
1829-30,

the people too wished for separation from

iOOl b i d .. 613.
1 0 1 Lemly,
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Colombia.

. . ."104

R. B. Cunninghame Graham, who has written the only
biography in English of Jos£ Antonio PAez,
completely entranced by his subject.

seems to have been

He described PAez in

the following termsi 105
. . . a personality that endeared itself to every
one . . . had those little failings that often make
a mem more popular than his more admirable qualities.
. . . Moreover he was generous about money, when he
had any; loved dancing, and was approachable and
courteous, qualities without which no mortal can be
popular either with the Spanish or Spanish
Americans.
He further states that the llanero General "was one of those
rare men in any country,

but rarer still in Spanish America

in those days, who put his country's welfare above the
triumph of his p r i n c i p a l s ."106
In describing the political events of 1829, Cun n i n g 
hame Graham asserts t h a t *1 0 7
Certainly a few men in history have had a greater
chance to seize supreme power than PAez had at this
juncture of his life.
That he resisted is a tribute
to his character, and shows h o w a man almost com
p l e tely destitute of primary education, exposed to
flattery on every side, and without one true friend
on w h o m he could rely for counsel and advice still
kept a level head.
This biographer felt that if PAez had "refused to take up
p ower the country would have fallen into anarchy,

for there

was no one of sufficient note or character to take his
place. " 1 0 8

153.
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Vicente Lecuna,

the greatest authority on Bolivar and

an expert on the military tactics of the wars for indepen
dence in northern South America,

rates General PAez as

"master of cavalry tactics."109

He states thati

"The few

patriot losses and the numerous losses of their adversaries
prove that the confusion and horror introduced in the enemy
ranks with a series of instinctive and instantaneous acts by
the violence of the unexpected attack, were very natural
phenomenons provoked or created exclusively b y PAez's
fertile genius."110

L e c u n a 1s admiration for PAez extends to

his ability as a leader also,
active and vigilant,
negligence,
army,

for he proclaims that "PAez,

could not prevent certain omissions and

but he maintained order and discipline in the

in so far as the llanero habits p e r m i t t e d . 1,111

The

General's personal qualities did not impress Lecuna equally.
He refers to PAez's "spirit of pride in wan t i n g to impose
his will,

and his ignorance."112

Regarding the llanero

chieftain's loyalty to his superior commander,

Bolivar, he

states that in 1818 PAez "did not care about Bolivar's fate,
nor was he interested in rejoining h i m . " 113
PAez's autobiography,

In evaluating

Lecuna reminds us that there "is a

psychological phenomenon which our self esteem imposes on us

109Lecuna,

Crdnica Razonada,

III, 417.

110I b i d . , II, 284.

111I b i d . , 431.

112I b i d .. 157.

113I b i d . , 188.
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to erase certain memories and forge others favorable to our
pride."1 1 4
After reading all these reflections written about
General JosA Antonio PAez.

the question arises as to wherein

lies the true nature of his character.

It seems to be that

of an exceptionally gifted man. both physically and mentally,
who lacked the polish and refinement of the emotions which
sometimes results from a formal education early in life.
Although he did not have the intellect of a Simdn Bolivar,
he was blessed with a quick and agile mind.

Perhaps he was

n ot as aware as the Liberator was of the overall picture and
principles involved in an issue, but on the other hand this
left his mind free to perceive and evaluate matters at hand
often times more clearly them Bolivar did.

This appears to

be particularly true when it came to the military tactics to
adopt in the Apure region.

No one, not even Bolivar himself,

could compare with PAez in instinctively knowing h o w to fight
the Royalists in this area.

It was not only his familiarity

with the terrain and his physical prowess that made hi m
supreme here,

it was also the unusual strategies he employed—

strategies which defined his innate military genius.
PAez's success as the undisputed military leader in
the llanos depended greatly also on the control and discipline
he exercised over the uncivilized hordes of llane r o s .
this instance,

In

PAez's superior physical abilities stood h i m

114I b i d . . 273.
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in good stead.

H a d he not been able to best the llaneros in

all of their physical feats, he would not have been able to
demand and secure their blind obedience to his orders.
llaneros would follow their
tionately called PAez,

Tio.

or Uncle,

as they affec

into the thickest of any fray.

they were fanatically devoted to him,

The

Since

the llaneros always

fought at their very best when he led.
P A e z 1s determination presents another keynote to his
character,
nary.

for it was also something quite out of the o r d i 

This in itself made h i m a formidable friend or foe,

for once he had decided on a course of action, nothing could
deter him.

He was not given to pondering the results a given

action might have such as Bolivar did.

His practical,

telluric outlook precluded any of the mental anguish experi
enced by a visionary or dreamer such as the Liberator.
H aving sprung from the barbaric, uncivilized llanos. PAez
was, despite a veneer of civilization,
spirit of the llanos— fierce, wild,

the embodiment of the

and strong.

The question of PAez's loyalty or disloyalty to his
superior, Simdn Bolivar, gives further insight into his
character.

There should be no doubt left in a n y o n e 's mind

that JosA Antonio PAez greatly respected and acknowledged
the Liberator's privileged intelligence and because of this
recognized his superior authority.
loyal to Bolivar.

To this extent, he was

He even wrote to him as late as 1829

inviting h i m to come share his exile with h i m in
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Venezuela.However,

once P&ez became convinced that the

split with Colombia was inevitable,

and men such as Or.

Miguel Pena h a d persuaded h i m that Venezuela would fall into
anarchy without his leadership, his loyalty to Bolivar fell
victim to his loyalty to his beloved llanos and Venezuela.
After all,

P & e z 's horizon h a d always been circumscribed by

the llanos.
H aving quickly learned both the extent of his c a p a 
bilities and the degree of his shortcomings,

General P&ez

appears to have been alternately arrogant and then h u m b l e .
This perhaps was the final attribute of his character that
prevented him from having the international status of a Simdn
Bolivar or Francisco Miranda.

However,

it waB one more

foible that helped to endear h i m to the masses of people,
and the bulk of them did love him.

Obviously nature had

further endowed Jos 6 Antonio P&ez with a rare g i f t — that of
an extremely likeable personality.

Perhaps people liked

PAez because they sensed he liked them.
did,

And like them he

for throughout his long and chequered career, he

revealed concern and compassion for the lot of his fellow
man.

This concern m a y well be the main k e y to his character.

In concluding,

it seems appropriate to insert the following

citation from his auto biography.H

6

I shall not deny that it is the peoples * fault
if demagogues find in them a passion they can easily

llSp^ez, Auto b i o a r a f l a . I, 542.

^^Ibid.,

516-17.

81
s e d u c e , flatter, and convert into harm for society.
Because of this, 1 shall always place among the
friends of humanity those who use all their influ
ence to destroy these vulgar preoccupations, leave
behind all idea of division, and make all interest
homogeneous.
For the man of talent, regardless of
his origin, color does not grant or take away
titles of merit.
Color shall always be an accident,
as is the greatest or slightest perfection of the
configuration of the human body.
God has estab
lished a more noble inequality which is convenient
to k n o w because it is an individual justice and a
social stimulus.
Appreciate the man because of
his soul, because of his capacity, because of his
heart, and because of his virtues.
The most capable
and the most virtuous shall be the most distin
guished citizens in a State, regardless of whether
they are white, black, or mottled.
These have been
the principles I have held all m y life, and I have
professed them with sincerity, publicly as well as
privately.

INTRODUCTION
It has become the custom,

and I might add the duty,

of every m a n who has figured in his country's political
scene,

to write an account of the events he has witnessed

and of the acts in which he has participated.

This will

enable a judicious posterity to have the abundance of d o c u 
ments and data necessary to disentangle the historical
truth - a truth often obscured b y the impassioned and seldomsimilar accounts of contemporaneous writers.
reason that today,
life,

It is for this

after the anxieties of a very agitated

I undertake to open the archive of my memories and

register the documents I have managed to save from the
ravages of time and revolutionary tempests.
The Hispanic-American revolution,

last episode of the

great drama that began in North America and had its most
interesting period in France, has not yet been properly
evaluated as a splendid triumph of the ideas of modern
civilization,

or as a training for peoples who suddenly

trade the smock of the slave for the tunic of the free man.
The opinions of historians who have written about the events
of such an important era are not in agreement on many major
points.

Perhaps this is because they did not have access to

unedited documents,

or because of personal interests and
82

83
considerations.

Nevertheless,

it is necessary to review the

works of these h i s t o r i a n s .
Of prime consideration are the official documents of
Colombia, which some scholars have collected and compiled
into twenty-two v o l u m e s . 1

In these volumes can be found the

m o s t authentic data of the events of the revolution.
Another work of merit for this period is that of Don
Feliciano Montenegro.

An erudite Venezuelan, he dedicated

to the youth of his country a book that in a few pages covers
all the principle events of the independence movement. ^

This

work is of great value not only because the author witnessed
the events he refers to, but because he was a Royalist of
h i g h military rank.

Montenegro gives valuable information

which today can be found only in the impenetrable Spanish
archives.
Four years after the publication of Montenegro's
first volume,

Senor Josfl Manuel Restrepo,

Secretary of Foreign

Relations in Colombia, published his monumental h i s t o r y . 3

^The author must refer here to the work compiled by
Francisco Javier Yafies and Cristobal Mendoza, Documentos para
la Vida Pflblica del L i b e r t a d o r . 22 vols. (Caracas, 1826-29).
Later these documents were incorporated by Josfl Felix Blanco
and Ramfln Azpurda, Documentos para la Historia de la Vida
Pflblica del Libertador de C o l o m b i a . Perfl. y B o l i v i a . 14 vols.
(Caracas, 1875-77).
2
Feliciano Montenegro Colfln, Geoqrafla General p a r a el
Uso de la Juventud de V e n e z u e l a , 4 vols. (Caracas, 1623-37).
3Historia de la Revolucifln de la Repflblica de C o l o m b i a .
10 vols. (Paris, 1627).
This work contains three volumes of
important documents, an Atlas with maps of each of the twelve
departments of the Republic, and a general map of Colombia.
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Subsequently, he wrote a corrected and improved edition.^
The last historian we review is Sehor Rafael Marla
Baralt.^

He clothed with the brilliant dress of a correct

and pure style the accounts of those who preceded h i m in the
undertaking.
At this point,

I must state that in the sections in

w h i c h SefCores Restrepo and Baralt refer to the events of m y
life,

1

have found grave errors.

This is particularly true

of Restrepo who, permitting himself to be chained in more
than one chapter by the spirit of provincialism,

is exces

sively unjust and too partial in his judgments and evalua
tions .
If the desire to give m y country one more document
for its history were not sufficient stimulus to make me u n d e r 
take the task of writing m y memoirs,

the need to answer some

of the charges made by m y political adversaries would move
me to do so.

I thank Providence for prolonging m y life

sufficiently so that I could do this.

It is my intention

n o w to tell all that I k n o w and hold to be certain and truei
to correct some historical errors that writers have incurred;

^Historia de la RevoluciOn de la Republica de C o l o m b i a .
4 vols.
(BesanzOn, 1858).
Restrepo condensed the ten volumes
of the prior work into four volumes and in the Advertencia of
this edition stated that the prior work h a d m a n y errors which
"deformed" its his t o r y completely and had been incurred when
he was not present to correct the printing.
5Resdmen de la Historia de Venezuela deede el descubrimiento hasta el afio 1 8 3 0 . 3 vols.
(Paris, 1841) . PAez
neglected to mention the co-author of this work, Ramdn Diaz.
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and, without failing to confess to the mistakes I m a y have
made due to error in judgment,

to defend myself from the

attacks which bad faith or the spirit of party politics have
engendered against me.

I am certain that the hostility shown

by some writers towards me will be readily understood by
those who know the hatreds dividing our political society.
However,

since the predominant number of the principles d i s 

puted in our political society are not generally known,

it

appears necessary to sketch them here.
On declaring political emancipation from the Spanish
government,

the colonies were confronted with the grandiose

example of peoples who under the name of the United States
h a d confederated for the sake of common security,

and yet

preserved for each section its sovereignty and particular
laws.

The spectacle of the prosperity enjoyed by these

states made some men believe that the same principles which
they saw develop there so successfully could be applied to
us.

Yet they believed that the Spanish h a d left the country

with a serious affliction as a result of their policy of
uniting different colonies founded by different conquistadores under the sovereignty of viceroys or captain generals.
As a result,
ing power,

they felt that all that pertained to centraliz

even under the most democratic form, was a

vestige of Spanish domination which must be destroyed as
unworthy of a people that had achieved liberty at the cost
of so m a n y sacrifices.

Thus,

then, centralization and

despotism became synonymous to some people.

These doctrines.
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expounding the virtues of the dignity of the individual and
his freedom as opposed to autocratic regimes, as beautiful
as they are seductive, began to diffuse themselves throughout
all the peoples of emancipated America.

Bach city that had

participated in the war or could present some historic title
aspired to become the capital of a sovereign and independent
state.

Each individual,

too, believed himself duty-bound to

use the same mediums with which independence was achieved in
combating all doctrines opposed to his.
Respectable men who knew the state of our society,
while greatly admiring the generous impulses of the new
generation, opposed adopting in the government of their
country principles that were producing such excellent results
in North America.

They realized that, until the public was

given a n e w education,

these same principles were impossible

to establish in a country where despotism had reigned for a
long time and where all the vices of colonial domination
remained.

Let us listen,

then to what Seflor Restrepo,

the

first Secretary of State in Colombia and the first historian
of the Republic, has to say*®
The author of this history concurred in forming the
act of federation and was an enthusiastic supporter of
that system.
Seduced by the rapid growth of the
Republic of the United States and by the complete
liberty that its inhabitants enjoy, I h a d the greatest
veneration for its political institutions.
Then X
believed, as did the leaders of N e w Granada, that our

&The author footnotes this as follows * "Restrepo,
Historia de la Revolucidn de la Reotiblica de C o l o m b i a . I,
147, note 9."
This citation is correct.

87
provinces were in the same state as those of North
America in 1776 when they formed their confederation.
However, the lessons of time and the events that I
have witnessed, added to m y reflections, convinced me
rather quickly to the contrary.
There was and still
is a great difference between the United States,
which were founded and grew in the shadow of repub l i 
can institutions, and provinces that had always depended
on a monarchical and despotic government.
In the
latter, democratic forms were absolutely new.
In fact,
m a n y of them were directly opposed to the customs,
habits and age-old preoccupations of the peoples
involved.
Generally speaking, in the United States,
it was necessary only to change from the appointment
of the governor, as done previously b y the kings of
England, to the election of this official.
The c o n 
stitutional charters and laws of the old provinces of
North America served as the governing instruments for
the same areas when they later transformed themselves
into republics.
In N e w Granada, to the contrary, it
was necessary to change almost everything that existed
in order to establish the federal system.
The little
stability of our nacent states, then, was not to be
admired; their laws did not suit the people and were
directly opposed to their old attitudes.
The .Liberator himself said in his message to the C o n 
gress of A n g o s t u r a ; 7
When I admire to the fullest the excellence of the
federating constitution of Venezuela, I see all the
more the impossibility of applying it to our situation.
According to my manner of thinking, it is a miracle
that its model in North America has existed with so
much prosperity and that it did not fall into confusion
at the first appearance of danger or difficulty.
Despite this, that country is an example of political
virtue and of moral rectitude.
Liberty has been its
cradle, and it has grown in liberty and maintains it
self in pure liberty.
I shall add that that country
is unique in the history of the human race.
And I
repeat that it is a miracle that a system as weak and
complicated as the federative one, could have existed
under the difficult and delicate circumstances under
which it has.
Nevertheless, regardless of the situa
tion with respect to the government, I must say to the

Lecuna
1939).

A copy of this document can also be found in Vicente
(ed.), Proclamas y Discursos del Libertador (Caracas,
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American people that the idea of comparing the situa
tion and nature of two nations as different as the
Anglo and Hispanic-American never entered m y mind.
Would it not be very difficult to apply to Spain the
political, civil, and religious code of England? Well,
it would be even more difficult to adopt in Venezuela
the laws of North America.
Does not the spirit of law
say that the laws must conform with the peoples that
make them, and that it is only by great coincidence
that the law of one nation is suitable to another?—
that laws should have a relation to the physical state
of a country, its climate, the quality of its earth,
its location, its size, and the mode of life of its
inhabitants? The laws should refer to the degree of
liberty that the constitution can endure, to the
religion of the people, to their inclinations, to
their riches, to their numbers, to their commerce,
and to their customs and morality.
In addition to the unsuitability of adopting p r i n c i 
ples developed

in countries that had been conceived in

liberty,

speak, many patriots, knowing that Spain

so to

did

not desist in her pretensions to reconquer, believed that
the n e w states

could be respected only by possessing a

strong central

force that in case of danger could work w i t h 

out any difficulty against exterior aggressions.

There

could be nothing hateful nor despotic in this centralization
of power,

since the head of the government exercised the

authority that the people deposited with h i m for a limited
period of time.

I confess that these doctrines do not sound

as well as those preached by their adversaries.

However,

dealing with sacred and vital interests one must not allow
himself to be flattered by theories that sound good, but
instead he should put into practice truths that produce
pos itive r e s u I t s .
I have belonged to the group that defends the

in
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pr i n c i p l e s just mentioned.
persecutions,

banishment,

For these I h a v e h a d to suffer
loss of m y possessions,

and misery.

Y e t all of this w o u l d h a v e been little enough had m y a d v e r 
saries not reached the p o i n t that,
wrath,

they attributed to me

committed.

in order to satisfy their

faults and errors I h a v e n o t

I will not d e n y that I h a v e m a d e some mistakes.

But who has not b e e n decei v e d in dealing w i t h men,

unless

God were to concede to h i m that marvelous grace of p e r c e i v i n g
the truth behind the m a s k w h i c h clothes ambition and the
desire to p r o s p e r at another's expense?
H o w m a n y times h a v e X p o n d e r e d the future fortune of
Am e r i c a I

Crises will continue to arise.

n o w c o u l d h a v e been foreseen,

W h a t is h a p p e n i n g

if statesmen h a d n o t e d h o w
Q

an archy has desol a t e d our s t a t e s . 0

The resultant weak n e s s

has p r o v o k e d those unjust aggressions that today are
inflamed b y hatreds w h i c h time has begun to e x t i n g u i s h and
that,

as was to be expected,

have p r o d u c e d no other results

ex c e p t to convince Spanish Ame r i c a that only union and
m a t e r i a l p o w e r m a k e countries strong and respected.
Wh i l e l l a n o s , p a m p a s . and sabanas exist to invite m e n

o

Undoubtedly, P&ez is referring in "what is h a p p e n i n g
now" to the w a r bet w e e n Spain and the Quadr u p l e A l l i a n c e —
Perti, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Chile.
This w a r resulted in the
b o m b a r d m ent of Callao and Va l p a r a i s o by the Spanish.
The
conflict, w h i c h of f i c i a l l y began in January, 1866, r e p r e 
sented a futile attempt b y Spain to regain p a r t of h e r lost
empire.
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to enjoy liberty,

I do not believe that Spain will again

conquer even a span of land that it possessed before.

But

it will take many years of work for South America to become
what she seems destined to b e .

Internal discords will c o n 

tinue as long as the causes of anarchy are in force,

and

sooner or later the question of boundaries and the right of
navigation on the great rivers will cause n e w difficulties
to surge.

Will all of these problems promote the establish

ment in South America of separate and distinct nations,
jealous of one another,
faith in the future.

as has occurred in'Europe?

all

I have

Still, unless our country adopts a

p r ogram of education for all classes of society,

I do not

see any w a y for us to safely enter the path of reform which
the progress of modern ideas demands.
I will not fail in this prologue to expound a desire
I have cherished for a long time, but which seems impossible
to realize as long as Spain has colonies in A m e r i c a . 9

I

would like to see not only the fraternal union of the South
American countries, but also the union of all of these with
their old mother country.

I would still nourish such

alluring hopes if the events presently verifying themselves
w ould not have come to destroy t h e m . ^ 0

If Spain would

At the time that P&ez wrote this introduction, in
1867, Spain still held Cuba and Puerto Rico as colonial
possessions.
10Again P&ez refers to the war between Spain and the
Quadruple Alliance.
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recognize the independence of h e r old colonies,

then both

parties could put aside the hatreds inflamed by war and
exist u nited by the powerful bonds of a common origin.

Thus

we w o u l d k n o w each other better and would present to the
w o r l d the grandiose spectacle of more than forty million
people who,

recognizing similarity of origin and language,

and h a v i n g the same vices and virtues, would unite always in
order to stimulate each other in any cultural idea.

The

p r esent generation would forget the offenses of their parents,
and brothers of both hemispheres could maintain a perpetual
fraternal commerce,

generously exchanging their land produce

and nobly competing in their literary triumphs.

It is e v i 

dent to me that liberal m e n of both hemispheres have been
animated by these same desires.
however,

It is necessary to confess,

that the lack of this fraternity must be attributed

solely to the government of unfortunate Spain.

Spain's

animosity, which has not and cannot cause us any harm, has
served only to unite the Americans in a common cause.
There are men that still preach the doctrine of races
in America,

and who want to begin a crusade of the peoples

they call Latins against what they term the ambitious
pretentions of the Anglo-Saxon race.

That doctrine, which

is n o thing more than a European plan of aggression against
the United States,

can only find followers among those who

are not familiar w i t h the condition of W a s h i n g t o n ’s republic
and that of the Hispanic-American countries.

Furthermore,

it is a fact belied by even the slightest observation of
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this continent,

for here the fusion of all races is co n 

stantly taking p l a c e — a result of modern progress and the
principle of universal fraternity.
I shall end this introduction recommending earnestly
to m y countrymen to have courage and arms only for a foreign
war and to work with faith and devotion for the future of
our country.

For our country needs only peace and order for

the development of all the varied aspects of prosperity.
The latter has not been given the proper attention due to
the dissensions and anarchy that have always made desolate
countries so favored by the Supreme Being.

JOSE ANTONIO pAEZ .

N e w York, April 19,

1867.

CHAPTER I
M y Birth— First Years of M y Y o u t h — Encounter
with Highwaymen— Death of One of the Highway
m e n — My Flight to Hato de la C a l z a d a — Descrip
tion of the H a t o s — The Negro M a n u elote— In
Business Transactions.
1790-1809
I was born June 13,

1790,

in a modest little house on

the shores of the Curpa stream, near the town of Acarigua in
the province of Barinas, Venezuela.

I was the next to the

youngest of the children of Juan Victoria P&ez and Marla
Violante Herrera.
living today.

Of their eight sons,

I am the only one

My parents were very poor,

for m y father was

employed by the colonial government in the department of the
tobacco monopoly.
city of Guanare.
Guanare,

This department was established in the
M y father,

therefore, had to reside in

and consequently leave my wonderful mother alone

frequently— m y mother who for different reasons never had a
settled abode with her children.
I was eight years old when my mother sent me to Senora
Gregoria Diaz's school,

located in the town of G u a m a .

There

I learned the first rudiments of a very limited education.
Since there was always an interest in preventing education
from b eing diffused in the colonies,

there were no schools

under the Spanish government in Venezuela,
principal towns.

except in the

The reader can imagine what that school at
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Guam a was like if he pictures a reduced populace,
from the chief centers,

concerned chiefly in providing for

the material necessities of life*
also a teacher,

separated

The reader must picture

such as Sefiora Diaz, w h o opened u p a school

primarily as a means of earning a living.

This teacher was

barely able to teach reading forced us to memorize Christian
doctrine by means of blows;

and at best,

taught penmanship

according to the method of Professor Palomares.
from this school by my brother-in-law,

I was taken

Bernardo Fern&ndez,

w ho then employed me in his dry-goods store.

There he

taught me to retail goods, but only after occupying m y
m o rning and afternoon hours w i t h the planting of cacao.

I

remained with my brother-in-law until a relative of ours,
Domingo P&ez,
San Felipe.

took me and m y brother, Jos 6 de los Santos,

to

There he employed us in one of his many b u s i 

nesses .
My mother, who then lived in Guama,
1807.

In June of that year,

called me home in

she commissioned me to carry

certain family papers to a lawyer who lived in Patio Grande,
a town in the present province of Barquisimeto.
to take a moderate sum of money.
then,

I was seventeen years old

and X was honored by this commission,

because I was provided with a good mule,
pair of bronze pistols,
m y personal use.

I was also

especially

an old sword, a

and two hundred pesos destined for

I was accompanied by a peon, who on his

return was to bring several things for the family.
The trip to Patio Grande was uneventful.

However,
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the return trip was quite different.

Completely pleased

w i t h the idea that I was a trusted young man with quite a
sum of m o n e y ,

1

was anxious to show off.

of the first opportunity to do so.
town of Yaritagua,

1

took advantage

On passing through the

I went into a clothing store on the p r e 

text of buying something.

When

1

started to pay,

I pulled

out all the money I had and put it on the c o u n t e r .
not notice the persons present,

I did

except to flatter myself

w i t h the thought that they were witnesses to the fact that
I was a man of means and w e a p o n s .
The spectators must have recognized quickly the
thoughtlessness of youth,
rob me.

and perhaps planned immediately to

I thought about them no longer, however,

tinued the trip.

and c o n 

I entered the narrow road that crosses the

Mayurupi mountain, happy to be carrying arms and at the
thought of using them.

I removed the one loaded pistol from

the saddle to kill a parrot that was perched up on a branch.
But at that very moment it occurred to me that it was already
late,

that I h a d to journey an entire night in order to get

home,

and that m y principal defense rested with the loaded

pistol.
1

had barely continued my journey when the occasion

arose to show the correctness of m y reasoning.

A tall man

appeared a few paces from the left side of the road.

He was

followed by three others who darted to grab my mule by the
bridle,

immediately I jumped to the ground on the right

side, pistol in hand.

Young, without having had any
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experiences in dangerous circumstances, m y difficulty at that
m o m e n t could not have been greater.

But,

I was animated by

an extraordinary recklessness on seeing the treachery of my
aggressors.
price.

I resolved to give them m y life only at a high

The one who seemed to be the chief of the highwaymen

advanced toward me with eyes fixed on the pistol aimed at
him.

I retreated as he advanced.

hand and a club in the other.
not dare shoot him,
Perhaps he

He had a machete in one

Perhaps he thought I would

for he disregarded my warnings to stop.

thought it would be as easy to take me as

been to take m y mule.
kept retreating.

He kept

advancing towards

it had

me, and I

When we were about twenty yards from his

companions, he threw himself on me and lunged furiously with
the m a c h e t e .

Without hesitating,

intent to kill.

Up to that point,

w o u n d i n g h i m in the leg.

However,

I fired— still without
I was satisfied with
in order to avoid the

bullet, he pulled back violently and got it in the groin.
remained mute and motionless for an instant.
the shot had gone haywire,
come to deal with me later,

Believing that

and that that horrible man would
I unsheathed m y sword.

started to

run h i m through,

the ground

and lay m o t i o n l e s s .

only of saving m y life,

I stopped,

for I saw

When I

h i m fall to

Blind with anger and thinking

I ran then with naked sword toward

the other thieves; however, they did not wait for me.
fled

I

They

when they saw themselves without a leader and pursued

by someone who had been converted from an unwary and easilyfrightened youth into a determined pursuer of his aggressors.
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I was really very l u c k y , for perhaps on that spot I
might have paid with m y life for the temerity of sustaining
such an uneven struggle.
any time,

Recognizing this and without losing

X quickly mounted m y mule which the thieves h a d

abandoned in the mountain.
highwayman,

On passing by the cadaver of the

I threw the pistol on h i m and hastily continued

my journey.

It was only then that X noticed that the pistol,

wh i c h h a d exploded in my hands when I fired it, h a d hurt my
hand.
Night fell an hour after this event.
panied by thundering and a heavy rain,

It was accom

so dark and gloomy,

that I h a d to stop m a n y times to find the road.
was extremely cumbersome.

My position

Surrounded everywhere by torrents

that noisily descended on the ground,

it seemed that e v e r y 

thing conspired to augment m y anxieties and fears.

This was

so even though it h a d occurred to me that what X had done
was an act justified by divine and human laws.
At four in the morning I arrived home.
very worried,

Though I was

X told only one of m y sisters what h a d occurred.

I was fairly calm there for a few days, until rumors began to
spread that I had been the hero of the episode in the forest.
Then, without consulting anyone,
childish fear,

and induced only by a

X resolved to hide.

Heading toward Barinas,

I went as far as the shores of the Apure.
to earn an honest living,

There,

desiring

I found employment in the peon class,

earning three pesos a month in the hato de .la C a l z a d a ,
belonging to Don Manuel Pulido.
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I must describe now an hato of that period,

for the

ones found today on those same sites differ as greatly from
the ones I k n e w in my youth as civilization differs from
barbarianism.

Progress has introduced a thousand reforms

and improvements in these farms.

Yet,

it is important to

note that the character of the inhabitants has not been
altered completely.
the Venezuelan

I will not stop, however,

[Rafael Maria]

to copy what

Baralt and the Grenadine

[Jos4

N.] Samper have written with such veracity and e x a c t n e s s . 1
Instead,

I shall proceed to talk about the hatos as I k n e w

them.
The hatos were then, as they still are in some respects,
very rustic cabins with roofs of dried palm leaves.
them,

grass grew at will,

Around

and the only paths leading to them

were those formed by the cattle tracks.

Skulls of horses

and heads of alligators constituted the only furnishings of
the solitary h a b i t a t i o n s .

These served as chairs for the

llanero when he returned home exhausted from riding an
ornery colt.

The skins of the cattle heads or dried hides

served as the only bed on which to stretch his weary body
after h aving eaten his one meal at 7t00 P.M.

Happy was he

who h a d a hammock on which to restore his lost vigor I

^Piez refers here to the descriptions of the llaneros
written by Baralt and Diaz, Readmen de la H i s t o r i a . I, 349;
and Jos4 M. Samper, Ensavo sobre Las Revoluclones Politicas
y la Condicion Social de las Repdblicas Colombianas {Paris,
1861), 188.
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The llanero I k n e w would spend the night in one
litter or another,

lulled frequently b y the monotonous sound

of rain on the roof or the chirping of crickets,
other insects.

frogs, or

The rooster, who slept in the same room with

him, was his clocks

the dog, his sentinel.

He would get up

at three in the morning, while it was still raining, and
saddle his horse.

At this time he would have already sur

mounted the first obstacle of the day.

This was to stumble

barefoot over the pyramids of cattle heads which surrounded
h is home to the small cluster of grass where he h a d tied his
horse.
His first task was to round up the cattle and drive
t h e m to the camping area.

This operation was known as the

rodeo if it included both cows and horses.
were included,

it was called the j u n t a .

If only horses

"J u n t a s . 11 the

llaneros would exclaim later when told of those formed to
defend the sovereignty of Spain,

"We k n o w of no juntas here

except those we form with a n i m a l s !"
After camp was made,

the yearling calves were

separated and taken to be branded.

Then the cows with calves

were rounded up, the bulls castrated,
sold set aside*
escape,

and the cattle to be

If the c o w or horse set aside tried to

the llanero followed it, lassoed it, or pulled it

down by the tail if necessary.
Just before nightfall,

the llaneros would all return

to their hatos to lock up the cattle.

Then they would kill

a cow, each taking his piece of meat and roasting it over an
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open fire.

They h a d neither salt to season it with, nor

bread to aid in its digestion.

The only luxury of the meal

consisted of tipping the t a p a r a . a kind of gourd that kept
water cool.

Then the llanero might say with the almost

resigned despair of the powerlessi
"El pobre con aqua i u s t a .
Y el_ rico con lo que g u s t a . " 2
To pass the time away after his sparse meal,
llanero would sometimes begin to sing.

the

It would be one of

those melancholy songs that are n o w proverbial as the
lamenting voices of the desert.

If he had been fortunate

enough to go to Mass that Sunday at a nearby town and been
able to persuade a troubadour to return with him, he would
have accompaniment for his song.

At other times, he would

amuse himself by combing his horse's hair and making twisted
halters.
Such was the life of the llan e r o s .
beyond their horizon,

they thought of them as inaccessible.

They never heard the sound
obligations,

Since cities were

of the bell that recalls religious

and they lived and died as men w h o had

no fate

other than to struggle w i t h the elements and beasts.

They

limited their ambition to one day becoming the foreman of the
place where they served as
With what ease this

a peon.
description is written in a

furnished room next to a pleasant firel

But h o w different

This refrain says in essence:
"The poor w i t h just
(holy) water, and the rich with whatever he d e s i r e s . ”
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It waa to experience itl

The struggle of man with wild

b e a s t s , for horses and savage bulls are wild b e a s t s , is an
uncea s i ng struggle in which life survives as if by miracle.
It is a struggle that tests bodily strength, requires b ound
less moral resistence,

and much stoicism, or else habits

acquired since childhood,

consider h o w difficult this

struggle must have been for me.
endure it; and furthermore,
of m y self-imposed exile.

I had not been born to

I looked on it as the punishment
Imagine h o w difficult the appren

ticeship in such a life was,

for this is a life that only a

robust man can w i t h s t a n d — a man accustomed from early youth
to exercises requiring great physical strength and good
health.

This was the gymnasium where I acquired the athletic

robustness that later served me in good stead

many times,

and which even today many men still in the vigor and strength
of their youth envy me.
like iron.

My body, b y force of blows, became

M y soul, with the adversities of the early years,

acquired that disposition that even a most painstaking educa
tion could hardly have given it.
But let me return n o w to Don Pulido's hato de la
Calzada and m y first employment there.

It was m y luck to

have as foreman a tall, taciturn Negro whose grave countenance
was made more venerable b y a thick, bristly beard.

His name

was Manuel or, as all of us called him, Manuelote.

He was

D o n Pulido's slave and his overseer.

Since the house had

burned down and the owner consequently did not visit the
farm at the time,

the hato was at the disposal of this grim
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overseer.

The suspicions that some peons h a d aroused in

Manuelote that I , under the pretext of finding employment,
h a d come to spy on him, made h i m treat me very harshly.
always assigned me the hardest tasks,

He

such as the taming of

wild h o r s e s .
The task of taming wild horses was one with which
Manuelote delighted in initiating any novice placed under
his orders.

His imperious voice would almost immediately

order the poor peon to ride an unbridled horse,

a horse that

had never even felt the weight of a load on its back.
order brooked no objection, excuse, or hesitation.

This

The peon

wo u l d have to leap on a savage colt and grab its rough,
thick m a n e .

When barely mounted,

the wild beast would begin

to jump and arch its back, or snap furiously at the rider,
thus placing the rider's legs in grave danger.

The beast

either would continue to try to unload the unaccustomed
cargo, which was unbearable for him, or spouting what seemed
to be fire through his eyes and nose, dart furiously in
search of his companions in the plains,

as if to entreat

their aid against the enemy oppressing its f l a n k s .

By n o w

the p o o r rider feels as if a hurricane with all its unbridled
fury is carrying him and nearly dragging h i m on the surface
of the land— the land, which although he imagines but a short
distance from his feet,

is still out of reach,

flees w ith the speed of lightning.

for it, too,

The wind buzzes in his

ears as if it were penetrating the cavaties of a deep cavern
with full force.

The unfortunate individual hardly dares to
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breathe.

And if he does keep his frightened eyes open,

it

is only to see if he can find assistance somewhere, or to
convince himself that the danger is not as great as he
pictures it.
Hie land, wh ich to the peaceful spectator seems very
level,

appears at each step to be frightful chasms into

w h i c h rider and beast will certainly hurl themselves.

No

aid, except that which Heaven m a y offer, can be expected;
consequently,

the rider commands himself with all fervor to

the Viroen del Carmen, whose scapulary he wears around his
neck.

At each moment he awaits his last second.

the anguish ceases,
tiredness,

Finally,

for the horse surrenders out of pure

and little by little abandons the impetuous

escape that wears out his strength.

The next time the

novice llanero performs this act, he is less frightened.
Finally,

there comes a time when there is no greater pleasure

for h i m than to tame the animal that before had made h i m
experience inexplicable terrors.
Another duty that Manuelote assigned to me and that I
hated the most because of the heat and the vigilance it
required, was to pasture the cattle during the day.

At night

he ordered me to watch the horses in case they got frightened
and tried to run away.
w o o d for the fences.

He also gave m e the job of chopping
Finally, he ordered me to get out in

the river w i t h the horses, before

1

h a d learned to swim,

in

order to serve as their guide in crossing from one shore to
another.

I remember that one day, on reaching a river, he
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shouted at m e i

"Get in the water and guide the cattle."

Because I hesitated,

and thus revealed I did not k n o w

h o w to swim, he told me in an angry tone*

"I am not asking

you w h ether you k n o w h o w to swim; I order you to get in the
river and guide the cattle."
I suffered very much while being treated like this.
M y hands cracked open as a result of the great efforts I
made to hold the horses by the horsehair halters used to tame
them.

Forced to struggle with those wild animals, either

bareback or on a wooden saddle w i t h raw leather straps, m y
thighs were hurt so. that m a n y times they were covered with
abrasions that bled.

Even worms came out of m y wounds, but

this was not rare in those deserts and in that savage life.
Similar embryos were produced by the multitude of flies
abounding there in the rainy season.
After finishing the day's work. Manuelote
down on his hammock and say*

"Catire PAez, bring a camazo

w i t h w ater and wash m y feet."
swing h i m until he fell asleep.
the name of Catire.

wou l d lie

Later, he would order me to
He distinguished me with

and chose me above all the other peons

to carry out the m o s t difficult and dangerous tasks that h a d
to be perfo r m e d on the farm.
M a n y years later, when I took Manuelote prisoner in
the Battle of Mata de la Miel.
greatest kindness,

I treated h i m with the

even to the point of making h i m sit at m y

^C a t i r e . blond; c a m a z o . jug.
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table.

One day when I revealed the desire to serve h i m in

some way, he begged me as sole favor to give h i m safe conduct
to go back to his home.

I accommodated him.

Later,

grateful

for the good treatment he h a d received, he joined m y army.
Then, the other llaneros in m y presence were wont to say to
one another w i t h certain malicei

"Catire P&ez, bring a

camazo with water and wash m y feet."

Manuelote,

bothered

w i t h those allusions to other times, would answer them:

"I

k n o w you all say that to annoy me; but you have such a strong
leader,

and the nation such a good fighter, because I m a d e a

man of P & e z ."
After living two years in the Calzada farm,
with Manuelote to the farm at Paguey,
Pulido.

I went

also belonging to Don

There X was to h e l p capture and brand cattle that

w e r e to be sold.

I had the good fortune then to m e e t Pulido,

w h o elevated m e from the p e o n status.
handle the sale of his cattle and,

He employed me to

since m y family had

recommended me to him, offered me his protection by k e e p i n g
me at his side.

For almost a year I carried out the charge

w h i c h he gave me.

Under his guidance I learned the business

and later retired to pursue this business on m y own.

After

some time h a d passed, Pulido h a d to collect a certain sum of
m o n e y through the sale of cattle.
this business.
his charge.

He p u t me in charge of

Gratefully and with pleasure I carried out

When X finished it, X begem again to tend to my

own business affairs.
There are times in one's life which,

although appearing
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insignificant, leave indelible memories,

it seems that

Providence takes pleasure in giving m a n a certain rest
before ma k i n g h i m a participant of great events,

she h a d

selected me as one of her tools to contribute to the libera
tion of my country from Spanish tyranny.
into the whirlwind of battles,
life

1

Before hurling me

fate wanted me to forget the

h a d spent as a p e o n and taste the sweetness of a

period calmed and ennobled by the pleasure of earning a
living leisurely.
goods.

Dur i n g this time,

M y work provided me with sufficient means to live

independently.

I felt satisfied and happy,

nothing else for myself.
approaching,
freedom1

I acquired some w o rldly

and 1 desired

But, the hour of redemption was

and Venezuela was preparing to conquer he r

CHAPTER II
Geographic Situation of Venezuela— Population—
P o r t s — Navigable Rivers— Defense of the Te r r i 
t o r y — Joseph B o n a p a r t e 's Ascendancy over the
Spanish T h r o n e — The Colonies Decide to Support
the Legitimate M o n a r c h — Ju n t a s — Revolutionary
M o v e m e n t s — War with Spain.
The Republic of Venezuela, previously a Captaincy
General of the same name,

comprises a vast expanse of t e r r i 

tory that lies between N e w Granada, which forms its Western
boundary;

the Atlantic, which bathes its Northern shores;

British Guiana, which borders it on the East;

and the

Tapirapecu and Pacaraima Mountains, which separate it from
the empire of Brazil.

She has excellent ports to export the

riches that are to be found in the interior of the territory.
Above all,

she has the beautiful Gulf of Maracaibo, which

the first visitors took to be a sea.

The topography of the

land presents great problems of communication between the
interior and the coast.

In order to surmount this difficulty

in the l l a n o s . Providence gave us majestic rivers such as
the Orinoco.

It flows between rich tropical plains and is

navigable for ocean-going vessels as far as the city of
Angostura and even further for smaller ships.

This river

and others fertilize the areas around their shores.
tropical fruits m a y be grown in abundance.
107

Here

In addition.
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great numbers of c a t t l e , which were and still are one of the
principal sources of the country's riches, pasture in these
plains.
Before Independence,
tions,

according to Humboldt's calcula

the Captaincy General of Venezuela had 800,000

inhabi tants.^

A great part of this population disappeared

during the revolt against Spanish tyranny,

for Venezuela

suffered more casualties during the war which it sustained
for thirteen years them the other colonies that rebelled.
Furthermore,

fears that Spain would attempt to conquer the

territory anew prevented the flow of European immigration to
the new republics.

Thus in 1822,

the year in which Colombia

was divided into seven departments and thirty-two provinces,
the total population of this state was 2,644,600.2

^ A e z refers here to Alexander von Humboldt, the d i s 
tinguished German scientist who first visited Venezuela in
July of 1801.
In collaboration with Aimd Bonpland, a French
scientist, he wrote Relation Historiaue du Voyage aux Regions
Ecruinoxiales du Nouveau C o n t i n e n t . 1799-1804 (Paris, 1814-33).
The Venezuelan Miniaterio de Educaci6n Nacional authorized
Don Lisandro Alvarado to translate this work.
It was p u b 
lished in five volumes under the title Viaie a. las Regiones
Eouinocciales del Nuevo C o n t i n e n t e . 1799-1804 (Caracas, 1940).
In the second volume of this translated work, 294-95, H u m 
boldt states that the Capitanla general de Caracas o de
provinciaa de Venezuela had close to a million inhabitants
in 1801.
In 1823, however, he lists the population of
Venezuela as 785,000.
Ibid., V, 92.
^The Republic of Colombia had been created in December
of 1819 at the Congress of Angostura.
It included the former
Captaincy General of Venezuela and the former Viceroyalty of
N e w Granada.
The country was divided then into three main
departments, former main colonial divisionsi
Venezuela,
with its capital at Caracas; Quito (modern Ecuador), with
Quito as its capital; and Cundinamarca (modern Colombia),
with its capital at Bogotd.
In M a y of 1821 the fundamental
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In the n e w form of government, Caracas was selected
to be the capital of the department of Venezuela,
where the Captain General had resided previously.

the city
Many

foreigners came to Caracas then, particularly the English
and French.

Enamored of the nation's riches,

they e s t a b 

lished their residences and told their fellow countrymen
about the resources they found.

Among the prominent persons

we had among us then was the celebrated Joseph Lancaster,
who came to diffuse the benefits of his system of education.^
Despite the importance and popularity of Caracas and the
fact that it is located only a few miles from the p o r t of La
Guayra,

access to this capital was not easy at this time

law of the Congress of Angostura was fulfilled when the c o n 
stituent congress of Colombia met at Cdcuta.
This body
signed a constitution which designated Bogota as the p r o 
visional capital and divided the republic into seven d epart
ments.
Venezuela was divided into three departments!
Orinoco, Venezuela, and Zulia which comprised ten provinces.
N e w Granada was divided into four departments!
BoyacA,
Cundinamarca, Cauca, and Magdalena which comprised thirteen
provinces.
Henao and Arrubla, History of C o l o m b i a . 350-55.
Mordn, A History of V e n e z u e l a . 131-41.
^Joseph Lancaster, who h a d been born in London in 1778
and had developed a successful system of elementary education
for the children of the poor, came to Caracas, Venezuela
about 1811 with the express purpose of establishing his sys
t em for education.
Although the Lancasterian system demanded
very little in the way of equipment and supplies, it did
require "Monitors" to assist the master in teaching large
numbers.
There were few people in Venezuela at this time
capable of or willing to serve as monitors, and to this fact
"may be attributed the evanescent influence of the Lan c a s 
terian schools of Hispanic America."
Webster E. Browning,
"Joseph Lancaster, James Thomson, and the Lancasterian System
of Mutual Instruction, with Special Reference to Hispanic
America," Hispanic American Historical Review. IV (Baltimore,
February, 1921), 60.
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because of the mountains.

But today there is a regular h i g h 

w a y leading to the city which was built during m y admi n i s 
tration.
Another important city in the department was Puerto
Cabello.

Serving as Valencia's port,

it was destined to be

one of the leading market places of the country because of
its excellent bay which harbors all kinds of ships.
Angostura, heroic Angostura,

eighty-three leagues from

the sea, can ship all the riches from the Guayana provinces
on the Orinoco River.

She was and still is the capital of

this province under the name of Ciudad Bolivar.

The Apure,

swollen by the waters of other navigable rivers, brings to
the Orinoco all the riches of the llanos of the Barinas
Province and all that is sent by the cities of Guanare,
Araure,

San Carlos,

San Fernando de Apure,

and the province

of Casanare.
At this point it is easy to observe the need and
importance of establishing good communications between ports
and the interior, of opening good roads where there are none,
and of endeavoring to make our rivers the best means for the
defense and assistance of the coastal regions.

But even all

these advantages will be of no avail if we d o not attempt to
get all possible profit from the agricultural wealth that
the interior of our privileged territory possesses.

We must

introduce into our country all the industrial and artistic
improvements that are producing such good results in states
less favored by nature.

Ill
Let us pause for a moment here and discuss education
in the department of Venezuela.
the Revolution,

In the period preceeding

it was limited to that offered by the col

leges and universities in a plan of studies formulated by
the government of the mother country.^

Naturally,

Spain and

her representatives were very careful to limit the books
that entered the colonies to those that aimed at inspiring
in the youth of the territory the respect for all authority
that had been venerated through the ages.
authority,

Before this

they were to be humble and never to examine or

discuss anything that men had elevated to the stature of
dogma.

Despite this, Don Antonio Nariflo translated

Rousseau's Social Contract.5

This was a crime for which he

^Higher education during this period was provided
mainly by Chairs of Grammar, one of which was founded as
early as 1593 in Caracas by Philip II and another in 1608 by
Bishop Alciaga.
These chairs existed from then on in
Caracas and possibly in other towns.
The education consisted
of Latin, rhetoric, arithmetic, history, geography, divinity,
language, and literature.
This type of secondary education
was also given in church schools in the larger t o w n s . In the
eighteenth century schools were organized using textbooks
that were current in Madrid.
In 1673 the Seminary of Santa
Rosas was officially opened by Bishop Gonz&lez de Acuna, but
it was not until 1721 that it secured permission from the
King to become a University.
With the Pope's blessing in
1722, the University of Caracas became Royal and Pontifical.
Mordn, History of Venezuela. 81-83.
^Don Antonio Narino, born to a noble family in Santa
F6 in 1765, was treasurer of tithes, a very remunerative
office within the Spanish hierarchy.
In 1794, he became so
enamored of A History of the Constitutional Assembly of
F r a n c e , that he translated and printed that portion relating
to the Declaration of the Rights of Man.
This established
h i m as the Precursor of the revolution.
For this, also, he
was tried by the audiencia and sentenced in 1795 to ten
years imprisonment in Africa and perpetual exile from
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was locked up in the dungeon of Cartagena and later sent to
Spain.

All rigorous measures were to no avail,

m e n t began to spread.

for enlight-

Just h o w much progress was made, even

in the most difficult branches of administration and d i p l o 
macy,
ence.

cam be seen in all documents published after independ
N e w universities and colleges were established and

supported by a portion of the ecclesiastical wealth.
pictures,

and scientific apparatus were introduced.

Maps,
Finally,

m a n y schools following the Bell and Lancaster plan could be
counted in Colombia,

along with several colleges and u n i v e r 

sities .
There are many still alive today who witnessed the
establishment of the education system founded in Venezuela
by Senor Feliciano Montenegro.

Don Montenegro also gave our

country a wonderful treatise on geography which is still
consulted as a source of valuable data.

During m y presid e n c y

1 always tried to give my support and attention to the i n t e l 
lectual progress of youth.

For this reason 1 established

mathematics classes from which have emerged men who are

America.
Enroute to the African prison, Narino managed to
escape at C&diz.
He subsequently went to Paris, then London.
In 1797, using several disguises, he returned to his native
land and presented himself to the Viceroy.
He was arrested,
and in 1803, while still a prisoner, was sent to a house in
the country to recuperate from an illness.
The Spanish
revolution of 1810 led to his liberation, and when the inde
pendence movement started in South America, he was one of
its first advocates.
In 1822, he became Vice-President of
Colombia.
He died in Leiva in 1823.
Henao and Arrubla,
H i s t o r y of C o l o m b i a . 180-84.
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h o n o r i ng our country today.

I encouraged Senor [Rafael

Maria] Baralt to give the world his excellent history,

a

classic work that Spain does not fail to place among the
best works written in her language.
About 1823, naval schools of both a practical and
scientific nature were established in Cartagena and Guayaquil.
These were the principal naval stations in Colombia.

By then

the Republic could rely on a respectable armada capable of
antagonizing the Spanish even in the waters surrounding its
possessions in the Antilles.
Countries,

such as Venezuela, possessing long coastal

regions that are within easy access even for ocean-going
vessels and into which great navigable rivers empty, will
always be exposed to an easy invasion from any naval power.
This is true unless large sums of money are spent to c o m 
p l etely defend the coastal areas.

Venezuela is not rich

enough to defray the enormous expenses required by modern
artillery to protect its extensive shores.

But then no

European nor American nation is rich enough to maintain such
a long line of well-guarded and mounted fortifications.
Only a powerful squadron could prevent the disembarking of
an aggressive power.
There are other means of defending our territory from
an enemy invasion.

It is a very singular coincidence that

where Providence has led peoples of the Spanish race to live
in h o t climates,

it has also placed them in areas where

114
topografic accidents help immeasurably to defend their
nationalities.

During the time of Spanish domination,

forts

were constructed in some ports to push back the attacks of
the filibusters or buccaneers that would risk penetrating
their ships even as far as the heart of the bays of populous
cities.

When these fears were ended,

those forts were m a i n 

tained in order to enforce maritime ordinances and also to
threaten the people in case of armed insurrection.

But,

these forts could not protect all the shores effectively
when they were located great distances from one another.
All these forts fell successively to the patriots,

and with

them all the tools of war that the Spanish had in them for
safe-keeping.
After our independence was assured,

I was always of

the opinion that those fortified ports only occasioned u s e 
less expenses,

for it was necessary to maintain strong

garrisons in them.

Above all,

I considered them harmful in

cases of insurrection against the established government.
If the forts did not have a strong garrison,

there was the

risk that in a moment of surprise a mutinous crowd,

armed

only w i t h sticks and stones, could easily take possession
and gain strength, by using the government supplies stored
there.
After putting up all possible resistance on the coast,
there are three lines of defense left to us against an
invader.

We cam retire to the narrow mountain passages where

the European cannot take a step without struggling against
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great obstacles.

Or we can go to the jungles where each man

familiar with the terrain is worth many of his foreign
adversaries.

It would be advantageous to take howitzers

weighing nine and twelve arrobas6 to these points transporting
them on mules.
If we are forced to abandon this first line, we can go
to our plains, which are traversed by copious rivers and
channels that are very difficult to ford.

These are inhabited

by dangerous animals that terrify the foreigner who is
unaccustomed to seeing them and struggling with them in m i d 
stream as the llanero is.

This second line of defense is

the theater where the cavalry will play an important part.
The horses the enemy might have brought from his homeland
will be worthless when pitted against our cavalry.

That is,

of course, unless our horses have been rendered completely
useless in the ravines forming our first line of defense.
The third line of defense would be the immense u n i n 
habited territory that comprises a great part of the Republic.
This area is crossed by great rivers and is covered by
impenetrable jungles.

If all else were lost, the Venezuelan

can come forth from here to rout the enemy— an enemy greatly
weakened already by the attacks of our first two lines.

But

it is almost impossible for the enemy to reach this point.
However,

if he were to attain it, he would then need an

®One arroba is equivalent to approximately twentyfive pounds.
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extensive line of troops to cover his communications and to
prevent his retreat from being cut off,

and from being c o m 

p l etely routed by inferior numbers.
The climate is another one of the elements we rely on
in case of a foreign invasion,

for it is an American patriot

w ho will always help its children against the European
aggressor.

Add to this the inconveniences of our roads,

impassable during the rainy season; the insects; and even
the fruits which,

though a palatable gift of the natives,

are p oison to the foreigner seeking refreshment and no u r i s h 
ment from them.

Relying on all these factors,

need ever to risk a field battle.

The need,

there is no

instead,

is to

force the enemy to march time and again, never giving h i m a
place to rest.

This will reduce his numbers,

tire him,

and

get h i m in a lethargic state.
Our country is thus unconquerable.

But please do not

believe that because of this I do not approve of being aware
of the contingencies of war in peacetime.

I believe that

good armories should be built in different places to store
our tools of war safely rather than depositing these in the
coastal forts.

For example,

small island called

in Valencia Lake there is a

El B u r r o .

possessing luxuriant w o o d 

lands and good pastures and which belonged formerly to the
Marquis del T o r o . 7

It is the most suitable place to

7The Marquis del Toro was Francisco Rodriguez del Toro.
He tried to suppress the insurrections in Coro and Valencia
in 1806 and failed in both instances.
Lecuna, Crdnica
R a z o n a d a . I, xvi-xvii.
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establish a good armory and a military school.
young cadets could find recreation,

Here the

in addition to learning

and practice.
After these pages are written,

the experience of what

is happening now in the Pacific should serve as a lesson to
the republics on the Atlantic coast.®

It should make them

see the need for fortifying their most important ports if
they do not want the appearance of one lone enemy ship on
their coast to place them in difficult straits.
also try to train good sailors,
necessary,

They should

even in foreign schools if

in order not to have to rely on foreigners when it

becomes necessary to form a squadron.
I have wanted to delve into all these considerations
at this point to give an idea of the state of our country
and of the good things that Independence has produced.

How

much m y country could still profit if her sons would put
aside the hatreds and grudges that divide opinions,

and

decide to reap benefits from the many gifts with which
Heaven has blessed this interesting section of the American
Continent 1
No one is unaware of the fact that the first political
movements of the South Americans were in the beginning e x p r e s 
sions of loyalty and sympathy toward the mother country at a
time when her King was a prisoner on foreign soil and her

®PAez refers again to the War of the Quadruple
Alliance [Chile, Perti, Ecuador, Bolivia] vs. Spain.
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throne occupied by an intruder supported by French b a y o 
nets.9

While in Spain prominent m e n and distinguished

generals applauded the fall of the Bourbons and the rise of
a n e w dynasty,

and while the Spanish lieutenants in America

accepted in a ple a s e d and submissive manner the n e w order of
things,

the American people,

full of indignation,

refused to

abandon the cause of h i m whom they felt was their legitimate
monarch.

The juntas formed in various provinces of the

Peninsula sent their representatives to the colonies so that
the latter would recognize them as the supreme ruling
authority of Spain during the absence of the monarch.
colonies,

The

not k n o w i n g which of the representatives were

legitimate and afraid of falling into the m i s g o v e m m e n t and
anarchy that prevailed in Spain, believed themselves w i t h i n

9This alludes to the events that h a d occurred in Spain
in 1808 w h e n Napoleon Bonaparte, Emperor of France, under
the p r e text of stimulating the war with Portugal, asked and
secured permission from the w e a k Charles IV to send troops
across Spain in return for certain concessions wa n t e d by
Manuel Godoy, Charles I V 's favorite.
The Spanish people
realized the threat posed to their national independence b y
the presence of French troopst
so they rose against Godoy,
w h o m they considered Napoleon's agent.
Charles IV speedily
resigned then in favor of his son, Ferdinand VII.
When
Charles changed his mind subsequently about his abdication,
Ferdinand appealed to Napoleon.
Both monarchs then sped to
Bayonne, France for an interview w i t h Napoleon and set t l e 
ment of their claims.
Napoleon imprisoned them both there
and p l a c e d his brother, Joseph, on the Spanish throne.
The
colonists in America followed the example set by the
Spaniards in the peninsula and formed juntas declaring
loyalty to Ferdinand VII, not Charles IV.
Baralt and Diaz,
Readmen de la H i s t o r i a . I, 16-18.
Henao and Arrubla, H i s t o r y
o f C o l o m b i a . 189-90.
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their rights to create other juntas and assemblies until the
Spanish monarch was returned to the throne £rom which he had
been w rested so violently.

The intruder King, whose brother

h a d placed him on the throne of San Fernando,

also sent his

emissaries to America to demand colonial submission to His
a u t h o r i t y .^
With the legitimate King a prisoner,
progress,

a civil war in

and disagreements even among the provinces loyal

to the King,

there could not have been a more opportune time

for Americans to shake off the yoke of the mother country.
However,

the sentiment of loyalty to their monarch was still

considered one of their most sacred duties.

In July of 1808

w h e n a French ship arrived on the coast of Venezuela with
orders from King Joseph,

the indignation of the people of

Caracas was such that the captain of the ship,
being attacked,

afraid of

thought it prudent to raise anchor and

leave.11

lOThe reference here is once again to Joseph Bonaparte
whom Napoleon h a d placed on the Spanish throne.
In July of
1808 he sent Lt. Paul de Lamanon to inform the authorities in
Caracas of the events in Spain and to urge the Spanish C a p 
tain General Juan de Casas to recognize Joseph as King of
Spain.
He failed in his mission and was escorted back to the
port of La Guaira.
There he reembarked only to be captured
by the British frigate Acasta, captain Philip Beaver.
Mordn,
History of V e n e z u e l a . 97.
11The French ship mentioned here was the French
brigantine S e r p e n t . Actually the direct orders to anchor off
Venezuelan coast came from Victor Kugues, military commandant
of French G u i a n a . Caracciolo Parra-PArez, Hiatoria de la
Primera Republica de V e n e z u e l a . 2 vols. (Madrid, 1959), I,
195.
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Let us see h o w this event is d e s c r i b e d by Cap t a i n
[Philip] Beaver,

o f f i c e r in the E n g l i s h navy,

who brou g h t

the news of the h a p p e n i n g s at Bayonne to Venezuela.
O n e n t e r i n g the city, I o b s e r v e d a great agitation
a m o n g the people, an agitation such as is w o n t to p r e ceed or follow p o p u l a r mutinies.
W h e n I entered the
b i g inn of the city, I found m y s e l f surrounded b y all
classes of people.
1 d i s c o v e r e d then that the Fr e n c h
C a p t a i n that came y e s t e r d a y h a d b r o u g h t news of all
that h a d t r a n s p i r e d favorably for the French in Spain,
that he h a d announced the a s c e n d a n c y of J o s e p h B o n a 
p a r t e to the S p a n i s h throne, and that he had also
b r o u g h t orders from the French Emperor.
The city armed itself immediately.
T e n thousands
of h e r inhabitants surrounded the palace of the C a p 
tain General and asked that Fern a n d o VII be p r o c l a i m e d
king.
The C a p t a i n General p r o m i s e d to do this the
following day.
But the people w e r e still unsatisfied!
so that very after n o o n by means of hera l d s they p r o 
c l a i m e d h i m K i n g throughout the city w i t h the pro p e r
c e r e monies and p l a c e d his pic t u r e between the lights
in the C i t y H a l l gallery.
The French w e r e p u b l i c l y insulted in a cafe and
forced to leave.
In fact, the French C a p t a i n h a d to
leave Caracas secretly that v e r y night at 8t00 p.m.
e s c o r t e d by a d e t a c h m e n t of troops.
He barely m a n a g e d
to e scape w i t h his life, for about lOtOO p.m. the m o b
d e m a n d e d that the Governor del i v e r the Frenchman to
t h e m . 13
W h e n they di s c o v e r e d that he h a d left, three

12The British frigate A c a s t a h a d arrived in La G u aira
in J u l y also.
Its captain, Philip Beaver, h a d been c o m m a n d e d
b y V i c e - A d m i r a l A l e x a n d e r Cochrane, commander of the B r i t i s h
L e e w a r d Islands squadron, to inform the people of Caracas and
C u m a n A that the Spa n i s h p e o p l e on the p e n i n s u l a h a d risen
a g a i n s t the French.
He was to inform them also that the
F r e n c h g o v e r n m e n t in Spain was illegitimate, that a g o v e r n 
m e n t a l junta h a d been set u p in Seville, and that Engl a n d
was n o w Spain's a l l y against France, their common enemy.
C a p t a i n General Casas rece i v e d the Eng l i s h com m i s s i o n e r
r a t h e r coolly, for he was m o r e sympathetic to the French.
Ibid.
13

By Gove r n o r in this instance. C a p t a i n Beaver refers
to the C ap t a i n General, Juan de Casas.
Andres Bello, who
s e r v e d as interpreter for Lamanon and later was secretary
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h u ndred men began to search for h i m in order to
kill him.
Despite the fact that the Governor received me
coolly, the most respectable inhabitants of the city
surrounded me and acclaimed me their liberator.
They read the news that I had brought from Cadiz with
great interest and shouted out their gratitude toward
England.
At 5*00 p.m., when I returned to the Governor's
palace, I asked h i m to deliver the French schooner
or at least to let me capture it in the bay.
He
refused both demands and told me that he had issued
orders for its immediate departure.
1 told h i m that
1 had already taken measures to capture it if it left
port, and that if it were not controlled b y Spaniards
on my return to La Guayra, 1 would seize it.
He
responded that he would order the Commandant at the
square to fire on my ship if I attempted such a thing.
I replied then that he would be responsible for the
consequences.
I further added that the reception he
h a d given me was more like that given an enemy rather
them a friend, even when I brought h i m news that
hostilities between Great Britain and Spain h a d ceased.
1 pointed out that his conduct revealed his friendship
to the French even though it was evident that Spain
was at war with France.
He answered that he knew
nothing pertaining to the latter.
1 repeated it again
and asked h i m then if he did not consider the imprison
ment of the monarchs and occupation of Madrid as acts
of hostility indicative of war.
His reply was that
His Government had not communicated anything to hi m
about this war and that he did not consider the d i s 
patches I had brought as official.14

for a meeting called by Casas of the principal Spanish
officials, describes these events vividly.
Miguel Luis
Amun&tegui, Vida de Don Andrfes Bello (Santiago de Chile,
1882), 40-46.
l^rhia is taken from part of the letter that Captain
Philip Beaver wrote Admiral Alexander Cochrane from La Guaira,
July 19, 1808.
The entire letter m a y be found in Amun&tegui,
Vida de Don Andres Bello. 47-48.
Casas' pro-French feelings
were not completely without reason.
The Americans h a d a
voice in their government for the first time under the Bonap a rtist government, for the Spanish National Assembly that
was called included not only deputies from the Spanish
provinces, but also from the colonies.
Casas could not h e l p
but remember that in 1808 the Supreme Central Junta of
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When it was known that disorder still continued in
Spain,

the respectable citizens of Caracas went to the C a p 

tain General, Don J[uan] de Casas,

and asked that a junta

similar to the ones formed in Spain be established.
public official arrested them.

This

Fortunately, he was forced

to free them later by the power of public opinion.
In 1809 a junta was formed in Quito under the Presi
dency of the Marqu6s del S e l v a - A l e g r e .

The Viceroy of Santa

F£ w anted to oppose this, but consulted the influential
citizens of Bogota concerning the course he should p u r s u e .^
, All unanimously agreed that if the authority of the legiti
mate sovereigns was not quickly restored in Spain,
would follow Quito*s example.

Viceroy [Antonio] Amar [y

Borbon] who was opposed to these measures,
to write an opinion.

this city

asked each citizen

To further intimidate those who did

not agree with him, he ordered the city-guard troops to
patrol the weapons.

As if to further frighten the faithful

supporters of true authority, which included the most eminent
citizens,

the Viceroy decided to punish what he considered

an insubordination.

He joined the Viceroy of Peril and

Government set up in Aranjuez had two deputies from each
province in Spain but excluded the American ones.
Mordn,
History of V e n e z u e l a . 97-98.
l^pAez refers here to the Viceroy of Santa F6 or N e w
K i ngdom of Granada (a viceroyalty created in 1717), Antonio
Amar y Borbon.
He had arrived in Santa F6 with his wife in
1803 and had been received with enthusiasm.
Deaf and lacking
energy, he was a poor choice to rule the colony at this
critical period.
Henao and Arrubla, History of C o l o m b i a .
123, 187.
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marched with armed forces to dissolve the junta at Quito.
On August 2 of this year many of the members of the junta
were barbarously murdered in prison.

To punish the city,

Viceroy Amar then turned it over to the looting of the
soldiers.
Such atrocities were sufficient to cool the loyalty
of the Americans; but this sentiment was so deeply rooted in
their hearts,

that the victory at Talavera was not received

any less joyously in the colonies than in the P e n i n s u l a . ^
The Marqu£s de la Romana declared the Junta Central illegi
timate t

so its members had to take refuge in the Isle of

Le6n, one of the few spots not occupied by French troops.

*6The Viceroy of PerCt at this time was Jos6 Fernando
de Abascal y Sousa.
Occupying this post from 1806 through
1616, he wrote Memoria o Relacidn de Gobierno. 2 vols.
(edited by Vicente Rodriguez Casado and Jos6 Antonio Calderon
Quijano, publicaciones de Escuela de Estudios Hispano Ameri
c a n o s , Seville, 1944).
17

Parra-P6rez calls this "victory" an indecisive battle
which occurred in May of 1809, and did force the British to
retreat, but gave Wellesly the illustrious name of Wellington.
Historia de la Primera Republica. I, 253.
l®The Marquee de la Romana commanded fourteen or fif
teen thousand troops who were serving with the French armies
when the Spanish revolt against the French broke out in 1808.
With the aid of the British, he and his army "defected" to
Spain.
He fought in countless battles against the French.
After the Junta Central was banished, the regency of Spain
and the Indies, which was subsequently established, issued a
decree in February of 1810 advising the Americans to elect
deputies to the Spanish Cort6s on the basis of one for each
capital of a viceroyalty and one for the capital of each
Captaincy general.
William Francis Patrick Napier, History
of the War in the Peninsula and in the South of France from
the Year 1807 to the Year 1814. 5 vols. (Philadelphia, 1842),
I, 178-79.
Henao and Arrubla, History of Columbia. 193-94.
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There they formed a Regency consisting of five members.
It seemed, then,

that the colonies had no other alter

native but to recognize the sovereignty of the French or to
declare themselves completely independent while the King was
imprisoned in Bayonne.
two extremes,

While they hesitated between these

the Regency sent its representatives to the

colonies encouraging them to promote their own interests and
reminding them of the vexations to which they had been
subjected by the ambition and caprice of the governors.

They

said that the new government planned to end these evils soon.
In 1810 news was received in Caracas of the sad state
of the national cause in Spain.

The people knew that the

governors were determined to recognize any government in the
mother country rather than permit the Americans the right of
adopting measures which they considered revolutionary.

As a

result on April 19, they deposed the Captain General
[Vicente Emparan] in the name of the Catholic Monarch and
organized a junta to govern the country until the Spanish
throne was occupied again by its legitimate sovereigns.
Such measures alarmed the peninsulares residing in
America.

They began to manifest open opposition against the

*9The Captain General at this time was Vicente Emparan.
By this act of April 19, 1810, the town council of Caracas
was transformed into the government of the Venezuelan prov
inces.
It took the name of Supreme Junta for the Conserva
tion of the Rights of Ferdinand V I I . This occurred on a
Holy Thursday and is Venezuela*s First Independence Day.
Parra-P6rez, Historia de la Primera Repflblica. I, 267-78.
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creoles, whose loyalty they suspected now.

In Santa F6, a

Spaniard insulted an American with offensive words directed
against his countrymen.

As a result of this incident d i s 

turbances exploded between the two groups.

Parties were

then formed on both s i d e s .
These events were told to the government of the
mother country in an exaggerated manner by the governors of
the colony.

Undoubtedly for this reason,

the Regency a n s 

wered the official dispatches of the junta of Caracas by
publishing a decree on August 31, 1810,
city in a state of siege.

that declared the

In the decree,

the Regency accused

the city of wanting to declare itself independent from the
mother country under the false pretext of forming juntas
representing the monarchy.

The loyalty of the provinces of

Maracaibo and Coro was commended,

for they had not followed

the pernicious example of the insurgent capital.

The Regency

proposed to end these evils by rigorously punishing the
guilty unless they resorted to the amnesty offered them by
the clemency of the government.
Such language was equivalent to a declaration of war,
for it came from a gathering of individuals and not from the
monarchy— the monarchy whose authority and decrees the people
were accustomed to respecting without appeal.

The manifesto

in which Caracas explained the reasons that had prompted it
to take the measures termed revolutionary,

and which were

really only a loyal expression of the sentiments which
joined the colonies with the mother country,

could not
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placate the susceptibility of the Regency.

The Spanish

Cortes became indignant at the daring of the Americans.
of the deputies said:

One

"If the Americans complain of h a v i n g

been oppressed for about three hundred y e a r s , they shall
experience the same treatment for smother three thousand
years.”

"I am g l a d , ” said another after the victory of

Albufera [Albuera], "I am glad we triumphed because n o w we
will be able to send troops to quell the i n s u r g e n t s .
Deputy Alvarez from Toledo exclaimed:

And

"I do not k n o w to

what race of people those Americans belong."
Thus was loyalty paidl

This is the manner in which

appreciation of a generous people ready to sacrifice their
dearest interests was shown 1
insult with threat,
fire until arms,

It was necessary n o w to answer

and threat with a struggle of blood and

and arms alone, would decide where right

and reason lay.
The rigorous measures taken to intimidate the patriots
served only to exasperate the spirit of the colonists further
and separate them more from the mother country,
all bonds of fraternity.

even breaking

When the first juntas were formed,

no one thought of declaring independence from Spain.
ever,

How

the conduct of the ministers in Spain and of her

^°The victory at Albuera occurred in 1814 when the
combined British and Spanish forces defeated the French army
under Marshal Soult.
It was really a nominal victory, for
it occurred only because of S o u l t ’s error in judgment in
withdrawing, for in reality he h a d superior forces.
Napier,
War in the P e n i n s u l a . II, 328-40.
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representatives in America was such,

that it gave the c o l o 

nists the right to proclaim before the w o r l d that they desired
and deserved freedom,

even at the expense of life and p r o p 

erty.
The revolutionary movement started in Caracas,
July 5, 1811,

On

representatives from several Venezuelan p r o v 

inces drew up their Declaration of I n d e p e n d e n c e . ^

This set

an example that was quickly followed by the provinces of the
Viceroyalty of Santa F&, Mexico,

and later on, the provinces

of the Rio de la Plata region.
The Spanish Cortes became alarmed then and thought to
resort to conciliatory measures.

But it was too late.

Americans asked that they be given,
of October 15, 1809,

The

according to the decree

the same rights possessed by Spaniards

born on the Peninsula.

Among other rights,

these included

h aving representatives in the National Congress; opening the
doors to the products of allied and neutral nations; having
free commerce with Spain and the Asiatic colonies; abolishing
the monopolies that enriched the public treasury and the
King's coffers,

21

and reimbursing both b y levying new duties

This "second" declaration of independence came about
w h e n the Venezuelan Congress took measures which were incom
patible with the acceptance of the authority of Ferdinand or
any Spanish government.
The new country took the name of
the American Confederation of Venezuela and comprised the
united provinces of Caracas, CumanA, Barinas, Margarita,
Barcelona, MArida, and Trujillo.
Coro, Maracaibo, and
Guayana remained Royalist.
The seven stars in the Venezuelan
flag are for the first seven provinces mentioned.
Mordn,
History of V e n e z u e l a . 105-109.
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on the same articles;

and giving the Creoles the right to

hold civil, military and ecclesiastic offices on the same
basis as S p a n i a r d s .
The English, who in 1797 had encouraged the revolu
tionaries of Venezuela,
this occasion.22

declared themselves adversaries on

In 1810 Lord Liverpool ordered the Gover

nor of Curazao to interpose his good officers to help adjust
the differences between the malcontents and their governing
officials.

The government of Great Britain even offered its

mediation services,

encouraging the Americans to reconcile

with the mother country.
followingi

The terms they proposed were the

that hostilities between Spain and her colonies

cease; that general amnesty for all those involved in the
movement be granted;

that the Americans be given representa

tion in the Cort6s and freedom of commerce, with preference
to Spain; that the appointments of Viceroys and Governors be
made indiscriminately from both peninsulares and creoles;
that local autonomy be granted to the cabildos of m u n i c i p a l i 
ties, whose members should be both Spaniards and Hisp a n i c —
Americans;

that the colonists recognize the sovereignty of

the Cort£s as representative of Fernado VII.

These and other

22After the Treaty of San Ildefonso in 1796, Charles
IV declared war on England, attempting to reconquer Gibraltar
and Jamaica; consequently, England captured Trinidad in 1797
and allowed the Venezuelan revolutionaries to use it as a
base of operations.
However, in 1808 England reversed this
position after she had signed a new alliance with Spain.
Parra-P6rez, Historia de la Primera R e p u b l i c a . I, 253.
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propositions were rejected by the Cort6s who saw in them
only Great Britain's desire to prosper from the commerce of
the colonies.
O n July 24, the Junta de Comercio of C&diz replied to
the British by issuing a manifesto which saidt
Freedom of commerce with the American provinces
would be the greatest calamity that could befall
Spain.
Those who want to establish it are imposters
deserving an exemplary punishment and banishment for
life, since the fortune of Spain and its political
existence depend on the solution of this question, the
names of those who propose
such disastrous traffic
should be transmitted to posterity so that the latter
m ay view them with the deserved indignation.
The
Americans have not solicited the establishment of this
free commerce.
Instead, they have detested it as
prejudicial to their interests since Spain could
become the toy of foreigners, her commerce and m a n u 
facturing could be ruined, and all freedom lost.
Such
commerce is against all rights of religion, morality
and order.
Whether these propositions were of interest to Great
Britain or not,

the fact was that this nation, which had

previously supported [Francisco] Miranda, now not only showed
itself indifferent to the American cause,
to a certain extent.

but even hostile

This attitude was what was most suit

able n o w to her interests on the European continent stirred
up by Bonaparte.

Nevertheless,

the junta at Caracas c o m 

missioned Don Luis Ldpez Mdndez and Don SimOn Bolivar to
solicit its support,

just as it h a d named Don Tel6sforo Orea

to entreat the aid of the United States.
Since all efforts to bring help from some foreign
power were in vain,

the patriots n o w depended only on the

justice of their cause— a cause which they determined to

131
defend at all costs.

The Caracas junta deposed the Spanish

authorities and established itself as a legislative body
issuing decrees which revealed the progress of new ideas.
Following its example,

other juntas were formed in the rest

of the provinces except Maracaibo.
[Fernando] Miyares,

There the Governor

seized the deputies from the Caracas

junta and sent them as prisoners to Puerto Rico.
reward for these services,

As a

the Regency named him Captain

General of Venezuela and ordered h i m to adopt severe m e a 
sures to stifle the insurrection.
With the thought of opposing Governor Miyares and of
protecting the patriotic provinces,

the Caracas junta sent

troops under the command of Marques del Toro.

since the

peaceful negotiations that the latter proposed to Miyares
were in vain, hostilities broke out.

The Marqu6s entered

the province of Coro in November [1810].

However, he was

finally forced to evacuate it for fear of losing contact
w i t h his supply lines.

CHAPTER III
I Enlist in the Patriot Army— I Retire from
Military Service— The Spanish General [Antonio]
Tiscar Appoints me Cavalry Captain— I Flee and
Accept the Same Appointment in the Patriot Army
— The Battle at Suripa— The Troops Abandon M e —
Entrance in Canagua— Trip to Barinas— I am
Sentenced to Death— I Leave the Prison— I am
Arrested Again and Sentenced to Death for the
Second T i m e — "The Army of Spirits."
1810-1813
After the struggle against the mother country started,
forces began to arise in all parts of America to fight the
Spanish.

In 1810,

I was called into the service of the

patriot army for the first time, and I enlisted in the
cavalry squadron that Don Manuel Pulido commanded in Barinas.
I served for some time.

Three months before the occupation

of the country by the Spanish chief Don Domingo Monteverde,
I retired from the army with an indefinite leave.*

I had

attained the rank of first sergeant in 1813.
When Bolivar occupied Cticuta, the deputy police chief

^Don Domingo Monteverde became Captain General after
the destruction of the first republic in July, 1812.
In c o n 
trol of the area mainly because of Miranda's inactivity and
the impressions created by the great earthquake, he was over
confident when it came to his own abilities.
He ruthlessly
pursued the patriots.
He was so influenced by ignorant
favorites, that even the Royalists wanted revenge.
Lecuna,
Crdnica Razonada. I, 25.
132
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of CanaguA handed me an order from the Spanish General, Don
Antonio Tiscar,

in which he commanded me to go with thirty

men to the Carrao farm,

fifty leagues from Barinas.2

There

I was to round up all the tame horses and the largest cattle
in that farm and bring them to his general headquarters in
Barinas.

Although I was not a soldier in the Spanish army,

for remember I have said I h a d served in the ranks of the
patriots and was presently on leave,
order.

1 had to obey that

In the state of military oppression that the country

was in, any resistance to such orders was considered a crime,
regardless of whether it was given to a soldier or to a
civilian.
on me.

Thus I could not refuse the commission conferred

With the feelings of repulsion that were to be

expected,

I went to carry out the order.

I made an agreement

with the foreman of the farm not to take more than two h u n 
dred horses and only a thousand head of cattle out of the
fifteen thousand they had.

I returned to general h e a d 

quarters with these animals.
This time Tiscar recognized me.

He manifested such

deference to me that he even invited me to eat at his home.
There I found some other guests w h o were officers.

Tiscar

had recently imposed a forced contribution on the citizens
of Barinas.

Those who would not or could not pay it were

obliged to take arms.

In this manner he collected funds and

2Don Antonio Tiscar was Capit&n de fraoata and the
Spanish Commandant General of Barinas.
I b i d .. 32.
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augmented the ranks of his army in order to face Bolivar,
who was approaching with his forces from N e w Granada.
Wa n t i n g to find out h o w much I had to contribute directly
from Tiscar,
amount then.
me,

who constantly "courted” me,

1 asked him the

He replied that he wanted no contribution from

for he thought to assign me to military service with the

rank of cavalry captain.
True to his word, Tiscar sent orders for me to come
to his headquarters a month later.

He sent this dispatch b y

Lieutenant Montero, who also h a d orders to place at m y disposal a company of mounted m e n and whatever resources X
needed to get there.

Tiscar wanted to encounter Bolivart

so h e ordered me to join his forces immediately.

Montero

presented me with a c a p t a i n ’s commission and told me that
w ithin three days all would be ready for me to march and
join Tiscar.

Without accepting the commission,

I told him

that I had to go to m y farm first and make the necessary
arrangements.
return,

1 asked him to hold my commission until my

for I would be back in the appointed length of time.

However,

I h a d already decided not to serve in the Spanish

army and had resolved to search for the patriots and join
them.

I crossed the Pedraza mountains accompanied by Don

Antonio Maria FernAndez,

a proprietor of Barinas.

arrived at the town of Santa Barbara,

Whe n we

I found the patriot

Commander Manuel Pulido w h o had come from MArida with a few
troops.

I joined h i m immediately,

and we marched toward

Barinas over the same road that I had just traveled.

On
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reaching that city, we discovered that it had been evacuated
by the Spanish forces after General JosA FAlix Rivas had
defeated one of Tiscar's divisions in Niquitao.3
along with the rest of the Spanish army,
Nutrias and San Fernando de A p u r e .

Tiscar,

retreated towards

The Spanish Commander

[josA] Yaflez [y Tiscar] then left Guasdualito to join
T i s c a r .4
The government established by the patriots in Barinas
began to organize troops to operate in those areas,

for

Bolivar had left and gone towards Caracas with all his forces.
It was at this time that the Barinas government conferred

JosA FAlix Rivas or Ribas, named by Bolivar Mariscal
de C a m p o . was born in Caracas, on September 19, 1775.
He
belonged to a noble and rich family, and he was Bolivar's
uncle by marriage.
Embracing the revolutionary cause
immediately, he opposed the recognition of Joseph as King of
Spain on July 5, 1808.
He then became instrumental in asking
for the creation of the Junta of Caracas.
After the Junta
de Espana e Indias on January 22, 1809 declared the colonies
in America part of the Monarchy, Rivas was one of those
accompanying Bolivar to meet in Caracas with the royal c o m 
missioners, Carlos Montufar and Antonio Villavicencia.
Then
on H o l y Thursday, April 19, 1810 he participated in the acts
of imprisoning and deporting Captain General Emparan.
Rivas
worked ardently to help form the junta that m e t in Caracas
on March 2 of 1810 and for the declaration of independence
on July 5, 1811.
While at his hideout in T a m a n u c e , he was
surprised and killed by his enemies.
Then the head of this
illustrious Venezuelan was placed on a spike in a public
thoroughfare.
When his wife, Josefa Palacios, was informed
of his tragic end, she retired to her bedroom and stated
that she would remain there until the patriots brought her
news of the triumph of their cause.
Bolivar had the pleasure
of bringing his aunt this news after the Battle of Carabobo.
Scarpetta and Vergara, Diccionario B i o a r A f i c o . 516-18.
^Don JosA Yanez y Tiscar was the Spanish Commandant
General of the llanos in Apure.
Lecuna, Crdnica R a z o n a d a .
I, 12.
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the rank of captain in the patriot army on me aa recompense
for m y refusal of that same rank in the Spanish army.
I never served in the K i n g 1s t r o o p s .

It is very

probable that the erroneous supposition on the part of some
historians who say the contrary originated from the followingi
the aforementioned interview with Tiscar;

the issuance of

the commission which I have mentioned earlier;

and the ful

fillment of the order given me to round up cattle for the
Spanish, which I had to execute against my wishes.5
The patriots of Barinas occupied the cities of Nutrias
and A c h a g u a s .

The Spanish then set up their headquarters in

San Fernando de Apure.

In October of 1813,

General Yaflez

moved with strong cavalry and infantry divisions on Achaguas.
He attacked the island and set fire to part of the town.
Although the patriots did everything possible to maintain
their position,

they finally had to retreat toward Barinas.

Then Yaflez took possession of Nutrias.

While Yaflez was there,

I received orders to attack Commander Miguel Marcelino, who
occupied the parish of CanaguA, with a cavalry squadron of
four hundred horses.

I succeeded in finding him in the

Sabana de Suripa, where he had retreated.

At dawn I surprised

him in a place called “Las Matas Guerrereflas," and 1 sub
sequently defeated him.

I pursued h i m as far as the left

bank of the Apure River,

from where I returned to Barinas

5The historians the author refers to in this instance
undoubtedly must be Rafael Marla Baralt and JosA Manuel
Restrepo.
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with the prisoners we had taken.
A short distance from Suripa,

1 encountered a soldier

from m y squadron called Pedro Andueza whom I had left in
Barinas due to illness.

He brought me a letter from a

friend telling me that Yaiiez had occupied Barinas and that
the patriots had retired towards San Carlos.
unpleasant news,

In view of the

I decided to go to Guasdualito.

not maintain m y position there,

If I could

I would go to the province

of Casanare in Colombian territory.

The squadron acco m 

panying me was composed of citizens from CanaguA and other
nearby p o i n t s .
I did not have much confidence in the patriotism of
those m e n who accompanied me and who had enlisted solely
because they liked me.

Consequently,

I recommended urgently

to the soldier who brought me the letter not to reveal its
contents.

But he did not obey my order.

Because of this

and because of the flanking movement I started, which
abandoned the Barinas direction, my troops naturally became
suspicious.

Having spent the night in the Calzada farm,

started the march before dawn.
forced to stop.

After about a league,

I

I was

The repugnance of the troops toward c o n 

tinuing in that direction h a d not been kept from me.

The

n e w day had barely dawned when I told my companions what had
occurred at Barinas.

I let them know that since there was

no w a y of joining the forces that had left Barinas,

I had

decided to cross the Apure River by the pass at Palmarito
and head towards the province of Casanare.

I asked them to
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tell me frankly if they warnted to accompany me and conquer
the obstacles we might encounter on the way.

Some replied

that it seemed impossible to them to cross the Apure at the
point X suggested,

for there was an enemy force there that

had control of the s h i p s .

They added that they would retire

to their homes and hide in the forests until the patriot
troops returned.

Then they would rejoin the army.

With the

intent of finding out which ones I could depend on, I asked
those who wanted to stay to step forward.
this.

I found that only twenty,

Nearly all did

including both officers and

men, were ready to follow me.
Vexed, but not discouraged by this disappointment,
took the weapons of those who refused to accompany me.

I

Then

I continued m y march to the shore of the Cajaro River and
hid these weapons there.

We marched on, but stopped at the

Cerrito farm so that my companions could eat.

Here they

decided that they, too, wished to return to their homes.
The only one that stayed with me was an eighteen-year-old
youth called Jos6 FernAndez, brother of the man who had
crossed the Pedraza mountains with me.
young man became very despondent.
hunger, mosquitoes,

After four days, the

Unable to withstand the

and the rains, he surrendered to a

Spanish chief who had him shot a few days later.
I was alone then, wandering over those plains and
suffering every kind of privation.

What was even worse was

that I did not have anyone to communicate with,

for all the

inhabitants of the province of Barinas were fanatic Royalists.
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In a d d i t i o n , they were armed and were pursuing and killing
patriots or those w h o m they suspected were patriots.
M y fri e n d , Don Manuel Pacheco, was military commander
of CanaguA at the time.

I was also a relative of his, but

this did not stop h i m from pursuing me like an enemy.

One

d ay we had an interview a league from the town of CanaguA.
This came about when Pacheco sent a soldier for me.

I

replied that he must come alone if he wanted to talk to me.
He agreed and came immediately to the rendezvous.

He told

m e h o w m u c h he hated to see me in that predicament, but that
h e had to fulfill his duty.

After assuring me that the

Spanish authorities were sorry that I had taken up arms
against the King, he said he was certain that I would
receive good treatment and no attention paid to m y previous
conduct if I presented myself to them.

He concluded by

telling me that the Governor of Barinas was Don Jos6 Maria
Luzardo,

citizen of Maracaibo,

and a friend of mine.

This

was an additional guarantee I could rely on.
I conceived the plan then of joining the patriots that
w e r e in San Carlos.

To do this I would have to accept a

p a s s p o rt from Pacheco for Barinas.

There I would accept

another from Luzardo on the pretext of joining Yanez w h o was
in Guanare.

Thus I would be able to travel on the highway,

for it would be very dangerous to carry out m y plan if I used
another road without a passport.

I told Pacheco that £

accepted his proposition and that I would leave with h i m
immediately for CanaguA.

But he replied that it would be
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better to go the following day.

I followed his suggestion.

When I got to town I noticed that the street on which
Pacheco's and my house were located h a d a picket of about
thirty cavalrymen with Pacheco himself commanding.

I entered

m y house, dismounted, put away the loaded blunderbuss 1
carried,

and then went out in the street.

p icket detail sayingt

"Senores, here 1 am!

one you have been pursuing.
wreak on me,

I addressed the
I am the very

If you have any vengeance to

there could not be a better time for it.

Act as

you will."
"We have no vengeance to wreak on you," they answered.
"Long live the volunteer Jos6 Antonio P&ez."
Commander Pacheco approached and asked me for m y
sword.
tion,

I turned it over to h i m without the slightest o b j e c 
relying on the good faith he h a d promised me.

when I was gone from my house,
m y blunderbuss.

However,

Pacheco came and confiscated

I was so careful with this weapon,

that the

first thing I noticed when I returned was that it had d i s 
appeared.

I found out immediately through m y sister Luisa

that Commander Pacheco h a d taken it.

X went to his house

and asked h i m for a passport to go to the Governor of Barinas.
He told me that this was unnecessary,

for he himself would

accompany me on the journey when he went to take the picket
detail.

We agreed to leave at twelve noon.

ready to march,

I asked h i m for m y weapons.

in doubt about turning them over to me,

When we were
Since he seemed

I told hims

"You

cannot deprive me of m y weapons and take me as a prisoner in

the middle of t r o o p s ."
He r e p l i e d , "1 will confer with these people and see
if we can return your w e a p o n s . ”
Indignant at such proceedings and distrustful of
Pacheco now,
weapons.

I replied that I was determined to recover m y

Without further evasion,

Pacheco's house and seized them.

I immediately entered
I went out into the street,

and for one-half hour I tried to incite them.
told them,

"If you

want to take

Finally,

I

me as aprisoner without

arms, come and get t h e m . ”
Throughout all of this,
express myself in that manner,

Pacheco begged me not to
for such words jeopardized us

both and woul d gain nothing except to aggravate m y situation.
He was finally able to calm me.

He made me enter his house

and there assured m e that I would not be molested and that 1
could go to Barinas with my weapons.

But when he got outside

he told the men who made up the picket that they had seen h o w
1 had seized m y weapons and that he felt they should take
them from me.

A sergeant replied by saying that it was

their duty to do this and that he

(Pacheco) could count on

them to be faithful servants of the King.

Pacheco responded

to this by telling them that since I seemed ready to defend
myself to the last,

it would be best not to use force.

added that although force would gain the objective,
also result in the
to be crafty.

loss of some

They agreed

He

it would

lives. It would be better

on this.

After a short while

Pacheco came to tell me that he was ready to march to Barinas
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We got. under w a y accompanied by the picket.
At the pass of the Paguey River,
from Barinas,

six or eight leagues

I found Fray Sim6n Archila, priest of canaguA,

and a very good friend of mine.

He spoke to me secretly and

told me h o w sorry he was I had taken such a step,
Spaniards would rejoice in capturing me.

for the

He went on to tell

me that he knew the members of the picket well enough to k n o w
that they would be the first to accuse me on our arrival at
Barinas.

I informed him that 1 had presented myself solely

wi t h the object of joining the patriots sooner.
what he said, however,

In view of

I told h i m that I was going to demand

that Commander Pacheco order the picket to leave or I would
not continue.
thing,

Father Archila begged me not to do such a

for since Pacheco had seen us talking secretly,

it

wo u l d be very natural for him to attribute my decision to
his advice; consequently,

I agreed not to make the demand

until after we had gone further up the road.
We continued our march.

After we had walked about two

leagues, we stopped at the Espada farm in order to rest.
Then I approached the Commander.

Taking h i m aside,

I asked

h i m to do me the favor of ordering the picket to return,
I did not want to get to Barinas as a prisoner.

for

I added that

if he were truly interested in me, he would render me this
service.

At first he refused to comply,

alleging that he

carried the troops in order to present them to the military
governor.

However, when he observed my determination not to

continue with the picket, he acceded to m y wishes.

He told
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me then that he himself would have the pleasure of accom
panying me,

for he wanted to help me in Barinas.

After the picket h a d been dismissed,

the two of us

continued our march alone until we were close to the city.
"Friend," I told h i m then,

"we have come to the point where

you can lend me your good offices.

I want you to enter the

city and tell Governor Luzardo that I am here and that I
need a passport from h i m in order to continue to Yanez's
general headquarters.

1 rely on you to exert yourself in

obtaining it and bringing it to me yourself."

He offered to

do it and went on into the city.
After he had talked to the Governor, he returned with
a letter from the latter asking me to come talk to him.

He

told me not to be afraid of anything and not to doubt his
word and friendship,
guarantees.

for I would be given all the desirable

X decided to present myself before Luzardo, who

received me with many kindnesses and much affection.

He

informed me that m y trip to Yanez's headquarters did not
seem to be the right thing to do.

He felt that it would be

better for me to remain in his home until some encounter
between the two armies would indicate more clearly what m e a 
sure should be adopted.
ship,

Innocently trusting in his friend

I followed his advice.

Two hours had barely passed,

however, when he told me that it would be desirable for me
to pose for some three days as having been arrested.

This,

he said, was in order to avoid the censure of the Spaniards
there and to maintain appearances.

I submitted myself to the
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pretended arrest.
On the third day, when I expected to be freed,

the

Spanish Commander Antonio P£rez arrived with his cavalry
squadron.

He was immediately proclaimed Governor and C o m 

mandant of Arms of the province.

The act concluded,

Captain

Juan Rafarte came to the jail with a guard of lancers and
twenty-six pairs of shackles to put on the prisoners who
were there.

He ordered all the persons to appear in the

upper corridor of the jail.

When Lieutenant Pedro Garcia,

a

prisoner also, begged h i m to put the lightest shackles on
him, Rafarte became infuriated.
they had taken from Garcia away
himt

He took a blunderbuss that
from

his assistant and told

"This blunderbuss that you loaded in order to blow a

Spaniard's brains out shall serve to blow yours out.
shackles I

Light shackles 1

Light

What a fine kettle of fish!"

Unable to witness that stroke of weakness on the part
of m y comrade Garcia without indignation,
courage to the others,

and wishing to give

X said in a loud voicei

"As for me,

it does not matter if you put the heaviest shackles on me.
Put two pairs on if you like,
them."

for 1 am a man that can carry

On hearing this, Rafarte and the

officers looked at one another.

But

approached the pile of shackles and,
heaviest,

said to Rafartei

of h a ving these put on me."

other Spanish
I, serene and dauntless,

taking the largest and

"Senor Don Juan, do me the favor
W h o would believe that this act

of haughtiness failed to incur the anger of the Captain and
his comrades?

Well,

this is exactly what occurred.

Instead,
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with or without reason,

I won the favor of the officers, and

especially that of Rafarte.
X separated myself from the group of prisoners after
they had put on our shackles.
hall where they had lodged me.
began to sing in a low voice.

I went into the capitulary
Sitting on my hammock,

I

One of the officers who had

witnessed the event concerning the shackles and who had
curiously found out the identity of the hot-headed youth,
approached me and ordered me not to sing.
"Do you also want to tie my tongue?

"Why," I queried.

Aren't you satisfied

with the shackles you have put on me?"

The officer informed

me then that he was giving me a warning,

for the authorities

might think that I was mocking the prison.
the justice of such an observation,

Acknowledging

I stopped singing.

A few minutes later Rafarte came in and ordered me to
return to where they were shackling the men so that they
could exchange mine for lighter ones.

Mine were to be used

on Juancho Silva, a mulatto from Barinas of such extra
ordinary strength,

that he was wont to take a wild bull by

the horns and kill it with one blow.

Silva was also a very

honest proprietor and in favor of the independence cause.
They took my shackles then and put them on Silva, giving me
lighter ones.
interest in me.

From that moment on, Rafarte showed great
He even offered to interpose his good offices

with [Antonio] Puy so that he would pardon m y life.6

He

6The author is referring here to Colonel Antonio
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pointed out that it must be common knowledge that to be a
prisoner was equivalent to being condemned to death.
Two hours after Rafarte had shackled all the prisoners
the Spaniards were most interested in safeguarding, Puy
arrived with his secretary,

the ex-governor,

Celis, my friend and Luzardo's partner.

and Don Francisco

Puy ordered a table

to be placed in the center of the capitulary hall.

There he

questioned all the prisoners about their neighborhood,
reason for their imprisonment,
insurgent army.

and the rank they held in the

When my turn came, he asked me:

is Don JosA Antonio P&ez?"

the

"Your name

"Yes Sir," I answered.

addressed his secretary and told him:

Then he

"Put Don Jos6 Antonio

P&ez down as Captain."
Ex-governor Luzardo and Don Francisco Celis told Puy
that I was very honest.

He retorted,

the patriot and very brave,

"Yes, and very much

according to what they say.

Notice that his shackles are not well riveted.
escapes,” he told the jailer later,
off with this sword."

If he

"X will cut your head

As he said this, he touched the sword

he carried at his side.
An hour later, commander Ignacio Correa came with a
party of lancers, took out the list of prisoners, and
ordered the jailer to bring them to him.

Then he began

calling the names of those wham he had been ordered to put
in the death house.

I was fourth on the list of those

Puig, alias Antonio Puy.
He is described as a ruthless Cata
lan.
Lecuna, Crdnlca Razonada. X, 201-202.
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destined to die.

About three in the afternoon they locked

us up in a room where we stayed until twelve that night.
Correa returned at this time, accompanied by some unmounted
lancers.

They were to take us to the place where we were to

be executed by lance thrusts.

Some of us were not shackled.

Correa sent those who were shackled outside and ordered a
soldier to tie the rest with halters.
with shackles.

When I went outside,

I was one of the ones
1 missed my hat.

begged the Commander to let me go get it.
me in a burlesque tone,

I

But he answered

"You won't need it."

We marched toward the right shore of the Santo
Domingo River, which was very close to the city.

When we

were about a block from the plaza, one of Puy's adjutants
overtook us.

He gave Correa a secret order from Puy.

Then

Correa countermarched with his victims toward the Gover n o r 's
house.

There he locked us up in such a small room that we

hardly fit in it.

We spent the rest of the night without

being able to lie down nor even sit down for lack of space.
On the next day, when no one had heard anything about the
prisoners,

everyone believed we had been executed.

About H i 00 a.m. my wife, Senora Dominga Ortiz, who
had just arrived from CanaguA, went to Puy's house to find
out where 1 was.

She was bringing me a letter from the

priest of that parish,

Fray SimOn Archila.

In this letter

Fray Archila told me that my painful situation had come to
his attention,

and that he hoped the Spaniards would not act

cruelly against me, taking my honesty into consideration.
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Furthermore, he felt that my commitments were not of such a
grave nature as to warrant capital punishment.

When R. P.

Archila was writing that letter, he was unaware of m y true
position.^
My wife had gone first to the jail.

When she was

unable to get any news of me there, she thought it more
opportune to go to Puy's home.

There she was told I was in

the house by the corporal of the guard that watched us.
That same corporal told her that despite the fact that all
the prisoners were supposed to be held incommunicado, he
would open the door of the room where we were so that she
could see me a moment.
That good man carried out his word.

Unfortunately,

Puy himself stepped out at the time that my wife neared the
door of the room.

Because of this, she only had time to

give me the letter.

When Puy saw my wife near the room, he

offended and insulted her.

He then ordered her to leave

immediately and threatened to shoot the corporal four times.
This act, so very painful for me, made my situation unbear
able.

A moment later,

1 opened the letter.

not to tear it as I opened the seal,

I was careful

for I thought I would

give it to Puy if its contents were favorable and pretend
not to have read it.

As 1 have said before,

though,

the

letter spoke well of me, and 1 resolved to send it to Puy by
means of the corporal.

The corporal fulfilled his charge.

7R. P. means Reverendo Padre or Reverend Father.
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and Puy came immediately with his secretary.

He called me

and gave me the sealed letter so that 1 would read it aloud.
1 opened it and pretended not to be able to understand the
h a ndwriting easily.
have it read.

1 begged h i m to read it himself or to

He ordered the secretary to do so.

After the

letter was read, he took it and went away saying,

"This sly

p riest must be very patriotic."
About an hour later I went to the door to get some
water.

1 h a d the good fortune to be seen by Senor D. N.

Escutasol,

a merchant who was a very good friend of mine and

a m a n of great influence among the Spaniards.

He came close

to greet me and told me h o w sorry he was to see me in that
situation.

I called to his attention the fact that if he

p ut his influence into p l a y and offered the Spanish some
money, he could perhaps obtain my pardon.

He did this.

By

means of his determination and the support of Rafarte and
other persons,

Escutasol achieved the desired end.

One hour

later he returned and told me I would be pardoned for the
sum of three hundred p e s o s .

After showing Escutasol my

gratitude for the important service he had just rendered me,
1 begged h i m to serve as m y bondsman and get the money I
needed.

Although he excused himself from doing this p e r 

sonally, he offered to get me another bondsman.

True to his

word, he brought Don Cristobal Orzda, who bound himself to
answer for that sum.
Then I was transferred to the jail,
were removed.

and m y shackles

Chance would have it that while climbing the
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steps leading to the upstairs of that jail,
encounter Senor Marcos Ledn.
though advanced in years.

I should

He was a handsome individual,

He asked me several questions

regarding m y position and told me that the Governor had
summoned him.

As soon as Puy came, he ordered Ledn locked

up in the room where I had been and where my comrades still
were.

That very night they were all barbarously killed by

lance strokes,

Ledn included.

It seems that the unfortunate

man had gone to replace me.
When I went to Puy to arrange for the payment of my
pardon, he told me that it was not three hundred pesos, but
six hundred pesos instead.

Although this was double the

amount that he had previously ordered that I had to pay,

I

h a d no recourse but to give it to h i m if I wanted to remain
free.
Fifteen days after these events, on December 5, and
while I was in Barinas, one of Puy's assistants came and took
me to him.

Without giving me so m u c h as a glance, he asked

a soldier w h o had served under me, what numbers 1 had used to
attack Commander Marcelino in the Sabana de Suripa.

The

soldier answered that I haul used one hundred and fifty men.
Turning toward me, Puy asked me where the weapons belonging
to that column were.

When I started to utter the word

"sir" in order to answer him, he interrupted me brusquely.
He called Commander Correa, w h o m he always h a d at his side,
and told him*
him,

"Put h i m in jail, rivet a pair of shackles on

and put h i m in the death house."
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At 5sOO p.m.

I found myself in the same position from

w hich Providence h a d freed me fifteen days earlier.
U ndoubtedly the soldier had told Puy that I had disarmed the
column.

This had exasperated that monster.

m yself that m y last hour h a d arrived.

I convinced

The Spanish authori

ties h a d adopted the system of executing prisoners by lance
thrusts in the darkness of the night.

Dating from the time

that m y previous prison companions had been killed,

various

parties of prisoners had been sacrificed night after night.
Thus convinced that that very night I would be killed,
no longer relying on any possible aid,

and

1 gave in to a deep

sleep that I enjoyed uninterrupted until lltOO p.m.

At that

time I was awakened by shouts of "Long live the K i n g , " and
the noise of troops in the plaza.
m y mind.

Again,

A ray of hope penetrated

I entertained the idea of living.

violent reaction took place in me.
p a ssing from death into life.

A

It seemed that I was

A multitude of contradictory

thoughts accumulated in m y mind.

I thought I heard the

shouts and clamor of the patriot army,

and in m y heart I

felt the vehement desire to fly to its ranks.

Suddenly,

I

remembered that it was that same Commander Puy who, wh e n the
patriot forces that were retiring from Barinas approached,
had ordered the assassination of all the prisoners he had in
the Guanare jail.

(The only person who h a d escaped the rage

of that barbarian was SefSor Pedro Parra.

He h a d gotten the

fortunate idea of hiding behind the door of the jail when the
party of lancers came to carry out the sanguinary order.)
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This uncertainty between life and death, between hope and
fear, made m y situation unbearable.
The cause for all the movements was a rifle shot
heard in the direction of the river area.
sent with a picket to reconnoitre the area,

Correa, who was
informed the

Spanish that there was an infantry corps on the other side
of the river.
the plaza,

Puy became alarmed,

and ordered a new reconnoiseance.

this order, Correa called out,

"Who goes?"

he said later, he was answered by,
of Death."

assembled the troops in
While executing

According to what

"A free America,

soldier

Then Puy decided to go to San Fernando de Apure

on the CanaguA road.

His first thought was to have the

prisoners killed as he had done before in Guanare.

However,

he was seized by such terror at the thought that he might be
attacked by superior forces if he delayed any longer, that
he marched without ordering the slaughter of the prisoners.
He was anxious only to escape from the "soldiers of Death,"
for Correa had assured him that the moonlight had revealed
them to be very numerous.
This dreamed-up army was later called even by the
Spaniards themselves the "army of spirits."

It gave

occasion later also for the inhabitants of Barinas to tell
me in a joking tones

"You are such a lucky man that even the

blessed spirits favor you 1"
Puy continued his retreat up to Achaguas.
of Nutrias was also abandoned then.
troops.

The city

Barinas was left without

However, when the Spaniards retreated from here, an
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officer approached the jailer and entrusted h i m with the
care of the prisoners.

He threatened h i m with the loss of

h is own life if he opened even one cell.

He told h i m that

the forces were going out to reconnoitre near the city and
w o u l d return soon.

CHA P T E R IV
Condition of the Patriot Prisoners— M y Departure
from the Prison— I Free the Rest of the Prisoners
— I March In Search of P u y — Arrival at C a n a g u A —
Events that Had Transpired in that T o w n — Capture
of Several Indians— March to Barinas— I am Named
Governor and Commander of the Province— I Do Not
Ac c e p t — I Retire to the Calzada F a r m — Persecution
of Commander Marce l i n o — Flight.
1813
The prison at Barinas had one hundred and fifteen
individuals doomed to die in the still of night at the hands
o f Spanish executioners.

Arrested without any proof except

that submitted by mercenary informers,

and guilty only of

being sympathetic toward the independence cause,

they

remained in jail whatever period of time a barbarous c o m 
mander indicated.

They left that jail only when they were

led to the place of execution.

These were the methods that

had been adopted to terrorize the patriots and to strangle
the sentiments of freedom and independence.

However,

such

atrocities did little to extinguish these sentiments.1

^It seems necessary to mention here that 1813 was the
year for Bolivar's "Admirable c a m p a i g n ” during which, with
considerable aid from N e w Granada, Venezuela was wrested
from Spanish control once more and placed in patriot hands.
Beginning with the liberation of San Antonio de Tachir a in
March, Bolivar successively freed MArida, Trujillo,
154

155
Observing that the plaza had been left abandoned and
that the guard was not in s i g h t , I left the death house to
look for the jailer.

I begged h i m to remove m y shackles.

He did not yield to m y pleas, however,
to accompany him in his flight.

even when I offered

He was that afraid of the

threats that had been made to him.
Senor Orzda, came at that moment.

Fortunately my bondsman,
He, too, begged h i m to

free me and promised I would return if the Spanish army
returned.

Finally,

the jailer conceded.

dearly for this act of generosity,

He was to pa y

for I learned later that

he was sentenced to be run through.
After I got out of jail,

I went home to get my sword

and m y horse in order to free the other prisoners.
returning to the plaza,

On

the first thing I saw was the guard

Barquisimeto, Barinas, Valencia, and finally Caracas.
The
liberating army was at first composed of two divisions, one
under the N e w Granadan Colonel Manuel Castillo, and the other
u nder the Venezuelan Colonel Ribas.
Castillo was replaced
in command by Francisco de Paula Santander once inside
V enezuela after a disagreement with Bolivar.
Santander soon
h a d to return to N e w Granada because of the same reason.
The liberating army was reorganized in Venezuela
placing Atanasio Girardot in command of the first division
with Fausto D'Elhuyar as his second-in-command.
Ribas c o m 
m anded the rear guard, and Urdaneta became Bolivar's
s e c o n d -in-command.
The main battles were at Niquitao, where on July 2
Ribas defeated Colonel JosA Marti; Los Horcones, where Ribas
was again victorious; Taguanes, where Bolivar completely
defeated the Spanish on July 31.
In the eastern part of Venezuela, Santiago Marino,
along with Antonio JosA Sucre, Manuel Carlos Piar, and the
Bermeduz brothers, had forced the Spanish Generals JosA
TomAs Boves and Francisco TomAs Morales to retreat.
The
Oriental Provinces n o w recognized Marino as their Supreme
Chief.
For a more detailed account of this "Admirable C a m 
paign, " see Lecuna, Crdnica R a z o n a d a . I, 1-73.

X56
in front of Puy's home.

He asked me,

“W h o goes?"

“S p a i n , " I answered.
“W h o are you?" he asked then.
“And who are you?" X replied.
"The governor's guard."
"Well,

I am the devil who will soon come to take all

of you away."
I cried,

Pulling back as if I were going to join others,

"Forward!"

The guards had barely heard this when they abandoned
their posts and fled hurriedly.
Spaniards had left.
mounted.

They supposed that the

I went to the jail door then and d i s 

Without saying a word to the guard, who perhaps

took me to be a Spanish officer and consequently offered no
resistance,

I began to distribute saber blows.

with such fury,

I did this

that the mark of one of the many I gave is

still on one of the doors.
prised and terrified,

Most of the soldiers,

sur

threw themselves on the ground.

Finally all of them fled,

except for the jailer.

I ordered

h i m then immediately to open the cells where the one hundred
and fifteen victims were ready for the sacrifice.

X

threatened to run him through with my sword if he did not
comply with my order immediately.

The jailer refused

tenaciously until I threw myself on h i m and gave h i m a strong
blow with the sword.
this "argument."
him,

He decided to open the doors after

Xn fact,

such was the terror that seized

that he could not even put the k e y in the lock.

delay this produced filled me with anguish,

for X was

The
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anxious to leave as soon as possible and get to the horse 1
had left in the street.

All the doors were finally opened.

The shackled prisoners, without even waiting to have their
chains removed,

came out hurriedly,

each one seeking to hide

in the safest possible place.
The undertaking of freeing the prisoners was extremely
risky and rash,

for I h a d gone into the jail, which was sub

ject to the arrival of an enemy party.

The latter could

easily have taken me in that most dangerous place of such
fatal memories.

Despite this, however,

the male prisoners,

after 1 had freed

I freed the female prisoners also.

This act completed,

I went about the city inquiring

concerning the whereabouts of the enemy forces.
a.m.,

About 2x00

I found out from a woman that the enemy had taken the

road leading from Barinas to CanaguA.

Then X decided to

leave Barinas in disguise and join them,
k i l l i n g Puy before dawn.

for I was intent on

And X would have accomplished this,

too, had X been able to overtake them.
About 8x00 a.m.

X intercepted a lieutenant of the

Spanish army, Don Diego Ramirez,
felt such anger in m y heart,

near the Paguey River.

that I proposed to take revenge

on this person for all the insults X had received.
conversing with him,

I

While

the impetus to carry out m y project

accosted me several times.

However,

I desisted from this

act of vengeance when X recalled that Providence h a d just
spared my life a few hours earlier, perhaps as a sort of
recompense for never having committed acts of cruelty.

I
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tried,

then,

to remove this idea from m y mind,

and 1 asked

h i m several questions with regard to the possible reasons
why Puy had abandoned B a r i n a s .
satisfactorily,

But he could not answer me

for he said that he was completely confused

on the matter himself.
We continued our march together until 3:00 p.m. when
we arrived at Canagu&.

Puy had left with the infantry just

a few hours earlier, headed toward Nutrias or San Fernando.
He h a d ordered the cavalry to cross the Apure River at the
Quintero Pass.
Before Puy's departure he had forced all the families
A*

to leave town, except that of Senor Marcelino Carrizales.
M y sister Luisa was his housekeeper.

While the Spanish

officer was resting and my sister was preparing food for the
A*

two of us, Senor Escutasol, Commander Loyola,
European gentleman appeared.

and some other

They were surprised to see me,

for they thought that all the prisoners h a d been assassinated.
They could not imagine h o w I h a d escaped from Puy's claws
and had gotten to CanaguA ahead of them.

Nor could they

fathom, h o w I, after having suffered so much in his hands,
could place myself in danger of falling into them again.

1

told them that all their doubts would evaporate w h e n they
k n e w that m y motive for following Puy was to join his ranks
and kill h i m under cover of night.

I authorized them to

repeat all this and to add to it that I was determined to
fight and die on the battlefield before falling into his
hands alive again and becoming a toy of his diabolic
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pleasures.

I asked them to say that I found myself more

determined than ever to defend the independence and freedom
of m y country.
These gentlemen were retreating from Barinas and
following Puy's army.
to leave.

After they ate with me.

they prepared

Senor Escutasol asked me then to give him as much

money as I could spare,

for he had left Barinas so hurriedly

that he had been unable to take any money with him.
had was sixty pesos.

All 1

I kept one and gave him the rest.

At

the same time officer Ramirez approached me and told me that
he did not even have enough money to buy bread.
I could please help him with something.
peso 1 had kept and gave it to him.

He asked if

I pulled out the

I assured him that it

was all I had, and that I regretted not having more to offer
him.
They left after this, but not before advising me to
desist from my resolution,

for they were certain that

Royalist troops would return to Barinas very soon.

I was

left on those plains without being able to count on one
individual to accompany me,
of the King of Spain.

for all had pronounced in favor

Furthermore,

these people were armed

and defending this Monarch with an ardor worthy of a better
cause.
The following day I went to the place not very far
from CanaguA where I had my possessions.
there and returned to town.

I changed horses

When I entered my house,

encountered five of Yanez soldiers.

I

They immediately seized
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the reins of m y horse and asked me who I was and where I was
going.

I gave them a feigned name, and I assured them that

I was going to San Fernando de Apure to join Puy's army.
They doubted the veracity of my reply,

for they asked me why

1 had waited until that moment to march.

They demanded my

sword and warned me that I must remain with them as a
prisoner.

I told them that I was determined to die before

surrendering m y sword, but that 1 would follow them since I
was not familiar with the road.

Their leader retorted that

he was certain I not only knew the road, but was also a
citizen of the town.
acceded to my wishes.
find something to eat.

Despite this, however,

they finally

They eagerly asked me where they might
X responded pleasantly that I would

take them to a house that was inhabited,
that town had gone with the Spanish army.
the poor soldiers accepted the offer.

for all the rest of
Accosted by hunger,

We went to Senor

Carrizales's home where I gave them some trifles to eat and
whiskey to drink.
liquor,

When I saw them quite carried away by the

I tried to make them prisoners by means of deception.

I was successful in achieving this and in getting some com
panions at the same time.
All of these men did not have m y confidence.

But

there was a certain Rafael Toro among them, a lively and
arrogant youth, who commanded the others.
one side and said,

I called him to

"I like you quite a bit; therefore,

I am in a position to harm you and your companions,

though

I would

like to avoid it if you cam reward the confidence you have
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inspired in me with loyalty."

He responded that he, too,

had liked me very much, and that he was ready to offer me
his services for something useful.
"Well then," I told him,
Captain in the patriot army.

"understand that I am a

At the outskirts of this town

I have a company of mounted men.

If you want to remain with

me, you will have all the guarantees you want and m y esteem,
to b o o t ."
"Long live the Republic," answered Toro.

He wanted to

continue his "Long Lives," but I contained him.

I told him

that it was necessary to consult the opinion of his other
companions.
"They will do what I want," he replied.
the p a t r i a l

"Long live

You can rely on u s . " 2

All of the men did manifest a desire to accompany Toro
and continue under my orders, offering fidelity to the
patriot cause.

That night we all slept together.

following day, however,

On the

they began to distrust my position,

for not one man of the imaginary company had appeared.

It

would have been natural for at least one of them to come and
give me news or to receive orders.

I tried to convince them

that such a company did exist by telling them that my soldiers

2It seems apropos here to interject an observation
made by the historian and biographer, Salvador de Madariaga.
"These first campaigns had thrown up a number of factsi
the
first was that the Spanish hold of the country was precarious.
The second was that allegiance was just precarious either way,
for everybody wanted peace rather than the victory of this or
that side." Madariaga, Bolivar, 192.
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were recruits and that they made many mistakes, which we had
to overlook.
for riding,

I added that they liked to get fresh horses
and that I was certain they were engaged in that

task on the neighboring f a r m s .
Not knowing what to do in such a difficult position,
I went to the bank of the river near the town.

A moment

later I could distinguish eight Indians on the opposite bank,
who were coming from Palma and were armed with ar r o w s .
they were within hearing distance I called out,

When

"Who goes?"

"Spain," they answered.
I ordered them to cross the river.
using a canoe.

They did so,

When they jumped on land I ordered them,

brandishing m y sword, to throw down their arms immediately
if they did not want to be slashed to ribbons.
Indians, who did not expect such a welcome,
arms,

full of terror.

them on m y shoulders,

Those poor

threw down their

I bundled the bows and arrows, put
and herded the Indians up to the town.

I quartered them in a house next to mine.

When they di s 

covered later that no one was watching them, they escaped
that very night.
The following day at 6s00 a.m. Toro told me:

"Cap

tain, I do not believe you have such a company of men: but
since I have pledged m y word to accompany you faithfully in
the service of this country,

I am ready to do so if we leave

right n ow for the capital of Barinas.
we can find some patriots we can join.
to carry this out,

There we shall see if
If you are not ready

I want to leave with my men this minute."
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This vai precisely what I wanted,

for I was ready to

seize any opportunity to disengage my s e l f from the difficult
position £ was in.

It is needless to point out again that I

did not have such a company and that I had been accompanied
only by a youth of fifteen, called Jos6 Fera&ndez.
theless,

Never

I still calmly maintained that the company did not

present itself for the reasons I had given them previously.
I told them,

though,

that the idea of going to Barinas

definitely received my approval.
After we decided to march on and I had told them that
I w o u l d leave orders for m y company to follow, we set out
for Barinas.

At Totumal,

a "stop-over" town, three gentlemen,

Juan jos6 Osorio, Manuel Ocariz,
joined us.

and Julian Santamarla,

We arrived at Barinas the following day.

The

town received me with as m u c h joy as if I were leading a
column of troops.

Immediately a great number of citizens

gathered in the cabildo to name me Governor and Commandant
of Arms of the province.

Before the appointment was o f f i 

cially communicated to me, however,

I went before that

assembly and told the members that I had just found out they
ha d named me Governor and commandant of Arms.

I thanked

them for such an honorable charge, but I added that it was
m y d u t y to inform them of the province's state of affairs
and of the only condition under which I would accept the
a p p o i n tment.
"We do not have," I told them,

"the elements of war

necessary to defend the population and sustain the authority
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conferred on me.
patriot army,

F u r t h ermore, there is no news of the

although there are rumors that it has been the

victor in Araure.

Nevertheless,

if we remain in the p laza

until said army comes, or if we resist the Spanish if they
show up, you can count on my services.”
X saw later that these citizens did not have the
determination needed to carry out m y proposals

so I told

them that it would be better for all to stay quiet until
help came from the patriot troops.

In the meantime,

I would

move toward the interior of the plain to assemble more men
and then return later to aid and protect them.

The assembly

or junta decided to follow my advice, despite the fear they
harbored of the consequences they had exposed themselves to
b y the Imprudent step they h a d just taken.
Rafael Toro's resolution to march to Barinas h a d been
truly fortunate,

for the very night after we left CanaguA,

Commander Miguel Marcelino arrived with forty cavalrymen and
the determination to kill me.

Several citizens told me then

that he was not very far away and would soon overtake us.
With the seven men that accompanied me,

1 went to the

Calzada farm to get some horses for them.
misgivings,

Because of certain

I decided not to stay there to sleep, but went on

into the plains, half a league away.
me that I took this precaution.

It was very lucky for

Without it, I would have

been a victim of Marcelino and his companions that very
night,

for at 3s00 a.m. they circled the farmhouse.

were certain that they would find me there.

They

They asked the
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housekeeper a thousand questions.

she informed them that 1

had left to sleep on the plains, but that she could not tell
them the exact spot.

However,

probably return that very day,

she felt certain that 1would
for she had heard me say

I was only going to get some animals.

that

She added that my

companions had left some clothes to be washed.

Marcelino

decided then to hide his company in ambush in the "Mata de
Leon," a little more than a mile from the farm.
the exact spot we had to go by
Marcelino's plans would
tunately for me again,

This was

our own return.
have been fatal for me.

For

I heeded a foreboding that seized me

a mile before reaching the "Mata de Leon."

We were taking

about five hundred animals to corral and tame on that very
farm.

Following a secret instinct, however,

I told my com

panions that I felt certain that we would be assassinated if
we went to that farm— probably without even being able to
defend ourselves.

The enemy was bound to come at the very

time we were dismounted getting the horses.
1 was changing the plans.

Because of this,

We would tie the animals we

needed under a tree, a mile from the "Mata de Leon."

My men

kept trying to persuade me that it was better to go on to the
farm and tie the animals there.

They felt that it would be

impossible to tie them if they were not corraled.

This would

be especially true in the case of two wild horses whose
beauty excited the greed of all.

Luckily for me, the two

animals escaped just at the moment we were conferring.
companions finally decided to march to the place I had

My
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pointed out.

There I climbed a tree and started tieing up

the animals.
Despite the fact that our enemies must have seen that
we had changed direction,
ambush.

they still did not leave their

They probably thought that we would have to go to

the farm eventually to get the things we had left there.
From the tree,
terrain,

I was able to inspect a great deal of the

for the area was flat and very clear.

When I

finished rounding up the animals, I discovered about a
league away,

in a different direction from the one we would

have taken to reach the farm, some forms which were indis
tinguishable because of the distance.

Without even waiting

for some of my companions to finish mounting,

1 got on my

horse and shouted orders for them to follow me as soon as
they were mounted.

Then 1 left at a gallop, only to find a

few unarmed men leading a

herd

of cattle.

While I asked

them questions about Marcelino and his party, m y lieutenant,
Vicente Gallardo, had me observe that a cavalry troop was
coming out from the center of the "Mata de L e o n ."
toward the place indicated.

I turned

Then I asked the men that had

already joined me if they were ready to follow me and fight
until victory or death.
times,

I asked this same question three

and each time I received the same answer,

count on usl"

"You can

But I realized that we only had one rifle and

three lances and that the enemy had forty mens

so I told my

people that although I had confidence in them,

I did not

consider the place suited for any resistance.

I told them
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that we were too m u c h out in the open and could easily be
surrounded.

Consequently,

I thought it prudent to retreat

to the bank of the Cajaro River,

a league away,

and seek

support t h e r e .
They were easily convinced of the wisdom of my advice.
T h e y agreed that I should order the retreat.
was already very near.

But the enemy

When they saw us turn our backs,

believed it to be the opportune moment to attack us.
as the rear guard,

they

Acting

I turned m y face from time to time to

impose respect on those who were advancing on us.

Because

of this or because they saw that we were retreating orderly,
they did not attack us.
bank,

When m y comrades got to the river

they threw themselves

in, although it was very deep.

I, who followed as rear guard, was forced to do the same
thing in the midst of enemy firing.
risk jumping in the river,
very wide,

Our pursuers did not

for although this river was not

it was full of quicksand and ferocious animals,

such as man-eating alligators.

Furthermore,

since by then

w e h a d established ourselves firmly on the opposite shores,
they realized the great advantage o f our position.

They

stayed there while I headed out on another road in the d i r e c 
tion of the capital of Barinas.

There I had hopes of finding

some patriot troops.
An incident occurred then which,

although funny in

some circumstances, would have h a d fatal consequences for me
h a d it happened just a little earlier.
to me u p to that point started shaking.

M y horse,

so useful

He stopped and was
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unable to continue the inarch except a step at a time.
our pursuers had crossed the river,
fallen into their hands.

If

I would have undoubtedly

The fear that they could still do

this caused me quite a bit of anxiety.

Fortunately,

at that

time I saw a Negro at some distance who seemed to have a
good mount.
him.

Instantly I conceived the idea of taking it from

I ordered m y companions to continue the march,

and I

went on alone following the road the Negro had taken.

At

first that poor devil tried to change directions.

Finally

we had to meet and then I approached him to talk.

I asked

h i m several questions about things of little interest.
he least expected it, I jumped to the ground,
and secured the reins of his horse.
to the ground.

When

sword in hand,

The Negro then jumped

Without the slightest opposition, he left me

in possession of the animal.

I was able to continue my way

then in order to join my companions.
A little later,

I saw a man on horseback at a certain

distance who was galloping in the same direction we were,
one of m y companions recognized my old horse.

for

It seems my

horse had recovered his strength and was being ridden by the
same Negro whom I had just robbed.
Not very far away we discovered a group of cavalrymen.
We were afraid they might be enemies,
reconnoiter.
Tapia.

and I went ahead to

The cavalrymen turned out to be fanners of

They had become alarmed by the news the Negro had

given them of what had occurred to him.

They had come, with

the rest of the citizens of the town, to block the passage

169
of those they thought to be a party of bandits.
nizing us,

they put aside all fear.

On recog

They took us to their

homes and entertained us all with the greatest generosity.

CHAPTER V
[Ram<5n] Garcia de Sena Puts Me in Charge of the
Cavalry Under his Com m a n d — Treachery of this
Leader— My March Towards M d r i d a — Threats of the
Royalist [Bartolom^] Li z d n — I Ask [Juan Antonio]
Paredes for a Post— I Encounter the Royalists in
Estanques— My Reckless Fearlessness in the Mountain
Range Along the Road from Estanques to Bailadores—
M y Retreat to the City of M e r i d a — I Join General
[Rafael] U r d a n e t a ’s T r o o p s — My Disgust at an
Injustice that Commander Chavez Wanted to Perpe
trate Against M e — M y Plan to Take Possession of
the Territories of the Apure and Attract the
llaneros to M e — I Go On to Casanare and join
[Francisco] Olmedilla— Encounter with the Royalists
— Defeat of the Latter— Cruelty of Commander
[Fernando] Figueredo— M y Protest and Indignation.
1814
Far from my pursuers,

I continued the march up to

Barinas, where I arrived after traveling forty-eight hours.
The patriot commander Ramdn Garcia de Sena was there with
five hundred infantrymen

and

two hundred

in charge of the cavalry

and

ordered me to lead an excursion

u p to Guasdualito b y way of the towns of
Quintero.

I carried out

his

h o r s e s . 1He put me

canagud and

orders with

the speed demanded

1Ramdn Garcia de Sena was a colonel in the patriot
army.
He worked zealously to help form the revolutionary
junta of Barcelona in 1811.
He joined Bolivar to help
liberate the northern part of N e w Granada.
In the battle of
Cerritos Blancos he fought heroicly with inferior forces
against the Indian Reyes Vargas.
Scarpetta and Vergara,
Diccionario B i o q r & f i c a . 176-77.
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by the circumstances,

for the enemy army under Y a n e z 1s c o m 

m a n d was between the border of San Fernando and the city of
Nutrias, only three days march away.

Permit me to copy here

the account of the events that transpired later, which were
reported with sufficient accuracy in an article of the
Nacional of Caracas on August 12,

1838, number 124.

Under the orders of the aforementioned leader
(Garcia de S e n a ) , approximately nine hundred men were
gathered in Barinas at the beginning of the year 1814.
Among these men, there were about four hundred select,
well-mounted cavalrymen.
On the twelfth, the city was
beseiged by one thousand cavalrymen under the command
of Remigio Ramos and the Catalan, Puy.2 Among the
officers in Sena's army were the Sefiores Florencio
Palacios, Diego Ibarra, Ledn Ferrer, Rafael Rosales,
Francisco Conde, Jos6 Antonio P&ez, Francisco Olmedilla,
and Juan Jos6 Conde.
These patriot officers wanted
very much to go after the beseigers who h a d set fire to
the city even as far as a quarter of a mile from the
plaza.
But Sena would not allow this,
in fact, the
rumor began to spread in the army and among the citizens
that Garcia de Sena was trying to abandon the city.
Consequently, he found it necessary to present himself
before the army and swear repeatedly, even by the cross
on his sword, that this was not so.
He told them that
he would go out to fight the enemy and that, regardless
of the outcome, he would return to the city.
Trusting
in this solemn oath, almost three hundred of the most
distinguished citizens of Barinas, almost unarmed, c o n 
sented to guard the city.
On the afternoon of this day,
January 19, Garcia de Sena and his division left on the
M 6rida road.
On the first encounter, they defeated the
enemy, who fled heading toward Nutrias.
Our army was
not permitted to pursue them.
Instead, our men were
ordered to halt when they were within sight of the city.
Finally at night fall, they were ordered to march off
by files toward M6rida on the Barinas road.
They did
this without giving those who remained in the plaz a the
slightest warning, notwithstanding the fact that the

^Remigio Ramos was the Spanish Colonel in command of
a cavalry division in Apure and Barinas.
Lecuna, CrOnica
R a z o n a d a . I, 202, 223, 354, 361.
The Catalan Puy has been
previously identified.
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enemy was so terrified that they had not stopped
fleeing in two days.
On January 22 the people of
Barinas still believed that our army was pursuing the
enemy.
It was only when the city was beseiged the
next day that the treachery of Garcia de Sena became
known.
This one (Garcia de Sena) wanted at all cost to
join General [Rafael] Urdaneta's division, which was
in Barquisimeto.3 Then in order to whitewash his
black action, he tried to say that his cavalry was
betraying him.
He even pretended to fire on these

^General Rafael Urdaneta was born in Maracaibo in 1788.
He studied Latin and Philosophy in Caracas and Maracaibo.
In
1804 he went to Bogota to work with his uncle who was Contador Mayor del Tribunal de Cuentas.
In 1810 he became active
in the revolutionary movement and joined the battalion
"Patriots of Cundinamarca." In November of this year he was
placed in command of "Battalion No. 3 of the Union" and went
with Bolivar to Venezuela.
While serving under Colonel
Castillo he aided Bolivar in the defeat of Colonel Ramdn
Correa and was promoted to the rank of colonel.
He joined
Jos£ Fdlix Ribas and together they were victorious at
Niquitao.
He was defeated in Barquisimeto and Arao, but won
laurels with Bolivar at carabobo.
He led the retreat when
Boves defeated the Republic and reorganized the dispersed
troops.
By 1815 he had become a division general.
He went
to the Apure region and accepted P&ez as squadron commander.
In 1818 Bolivar appointed him Governor and Commandant General
of the Province of Caracas.
In 1819 he represented Barinas
at the Congress of Angostura.
Then Bolivar appointed him
Chief of Staff of the Army of the Apure.
He joined his
troops with the British Legion and the German Column.
In
1821 he was promoted to General in Chief and Commander in
Chief of the Military Department.
In 1822 he was Commandant
General of the Department of Cundinamarca.
From 1823 to
1824 Urdaneta served as President of the Senate of Gran
Colombia.
In 1826 he bitterly opposed P&ez's disobedience
to Colombian laws.
He became Colombia's Secretary of War
and Navy.
He voted against Bolivar's dictatorship and in
1830 was elected a member of the Congreso Admirable.
In 1831
he retired from public office only to return periodically to
serve his country.
He died in Paris in 1845 while serving
as Colombia's Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extra
ordinary to Spain.
D&vila, Diccionario Biocrr&fico, II, 3434 9 f Memoriae del General Rafael Urdaneta (Caracas, 1888),
11-15.
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men the first night of the march, after he had left
them as rear guard.
What signs of treason could a
cavalry troop that had just defeated the enemy and
marched towards M6rida possibly give? Perhaps they
might have spoken some words of reproof for a con
duct which was obviously treacherous, dishonest, and
prejudicial.
The fact was that this cavalry troop
obeyed as many orders as were given to it.
They were
even forced to go by Callejones, where nearly all the
horses perished.
As a result, very few of the cavalry
reached the town of Piedras.
There Garcia de Sena
told them to take whatever course they wanted.
From
here P&ez went on foot toward M£rida.
He was accom
panied lay Luciano Blasco, Jos€ Maria Olivera, and
Andrds Elorza, who later became a Colonel.
It was
also here that Garcia de Sena received an official
communication from the Governor and Commander of Arms
in M6rida, Juan Antonio Paredes, asking him for help.
Garcia de Sena sent him about one hundred infantrymen
led by Commander Frameisco Conde and went on to
Barquisimeto to the Trujillo r o a d . 4 T h e Goths then
took Barinas and assassinated its unarmed d e f e n d e r s . 5
Governor Paredes was in Lagunilla getting ready
to march toward Bailadores where the Goths had risen
up in arms and were threatening the capital. It was
there that Paredes received a relay sent by commander
[Bartolom6] Lizdn, who had joined the soldiers of
BailadoreB with his five hundred infantrymen.6 This

4commander Francisco Conde was born in Caracas in 1780.
He joined the revolutionary army in 1810 and served first
under Miranda and later Bolivar.
He went to N e w Granada with
Urdaneta and later fought with P&ez in Apure.
In 1818 he
became a C o l o n e l . In 1821 he served as Governor of Guayana
and in 1823 of Barinas.
He was named Intendant of the Depart
ment of Apure in 1825.
He died in 1842.
Divila, Diccionario
Bioqr&fico, I, 95-96.
5It is interesting to note that the Latin Americans,
particularly during the wars for independence, referred to
the Spaniards as crodos. or Goths.
This was a disparaging
term they used to remind the Spaniards of their barbaric
Visigothic ancestors, who had ruled most of Spain from 441
until the invasion of the Saracens under Tarik in 711.
Even
to this day, in some sections of Latin America the term godo
is used to denote someone cruel and unrefined.
Cunninghame
Graham, P S e z . 75.
®The Spanish Captain, BartOlome Lizdn, was able to
defeat Colonel Francisco Santander and his patriot forces on
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relay told of the surrender of MArida and announced
that Lizdn would come with a knife in one hand and
an olive branch in the o t h e r ♦ He threatened to
behead all the population and reduce the city to
aahea if even the loweat of his soldiera waa w o u n d e d .
By means of this relay it also became known that
Lizdn had stayed in Bailadores with three hundred
musketeers and then had advanced up to Estanques with
two hundred light infantry, and two artillery pieces,
under the command of Commander Matute.
Paredes
resolved to attack the latter before Lizdn joined
them.
In the meantime, PAez had asked Paredea for a
post, and the latter wanted to put him in charge of
a cavalry company.
However, PAez did not accept this
command, for he felt that the men of this company
were not well suited to serve in that capacity.
In
stead he preferred to serve as an assistant in the
small squadron led by Captain Antonio Ranjel.7
PAez
was on his own personal mount, an excellent horse he
had found in E g i d o .
Then the patriot forces marched from Lagunilla
toward Estanques, as the famous cacao plantation is
called.
The Goths were there when the patriots
arrived.
Some shooting occurred, and as a result the

October 12, 1814, in the plains of Carrillo.
This victory
placed the Spaniards in possession of Pamplona, the most
important city in the north of New Granada, and thus put them
in control of the valleys of Cticuta and to a certain extent
also, the province of MArida.
Baralt and Diaz, Readmen de
la H i s toria. II, 202.
^Colonel Antonio Ranjel was born in MArida on June
13, 1788.
He began his services for Colombian independence
dating from 1810 when he was in Venezuela.
In 1813 he moved
to Casanare where he had PAez under his command after the
latter's dispute with Commandant Chavez in Bailadores.
He
fought victoriously in Chire in 1815 and participated in the
action against Vicente Pena in Arauca.
In 1816 he fought
against the Royalist Colonel Francisco L6pez in the battle
at Palmarito.
In 1817 he was defeated in Nutrias by Reyes
Vargas.
In 1819 he returned to the llanos. After partici
pating in the Battle of Carabobo, he was ordered by Bolivar
to besiege Puerto Cabello.
He died of a fever while carry
ing out this order.
Scarpetta and Vergara, Diccionario
BiocfrAfico. 498-99.
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Goths retreated toward Bailadores and the patriots
took possession of that plantation.
The Goths
crossed the plantation grounds and later formed a
small column.
There Ranjel, PAez, and their fifteen
riflemen found them.
Some shots were exchanged.
Later Ranjel retreated with his men, despite the
fact that PAez insisted on staying.
Consequently,
PAez was the only one remaining to observe the Goths.
After Ranjel retreated, Matute's column marched
off by files in the direction of Bailadores along a
slope that in its widest section barely allowed the
soldiers to march more than in a single file.
PAez
followed the enemy and, observing that they could
not form to resist an attack, shouted "Long Live the
Patrial"
Simulating different voices, he shot
suddenly and killed the last sargeant in the rear
guard.
Frightened, the enemy forgot how to defend
itself.
PAez achieved an easy, though very impor
tant, victory.
Some of the enemy soldiers left the
road and found death in the precipices.
Others
trampled over their companions and presented better
and bigger targets for the bullets of the daring
champion.
Others threw themselves on the ground and
shouted for mercy.
Still others threw down their
arms and munitions.
They even abandoned their two
artillery pieces.
The only one who disputed this victory with his
life was a certain JosA Maria SAnchez, a man who was
greatly feared by the people of MArida.
He forced
PAez to get off his horse and engage in hand-to-hand
combat for the possession of his (PAez's) lance.
When PAez finally wrested it from SAnchez, all opposi
tion c e a s e d . 8
PAez then followed the enemy to where

®PAez states in his footnote to the abovet
"This
SAnchez was famous among the Royalists for his valor and
daring.
He was also greatly feared by the patriots of MArida.
It was said that in an encounter in the town of Lagunillas he
had dismounted a violento. or mountain cannon, and carried it
on his shoulders as if it were the lightest rifle made.
When
I was pursuing the terrified Royalists, SAnchez turned sud
denly and was successful in warding off the lance thrusts I
aimed at him with the short carbine he carried.
When he saw
that he could not use the firearm freely, he threw it on the
ground and grabbed my lance, intending to fight me for it.
Without letting my lance go, I threw myself off my horse.
Through a great effort, I was able to wrest the lance from
him and wound him mortally.
Seeing him stretched out on the
ground, I tried to take a handsome cartridge belt or
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the downgrade of the slope ended with a small river
called the San Pablo.
Matute arrived at Bailadores
with only twelve men.
The result of this heroic
action, in addition to destroying a strong enemy
column which left all its armaments, flag, baggage,
munitions, and artillery in our power, was that
Lizdn fled ashamedly toward Zulia.
He officially
communicated to Commander Briceno (alias Pacheco, el
C o t u d o ) , residing in Ouasdualito, that he was retreat
ing, for a cavalry column had destroyed two hundred
of his men.
When PAez returned, he found our army in the same
place where SAnchez lay dead.
The citizens of MArida
were there also.
They could not find words with which
to praise him for his victory and for, above all,
having ended the life of the monster, SAnchez.
Our
troops entered Bailadores on the following day.
The
Mac-Gregor division of New Granada arrived a little
later.9 Senores Concha, [Fernando] Serrano, and

muleteer's girdle that he had around his waist.
He broke out
in angry words, improper for the moment.
I exhorted him then
to die well, and I said the Apostles' Creed aloud, encourag
ing him to repeat it.
Fortunately for me, I turned my eyes
accidently and saw that, instead of accompanying me in my
prayers, he was unsheathing the dagger he had at his waist.
1 confess that my charity died completely, and my indignation
did not permit me to concern myself any longer with the
future of my adversary.
With one lance thrust, I freed him
from the anger that engulfed him even more than the blood he
was shedding.
After this encounter with SAnchez, I continued the
pursuit.
I took the eight Royalist artillerymen prisoners,
and I took possession of their flag and two cannons.
One of
the cannon was a gift from a lady of MArida, and her name
was inscribed over its mouth.
According to rumors, this was
the same cannon that SAnchez had carried from Lagunillas.
Later we lost this same artillery piece three times and
recovered it an equal number of times."
9The Mac-Gregor division was led by Gregory Mac Gregor,
descendant of an old Highland family.
In his youth he had
served in the British Army.
In 1811 he went to Caracas to
join the revolutionaries.
There he married a Venezuelan lady,
Dona Josefa Antonia Andrea de Xeres Aristeguieta y Lovera
Bolivar.
He became Colonel and Adjutant-General to Francisco
Miranda.
After the latter's fall, he served under Bolivar
with such distinction, that he was received into the order of
Libertadores in 1817.
In 1819 he and his men took Puerto
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[Francisco de Paula] Santander, who later figured as
leaders in Casanare and Guasdualito, were in this
d i v i s i o n . P A e z met them at this time.

Cabello, but were surprised by the enemies and forced to flee.
In 1621 he quit the Venezuelan service and settled on the
Mosquito Coast.
There he made himself Cacique of the Payais
Indians under the title of His Highness Gregor.
In 1839 he
petitioned the Venezuelan government to be reinstated in his
general's rank and pay.
His request was granted.
He d i e d a
few years later in Caracas.
Alfred Hasbrouck, Foreign
Legionaries in the Liberation of Spanish South America (New
York, 1928), 25, 26, 154-58; Cunninghame Graham, P A e z . 96.
^■°No additional information could be found on Senor
Concha.
Fernando Serrano was the colonel whose forces, p u r 
sued by Morillo's troops, had crossed from N e w Granada to
Venezuela.
He participated in a junta of a small group of
lawyers and chieftains who decided to set up their own g o v e r n 
ment.
This junta had appointed Serrano as Supreme Chief,
Francisco Yafles as Minister of State, and Colonel Francisco
de Paula Santander as commander of the troops.
PAez was
called before this group and acquiesced in all these appoint
m e n t s — probably tongue in cheek.
However, when PAez returned
from the horse-catching expedition Santander had sent h i m on,
his troops had "mutinied" and insisted that he dissolve this
government and take both civil and military command.
PAez
obliged his troops in September of 1816.
Madariaga, B o l i v a r .
294.
Francisco de Paula Santander was born in April, 1792
in Cticuta. When the revolution broke out, he was a student
at the College of Sam BartolomA at Santa FA where he was
studying law.
He was barely eighteen when he took u p arms
against Spain.
In 1810, he was banner-bearer of the national
guards and adjutant of the military commander at Marquita.
A
soldier of the federation, he was made prisoner by Nariflo in
1812.
After his retreat to Casanare, he fought in the V e n e 
zuelan campaigns and attained the rank of brigadier general.
Bolivar, an excellent judge of men, selected h i m as the m o s t
capable Granadine to organize and lead the invasion of N e w
Granada after the Royalists had regained control there in
1816*
He became famous for his heroism in the Battle of
BoyacA in 1819 in which the Spanish were defeated.
In 1819
also he was named Vice-President of N e w Granada, with the
special commission of directing the war in the liberated p r o v 
inces while Bolivar went off to conduct the war in Ecuador
and Perd.
When Bolivar accepted dictatorial powers in 1828,
Santander openly opposed the dictatorship and became Bolivar's
chief rival.
That same year he was banished from Colombia on
the grounds of suspicion of having participated in a con
spiracy to take Bolivar's life.
H e was traveling in Europe
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After the action at Bailadores, I stayed in Mdrida
until the middle of the year 1814 when Urdaneta arrived on
his way out of Venezuela.11

He incorporated me in his

troops, giving me command of a cavalry company that I myself
had organized in M6rida.

This company was composed of all

those llaneros that Garcia de Sena had cast aside.
on to take part in the Battle of Mucuchies.

I went

However,

I never

entered the action because a mile before getting to the
battlefield, Urdaneta discovered that Barlovento's battalion

when Bolivar died and later when the Republic of Gram Colom
bia was being dismembered.
The Republic of New Granada
which was subsequently organized elected Santander its first
President in 1832.
Henao and Arrubla, History of Colombia.
309-25, 393-404, 435-39.
11The year 1814 was militarily disastrous for Vene
zuela, for all that had been accomplished in the brief but
memorable campaign of 1813 was undone.
The reverses were
caused mainly by the rise of a new Royalist leader, Jos4
Tom&s Boves.
He defeated Vicente Campo Elias at La Puerta
on February 3. Boves then advanced toward Aragua while
Bolivar marched from Caracas to Valencia in order to face
him.
They fought a battle on February 26 and another on
March 24.
Then Boves was forced to face Marino, who was
coming up from Aragua de Barcelona.
Marino defeated Boves
at Bocachica.
Boves then retreated toward Calabozo, p u r 
sued by Bolivar.
At this point Ceballos had to lift his
siege of General Urdaneta in Valencia.
While Generals Jos6
Ceballos and Juan Manuel de Cajigal, who came to reinforce
Ceballos, were being defeated by Bolivar at Carabobo on May
28, Urdaneta was "saving the army of Caracas" by marching it
to Cticuta.
It was now that P&ez joined Urdaneta.
The rest of 1814 went as badly for the patriots.
Boves recovered enough from Carabobo to defeat the combined
forces of Bolivar and Marino at the second battle of La
Puerta.
By July 16, Boves was in Caracas and had set up a
dictatorship even more severe than that of Monteverde.
At
Aragua de Barcelona Bolivar's forces were wiped out by
Morales.
Bolivar escaped and sailed to Cartagena.
Lemly,
Bolivar. 63-101; Madariaga, Bolivar. 241-42; Mordn, History
of Venezuela, 118-19.
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had been defeated.

This battalion had been ordered by

Urdaneta to remain where they were until he arrived with the
rest of the troops, composed of battalions from Valencia,
Guaira, and seventy cavalrymen under m y command.

Urdaneta

had to protect Barlovento from the enemy, who was pursuing
him before his very eyes.

Consequently, he did not want to

enter the battle, but instead countermarched immediately to
M6rida in order to begin his retreat to N e w Granada.
In Bailadores,

X left Urdaneta because the cavalry

Commandant General Chavez,
it to another officer.

decided to take m y horse and give

I objected to this injustice until I

was finally forced to yield purely for reasons of military
discipline.

Nevertheless,

I was so disgusted,

that I decided

to leave and carry out the resolution I had made in MArida
to go to the plains of Casanare and begin operations against
Venezuela.

X wanted to take possession of the Apure terri

tory and of the very men who had destroyed the patriots under
the orders of [JosA TomAs] Boves,
~
12
Yanez.

[josA] Ceballos,

and

Everyone I told about m y project thought I was

^^Boves was born JosA TamAs Rodriguez in Jijdn in the
province of Asturias, Spain.
He had been a pilot's appren
tice by profession.
Convicted of piracy, he was condemned
to eight years' imprisonment in Puerto Cabello.
A Spanish
mercantile family by the name of Jovei succeeded in getting
this sentence commuted to confinement and exile in Calabozo.
Here he dedicated himself for some time to the business of
being a merchant.
(By this time he had changed his name to
Boves, either out of gratitude for his benefactors or out of
embarrassment for his own.)
His business now took him to
the various little towns and hamlets in the llanos where he
purchased the “fruits of the country"— cheeses, hides,

leo
delirious.

They could not see how the llaneroa. who had

shown themselves to be so enthusiastic for the cause of the

feathers, and furs.
It was during this time that he learned
to be the consummate horseman his future exploits proved him
to be.
It was even more important that during this time he
became popular with the llaneros. A contemporary described
him then as fair, with blue eyes, of medium height, and
capable of expressing both great energy and cruelty.
When the revolution broke out in 1810, Boves joined
the patriots enthusiastically, serving under the orders of
Juan Escalona.
When the latter struck him when he refused
to do the duty of a common soldier, Boves deserted and joined
the Royalists under Monteverde.
He soon rose to be a c a p 
tain in the Royalist ranks.
When the Spanish General Cajigal
evacuated the town of Barcelona in 1813, he left Boves and
his lieutenant Francisco Tom&s Morales his ammunition and
arms.
At this point, Boves, taking advantage of his kn o w l 
edge of the llanos and its inhabitants, retired to the llanos
and raised a large army, partly by promising the plunder of
the towns as reward.
Boves called this force the Infernal
Legion.
(At this same time another Spaniard, Yafiez, was
raising a second army of llaneroa on the plains of Apure.)
In October of 1813, Boves was defeated by another Spaniard,
Vicente Campo Elias, who was serving the patriot cause, at
La Sabana de Mosquitero.
When Campo Elias celebrated his
victory by cutting the throats of one-half of the inhabitants
of Calabozo, the llaneros flocked by the hundreds to join
Boves, most anxious for revenge.
Boves then found himself at
the head of an army of seven thousand and marched victori
ously on Ocumare.
After his victory over Bolivar at La
Puerta, Boves swept onward like a prairie fire, destroying
everything and murdering all prisoners.
His cruelty seemed
to grow.
He bound his followers, who were mainly of mixed
blood, closer to him by declaring war and death on all
w h i t e s — this despite the fact that he was white himself.
He
defeated Bolivar again in the second battle of La Puerta.
Fortunately for the patriots, Boves was killed in battle in
December of 1814.
B o v e s ’ bloodthirstiness and excessive cruelty have
become legendary and caused him to be known as another
Atila, the Hun.
Despite these traits and his great personal
ambition, Boves unintentionally made two great contributions
to the patriot cause.
First of all, he organized the
llaneros not only into a cavalry unit, but also into a con
scious group with a collective spirit ready for a leader such
as JosA Antonio PAez.
Secondly, he established a social
democracy in his forces, freeing slaves and promoting mixed
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Spanish Monarch and who had committed themselves so deeply
in the fight against the p a t r i o t s , could change and decide
to defend the patriot cause. If 1 were unable to change their
loyalty, everyone also felt that I would find it difficult
to defeat them in the battles which would necessarily follow,
for they were superior in numbers and horses.
Despite the logic of these objections,

I left

Bailadores for the Casanare plains without a passport from
Urdaneta, but still with the firm determination to carry out
m y plan.

In fact, m y resolution was so firm, that I refused

the command of a cavalry regiment that Garcia Rubira offered
me when I went through N e w Granada.

Defying a thousand

difficulties and traveling on foot the greater part of the
way,

I was able to cross the Andes and arrive at the Casanare

plains accompanied by m y family and some Venezuelans.

I had

been forced to resort to selling several personal objects in
order to provide a meager subsistence for us.
When we arrived at Pore, the capital of casanare,

I

breeds to high military rank— practices unknown in 1814.
Cunninghame Graham, P A e z . 64-66, 66-67, 69-70, 70-71.
Juan
Uslar Pietri, Historia de la Rebelion Popular de 1814
(Caracas, 1962), 83-115.
Montafio Valdivieso, JosA TomAs
Boves (Caracas, 1931), 1-147.
JosA ceballos was the military commander of Coro who
opposed the independence movement in Caracas in 1810.
He
ordered Monteverde to begin his offensive against the
patriots from Coro.
As mentioned earlier, he had beseiged
Urdaneta's army in Valencia and was defeated by Bolivar at
Carabobo in 1814. Mordn, History of Venezuela. 108, 109,
118, 119.
General JosA Yafiez y Tiscar has been previously
identified.
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went to see the Venezuelan commander, Francisco

O l m e d i l l a . 1 ^

He had been appointed Commander-in-chief by the Casanare
government.

Olmedilla and the government welcomed me enthus

iastically.

They facilitated funds and proved so eager to

help me with my plans,

that within three days I was able to

be in the town of Betoye at the head of a cavalry regiment.
Several Venezuelan officers who were there without a post
joined me.

Soon we had a cavalry corps of more than a

thousand men.

Then we started the march to Venezuela on

October 10, 1814.
Under Olmedilla's command,

our division crossed the

deserts of the plains of Larenas in order not to be seen by
the enemy.
day.

We only marched at night and rested during the

We swam across the Arauca River, carrying out weapons

and saddles over our heads.

I carried the weapons and

saddles of those who did not know how to swim in this manner
in cow-hide boats.

Thanks to these precautions, we were

13Francisco de Olmedilla joined the revolutionary
movement.,in 1810.
The Governor of Barinas then, Manuel A.
P. Briceno, placed him in comm am d of a cavalry detachment.
From 1812 until 1813 he was in exile during Monteverde's rule.
He joined Bricefio again in 1813 and fought against the Royal
ists in Berinas.
He joined the Liberator in the Declaration
of 1813 and fought with him in Araure.
He returned to Barinas
with Garcia de Sena when Governor Briceno resigned his post
after a disagreement with Bolivar over governmental princi
ples.
After the siege of Barinas in 1814, he emigrated to
N e w Granada.
He went from casanare in Arauca and in 1615
defeated Colonel Miguel Bricefio Pacheco in Guasdualito.
Olmedilla fell into Brigadier Calzada's hands in Pore in 1816.
DAvila, Diccionario BiogrAfico. II, 27-28.
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able to arrive at the village of Guasdualito at 4t00 a.m. on
January 29 without having been discovered by the enemy.
There were about eight hundred Royalists t h e r e , counting
both cavalrymen and unmounted dragoons on g a r r i s o n , under
the command of Commander Pacheco Briceno,

nicknamed el cotudo.

Our division was organized in three columns.
column,

I led the first

and we were placed on the road leading away from

Guasdualito and into the interior of Venezuela and San Camila.
The second column flanked the town, while the third was
situated across from where I was.
Before dawn, Olmedilla imprudently ordered a cannon
blast and the sounding of reveille.
they were surrounded.
in the plaza.
suddenly.

This let the enemy know

They formed full strength in a column

Then they marched to where I was and attacked

It was so dark,

that we failed to see the enemy

forces until they started firing at close range on one of
the squadrons that was at the front of the street where they
were heading.
this line.

Consequently,

Unwittingly,

they were able to break through

the enemy failed to notice that

there was another squadron on the left flank,

for I ha d

established a hammer formation— the only one permitted by
the terrain.

Suddenly

this squadron, which I was leading,

attacked the enemy from behind.

Despite the many efforts of

the Spanish Commander,

the enemy was completely defeated in

this one lone charge.

Very few of the soldiers escaped

death or being taken prisoner.

There were more than two

hundred dead and wounded left on the battlefield,

and

184
twenty-eight m e n were taken prisoners.

The enemy then tried

to take the road called "Manga," which goes out to the
valleys of cdcuta,

for they were attempting to seek refuge

with General [Sebastian de la] Calzada who h a d marched the
previous day with fifteen hundred men from Guasdualito to
invade those v a l l e y s . ^

<phe routed enemy was fleeing in the

area between the town and the Apure River, one league away.
A m o n g them were Commander Manuel Maria MarchAn, Captains
Francisco Guerrero and JosA Ricaurte,

and other officers.

Well-mounted,

these men h a d been able to withdraw from the

battlefield.

I followed them very closely.

When they reached the shore of the Apure River,
men went separate ways.

these

Three of them went into the forest.

Two of them stopped and threw down their swords.

Commander

MarchAn and Captains Guerrero and Ricaurte hurled themselves
in the river with their horses.
river also.

I hurled myself in the

Guerrero and Ricaurte came out on the opposite

shore and left their command behind.
letter's retreat,

X interrupted the

for I got to land before him.

the river bank for h i m and let the other two go.

I waited on
As soon as

^ G e n e r a l SebastiAn de la Calzada was a Spaniard of
humble birth and education who had served in the Queen's
battalion in 1810.
He succeeded General Yanez in command of
the Spanish forces after the l a t t e r 1s death in battle in
1814.
Although Calzada was generally considered little more
than a guerilla chieftain, he still refused to yield to
Morales's order to surrender Puerto Cabello in 1822 after the
capitulation order h a d been signed.
He fought bravely to
defend Puerto cabello, but lost to PAez.
Cunninghame Graham,
P A e z , 85, 92, 203-209; Madariara, B o l i v a r . 303-304.
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MarchAn's horse set foot on land,

1 ordered h i m to surrender.

He did this without any opposition,
his life.

I told h i m I would and ordered h i m to come out of

the river.

I was astonished that this man, who was riding

such a famous horse,
escape.

but begged me to spare

did not have the determination to

I was also astonished that he did not have the

courage to attack me, particularly when he saw that I could
not receive help from my people.
MarchAn agreed to cross the river with me again.
the opposite bank,

On

I found that my troops had destroyed the

crews of two Royalists boats.

I organized m y people then

and w e n t to Olmedilla with two hundred and twenty-eight
prisoners.

When 1 finished giving h i m the account of the

battle, which h a d ended so happily,

I told h i m that 1 had

offered to spare the life of the Spanish commander.
"How do you have the courage," he asked me,
sent this man alive to me?

"to p r e 

W h y have you not killed him?

Because I have never used my arms against the v a n 
quished I" I answered.

"There he is.

Kill him if you want

to! "
On the spot Olmedilla ordered Captain Rafael Maldonado
to cut MarchAn's head off.
barous order.

Maldonado carried out this b a r 

Immediately Olmedilla ordered all the troops

to go to the plaza with the prisoners.

The troops formed in

a square, with the prisoners in the middle.

Olmedilla

ordered his second in command, Fernando Figueredo,

to have
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all the prisoners' heads cut o f f . F i g u e r e d o ,

who rivaled

Olmedilla in savage cruelty and bloodthirstiness,
witness the execution.

flew to

He appointed Captains Juan Santiago

Torres and Rafael Maldonado to carry out the order.
The prisoners had been unaware of the meaning of
those preparations until they noticed Chaplain A. Pardo
coming with a Santo Cristo in his left hand.

They fell on

their knees as he started to bless them with his right hand.
Immediately,

the two captains began cutting off heads.

When the fifth head fell,
indignation.

I could no longer contain my

I headed my horse toward the two executioners,

and I warned them that if they killed just one more indi
vidual,

it would cost them their lives.

frightened and surprised,
Figueredo reprimanded me.

The captains,

stopped the execution.

Meanwhile,

He was irritated by my opposi

tion to the fulfillment of the orders of our commanding

15Colonel Fernando Figueredo was born in San Carlos,
Venezuela in 1790.
He entered the revolutionary army as a
captain in 1810.
In 1812 he was imprisoned for seven months
in Coro and Puerto Cabello.
When he got free, he joined
Bolivar and continued the campaign.
In 1814 he fought with
Urdaneta and was forced to emigrate to New Granada.
After
fighting under Ranjel and Olmedilla, he joined P&ez in 1815.
When Olmedilla decided it was useless to fight for the
patriot cause any longer against such great obstacles, he
left his troops to Figueredo's command.
In 1816 Figueredo
joined these troops to P&ez's to fight in Apure.
In 1819 he
fought with P&ez in Las Queseras and with Bolivar in BoyacA.
At this point he was rated one of P&ez's most trusted "lieu
tenants." As a colonel in 1824 he fought in the Battle of
Carabobo.
For three years he was Commandant of Arms in San
Carlos and later served in this same capacity in the Province
of Carabobo until 1827.
He died in Nutrias in 1841.
D&vila,
Diccionario Bioar&fico, I, 150-51.
Scarpetta and Vergara,
Diccionario Bioar&fico. 154-55.
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officer.

I told him calmly that I was determined to die in

order to defend the lives of those unfortunate beings whom
they were assassinating so horribly.

Figueredo screamed at

me, insisting that the prisoners must die regardless of what
I had to say.
When the captains stopped obeying F i g u e r e d o 's orders,
the latter went to Olmedilla so that he could dispose anew
how to carry out his wishes.
Olmedilla, however,

Before Figueredo found

I had already presented myself to him.

1 was telling him what was happening and trying to make him
see the inhumanity and stupid barbarity of that slaughter.
I pointed out how unwise this action was particularly when
the time came to penetrate Venezuelan territory with the
title of liberators and friends of humanity.

Olmedilla,

without reasoning, coldly answered me that the life of the
prisoners was in F i g u e r e d o 1s hands.
"Well,

if this is the c a s e , ” Figueredo answered,

"they

shall all die."
We started arguing again before the troops and the
prisoners.

Finally,

I won the argument,

unable to have another man killed.

for Figueredo was

Furthermore, he was unable

to have me punished as he wanted to do,

for he knew that the

troops would not permit a violent act to be perpetrated
against me.
Thus,
saved.

the lives of those unfortunate beings were

They had been condemned to death by the evil heart

of a vandal.

The good treatment they received now made
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friends out of our former enemies.
later enlisted in our infantry.

In fact, all of them

They became such faithful

and inseparable companions in so many battles that, had
there not been many witnesses to these events,

these men

would run the risk of passing before posterity as fables
invented for solace and entertainment.
This account— and I say it deliberately— involves one
of the acts of disobedience and insubordination with which I
am accused by those who dislike me.
Olmedilla and Figueredo i n d e e d N o !

Insubordination to
obedience, even in

its strictest military sense, cannot change the sword of the
soldier into the knife of the executioner, or transform war
into the slaughter of prisoners.

I give the Almighty

infinite thanks because he has left me time, reason,

and the

good memory necessary to relate these events as they h a p 
pened

so

that just men might judge them as they deserve.

l®PAez's insubordination was really to Simdn Bolivar
and his Decree of 1813 which declared "war to the death" to
all S p a niards.

CHAPTER VI
Olmedilla Orders Seventy-Six Prisoners Killed
Du r i n g M y A b s e n c e — Figueredo Takes Charge and
Tries to Arrest M e — Disastrous End of Olmedilla
— The Battle of C h i r e — Inevitable Ailments P r o 
duced by Battles— A N i g h t ’s Adventure on the
Battlefield— Dress of the Military While on
Camp a i g n — Surprise at Palmarito— The Valiant
[Vicente] P e n a — H o w I Saved H i m — Battle of the
Mata de la M i e l * — My Promotion to Lieutenant
Col o n e l — Military Mutiny in My Favor— I Break it
Up.
1815
An order from Olmedilla to countermarch to Casanare
ended our dispute over the prisoners.
secured , the army started moving.

With the latter well-

We were afraid that

Calzada would return to Guasdualito when he heard what
Guerrero and Ricaurte were bound to tell him about our
slaughter of the troops he had left there.

That very a f t e r 

noon , the army got to the shore of the Arauca River,
five leagues from Guasdualito.

only

Olmedilla put me in charge

of crossing the army, ordering m e to send the prisoners
first.

This operation took the entire night,

only one canoe.

for we had

The following morning about 9*00 I crossed

to the other side of the river.

At the carnp I discovered

that they were assassinating the seventy-six prisoners at
that very moment at a place called "Las Cuatro Matas."
of the officers came to me and begged me to save them.
189

Many
I
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asked h o w much time had elapsed since they had been gone.

I

deduced from their answer that it was too late to save them.
Olmedilla continued the march to Cuiloto.
got there,

though, he had left the troops under Figueredo's

command while he himself headed toward Pore,
Casanare.

When we

the capital of

Before his departure he revealed that he was very

displeased with the Casanare government.

He stated that he

would not return to head the troops and told everyone to do
whatever he thought best.

Figueredo then ordered all the

men to remain on foot at the outskirts of Cuiloto.

He put

the horses on the plains in the direction of the enemy camp.
This act alarmed the troops greatly,

for they were still

afraid that Calzada might march against us.

Because of this

fear, a junta of officers was formed which commissioned four
of its members to tell Figueredo that the horses were not
well placed.

They wanted to point out that should the enemy

forces attack suddenly,
our h o r s e s .

they could easily take possession of

They also wished to remind Figueredo that there

were other roads,

that were not covered by advance guards,

w h i c h the enemy could use to advance.
composed of Major Rosario Obregon,
and Juan Pablo Burgos,

and myself.^

This commission was

captains Genaro v&squez,
Since 1 commanded two

^No further information was available on Rosario
Obregon and Juan Pablo Burgos,
captain Genaro VAaquez, a
native of Venezuela, started his military career in 1814.
His comrades-in-arms described h i m thuai
"Valor was a habit
with him."
P&ez always relied on h i m for his riskier u n d e r 
takings.
V&squez was killed in the Battle of Ortiz on March
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squadrons.

It fell m y lot to be the spokesman.

that Figueredo,

a

We all feared

capricious and haughty man, would not

receive our commission well.

We were correct.

When we were brought before Figueredo,

1 told him

that we wanted to talk to him privately about military
affairs.

He ordered us to a room and closed the door.

we had placed our swords on the table,

After

I fulfilled my charge

by telling h i m what had brought us there.

X pointed out to

h i m the need of putting the horses at the rear of the army
and of covering our unguarded points.

Figueredo showed great

displeasure on hearing these o b s e r v a t i o n s .

He retorted that

the army had nothing to say about the measures he took for
its security,

and that he was of the opinion that the camp

and the horses were in a secure place.

He added that in the

final analysis he was the only one responsible for the army;
therefore, he would appreciate it if in the future we would
abstain from making observations that he h a d not solicited.
" Comma n d e r ," I responded,

"Permit me to tell you that

you are not the only one here who is responsible for t h i s .
army.
I,

Each one of us has his share of responsibility,

for one,

and

am not satisfied to have another person be fully

responsible when my life and honor are at stake."

27, 1818.
Fourteen years later, in 1832, P&ez took his
remains to Valencia.
Seeking to perpetuate the name of his
beloved friend, PAez named the lake at his farm in San
Fernando after him.
Scarpetta and Vergara, Diccionario
B i o q r a f i c o . 675.
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Figueredo could not contain the anger that dominated
h i m any longer.

Pronouncing a certain military word e n e r 

getically, he kicked the floor and shouted at ust
that I am the one w h o is responsible here,

MI repeat

and that the army

h as nothing to say about my m e a s u r e s ."
It was not possible for me to let that exclamation go
unanswered,

so I replied with equal vigor and firmness.

Then Figueredo, who was already predisposed against me because
o f the incident involving the prisoners in Guasdualito,
o pened the door of the room, called Lieutenant Juan Antonio
Mirabal,

and said to himt

"Take Commander P&ez prisoner and

shackle him."
I already k n e w the manner of man I was dealing with.
I took m y sword and left the room, exclaiming in a loud voice*
"Come and get me.

But let me warn you that I am determined

to die killing rather than let myself be dragged like a
criminal.

If I am to be judged,

be sufficient.
quer m e ."

Force, however,

an order for m y arrest will
shall never be able to c o n 

Then I headed toward the t r o o p s .

Figueredo immediately suspended the order to imprison
me and spoke with the other three men who h a d remained in
the room.

He asked them to go quiet me,

for he supposed

that I h a d gone to raise the troops against him.

When he was

convinced that I had not thought of such a thing, he resumed
his haughty tone.

He told me that I was insubordinate and

that he would gladly give me a passport if I asked h i m for
one.
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The following day Figueredo did issue me a passport
for the capital.

Twenty-four hours after I had left,

greater part of his army had already deserted.

the

Figueredo

then informed the government about what had transpired.

1

did, too; and I related the event clearly and justified my
resistance to the unjust prison order he had issued against
me.

The government approved my conduct and removed

Figueredo from command.
General Calzada then advanced toward the camp at
Cuiloto where only one hundred and eighty men remained out
of the original thirteen hundred.

This remnant retreated

under the orders of citizen Miguel Guerrero to a town named
El Puerto, which bears toward the left shore of the Casanare
River.^
troops,

Guerrero then replaced Figueredo in command of the
and thus he began his military career.
Calzada got as far as Cuiloto and took possession of

a great part of the horses,

saddles, and lances that had

belonged both to the troops that had deserted and to those
that had followed Guerrero.

The latter had left in such a

hurry that some of them had not been able to corral horses

^Miguel Guerrero became a general in the Venezuelan
army.
Although he had performed many invaluable services to
the cause of independence while under Olmedilla's command,
his military career really began at this point.
Later he
served with P&ez in the Battles of Chire and Mata de la Miel.
He was in the battles against Peffa in Arauca and Palmarito.
In 1819 he was a member of the Congress of Angostura.
In
1826 he declared himself in favor of Bolivar in Venezuela.
Later he was opposed to PAez as Commandant of Arms in B a r i n a s .
Scarpetta and Vergara, Diccionario BioarAfico. 204-205.
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for their retreat.

A shipment of salt that had just arrived

from Chitaga also fell in Calzada*s hands.

Salt was a very

rare commodity and of prime necessity for the troops.

At

this time Calzada could have easily taken possession of the
entire province of Casanare if he had continued.
know why he countermarched to Guasdualito,

I do not

for the patriots

in that province then had time to organize a new corps of
troops.
When I arrived at Pore,

I found Olmedilla there.

Knowing that I had left the army, he asked me to come to his
house.

1 went without delay.

He was somewhat indisposed,

or at least he seemed that way.
me,

"I regret to h e a r , " he told

"that you have left the army,

you are to it.

On the other hand,

for I know what an asset
though,

1 am glad,

for it

offers me the opportunity to tell you what 1 think about the
unequal battle that America has undertaken against the power
of Spain.

1 believe that it is impossible for us to win,

and that we shall all perish in this contest without profit
ing from our labors and vigilance,

and without even the

gratitude of the people or of those we command.

Therefore,

1 have decided to leave the army and go to Vichava— a place
which is inhabited only by savage Indians, but which is com
pletely inaccessible to the Spanish troops.

I rely on some

companions, who are convinced of our critical circumstance,
to follow me.
follow me.
immediately.

I hope that you, too, commander P&ez, will

If you do,

I will order you to return to the army

There you will hand pick some two or three
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hundred men and an equal number of horses.

In the meantime,

I shall return to the Meta with my family and yours.
I will get what I can for our embarkations.
salt, which is indispensable,
pastor there.

There

I will also get

and a priest to serve as our

On your return trip from Cuiloto, you shall

take the gold and silver vessels from the church in Pore and
all the money you can wrest from the citizens, because l am
certain that everything will fall later into Spanish hands.
Take heart,

amigo PAez,

to carry out this plan,

can carry it out better than you.

for no one

Then, too, I know the love

you profess for the army."
This speech, coming from Olmedilla,
I did not know what to say to him.

left me astounded.

Knowing him, though,

seemed better not to contradict h i m suddenly,
want to agree with him, either.
opinion on this matter,

but I did not

Thus, without revealing m y

I asked him to let me go home to

think his propositions over carefully.
later.

it

I returned an hour

Then I pointed out to him the necessity and suita

bility of having him continue at the head of our army.

I

admonished him not to abandon the cause he had embraced in
such dangerous times,

and to desist from a project which

seemed unwise to me for many reasons.
say a single word,
him greatly.

I knew, of course,

Although he did not
that 1 had displeased

Aware of this and lamenting his conduct,

I

took leave of him.
About two hours later,

I received a dispatch from

Olmedilla ordering me to return immediately to the army and
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assume command of my regiment.
town,

1 did this.

As I was leaving

I noticed that Olmedilla was setting out with his

family for San Juan de los Llanos.
On the way to rejoin my regiment in the town of Puerto,
I found the one hundred and eighty men who under Guerrero's
command had fled from Calzada.

This small corps had been in

Puerto augmenting its ranks with new recruits from all over
the province.
Meanwhile, quite unexpectedly,

Governor N. Solano

appeared and proclaimed the news that Olmedilla had
deserted.^

Solano was determined to have Olmedilla arrested,

and he ordered me to do so immediately.

This order d i s 

pleased me greatly, not only because of the personal consider
ations I owed Olmedilla, but because of the fact that he had
revealed his plans to me confidentially.
believe that 1 had denounced him.
could offer,

He was bound to

Despite all the excuses I

1 was finally obliged to obey Solano's order.

Accompanied by four officers and their assistants,

I left at

a forced march to overtake Olmedilla and his companions.
After five days of uninterrupted travel, we overtook
Olmedilla at dawn in the province of San Martin.
lodged in a way-side inn.
covered our presence,

He was

When he and his companions d i s 

they armed themselves.

Then Olmedilla

^N. Solano was the new patriot governor of the remote
province of Casanare, a haven for defeated patriots.
Cunninghame Graham, P&ez., 88-89.
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ap p e a r e d , armed with a blunderbuss and a sword,
gate and askedi

at the fence

“W h o goes?"

“A free A m e r i c a , " I answered.
“What are you doing here?" he asked me.
"Ordering you and your companions to surrender as
prisoners,"

I replied.

Olmedilla responded to this with an outburst of
insults against the government.

He went on to say that he

was determined to die rather than return to Casanare as a
prisoner.

Furthermore, he stated that I had no authority to

arrest him,

for he was outside the jurisdiction of the

patriot government.

I told h i m that my orders were to c a p 

ture h i m wherever I found him.
“Very well," he replied.

“I would like to see the

order for my arrest."
After he had read this order, which authorized me to
take h i m dead or alive, he expressed a desire to talk to me
privately.

With this in mind, we went to the spot he

designated.

He stayed inside the fence while I remained on

the outside.
“Let us see h o w we can fix this affair,

P&ez," he

told me.
“This affair will be fixed in Casanare," I replied.
“Do not resist me.
of m y friends,

Instead,

rely on my influence and that

and nothing will happen to you."

“Promise me that you will take me to Bogota as a
prisoner.

Then I will go with you."
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"I cannot take you to that city," I answered,

"For I

have been commissioned b y the government of casanare and not
that of Bogota."
"Pieces of Olmedilla," he replied furiously.

Throw

ing the paper that contained m y orders at me, he said again,
"You will take pieces of Olmedilla,
h i m alive

1

but you shall never take

"

"I will regret having to take you in pieces, my c o m 
mander; but if you insist on this,

I shall have to c o m p l y . ”

"Whenever you are r e a d y , ” he replied.

Heading toward

the hut whe^re his wife and children were, he said,
I am going to die,

"Daughter,

for Olmedilla does not allow himself to

be captured a l i v e . ”
With surprising resignation she told him,
doing the right thing.

"You are

£ prefer to see you wa l l o w in your

blood and be a witness to your agony, than to see you
humiliated and a p r i s o n e r . ”
Olmedilla turned to me then and said,
you decided,

"Well what have

P4ez?"

"I am going to decide this minute, my commander , " Z
said as I dismounted.

I ordered m y companions not to move,

and then I began to remove the locks from the door.

When I

entered the inn, Olmedilla cocked his blunderbuss and put
himself on guard.
said to himi

With m u c h serenity and a peaceful tone,

"Is it possible, m y commander,

h a v i n g been together on so many battlefields,
enemies of our country to pieces,

that after
tearing the

and sharing all the

I
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dangers and disasters of war, we might n o w destroy one
another?

How can we do this when we have before us a vast

field in which to collect laurel wreaths, when we can offer
the burnt sacrifice of our lives to the cause of the freedom
and independence of our country?"
"I am not a s l a v e , " he responded,
serve,

"to be forced to

and I do not choose to serve this cause any longer."
Both m y comrades and I saw Olmedilla's desire to kill

me,

for he probably thought that I had told the authorities

at Casanare about his plan to desert.
approached him,

Nevertheless,

showing the greatest confidence.

1

I intended

to distract h i m w i t h conversation while I tried to grab the
blunderbuss he held.

His wife,

armed with rifles, was some

paces away with two of her children.

Believing that she

m ight bring h i m to surrender without resisting,

I asked her,

"Seflora. use your influence and help me to convince your
husband to return with me to Casanare.

I give you m y w o r d

of honor that nothing bad will happen to him."
"I have already told my husband," she replied,

"That

it would affect me less to see h i m die than to see h i m
humiliated and taken prisoner."
Her response made me lose the aplomb and patience I
h ad shown until then, and 1 answered rather annoyedt
if you think that would be very difficult,
the contrary to y o u ."

"Well,

I want to prove

Drawing my s w o r d , 1 turned toward

Olmedilla who was still complaining to m y comrades about the
manner he was being treated.

I asked h i m firmlyt

"Do you
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surrender or not?"
"I see/' he said,

"that what you want is to humiliate

me and have me sacrificed in Pore.
please you."

Well,

1 am going to

He handed me his sword and his blunderbuss.

On

hearing his words, his sons and the others who accompanied him
flung their weapons spitefully on the floor.

His sons shed

tears of anger.
That same day I countermarched with Olmedilla,

leaving

the other persons that were there to protect his wife.

On

the way, Olmedilla held back his horse repeatedly and would
exclaim,

full of despairi

"What have I done?

Is it possible

that I was cowardly enough to surrender and see myself
humiliated in this manner?"

I repeatedly tried to calm him

and inspire him with confidence until we got to Pore.
I turned him over to Governor Solano.

There

The latter treated

Olmedilla very harshly and immediately ordered him to be put
in two pairs of shackles.
Later that day Olmedilla sent for m e .
difficulty,
see him.

After much

I was able to get Solano to give me a pass to go

Olmedilla was very uncomfortable,

did not permit him to move.

for the shackles

I offered to talk to the

Governor to see if I could relieve his situation.

I found

Solano so inflexible that, despite the deference he had for
me,

I was successful only in having one pair of shackles

removed from Olmedilla.
All of Olmedilla's friends made many efforts to save
him.

Among them was Senor M4ndez,

later Archbishop of
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Caracas.

Finally we were able to get the government of

Bogota to pardon him.

But then, when the capital of New

Granada was lost by the patriots after the defeat of General
Rovira in Cachiri and the Spaniards invaded the province of
Casanare, Olmedilla jeopardized his position again.

Instead

of going to Guasdualito as the other patriots did, he
remained in Casanare,
There,

still pursuing his favorite scheme.

in the deserts of that province, he was subjected to

the greatest poverty.

According to some of his friends, he

was even forced to eat the cadaver of one of his small
children in order to satisfy the horrible hunger that over
whelmed him.

Thus ended the life of that chief.^

Had he

only possessed greater perseverance, he would have been able
to render great services to his country and leave a name full
of glory for posterity.

Olmedilla was then replaced in the

patriot army by General [Joaquin] R i c a u r t e . ^
At the end of 1815, the province of Casanare was
invaded by General Calzada.
infantrymen,

With an army of three thousand

five hundred cavalrymen,

and two pieces of

4p&ez does not include in this account the fact that
Olmedilla was beheaded by General Calzada and his head
placed on public display.
^General Joaquin Ricaurte was born in BogotA.
On July
, 1810 he signed the act of independence and was designated
a Sergeant Major in the army.
In 1812 he went on to V e n e 
zuela where he was second in command.
By 1814 Bolivar had
conferred the rank of general on him.
He proved his valor
and loyalty to his country in countless battles, specifically
the Battle of Chire in 1815. Ricaurte died a natural death on
July 27, 1820.
Scarpetta and Vergara, Diccionario BioarAfico.
513.
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artillery, he penetrated up to the region of C h i r e .
area,

In that

in a great plain called Banco de Chire, our troops

were waiting under Ricaurte's command.

Ricaurte assembled

the army and then had the strange idea of retreating to the
rear guard some three miles back, with his chief of staff
Vald£z, before the enemy had even come within cannon-fire
range.

There he ordered his assistant, Antonio Ranjel,

climb a tree and observe the outcome of the battle.

to

The

worst of it was that Ricaurte took the eighty dragoons,
armed with the only rifles we had, as his personal guard.
It was December 31, 1815.

I commanded squadron

Number Two, consisting of two hundred men.
pgrez commanded squadron Number O n e .^
first line of defense.

Ramdn Nonato

His forces formed the

After the enemy artillery had opened

fire. Commanding General Miguel Guerrero gave orders for our
cavalrymen to file off to the right.
with this account,

But before continuing

I believe it apropos to mention here a

singular event, one that has influenced several acts in my
life.

At the beginning of all battles, when the first shots

were fired, a violent and nervous excitement would sieze me
and impel me to hurl myself against the enemy and receive
the first blows.

I would have always done this if my

^Ramdn Nonato Pgrez became a Colonel in the Venezuelan
army.
He was born and reared in Venezuela, and he played an
active role in the terrible wars of the llanos from 1815 to
1619.
He served P&ez well and faithfully.
When he joined
Bolivar in the campaign against Cundinamarca, he crossed the
cordillera and fought in Paya.
He was wounded in this
battle and returned to his beloved llanos where he died.
Ibid., 460.
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companions had not contained me with great eff o r t s .

An

attack of this nature hit me before entering the fight at
C h i r e , for I had already come forward and had an encounter
with the advance guard.

My companions were struggling to

hold me to the rear of the army; however, when they heard the
first firing by the Royalists,
occupy their posts.

they had to release me to go

Fortunately,

by then I had recovered

from the affliction and mounted a horse.

Seeing the flank

movement of our cavalrymen, whom I thought were trying to
flee,

I ran toward them.

I put myself at the head of my

squadron and shouted without consulting anyone,
load!"

This order was carried out immediately.

cavalry had also seen our flank movement.
too, believed that we were fleeing*

The enemy

Undoubtedly they,

so they loaded.

went to meet them so une3q>ectedly however,
in complete flight.

"Forward and

We

that we set them

We also routed the left infantry wing

which was formed four deep in a single line.
The bewilderment of the enemy infantry after this
encounter was such that I was easily able to go behind their
lines in search of Calzada or some other chief.

If possible,

I wanted to distinguish myself that day by killing one of the
Spanish chiefs.

Our forces continued pursuing the enemy.

However, when our cavalrymen found the commissary and all
the equipment that the Spanish had left behind,

they stopped

their pursuit in order to take possession of the spoils.

The

Spanish infantry, which otherwise would have fallen in our
power, was thus saved.

Had our cavalry continued its pursuit
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on the Salina de Chita road, we would have spared ourselves
m a n y misfortunes,
in Chitaga.

including the defeat of General Urdaneta

For Calzada in his flight encountered Urdaneta

and his forces and whipped them completely.
tives took advantage of our soldiers'

The other fugi

disorder and took to

the summits of the mountain range that was at their right.
They followed the Chita road and penetrated into the heart
of N e w Granada as far as Ocana.
Accompanied by a caribineer,

I pursued the enemy

tenaciously to the other side of the Casanare River.

I

recall that in the midst of the pursuit X found a soldier,
assistant to Commander Delgado, whom I intimidated into
surrendering.

At this time I took a famous saber belonging

to his chief from him, which I gave later to Captain Miguel
V&squez.7

The assistant pleaded with me not to kill him.

I told h i m I pardoned his life and asked him to take m y hat,
which my comrades knew well,
h a d pardoned him.
his life,

as proof of the fact that I

He did this; but he still almost lost

for m y comrades, who did not see me return,

posed that he h a d assassinated me and taken my hat.

sup
They

started to kill him several times.
O n the other side of the Casanare River,

the twenty-

7Miguel VAsquez, a native of Venezuela, eventually
became a colonel in the army as a result of his heroic
actions in the battles for independence.
He joined P&ez in
Guasdualito after defeating the Spanish Colonel Torrellaa.
Later he fought to support P&ez and his government.
Ibid.,
675.
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five fugitives who were ahead of me scattered in the woods.
Among these men was the young Juan Jos 6 Flores, who later
became a General and President of E c u a d o r .8

He h a d been

w i t h the patriots in the siege of Valencia where he had been
taken prisoner by the Spanish and added to the military
health department.

After four or five days of fleeing

through the woods along the river bank, he came to us v o l u n 
tarily.

From then on he served in the patriot ranks, under

m y immediate command, until the beginning of 1821.

Then he

8Juan Josd Flores was born in Puerto Cabello in 1800
of Indian parents.
He was a Venezuelan like Miranda, Bolivar,
and Sucre.
Having little formal education, he enlisted in
the Spanish army at an early age.
When his master in this
army was taken prisoner, Flores joined the ranks of the
patriots and soon became one of Bolivar's most trusted lieu
tenants and fought in more than twenty-three battles.
He
was a Lieutenant Colonel at twenty, a Colonel at twenty-two,
a General of Brigade at twenty-six, and a General of Division
at twenty-nine.
He was major Chief of Staff in the army of
the West in the Battle of Carabobo and later Chief of Staff
to Bolivar in the Battle of Cuenca.
After the defeat at
Pasto he retired from the army and went to live in PopayAn.
There he succeeded General Solom in 1824 as Chief of the
Army.
He brought the revolutionary war to a close after his
victories at Sucuimbo and Pasto.
In command of all E c u a 
dorian armies now, he quelled the military rebellion in Quito
and Guayaquil.
Along with Sucre he won the famous Battle of
Tarqui against Perti.
When his army helped declare the inde
pendence of the province of Quito from Gran Colombia, Bolivar
sent General Sucre to supersede him.
Sucre was assassinated
in route and many claimed Flores was the instigator of the
foul deed.
When Bolivar died in 1830, Flores succeeded in
establishing Ecuadorian independence from Gran Colombia.
He
was elected to the presidency for two years then but served
in this capacity until 1834 when he "condescended" to let
Rocafuerte be elected to this high office.
He was reelected
President in 1839 and served until 1845.
He remained a p o w e r 
ful force in Ecuadorian politics until his death, of natural
causes, in 1864.
A. Curtis Wilgus, South American Dictators
Du r i n g the First Century of Independence (Washington, D . C .,
1937), 348-63.
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went to join the army formed in N e w Granada to invade V e n e 
zuela.
When I crossed the Casanare River and found myself
completely alone,

1 realized the imprudence I had committed

in going ahead so far.

1

decided to move back, not on the

road I had used to come, but on a different one,

for I was

afraid of falling into the hands of one of the enemy parties
I had left behind.

To make my risky position even more

difficult, m y horse was lame.

Fortunately,

I found another

one in the lowlands of the river which I was able to capture
after considerable effort.

I continued my march along the

lowest slope of the mountain which was covered with straw.
1

did not know exactly where

1

was, and

by a bonfire I saw in the distance.
located there.

1

was guided solely

I supposed our camp was

The fire 1 saw, however, had been started on

the plains by rifle plugs during that day's battle.
Grouping thus in the dark and surmounting a thousand
difficulties,
midnight.

1

I descended in the direction of the fire about
found myself at our camp.

It was completely

covered with the enemy spoils that our men had abandoned
there as useless.

Without knowing what fortune had befallen

our army and even afraid that it might have been defeated, I
decided to go to the place where we had agreed to reunite in
case of disaster.
the call,

A few moments after starting out, I heard

"Who goes?"

instead of answering this query,

asked the same question.

I

"A free America," cried out a voice

which 1 recognized as belonging to the courageous [Francisco3
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Aramendi.

I told h i m who I was then, and I was received

with a great deal of joy by my companions,
thought

1

for they had

was dead.

The day after the Battle of chire,

General Ricaurte

ordered everyone who had taken booty from the Spaniards to
place it at the disposal of the Chief of Staff.

He

allegated that the sole objective of this measure was to
force the soldiers to be more prompt in pursuing an enemy
that was still in sight.
later among the troops.

He offered to divide the booty
All the soldiers religiously turned

in the spoils of war they had wrested.
to the town of Morcote.

Ricaurte then marched

He took the valuable cargo with him,

and these he later divided exclusively among the individuals
of his staff and escort.
The troops remained under the command of Guerrero who
was ordered to march toward Guasdualito.

It happened that

some days later I went to Pore to fulfill my military duty
and present myself to Ricaurte.
dressed.

I was barefooted and poorly

My trousers, of green flannel, were gnawed up to

the middle of the leg.
head to toe.

However,

I presented a miserable sight from
this was very common during those

times of war, even among the military of the highest rank.

9p&ez refers here to Colonel Francisco Aramendi,
designated at P & e z 's inseparable companion.
He fought with
unsurpassed bravery in the battles for Venezuelan indepen
dence from 1814 to 1823.
He was assassinated in 1827.
Scarpetta and Vergara, Diccionario BiocrAfico. 23-24.
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"I congratulate you. Commander P&ez, 11 he told me,
"for your courage and heroic comportment in the Battle of
Chire.

But h o w can you come before me in that beggar's

get-up?"
"My general," I responded,

"It is the only one I have.

I believed it my obligation as a military man to present m y 
self to my superior.

I have done this without bothering

about m y clothing and believing that no one is forced to do
more than he is able to do."

Anyone would think that the

heir of the victors of Chire,

seeing m y painful need for

clothes, would at least offer me some; but the man changed
the conversation then and did not mention dress etiquette
again.
About the middle of January we heard that the enemy
was rounding-up cattle in the plains outside the town of
Arauca.

Immediately we decided to set an ambush at daylight

in a brushless plain.

We were able to accomplish this feat,

although at firBt sight it appeared very difficult.

We put

six hundred cavalrymen in the hollow of a dry ravine.

They

were so well covered that they could only be seen at a dis
tance of about one hundred v a r a s .10

Stretched out over the

horses' necks, our cavalrymen awaited the enemy.

The latter,

five hundred strong, were under the orders of Commander

^®There are 2.8 feet in a vara.

209
Vicente P e n a . 1 1

These men were leading the cattle and horses

they had gotten in the Larenos farms and were headed toward
Guasdualito.

Since we were well hidden and quiet, the

Spaniards marched on, completely unaware of our presence.
When they were about three hundred feet from us, we took
them so by surprise that they were forced to flee.
charged them on the front and flanks.

We

Then we pursued them

to the Arauca River where they threw themselves in the water.
The outcome of that surprise attack was very profitable for
us.

Without having to round them up, we got over two

thousand cows, nine hundred horses,

and eighty prisoners.

The greater part of the enemy corps perished,

for only Pena

and twenty-five of his men later joined Arce in Guasdualito
to relate what h a p p e n e d . 1 2
Ortega,

Genaro V&squez,

Captains Nonato P€rez, Rafael

Basilio and Gregorio Brito

^ V i c e n t e Pena fought heroicly against the patriots
during 1815 in the Province of Barinas under the orders of
Francisco Ldpez.
In Palmarito he was defeated and captured
by P & e z . Pena's bravery and stoicism so impressed P&ez, that
he used all his power to save him from being killed and then
to persuade him to join the patriot cause.
He finally joined
the patriots in 1815 and went on to fight in the Battle of
Mata de la Miel against his former chief, Colonel Ldpez.
In
1817 PAez promoted him to the rank of lieutenant colonel.
In 1821 he fought at carabobo and later in 1823 he took part
in the siege of Puerto cabello.
When the government of
Bogota promoted h i m to cavalry colonel in 1823, he retired
to Villa de Obispos.
Pena died in Obispos in 1826.
D&vila,
Diccionario Biocrr&fico. II, 81-82.
12Colonel Arce was the Spanish governor of the province
of Barinas.
He gave refuge to Juan Vicente Pena in Guas
dualito.
Judging this town indefensible, he evacuated it in
1815.
P&ez immediately occupied it. Cunninghame Graham,
P&ez. 94.
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distinguished themselves particularly in the encounter . 1 3
On the third day of this journey we occupied Guas
dualito, which had been abandoned by Arce.

Under orders

from from Colonel Francisco Ldpez, Arce headed toward the
capital of the province of Barinas to organize new forces in
the town of Q u i n t e r o . ^

We knew that Quintero was only

seventy miles from Guasdualito and that Ldpez intended to
march against us.

We also knew that Ldpez had a detachment

of five hundred cavalrymen posted in the pass of Palmarito,

13Nonato Pdrez and Genaro V&squez have been identified
previously.
Rafael Ortega was born in San Carlos in 1790.
He
enlisted in the revolutionary army in 1810 and by 1814 had
attained the rank of captain.
In 1814 he went to Cticuta to
join General Urdaneta.
It was after he went to Casanare
that he joined P&ez and fought valiantly with his forces. He
attained the rank of general.
On July 6 , 1836, he died of
natural causes in Maracaibo.
Scarpetta and Vergara,
Diccionario Bioqr&fico. 411.
Basilio Brito, a native of Ospino, was Gregorio
Brito's brother.
He fought valiantly for the independence
cause in the battles of Mata de la Miel and Cara b o b o .
I b i d ., 6 6 .
Gregorio Brito was born in Ospino also.
He was one
of the first to enlist in the independence movement.
He
fought valiantly under P&ez until he was mortally wounded in
the Battle of
Mata de la Miel.
He died on February 16, 1815
the day after this battle.
Ibid.
^ F r a n c i s c o Ldpez, Venezuelan by birth, was General
La Torre's second in command when the latter became the
Royalist commander when General Morillo was wounded at La
Puerta.
Cunninghame Graham in his Jos& Antonio P&ez on page
146 describes
him as "an energetic soldier and well accus
tomed to guerilla warfare."
He was the man who, relying on
the fact that then only special regiments from Spain wore
distinctive uniforms, conceived the plan to surprise Bolivar
in the middle of his camp.
His men, masquerading as patriots,
would have killed Bolivar in his hammock if he had not risen
exceptionally early that morning.
When Ldpez was killed in
battle following this surprise attack on Bolivar in 1818, the
Spanish lost their best cavalry officer.
Ibid., 146-49.
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on the Apure River.

Consequently,

1 inarched with three

hu ndred of our men to surprise them.

I ordered meat to be

roasted and prepared for three days in advance so that we
w o u l d not have to slaughter cattle and attract the vultures,
very numerous in those plains, which would have announced
our presence.

At the end of a three-day march, we arrived

at daybreak at the Spanish camp;

and at

6

a.m., on February

2, completely unexpected by the Spanish, we attacked and
destroyed them completely.
prisoners.

Almost all the Royalists fell

Among them was Chief Vicente Pena who had been

held back by one of our soldiers as he was attempting to
swim across the river.
When Pena was brought before me he saidi
I am not asking you to spare my life,
do not want to do so.

"Commander,

for I should not and

The only favor I ask of you is to let

me say goodbye to m y wife."
"We are not assassins," I answered.

“Although we try

to destroy the enemy on the battlefield, we are generous
w i t h the vanquished."
The arrogance and serenity of that man who knew well
the fate that awaited h i m in that era of implacable war to
the death, called m y attention in an extraordinary manner.
I tried to win h i m over to our cause by pointing out the bad
choice he h a d made,

for he was an American.

I told hi m

enthusiastically h o w useful it w o u l d be for h i m to support
the principles of freedom and to give his valor and deter
mination of purpose to the sacred cause of his country.

But
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he always answered without hesitation that he looked on life
with the greatest contempt and that he would take glory in
dying for the King's cause which he believed to be very just.
It was impossible for me to permit such a valiant military
m a n to be sacrificed.
times,

Contrary to the practices of the

I sent h i m to Pore with the rest of the prisoners,

recommending h i m very highly.
eminent patriots,
These men,

In Pore there were many

among them Sehor Mendez and Or. Y a n e z .

though uselessly at first, made the greatest

possible efforts to convert Pena to our cause.

Finally, he

was unable to resist the influence of those eloquent m e n who
were sacrificing all for their country.

He decided then to

serve under the banners of ind e p e n d e n c e .
The Pore government sent Pena to our camp, where I
welcomed him with the greatest joy.
Serrano, who was in Guasdualito,
served us in good f a i t h . ^ 5

However, President

did not believe that Pena

Fearing that he would escape and

tell the Spaniards about our critical situation, he ordered
me once and for all to take his life.

All m y efforts to

persuade Serrano of Pena's sincerity were useless.
I had to obey,
execution.

Finally,

and I issued the necessary orders for his

But when they were taking h i m away,

to contain the desire I had to save him.

I was unable

Assuming all the

responsibility for the wrath my action might incur,
pended the order.

Pena remained impassive.

l^See Footnote 10 in Chapter V.

I sus
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I returned to Serrano's house.

I begged, pleaded,

and presented new arguments so that he would spare the life
of that valiant man.

Serrano remained inflexible.

But

after great efforts on my part and after saying that

1

would

be personally responsible for the good conduct of m y protege,
I was finally able to save h i m at the last second.

Later

events were to prove h o w correct I had been in my opinion of
Pena— an opinion which I had formed exclusively because of
his courage.

But I shall talk about this later in the

course of the narration.
I was with Pena,

resting in a log cabin, when a

cavalryman presented himself to Pena and said to himi
is nothing wrong in the Mata del C a r d o n a l ."
did not realize that Pena was a prisoner.
communication d r e w my attention greatly.

"There

The poor m a n
This official

Consequently,

1

called the messenger and induced h i m to take us to the place
where he had come from, warning h i m that any deception on
his part would cost h i m his life.

The good Indian guided us

along the bed of a ravine leading to the place indicated.
He did this with so much certainty and secrecy that we c o m 
p l e t e l y surprised the guard detail to which the communique
referred,

and did not even give them time to think about

defending themselves.
The guard detail consisted of a complete company, minus
a captain.

It was lodged in an orchard which was so free of

brush that everything was visible under the trees.
the captain of this guard then?

Where was

We searched and asked for
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h i m in vain,
he was.

for his loyal soldiers refused to tell us where

We retreated then, accompanied by the prisoners we

had taken there.

We had gone some distance when one of our

soldiers, Romualdo Salas, yelled and pointed out the missing
captain to us.

It seems that he had climbed a palm tree and

covered himself with its fronds so well, that he could not be
seen from beneath, except by accident.
into coming down right away.

He was intimidated

When he hit the ground he said

as serenely as he did cleverly,

"My goodness 1

In Guasdualito

I escaped on the wings of the rabbit; but here not even our
Sehora del Cobollo was able to save me."

Charmed by the

conduct of that courageous man, I sent him to BogotA.

I do

not know what his fate was later.
After we had been in Guasdualito a short while.
General Joaquin Ricaurte arrived and placed himself at the
head of our forces.

He established his headquarters here.

At midnight on February 15, a servant of Commander
Miguel Guerrero arrived at our camp which was situated out
side Quasdualito.

He had been sent by one of Guerrero's

brothers, called "el Chato," who served as a captain in the
Spanish army, to warn Guerrero not to participate in the
battle which was to ensue,

for we would probably lose it.

He pointed out that the enemy had more men than we did,

and

that these soldiers were more select and well-disciplined.
He informed him also of the enemy's proximity and told him
that we would be attacked the following day.
the servant to keep silent.

Guerrero warned

At 6*00 a.m., he went to
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General Ricaurte's home to tell h i m what was happening.

He

took that very servant with h i m so that he could give all
the information wanted from him.
After Ricaurte heard this account, he ordered Guer
rero and his brother's emissary not to say a single word on
the matter.

He assembled all the army officers,

telling

them that he wanted to know their opinion on a plan to
retreat to the other side of the Arauca River in the province
of Casanare.

Since several moments passed without anyone

responding, he turned to me and asked my opinion on the plan.
1 answered that I had told the people of Guasdualito that we
would defend them from the enemy until the very last.

I

begged him to release me from his orders if he intended to
carry out the plan to retreat and allow me to remain with m y
squadron, because I wanted to fulfill my promise to the
people of Guasdualito.

Without saying another word to me,

he asked the other officers the same question.
answered that they shared m y opinion.
angrily,

"Well,

"Let Commander P&ez command you.

to lead you.

They all
then," he said

I no longer wish

Those who do not want to follow me to Casanare

m a y continue under his o r d e r s ."
In effect Ricaurte retreated to Casanare without
telling us one thing about the proximity of the enemy.

He

was followed by calvary Captain Miguel Guerrero, Chief of
Staff Miguel V a l d 6 z, the staff,

an infantry company,

auiother
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company of dragoons,
I was left,

then,

and a few more chiefs and officers.

as chief and with a force that had been

reduced to five hundred cavalrymen.
Not knowing what the others knew,
stayed set out immediately

those of us who

in search of the Spanish army

fight it wherever we found it.

About a

league away our

reconnaisance met the enemy's reconnaissance,
and set it in flight.
with ardor and courage,

to

attacked it,

Our men then pursued these Royalists
but were unable to take a single

prisoner because the Royalists had very good horses.
While our reconnaissance forces were pursuing the
fleeing Royalists, we were left behind without any news.

I

had remained looking over the town so that no men would stay
behind.

When 1 was leaving to catch up with m y forces,

ran into a soldier who was

galloping at full rein to tell

about the encounter our advance guard h a d had.
the news,
forces,

1

1 accelerated the march.

me

Alarmed by

After X h a d joined m y

X issued an order to double the march.

X went on

^ C o l o n e l Miguel Vald 6 z was born in Puerto Cabello
about 1774, son of Lieutenant Colonel Juan de Dios Val d 6 z de
Yarza, who was Governor of the island of Trinidad.
He joined
the army in 1790 and campaigned with Miranda in 1811 and 1812.
In 1813 and 1814 he fought with Bolivar and attained the rank
of Colonel.
He helped General Ricaurte defeat General
Calzada at Chire.
In 1817, together with Generals Urdaneta,
Carreno, and Cordoba, he left the Army of the Apure to seek
out Bolivar.
Gravely ill with cancer, though, he was forced
to stay behind in Urbana del Orinoco where he died in 1818.
D&vila, Diccionario Bi o q r & f i c o , XX, 3S8-59 states that P&ez's
troops, w i t h P&ez's knowledge and approval, stripped V a l d 6 z
of all his possessions before his death.
Miguel Guerrero
later denounced this to Bolivar.
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ahead until 1 found our reconnaissance forces.

They had

stopped to watch a big cloud of dust that was rising from
the place called the "Mata de la M i e l . ”

This was the first

inkling we had of the presence of the Spanish.
Quickly I grasped the fact that that cloud was being
raised by an army that was heading toward us.

I decided to

approach it, despite the fact that it was very far away,

in

order to familiarize myself with its quality and numbers.
Commander Nonato P&rez and sixteen dragoons, who were a
little ahead of our reconnaissance, had also left to recon
noitre.

He asked me where 1 was going.

I stopped long

enough to answer h i m and then continued at a gallop.

For

tunately, he followed me with his dragoons.
When I was within sight of the enemy,
order to conduct a better inspection.
sance,

The enemy reconnais

consisting of thirty men, was about six hundred yards

from its army.

Their officer in charge and 1 began to boaBt

to one another impudently.
bat.

I stopped in

I challenged h i m to single c o m 

I did this with such ardor that, without realizing it,

1 got closer than was suitable for m y personal safety.
ordered his m e n to fire then,
m o r t a l l y wounding my horse.

and one bullet succeeded in
The handsome animal fell,

p i nning one of m y legs under his body.
I m a naged to free myself.

With great difficulty

The Spaniards would have had

enough time then to knife me while I was on the ground.
ever,
at me.

He

How

they contented themselves only with firing some shots
Since Nonato P 6 rez and his men stayed immobile about
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a block away,

I shouted for h i m to advance as soon as I

could get on m y feet.

He obeyed and killed five of the

enemy's advance guard.
where I was.

P6rez then returned to the place

I took the horse belonging to one of the

dragoons and rejoined m y troops.

I addressed them then,

I

remember as if it were today, with the most astonishing
proclamation that ever occurred to any general.
sorrow over the loss of my horse,
they have killed m y good horse.
now to avenge his death,

I told them,

Full of
"Comrades,

If you are not ready right

I will hurl myself against the

enemy alone and die in their ranks."

They all answered,

"Yes, we will avenge itl"
I accelerated the

march again for it was so late in

the evening that many of the leaders thought we
pend the attack until the following day.

should sus

They felt that by

the time we got within rifle range it would already be dark.
I retorted that the darkness of night would be as great a
handicap to the Spaniards as it wo u l d be for us.
moderate distance from the enemy,
two lines.

At a

I ordered the formation of

The first was to be under the command of the

valiant Nonato P6rez; the second, under that of the ge n t l e 
manly and enterprising Commander Genaro Visquez.

We marched

slowly and approached the Spanish army until we forced it to
start firing.
The Spanish chief. Colonel Francisco Ldpez,

let us

approach to within less than half the rifle-range distance.
Then he broke out with his artillery and musketeers.

Our
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first line, with Nonato P6rez at the lead, charged so
impetuously and orderly then,

that it may be said that it

p ulled more than two-thirds of the enemy cavalry out of forma
tion and defeated them completely.
I had warned V&squez not to advance until he received
orders from m e .
N o n a t o 's .

1 was located between his column and

When X had noticed that the enemy was aiming and

ordered the first line to advance, V&squez believed that
order included h i m also; so he advanced.
toward him in order to detain him.

I had to run

When I was doing this,

m y horse was wounded by a bullet and began to leap.

He

threw me quite a distance, with my saddle between m y legs,
and fled in the direction of the enemy.

I remained on the

spot, covered by a thick cloud of dust raised by the cavalry,
without even knowing where I was.

Fortunately,

shadows and ran into citizen Esteban Quero.

I left those

I asked h i m for

his horse, which he generously gave me as soon as he r e c o g 
nized me.

I had barely mounted when I noticed that the

second line was retreating.
I sped to halt that retreat.

After a good struggle,

I succeeded in making the cavalry turn back.

Animated again

by m y presence and effectively aided by V&squez and the
officers, we hurled ourselves full blast on the remains of
the enemy cavalry, which had stayed to the right and c o n 
sisted of about four hundred men.
the impetuous attack.
started to flee.

The enemy could not resist

They whirled about and immediately

Pursued by our men,

the enemy forces ran
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into our first line w h i c h h a d broken them first and was not
further ahead.

The worst part for the enemy occurred then,

for we lanced them without pity.

We did have the misfortune

of counting among our wounded the courageous Captains Rafael
Ortega and Gregorio Brito.

The latter died the next day,

lamenting the egoism of Ricaurte and Guerrero, who h a d not
told us about the proximity of the enemy.
The very bloody struggle with the enemy cavalry ended.
Then,

since it was already about

infantry.

81

OO p.m., we turned on the

But the infantry had already left its former

position and started its retreat toward the thickets of the
Apure River.

Although we did encounter this enemy infantry

about 9*00 p.m., we barely took any prisoners.
Baralt, commenting about that day states t

"There is

nothing sadder than a battle in the darkness of night.
then deeds go by without witnesses or glory.
do so without exciting compassion.
aid you.

For

Those w h o die

There are no friends to

Even courage and skill are worthless against the

enemy b l o w s . " 1 7

Such was the Battle of Mata de la Miel in

which the enemy lost nine hundred men,
and five hundred taken prisoners.

four hundred killed

The enemy also lost 3,345

horses and a great number of lances and rifles.

Captains

Genaro VAsquez, Nonato PArez, Miguel Antonio Figueredo,

17This exact citation may be found in Baralt and Diaz,
ResAmen de la H i s t o r i a . I, 350.
Note that Baralt lists
this battle as occurring in 1816.
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Antolin Mujica,

Francisco Hurtado, Hermenejildo Mujica,

Gregorio Brito,

and Juan Antonio Romero distinguished t h e m 

selves in this battle as u s u a l . T h e
Granada,

government of New

on which the troops under m y command in Casanare

were dependent,

then sent me a dispatch promoting me to

Lieutenant Colonel.

l®No further information was available on Miguel
Antonio Figueredo.
Captain Antolin Mugica was a native of Venezuela.
He
enlisted in the patriot ranks in 1814 and fought most o u t 
standingly against the Royalists.
In December of 1815 he
fought with P&ez at the Battle of Chire against General
Calzada.
He was at the surprise attack on Vicente Pena at
Arauca.
Distinguishing himself particularly at the Battle
of Mata de la Miel, he went on to another victory against
the Spanish at Paso del Fr£o.
In 1816 he joined Captain
Antonio Ranjel in the Battle of Achaguas.
He was defeated
and captured.
Colonel Andr£s Torrellas h a d h i m shot and
beheaded.
Then his head was fried in oil and placed on
public display in Calabozo until 1818 when Bolivar and F&ez
entered the city, removed it, and buried it with the proper
pomp and circumstance.
Scarpetta and Vergara, Diccionario
Biogr&fico, 371-72.
Cunninghame Graham, P & e z . 110-11.
jos6 Francisco Hurtado joined Piez's forces in 1816
as company captain.
In 1819 he became a cavalry lieutenant
colonel and a member of P&ez's Honor Guard.
In 1826 he
attained the rank of colonel.
D&vila, Diccionario B i o g r & f i c o .
I, 252-53.
Colonel Hermenejildo Mujica was Antolin's brother and
a fierce warrior who waged battle as if death were m e a n i n g 
less.
He fought in the battles of Achaguas, Mucuritas,
Ortiz, and Rincon del Toro.
He particularly distinguished
himself at the Battles of Mata de la Miel, BoyacA, and
Carabobo.
Ibid., 392-93.
Juan Antonio Romero was born in Santa Lucia about
1795.
In 1813 he enlisted in Miranda's squadron and fought
in Mosquitero.
He fought under campo Elias at the first
battle of La Puerta in 1814 and was defeated.
In 1819 he
fought under PAez at La Cruz.
Continuing to fight ardently
against the Royalists, Bolivar promoted h i m in 1827 to the
rank of lieutenant in the cavalry.
P&ez gave h i m his r e t i r e 
ment papers in 1830.
In 1845 he became Militia Captain in
Orituco and by 1853 was second in command there.
Romero
died of cholera in 1856 in Caracas.
Ibid., II, 204.
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I gave the prisoners from the Spanish army the freedom
to desert and return to their homes if they so desired.
Because of their good treatment, m a n y of those w h o m X did
not send to N e w Granada,
the month.

joined my ranks before the end of

Nearly all of them were Venezuelans and in that

time there was middle ground between friend and enemy.

The

news of m y generosity toward the prisoners and the glory
brought by victory spread throughout the towns of Barinas
and j^>ure.

Their inhabitants, w h o previously h a d h e l d a bad

opinion of the patriots because of the cruel conduct of some
of their leaders, were converted to the justice of our cause.
Coaxed by the leniency of our conduct toward the vanquished,
they slowly began to join our ranks and become later the
bulwark of the forces for Colombian independence.
While we were still pursuing the remains of LOpez's
army in the direction of Barinas, Commander Guerrero p r e 
sented himself in Guasdualito with orders from Ricaurte to
assume command of the forces I was leading.

This was stupid

of the mam after he h a d turned us over to the en e m y — an
enemy w hich was n o w fleeing before our troops.
these troops,

After all,

on the strength of their own efforts and

guided by other leaders, h a d just triumphed over the very
forces that h a d set Ricaurte and Guerrero into flight.
A lthough the bulk of these troops h a d not yet returned,
R i c u a r t e 's authority was immediately disregarded by those
who were with the wounded and with the prisoners.
claimed head of the army,

I was p r o 

as x h a d been in the battle.
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Despite the good reasons for the action taken by the troops,
I countermarched hurriedly toward Guasdualito as soon as 1
received news of the event.

Exercising m y influence there

with the leaders of the uprising,
reinstatement.
my satisfaction,

I achieved Guerrero's

He continued in command.

This was much to

for despite all the inconveniences,

it was

better to have h i m as leader them to get rid of him at the
cost of a mutiny or a barracks'

congress which is usually

ill-advised and seldom beneficial.

CHAPTER VII
[Miguel Antonio] V&squez's Occupation of M a n t e c a l —
The Priest, Colonel [Andres] Torrelias— Ldpez Decides
to Attack M e — I Prepare for the Def e n s e — I Take the
Offensive Against the Spaniards— Obstacles of the
Apure Campaign— The Valiant Captain, Antolin M u g i c a —
His Disastrous E n d — I Go to Arichuna Parish--Movements
of the Royalist Army under the Command of [Miguel de]
La T o r r e — Tasks that the Chief of the Army, Colonel
Francisco de Paula Santander Assigns to M e — I am
Named Supreme Chief in Place of the Latter on My
Re t u r n — Condition of the Army I had Under m y Command.
1816
Eventually [Miguel] Guerrero was called to the province
of Casanare,
dualito.

and I was left in charge of the army in G u a s 

I ordered Commander Miguel Antonio Vdsques to march

with five hundred cavalrymen to occupy the town of Mantecal.
He did this, destroying a picket of forty enemy riflemen
that he found there.

However, he was quickly dislodged from

Mantecal and pursued up to Trinidad de Arichuna by a column
of eight hundred enemy cavalrymen.

This column, under the

command of the priest Colonel Andr 6 s Torrellas,
itself in that town.^

then lodged

V&squez continued retreating toward

^Colonel Andrds Torrellas was a priest in the town of
Siquisique when on March 10, 1813, he joined the Royalist
forces to fight against his countrymen.
He came to be one
of P&ez's implacable foes in the terrible wars of the l l a n o s .
In fact, he was so zealous in his devotion to the Royalist
cause, that he shot maity patriot prisoners, among them the
224
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Guasdualito.
him.

When I heard about this,

I set out to meet

Placing myself at the head of his column, we returned

immediately toward Mantecal.
cautious,

Torrellas,

did not wait for me.

de Totumo.

either afraid or

Instead he retreated to Mata

I pursued h i m without results,

for he retreated

constantly until he reached the other side of the Apure River,
which he crossed at the Paso del Frio.
where,

about the middle of June,

I stayed in Mantecal

Ldpez decided to attack me.

Despite the fact that our army had suffered many
casualties, we went out to wait for the enemy in an open
plain.
men.

There I stationed m y small column of three hundred
I h a d sent fifty of my men in formation under the com

ma n d of Captain Basilio Brito to the town of Rincon Hondo.
Ldpez formed his men to the right of the ditch at Caicara.
He had a force of twelve hundred cavalrymen and four hundred
infantrymen and six pieces of artillery.

Neither side

gained any ground during the day since there were only a few
skirmishes between the two hundred Royalist riflemen and
fifty of the patriots led by the very brave Captain Antolin
Mugica.

Our force repelled the enemy in several attacks,

killing m a n y of them.

Our only casualties consisted of

Brave Antolin Mujica.
By 1822, however, he embraced the
patriot cause and fought for it with equal z e a l . Soublette
then named h i m governor of the province of Coro.
Though
Torrelles supported P&ez in his movement for the separation
o f Venezuela from Gran Colombia in 1826, Bolivar still named
h i m General of the Colombian army when P&ez submitted to
Bolivar's authority.
He died near Caracas in 1848.
Scarp e t t a and Vergara, Diccionario BioorAfico. 624-25.
Cunninghame Graham, P & e z . 110-11.
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three wounded and Mugica's horse.
Afraid of being surprised during the night,

I retreated

to a sand dune which was behind us and surrounded by somewhat
deep water.

Here the Spaniards did not dare attack us, not

even the following day.

They stayed in sight until they

retreated on the following night to the Nutrias road in
search of Paso del Frio.

It was not in keeping either with

my character nor my plans to remain idle any longer.
minute I discovered their retreat,

The

1 gave the order to march.

We overtook the Spaniards two days later.

What was even

worse for them was that we surprised them at 4i00 a.m. at
the Paso.

The battle which ensued was disastrous for them.

Their casualties amounted to over three hundred men.
included the dead,
horses.

scattered,

and wounded,

This

and five hundred

We were unable to inflict greater damage because of

the swampy terrain.
overflowing river,

Covered with woods and water from the
the area afforded the Spanish infantry a

cover from which to defend itself advantageously.
Normally,
obstacles.

the Apure campaign presented infinite

Moreover, we had to cross an estuary about a

league long in order to reach the aforementioned river p a s s .
It was so full of water,
up.

that our horses could barely stand

The pass was as full of alligators as the rest of our

plains.

This trip, across the overflowing waters and in the

darkness of night,

seemed little less than impossible.

It

took the Spaniards completely by surprise when we were able
to carry out this operation successfully.
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After this surprise at the Paso del Frio,
to Mantecal.

I returned

There Captain Antonio Ranjel and some other

officers insisted that I send them to take the city of
Achaguas, which was seventy leagues from Mantecal and
unguarded.

To take it by surprise,

X detached one hundred

and fifty men under the command of Ranjel,
to remain hidden as long as possible.
to go around the Zancudo corner,

and ordered them

To do this,

they h a d

cross the Apure Seco River

below the mouth of the Payara River,

and attack the city

unexpectedly from behind.
The difficulties that Ranjel had to surmount in order
to carry out this plan are inconceivable,

for all the terrain

he had to cross was inundated by the overflow of those rivers,
and by the qamelotales which grow at the edge of the water.
However, he was finally

able to get to the vicinity of

Achaguas without having

been detected. There he discovered

that there were one hundred grenadiers in the barracks in the
plaza.

These forces had come down from Frio and embarked

w i t h the purpose of collecting their scattered forces and
augmenting their ranks with n e w recruits.
Ranjel was not informed
the edge of the river,

Unfortunately,

that there was another barracks at
about

two blocks from the plaza, with

two h u n dred unmounted lancers.
At dawn, Ranjel attacked the infantry barracks and was
able to enter, killing all who resisted h i m either w i t h a
lance or a saber.

At that moment,

the two hundred lancers

charged and forced the patriots to retreat outside the city
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and abandon their prisoners and the arms they had taken.
Ranjel proposed to retreat now by the same road that he had
come.

The fiery captain Antolin Mugica,

do t h i s .

said he would not

He added that he would rather die continuing the

fight than be the bearer of the unhappy news of an unfor
tunate battle.

He invited all the men to accompany him in

continuing the attack.

Unfortunately for him, some men did

follow him, and in the charges and countercharges that took
place, his horse fell in a rainwater pool, created for the
purpose of drinking water in the summer.

There he was made

a prisoner and shot by the priest. Colonel Andres Torrellas.
His head,

separated from the body, was fried in oil and sent

back to the city of Calabozo.

There it was placed on a spike

and remained in execrable exhibition until we found it in
1818 when, by General Bolivar's order,

it was taken down and

buried with due reverence.
After this unfortunate event, I decided to change my
position to the Arichuna parish in order to facilitate c o m 
munications with Guasdualito.

Meanwhile [Pablo] Morillo's

troops had occupied New Granada and destroyed the government .2

2General Pablo Morillo was born in Fuentesecas, Spain,
on May 5, 1778.
A man of humble birth, he had served in the
Spanish army first as a soldier, corporal and sergeant.
At
the time of the French invasion in 1808, he became an officer.
He fought so brilliantly in the siege of Vigo, that he won
the rank of colonel.
Serving under Wellington until the end
of the Peninsular Campaign, he finally attained the ranks of
field marshall and lieutenant general.
Unfortunately, he was
the type of man who was only at home in an army camp.
The
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With a strong column under [Miguel de] La Torre's command,
the Royalists had also pursued the remains of the Republican
troops up to casanare.3

General [Manuel de] Servier,

leader

of the patriots in the unfortunate retreat from Bogota to
Casanare, was able to save only about two hundred men from
the defeat that Lieutenant colonel Antonio Gdmez had

title of Pacificador and the mission to subdue all of South
America in one hundred and sixty days were incompatible with
this man.
He was in command of the Spanish forces in
America from 1815 until he was replaced by La Torre in 1820.
He held the titles of count of Cartagena, Marquds de la
Puerta, and Captain General of Madrid and New Castile.
He
died while in France in 1837.
Henao and Arrubla, History of
C o l o m b i a . 269-70, 347.
Thomas Rourke, Man of Glorv. Simon
Bolivar (New York, 1939), 235-36.
Laura F. Ulrich, "Morillo's
Attempt to Pacify Venezuela," Hispanic American Historical
R e v i e w , III (November, 1920), 535-65.
^General Miguel de la Torre began his career as a
common soldier.
When he had become a sergeant, he came to
America where his valor and knowledge were influential in
his promotion to brigadier.
In 1816 he was given an impor
tant command in Venezuela where he distinguished himself
particularly in the siege of Angostura.
He was forced to
abandon Angostura by illnesses and lack of supplies.
In
1820 he was promoted to field marshal, and soon replaced
Morillo as supreme commander of the Spanish forces in America.
He was defeated by Bolivar and P&ez in the Battle of Carabobo
in 1821.
In 1822 he was still in command of the Spanish
forces.
By 1823 he was named civil and military governor of
Puerto Rico, a post he maintained until 1837.
EspasaCalpe (Hijos de j. Espasa, eds.), Enciclopedia universal
ilustrada Europeao-Americana, 70 vols.
(Madrid, 1905-30);
A p p e n d ices. 10 vols. (Madrid, 1930-33), LXII, 1301.
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inflicted on him in Caqueta on June l l .4
Torre overtook Servier,

La

but h e was unable to prevent the

letter's retreat which was accomplished,
losses,

Two days later.

although with some

because o f the cover afforded by the intervening

Ocoa River.
On June 22, La Torre overtook Servier again in Upia
and finished scattering his troops; consequently.

General

Servier arrived at Pore to join General Urdaneta on June 23
with a very insignificant number of men.

There Servier

joined the emigration and was deprived of his command by
order of Colonel Miguel V a l d 6 z.

The latter had replaced

General Ricaurte in Guasdualito when he h a d resigned,

unknown

to Urdaneta, under the pretext that the government was d i s 
solved and unable to appoint him.

Meanwhile in Pore, Colonel

Juan Nepomuceno Moreno remained in command w i t h the title of
governor but without sufficient forces or means to maintain
h i m s e l f .®

^General Servier is usually referred to as General
Manuel de Serviez.
He was a Frenchman who came to Cartagena
in 1812 and fought for two years in the Cauca Valley under
Marino.
In 1616, at the head of the second line of defense,
Servier saved the patriot army from destruction and led what
was left of it to safety at Bogota.
In October of 1816,
when h e had gone to Achaguas to cooperate w i t h PAez, he was
assassinated.
Hasbrouck, Foreign L e g i o n a r i e s . 343.
^Juan Nepomuceno Moreno was born in the province of
Casanare.
He fought with PAez, Aramendi, and Olmedilla for
the cause of independence beginning with the Battle of
Guasdualito until the Battle of Yagual and the seizure of
Achaguas.
As Governor of Pore he assembled regiments that
fought with Bolivar in countless battles.
He himself fought
against the Royalist in the Battle of BoyacA.
While serving
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Two other patriot columns had also crossed the m o u n 
tain range headed toward Casanare.
them to approach,

stopped his march.

La Torre,

anxious for

He intended then to

surround Pore and end the campaign in that province.

One of

La Torre's columns, under Lieutenant Colonel [Matias] EscutA's
command, went from Tunja,
salt mines of Chita.®

by w a y of Sogamoso and Taso,

to the

There it occupied the site of Sacama

as an impregnable position.

Colonel Juan Villacicencio then

came down from San Gil with two hundred and seventy horses,
and on June 29 h a d an encounter on the plains of Guachiria
with eighty cavalrymen and seventy-five infantrymen under
Moreno's c o m m a n d . 7

Both forces disputed the field gallantly

until, mutually pressed by the fear of being charged by

as Chief of the Republic's troops in Casanare, he refused to
accept Venezuela's separation from the confederation.
In
1830 he defeated General Justo Bricefio in a battle ensuing
from the revolution which was promulgated against the e x i s t 
ing government.
He entered BogotA with his troops then and
took part in the junta that supported Vice-President Caicedo.
H e succeeded in getting the head of the government to issue
his decree of June 10 by which the doors of the country were
opened again to those who had been exiled after the c o n 
spiracy of September 25, 1828.
Scarpetta and Vergara,
Diccionario B i o a r A f i c o . 359-60.
6Colonel Matias BscutA was in command of the first
of Morillo's two squadrons in Venezuela in 1816.
Lecuna,
Crdnica Razo n a d a . II, 2.
7Colonel Juan Villavicencio is sometimes listed as
Colonel Manuel Villanvicencio.
He was in command of another
one of Pablo Morillo's columns in Venezuela.
Villavicencio
left San Gil with some of Ferdinand VII's cavalry and light
artillery to join EscutA and take over the command of both
Spanish columns.
D. Mariano Torrente, Historia de la
Revolucidn Hispano-A m e r i c a n a . 3 vols. (Madrid, 1829), II,
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greater forces

(their exact numbers were hidden by the d a r k 

ness of night),

they abandoned the struggle.

Villavicencio

returned toward the mountain with quite a number of losses.
The patriots returned toward Pore,

and remained masters of

the llanura until they evacuated the city and went w i t h a
large part of the emigration to Arauca.
La Torre occupied Pore on July 10 and pursued the
patriot forces to B o c o y e s .
returned to Pore,

He failed to overtake them,

and established his winter quarters there

until the worst of the rains had passed and the swollen rivers
h a d returned to their normal size.
Morillo considered La Torre's march from Bogota in a
p eriod of forty-four days an unheard of feat.

During this

time La Torre did not sleep in an inhabited place and only
h ad meat to eat.

He had been forced to endure continuous

rains and cross swamps and the copious Negro, Upi,
rivers.

According to what he himself said later,

and other
the

smallest of these rivers was wider than the Ebro at its
mouth.

For a native of our country,

admiration for h a v i n g

c onquered such hardships and difficulties is incomprehen
sible,

for we do not need many comforts while on campaign and

are used to eating only meat, without bread or salt or any
other condiment.

When we do get any of these articles m e n 

tioned, we are completely satisfied.
and always live out in the open.

We do not need shoes

We sleep on the plains or

in the forest as if we were under the most comfortable roof.
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We are frugal,

and we are never despondent or desperate when

we find ourselves surrounded by difficulties and dangers.
For a European,
However,

La Torre's march was truly extraordinary.

it is insignificant when compared with what the

Colombians accomplished who covered the immense territory of
five republics in need of everything.

The few of them who

are alive today talk about their dangerous marches to Cuzco
as if they had been nothing more than excursions of fun.
In Trinidad of Arichuna,
from Colonel Vald 6 z,
nare troops,

I received a communication

the Commanding General of the C a s a 

to come to Arauca and attend a meeting of the

Granadine and Venezuelan leaders and officers for the p u r 
pose of establishing a provisional government and selecting
a leader.

Lieutenant Colonel Fernando Serrano,

ex-governor

of Pamplona and a person of great merit, was unanimously
named President of the State.

Doctor Don Francisco Javier

Yahez was named Secretary of state and Generals Servier and
Urdaneta were named Counsellors.

Colonel Francisco de Paula

Santander was appointed General-in-Chief of the army.
government was later installed in Guasdualito,

This

and its members

swore to support it and never c a p i t u l a t e .
After this event,

I went with Santander to the town

of Trinidad where the column under my command,
that existed then, was stationed.
begin active operations.

the only one

The horses were unable to

Ramdn Nonato P 6 rez was in the

plains of Cuiloto with two hundred men and one thousand
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h o r s e s , but he refused to recognize any authority.®

San

tander commissioned Father Trinidad Travieso and me then to
persuade him and his people to join our army.®

He offered

to do so, but did not carry out his word.
In view of the need we had for horses,

Santander h i m 

self also commissioned me to go to the Lareno farm to get
colts to use for cavalry mounts.

I did this and was bringing

five h undred of them to headquarters when,
away,

about a league

I found out through several leaders and officers who

came out to m e e t me,

that the troops h a d named me supreme

chief and were in formation at camp waiting to get m y consent
for their action.

These chiefs and officers begged me when

we reached the camp not to report the outcome of my c o m m i s 
sion to Santander,

for he was no longer chief.

This is one of the most notable events of my life,
and perhaps the beginning of that continued series of
caprices with which fortune chOse to elevate me and give me
a place in the history of Colombia.

N o w let us hear what

^Although Scarpetta and Vergara state that Nonato
P 6 rez served P&ez well, Vicente Lecuna mentions that Colonel
Ramdn N onato P 6 rez was brought to trial in 1816 supposedly
because of inflicting arbitrary deaths, stealing, com m u n i 
cating with the enemy, and bad conduct toward the refugees
in Guasdualito.
In reality, the charges were “trumped up"
b y P&ez as a means of punis h i n g a disobedient chief.
Scar
p e t t a and Vergara, Diccionario B i o g r & f i c o , 460.
Lecuna,
C r dnica R a z o n a d a . II, 308.
®Father Trinidad Travieso was b o m in 1798 in San
Felipe, Venezuela.
From 1813 until early in 1822 he served
as aide-de-camp to General-in-Chief, Rafael Urdaneta.
Scarpetta and Vergara, Diccionario B i o g r & f i c o . 633.
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Baralt

(and Diaz)

in their Historia de Venezuela. Volume I,

page 289. have to say about Serrano's and Santander's govern
ment.

10

The truth is that this apparatus of regular govern
ment in those waste lands, designed by a few fugitives
without either subjects or land to govern, was highly
ridiculous, illegal, and what is more, embarrassing.
Serrano was an excellent man.
However, he was from
N e w Granada and was now in Venezuelan territory.
Which republic was he to direct? And where was the
army Santander was to lead— Santander who was a Granadine also and unknown in Venezuela?
Servier. French
by birth and a Gram adine officer, could not inspire
any confidence.
The names of Urdaneta and Yanez, so
respected in Venezuela and New Granada, were not suf
ficient to lend authority and weight to that wretched
government, situated as it was in the midst of semibarbaric men for whom civil virtues, and even military
virtues of a certain elevated order, were strange and
foreign things.
Naturally, that retinue only lasted a
very short time, for it had barely arrived at Trinidad
de Arichuna, when several Venezuelan leaders thought
about destroying it and substituting it with what was
needed then.
And this was one sole and absolute leader
who had the confidence of the llaneros and could lead
them in war.
A mutiny of three squadrons was attempted
while a junta of officers met to pretend to be intimi
dated, seek means to appease the troops, and find these
means in the deposition of Santander.
The latter cut
short the confusion by presenting himself before the
junta and immediately after before these squadrons.
Realizing that he was not the man needed in these
circumstances, he resigned his command immediately in
the presence of President Serrano.
The junta, composed
of colonels Juan Antonio Paredes and Fernando Figueredo,
of Lieutenant Colonels Jos£ Marla Carreno, Miguel
Antonio V&squez, and of Sergeant Major Francisco Conde,
went on later to elect a person who would occupy both
Santander's and Serrano's positions simultaneously— a

10In the 1939 edition of Baralt and Diaz, ResCimen de
la Historia published by Descl 6 e de Brouiver in Paris, this
citation may be found in Volume I, 351-54.
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m an w h o was to be the absolute leader in the l l a n o s . ^
The election went to Ptiez, caudillo of the only force
there was there, and this explains his victory.
As
for the rest of this curious event, which seen in the
light o f m i l i t a r y regulations is a true anomaly, it was
very natural in those circumstances.
The error, of
course, was not in the destruction of that kind of
government, for it h a d been the work of an unauthorized
junta.
Necessarily, it would last only as long as the
voluntary submission of the chiefs, officers, and troops
to which the Republic had been reduced.
It was easy to
foresee that such obedience would not last long.
San
tander himself said it when he wrote in 1827 t
'I saw
only too well that everything that was being done would
tumble the day that one of those chiefs wanted it, and
this wo uld be a chief who, by analogy of the customs,
also would have influence over the llan e r o s . Fur t h e r 
more, by then I h a d already been labeled an enemy of
the Venezuelans because of the differences originating
in Cticuta between Bolivar and [Manuel d e l j C a s t i l l o .'12
And further on Santander writesx
'This attempt s u p 
pressed, X could not continue commanding m e n who leaned
toward rebellion, particularly in a country where it
was believed to be dishonorable for a Granadine to
command V e n e z u e l a n s .'

H-No further information was available on Juan A.
Paredes.
Josti Marla Carreno was born in Cua, Venezuela.
He
joined the revolutionary army in 1810.
On September 13,
1813, he lost the use of his right arm in the Battle of
Cerritos Blancos, but he still continued the campaign.
He
later became Governor of the Province of Santa M a r t a and
Intendant of the isthmus, Zulia, and Orinoco.
In 1830 he
w as a deputy to the Congreso A d m i r a b l e , and in 1832 he
returned to Venezuela as General of Division.
He died in
Caracas in 1849.
Dtivila, Diccionario B i o g r & f i c o . I, 73.
^ 2Baralt refers here to Manuel del Castillo, a N e w
Granadan, who in 1813 was in command of one of Bolivar's two
divisions destined to liberate Venezuela.
Castillo and
Bolivar quarreled, and in Cticuta Castillo was replaced in
command by Santander.
In 1815 Castillo was governor of
Cartagena and refused to help Bolivar to carry out his c o m 
mission, given by the government of N e w Granada, to liberate
Santa M arta from the Royalists.
Because of this, on M a y 8 ,
1815, Bolivar resigned his command in order not to quarrel
w i t h another patriot official and sailed for Jamaica.
Mortin,
Hi s t o r y of V e n e z u e l a . 114, 121.
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The truth of the matter is that Santander had
strong antipathies working against him.
He was not
man enough for the situation and in the final analysis,
wlthough gifted with a distinguished capacity, he did
not have the background nor the natural disposition to
wage war.
He had been placed by the llanero in that
derogatory category of officers called 'of letters . 1
But Serrano, it will be said, exercised a purely civil
authority and was in addition a good and respected man.
Whose way was he in? unfortunately, he was in every
body's way, for there was nothing more to the republic
than a camp of semibarbaric soldiers.
Therefore,
Serrano's supreme authority embarrassed war operations,
especially when the ignorant and the ignored of the
country could not direct them.
No; the evil was that
in saying the military hierarchy, indispensable basis
of discipline, P&ez was to command officers of rank
higher than his.
Among these was a Venezuelan General,
capable, courageous, and known for many and eminent
services.
History can respond to this with the fact
that Santander's election was in this same category,
and that Urdaneta, aspiring only to join Bolivar
wherever he appeared, did not want to take part in
these affairs.
He knew the llaneros too well to believe
that he could command a troop of them— alone as they
were and without ever having been submitted to the rule
of any ordinance.
Servier, a foreigner and unknown to the country,
contributed to not being considered by showing his
jealousy of Urdaneta.
The other leaders, although
very worthy of esteem and considerations, because of
their merit could not compete with P&ez who was w o r 
shipped by his t r o o p s . He was caudillo or the only
force that existed, famous because of his valor and
the constant success that had accompanied him in all
his undertakings.
That election, which could easily have been marked
by intrigue and violence, met with success instead.
In
fact, it is evident to us that several courageous
citizens, including Servier, were very anxious to p r o 
mote the change spontaneously.
It so happenens,
though, that these citizens came to flatter themselves
into thinking that they could later direct P&ez.
But
P&ez shook himself from them, leaving them feeling a
little cheated and peeved.
I have cited Baralt as the best authority among us.
However,

I will not fail to correct the errors his narration
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contains,

said I shall relate the events in the manner in

w h i c h they occurred.
On September 16,
quarters.

1816 1 arrived at Santander's h e a d 

After the events which I have mentioned previously,

the leaders and officers w h o had stayed in the camp,
p anied by a large part of the civilians,
me.
this,

accom

came out to welcome

They proclaimed me their supreme leader.

Surprised by

I reprimanded them and asked h o w they could disregard

Santander and the other authorities who governed them.

They

answered that they did not find Santander capable enough or
w i t h sufficient judgment to save them in those very dangerous
circumstances,

and that they had agreed to take this step "in

order that I would liberate them from the deathhouse in which
they already considered themselves."

They insisted that I

should not refuse their proclamation since everyone at h e a d 
quarters was in agreement.

I reprimanded them again,

them that I was not disposed to support them.
out that they,

telling

They pointed

representative of the emigration from N e w

Granada and Venezuela,

and the only relics of both Republics,

were the only sovereign.

Because of this,

they felt that

they were in a position to resolve and execute what best
suited them on this occasion.
They made m a n y other observations to me,
I ignored.

In fact,

all of which

I tried to detach myself from them in

order to go to Santander's house and give an account of the
commission he had given me.

They tried to prevent me from

doing so and to make me see that

1

was their chief and
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consequently had to account to no o n e .

They begged me to

ma r c h with them before the troops and be recognized as supreme
chief.

1 resisted and got away from them.

Then I wen t to

S a n t a n d e r 's house and gave an account of m y commission w i t h 
out telling h i m anything concerning what had just occurred.
After I had retired to the ranch that served as my
home,

the same leaders and officers,

more citizens,

accompanied by even

came to urge me again to go with them before

the troops that were in formation and ready to recognize me.
I refused for the hundredth time.

But at this point

Santander came in and asked what was happening.
noticed that the troops were in formation.

He had

They told h i m

that since they considered themselves to be in eminent danger
because of the critical circumstances that surrounded them,
they had resolved to confer the supreme command on me and to
obey m y wishes blindly;

they were certain that

1

was the only

one who could save them from the dangers that threatened them
from all sides.
and that,

Santander answered that he agreed wit h them

furthermore, he would submit himself to my orders

with pleasure if they would accept the resignation he would
tender right then.
a resignation,

They pointed out the uselessness of such

for they had already ignored his authority.

They told h i m further that they, along with the people that
h a d saved themselves from the Spanish,
eignty,

represented sover

for there was not any government left anywhere in New

Granada or in Venezuela.
permitted to resign.

Santander still insisted that he be

The assembly resisted his request
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vehemently until Santander stuck his sword in the ground and
said emphatically that he preferred that they take his life
with his sword rather than give his consent to this outrage.
I spoke then for the first time and pointed out the justice
of Santander's demand.

I said that I would not accept the

command if he were not permitted to resign.

They finally

yielded, and then I accepted the supreme command and was
recognized as chief.
In the citation from Baralt [and Diaz] which I gave
previously,

it is easy to detect another error when he [they]

ascertained that I attended the meeting called to decide on
Santander's deposition and m y elevation to command.

I have

already said that at that time I was executing the commission
that that chief had given me to corral horses for the troops
and to convince Nonato P4rez to join our army.
Restrepo states in Volume 27, page 326 of his work
t h a t t^
Such was the confidence that all had in P & e z 1s
courage, in his energy, in his influence on the
l l a n e r o s . and in the other gifts that graced him,
that Generals Urdaneta and Servier, and some colonels
submitted themselves willingly to his authority.
They looked on this step as the only narrow chance of
salvation in that frightful disaster.
P&ez immedi
ately decreed the end of President Serrano's functions
by declaring before the troops that he alone had the

l^The work of Jos6 Manuel Restrepo, Historia de la
Revolucidn de la Repflblica de C o l o m b i a , published in
Besanzdn in 1858 by the Imprenta de Jos6 Jacquino is c o n 
densed into four volumes.
The second volume contains dis
cussions of the years 1815, 1816, and 1817 among others.
This citation could not be located in these discussions.
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supreme authority.
In that difficult and sad occasion,
it could not have been any other way.
Civil authority
and division of command would have caused difficulties
in adopting and executing the active and energetic
measures that were needed, and without which the unfor
tunate relics of the patriots that had taken to the
llanos situated between the Arauca and the Apure could
not have been saved.
After speaking to the troops and the people and
thanking them for the confidence they had shown in me,

I

advised them to ask Divine Providence not to deny me the p r o 
tection I needed in the arduous enterprise before me.

I was

thinking about leaving that very day to encounter the enemy,
after I had placed the non-combatants in the safest possible
place.
Now I was in control of the supreme command of what
remained of the Republics of New Granada and Venezuela.14

j

formed a junta then in order to familiarize myself with the
opinions of the principal officers concerning the operations
we had to undertake to save our last hopes.

We had to agree

on a plan of operation against the enemies of our independence.
It is necessary at this point to give the reader an
idea of the condition of the troops and the resources we
relied on to save our country.

The army horses, untamed and

new, were worn out because the pasture in the plains where we
were was scarce and poor in quality.

Most of the soldiers

14At this time the Supreme Commander, Simdn Bolivar,
was in Haiti, where he had been forced into exile by the
Spanish reoccupation of Venezuela.
His liberating expedition
did not leave Haiti until December of 1616.
Restrepo,
Revolucidn de la Repdblica de Colombia. II, 369-70.
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had no weapons other than the lance and apricot-tree sticks,
sharpened like a pike at one end.
fire arms.

Very few of them carried

They clothed themselves with ouavucos . 1 5 Their

hats had rotted with the rigors of the rainy season.
had no saddles,

They

and we could not even supply them with a

blanket or any other soft seat.
soldiers fought over its hide,

When we killed a cow, the
for they needed it as shelter

from the rain at night in the open plain.

We were forced to

stay on the open plains in order to prevent being taken by
surprise;
were,

for, with the exception of the territory where we

all the rest of the area was occupied by the enemy.

Those who committed the indiscretion of separating themselves
from the center of our forces were pursued and killed.
The historian[s] Baralt [and Diaz] state with con1 fi

aider able accuracy ! -10

It is impossible to imagine the depths of poverty
endured by those men who then and later fought a war
in the llanos. The soldiers were so naked, that they
were forced to use the raw hides of the cows they
killed to cover themselves.
A few of them had hats,
but none had shoes.
The customary and only source of
nourishment was meat without salt or bread.
In addi
tion to all this, the rains were very frequent, and
the overflowing rivers and ditches had inundated the
territory.
There was a need for horses, and since these
are indispensable to the llanero soldier, it was neces
sary above all things to look for them.
Consequently,
the first movements were aimed at this acquisition.
The horses that were usually found were wild and had
to be tamed by squadrons according to the custom of
the ll a n o s . This was by the effort of the r i d e r s .

^ Quavuco is a loin cloth used by the Indians of
Venezuela and Colombia.
16Baralt and Diaz, Restimen de la Historia. I, 354-55.

243
It was a curious spectacle to see five or six
hundred m e n at a time struggling with those
ferocious animals.
Several officers were placed
around the camp of exercise.
They were mounted
on tame h o r s e s , not for the purpose of helping the
riders that fell, but for chasing the horses that
h a d knocked them down and retrieving the saddle,
even if it was nothing more than the tree and bow
of a saddle with r a w leather straps.
'We wanted
r i s k , ' wrote a witness m u c h later, 'in order to end
such a bitter life w i t h g l o r y . ' . . .
In addition to all this, there were the difficulties
presented b y a numerous emigration and the need of p r o 
viding a livelihood at each step, for there were no
storage facilities.
This group of men, women, and
children, without homes or country, vividly presented
the image of a nomadic people who, after having c o n 
sumed the resources of the area they occupied, lifted
their tents to conquer another by force.
I would add that our emigration reminded me of the
exodus of the Israelites from their captivity in Egypt.

The

sole difference was that we did not have a cloud of fire to
guide us on our way.

Neither did the poor Moses leading us

have a w a n d capable of making manna rain from the heavens
nor water burst forth from the ground as did the Hebre w
caudillo.

To make the comparison more exact,

us that General Morillo,

news reached

as another Pharoah, was searching

for us to reduce, us again to the old slavery.
Oht

Those times!

Only God knows w h a t we suffered.

Rather than go to the towns and there risk life in the arms
of a despised and vengeful tyranny, we h a d to acquire more
than stoicism and heroism to face an existence so full of
dangers and needs,
endure.

that it seemed more than a h u m a n could

Our children will never be able to imagine even

remotely the price we paid for independence; but those times
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brought forth m e n who possessed bodies and souls that were
tempered of steel.

Nothing was left to us then but hope and

an indomitable resolution which was greater than all the
calamities and misfortunes p u t together.

Hope nourished us

and our determination served as a basis on which to raise
again the sacred altar of our fatherland.

CHAPTER VIII
Morillo's Expedition— Condition of Venezuela and
New Granada at Time of his Arrival— Siege and
Occupation of Cartagena— Morillo's Cruelties—
System of War Adopted by the Patriots— Organiza 
tion of the A r m y — Emigration— Encounter in "Los
Coc o s " — Action at Yagual— Interview with the
Royalists, Ldpez— Seizure of N u t r i a s — Event at the
Entrance to Masp a r r o — Surprise Attack on Some of
our Boats at the Entrance to La Portuguese— Battles
in El Palital and Rabanal— March to Achaguas—
Terror of Some Patriots on Hearing of Morillo's
M o v e m e n t s — Defense of the Army of A p u r e — Correc 
tion of Some of Baralt's [and Diaz's] Errors.
1015-1816
Spain would not abandon her goal of reconquering the
countries that h a d risen against her domination.

She was

barely free from the French invasion when, without stopping
for any reconstruction,
plish this purpose.

she readied an expedition to accom

Spain felt that she would get more than

enough compensation from the reconquest of the rebellious
territories.
Wellington,

Don Pablo Morillo headed the expedition.

Lord

recalling the distinguished military attributes

and integrity of character that Morillo had exhibited in the
Peninsula, h a d recommended h i m as the most apt person for
the undertaking.

Morillo has been justly compared with the

celebrated Duke of Alba, whom Philip II h a d considered the
most capable of his generals for the subjection and p u n i s h 
ment of the rebellious Flemish.
245

He was seconded in command
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b y Don Pascual Enrile,

a native of Habana and thus a d i s 

grace to the American n a m e . 1
10,642 men,

This expedition consisted of

selected from the cream of the Spanish troops.

They sailed in sixty merchant vessels and were escorted by
three large war frigates, thirty smaller ones,
ship,

and the w a r 

San Pedro A l c & n t a r a .
The question arises now as to what the condition of

the patriot cause was in N e w Granada and Venezuela at this
time when the mother country was sending such a formidable
force to subjugate them again.
civil discord had ignited.

In N e w Granada the fire of

Bolivar had been forced to s u s 

p e n d his activities against the Royalists in order to reason
with the people who refused to recognize the government of
the Union.

This was particularly true of Cartagena,

a city

which he finally had to lay under siege when it resisted

^Brigadier Enrile was of noble lineage and was born
in CAdiz.
Since he spent his childhood in Havana, it was
believed to be his native city and explains P&ez's error in
this instance.
He had excellent military training and
served with distinction in the Peninsular War against
Napoleon.
At this time he commanded the Spanish naval forces.
As Morillo's Chief of Staff, he wielded great influence over
the expeditionary leader.
Henao and Arrubla, History of
C o l o m b i a . 270, 276, 287, 294.
Lemly, B o l i v a r . 111.
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peaceful tra n s a c t i o n s . 2

Bolivar eventually was forced to

abandon command and embark for Jamaica when the means to
continue the w a r were refused him under deceiving pretexts.
Even his absence was not sufficient to end the internal d i s 
cords,

for the dissensions had grown to such proportions,

that they could have been detrimental to the American cause
if the need for a common defense had not come to conciliate
spirits.
Meanwhile the patriots of Venezuela had been subjected
by Boves's l l a n e r o s .

The patriots did not even have am army

w i t h which to protect Caracas.
the siege of Puerto Cabello,
by Boves.

Valencia,

They were forced to abandon

and La Guaira was then occupied

after resisting with unequal fearless

ness, was forced to capitulate at a high price.
barous and ferocious Boves,

The b a r 

failing to fulfill solemn oaths.

2 Pdez's and Henao and Arrubla's views on this incident
(see Footnote 13 in chapter VII) are not shared by some later
writers.
Salvador de Madariaga, for instance, perhaps o v e r 
looking the facts that the Congress of M e w Granada h a d given
Bolivar military command and that General Castillo in Carta
gena was his subordinate, is highly critical of Bolivar's
action in this instance.
He points out that Bolivar u s e d
the troops that the union Government had given h i m to fight
the Spaniards in Santa Marta for the purpose of subduing
Cartagena and its Military Governor, General Castillo.
Ma d a riaga statest
"We are told Bolivar could not take Santa
M a r t a because he lacked the means which Cartagena possessed;
and that, therefore, he had to go to besiege and take C a r t a 
gena and wrench from the obdurate city the means to fight
Santa Marta.
H o w could he then force Cartagena without
m e a n s 7 As all this is sheer nonsense, the sense must be some
where else.
Bolivar wanted first to get rid of Castillo and
then to liberate Santa Marta and Venezuela, but on condition
that he would be the one and only Li b e r t a d o r ." Madariaga,
Bolivar, 249.
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sacrificed the best citizens after having insidiously taken
possession of all their riches.
This was the condition of both countries when on
April 3, 1815 the expedition presented itself at Cartipano.
It advanced quickly to the island of Margarita where some
Venezuelan patriots,

including the never sufficiently-praised

[Francisco Esteban] Gdmez,

[Juan Bautista] Arizmendi,

[Jos4 Francisco] Bermddez were s t a y i n g . 3

and

Any resistance to

^General Francisco Esteban Gdmez was born in Margarita.
He served the independence cause until Morillo landed in
April of 1815.
In 1816, when the island fell into patriot
hands again, Gdmez served as Governor of the island while
Arizmendi went to Barcelona to aid Bolivar.
He welcomed
Bolivar to Juan Griego on December 28, 1816.
From 1817 until
1819 he fought Morillo's reoccupation of the island.
In 1819
he became Governor while Arizmendi was named Military Chief.
Scarpetta and Vergara, Diccionario BiogrAfico. 182-84.
Juan Bautista Arizmendi was a native of the island of
Margarita and was half-Creole and half-Indian.
He was the
leader of the local movement on the island which seconded the
Junta founded in Caracas on April 19, 1810.
When Margarita
set up its own Junta, Arizmendi became Commander of Arms.
This weighed heavily against him when the island fell into
Spanish control under Pascual Martinez.
Martinez treacherously
imprisoned Arizmendi.
However, on June 13, 1813 Arizmendi led
a revolt that forced the Spanish garrison to surrender.
On
April 7, 1815 when Morillo's forces sighted Pampatar, the
chief city and port of Margarita, Arizmendi ordered the Spanish
flag raised.
On April 9, the Spanish troops landed after the
island offered to surrender if forgiven for its past deeds.
Arizmendi stayed on in Margarita and reported to Morillo
under cover of Morillo's proclamation granting amnesty to all
rebels.
Morillo forgave Arizmendi, even against Morales's
advice.
In November of the same year, Arizmendi broke his
word to the Spanish General and initiated a second revolt in
Margarita.
It has been said that this act of treason com
pletely altered Morillo's policy of conciliation.
Madariaga,
Bolivar. 216, 257-58, 274.
General J. F. Bermudas was born in Venezuela in 1782.
As early as 1809 and 1810, he fought Spanish domination in
the revolutionary juntas of Caracas.
He joined General
Marino's forces in 1812 and with him suffered the defeat at
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the disembarking of the expeditionary troops would have been
futile.

A great number of those who were on the island,

including Bermddez,

escaped between the enemy ships and

took refuge in Cartagena and the Antilles.
After disembarking at Margarita, Morillo went on to
Caracas where some Royalist corps joined him.

In August he

left Puerto Cabello with the object of beseiging Cartagena,
a patriot stronghold.

He stopped in Turbaco to form his

line that was to cut land communications to the plaza.

Then

he occupied “Boca Grande" and severed its sea communications.
Just as heroicly as at Sagunto, Numancia and Zaragoza,

the

plaza was defended against the repeated attacks of the

La Puerta in 1814.
With Generals Rivas and Piar he helped
defeat General Morales in Maturln in 1814.
He fled to
Margarita this same year and joined General Arismendi only
to flee to the mainland again when Morillo was landing his
Spanish troops. Legend says that he escaped by passing
right through the heart of the Spanish fleet, shouting who
he was and insulting the Spanish.
In 1816 Bolivar named him
Chief of the First Division, and in 1819 he replaced Marifio
as head of the Army of Oriente.
He was victorious at the
Battle of Carabobo in 1824.
In 1826 he did not support
PAez in his split with the Union.
By 1831, he yielded to
the inevitable and recognized the legitimate government of
PAez as President of Venezuela.
Later this same year he was
assassinated in CumanA by Francisco Carrera.
Scarpetta and
Vergara, Diccionario BioarAfico. 47-49.
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Spanish troops.4

Although the patriots found themselves

reduced to the extreme of eating even the most unclean a n i 
mals,

they would not surrender.

Finally when the daily

mortality rate ascended to that of one hundred persons,
evacuated the plaza,

they

forcing passage with their ships through

the midst of the enemy ships.
When the Spanish entered this city,
account given by captain General Montalvo,
cadavers, people who were dying,

according to the
they found only

and an air of pestilence

^The Battles of Sagunto, Numancia, and Zaragosa have
become legendary in the history of the Iberian Peninsula as
examples of the indomnitable courage of the Spaniards when
fighting for their fatherland.
The Battle of Sagunto or Saguntum (the town is n o w
officially known as Sagunto) took place in 219 B.C.
When
Hannibal took over supreme command of Punic Iberia, he led
his victorious armies over the whole of southern and eastern
Spain.
One city alone resisted this Carthaginian onslaught
in such a courageous manner that "the name of Saguntum
lives in history, as glorious as that of Hannibal himself."
U lrick B. Burke, A History of Spain from the Earliest Times
to the Death of Ferdinand the C a t h o l i c . 2 vols. (London,
1900), I, 12.
See also Rafael Altamira, A History of
Spanish Civilization (London, 1930), 26, 27.
The Battle of Numancia or Numantia took place inter
m i t t e n t l y from 209 to 27 B.C. when the Celtiberians here
d efied the Roman legions that had conquered most of the rest
of their territory.
It took sixteen months of a continuous
siege led by Scipio Africanus to make the city surrender.
W h e n the Romans entered the city, they found that those who
h a d survived the famine, had slaughtered each other rather
than yield to Rome.
Burke, History of S p a i n . I, 14-28.
The Battle of Zaragosa or Saragosa occurred in 1809
during the Peninsular Wars against French domination under
Napoleon.
It was only after the most desperate resistance
failed that the city was captured.
Louis Bertrand and Sir
Charles Petrie, The History of Spain 711-1931 (New York,
1934), 443.
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C

that interfered with breathing.
laments from all parts.

There were groans and

When the great deeds of the South

American Revolution, w h i c h are second to none, become known,
history shall do justice to this heroic defense.
With Cartagena occupied and the Cachiri battle lost.
N e w Granada was at the mercy of the c o n q u e r o r . 8
quickly took possession of Santa F 6 .

Morillo

There he covered his

name with well-earned infamy by killing its most illustrious
citizens.?

Among these was the eminent scholar, Don

Francisco JosA de Caldas, whose loss Granadine letters will
always m o u r n .8

The expeditionary leader wrote to the

5Field Marshal Francisco Montalvo, a native of Havana,
was appointed in 1813 as Captain General of the New Kingdom
of Granada.
In 1816 a royal decree made the captaincy g e n 
eral of N e w Granada a viceroyalty once more and Montavlo was
appointed Viceroy.
His residence then was in Cartagena with
the royal audiencia.
In February of 1818, he resigned and
abandoned his post.
Henao and Arrubla, History of C o l o m b i a .
248, 265, 271, 273, 276, 299, 302.
8The Battle of Cachiri occurred on February 21 and 22
in 1816.
The patriots led by Garcia Rovira held their p o s i 
tion at the entrance of the cachiri and fought desperately
for two days against great odds.
The Spanish Commandant
Calzada finally defeated them with a cavalry charge.
I b i d .,
277-79.
?Madariaga asserts that Morillo's harsh attitude
toward the citizens of Santa F 6 stemmed directly from
Arizmendi's betrayal.
Madariaga, B o l i v a r , 290-91.
sDon Francisco JosA de Caldas, known as
El Sabio or
Wise One, was born in Popay&n in 1771.
He graduated from the
Colejio del Rosario where he specialized in physical sciences
and mathematics.
He published treatises on these subjects in
el Semanario and the Dlario P o l i t i c o . In 1810 he consecrated
h i m s e l f to the independence cause and became a Colonel in the
engineering corps, supervising the manufacture of cannons and
gun powder.
When PopayAn fell to the Spanish again in 1816,
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Minister of War in a letter,

found on board a ship siezed by

a corsair from Buenos Aires,

that the scholars of N e w Granada

were the ones that directed the revolution while the patriots
of Venezuela helped with the sword.

Morillo wrote:

owe everything to the rebels of Venezuela.

These men fight

like animals when they are in their territory.
successful in getting able leaders,
to subjugate them.

"They

If they are

it will take many years

Even so, this objective will be accom

plished only at the price of much bloodshed and considerable
sums o f m o n e y ."
The system of war that the patriots had to adopt
against these veteran troops was like the one the Spaniards
themselves had adopted in the Peninsula to destroy their
invaders.

These Spanish troops were accustomed to fighting

in terrain similar to ours.
disciplined,

courageous,

In Columbia,

as in Spain,

fenses in all parts.

In addition,

they were well-

and extremely loyal to their cause.
the terrain offers natural d e 

Later with sufficient reason the

Liberator said to the Congress of Bolivia,
nature of this continent

(America)

"that the savage

itself rejects monarchical

he fled to Paispamba.
There he was taken by Simdn Munoz and
brought to Bogota.
Pablo Morillo h a d him executed in O c t o 
ber of 1816, saying to those who pleaded for his life—
"Spain has no need of wise men."
Scarpetta and Vergara,
Diccionario Biour&fico. 76-77.
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Q

order,

for deserts invite independence . 1
The guerrilla system of warfare is and always shall

be the type to adopt against an invading army in countries
such as ours where there is more than enough land and not
enough people.

The forests, mountains,

and plains invite

men to freedom, while the hills and plateaus nurture h i m in
their breasts to protect h i m from the numerical superiority
of the enemy.

In the mountains and in the forests the

patriot must never take the offensive.

However,

in the

plains he should never neglect any opportunity to take the
initiative against the enemy and attack h i m w i t h vigor and
courage.

He,

the Americans,

owe the advantages that we

gained while we still lacked a numerous and well-organized
army to this type of warfare.

Against the discipline of the

Spanish troops, we pitted the patriotism and courage of each
individual combatant.

Against the bayonet,

that powerful

weapon of the Spanish infantry, we hurled the formidable
lance as wielded b y the even more formidable arm of the
llanero.

With this weapon, whether on horseback or on foot,

the llanero broke the Spanish squares and swept over their
battalions.

Against the superiority of their artillery, we

us e d the speed of our movements,

aided by the noble animal

raised on our l l a n o s .

9 P&ez

refers here to the speech that Bolivar made
before the Constitutional Congress of Bolivia.
This p a r t i c u 
lar citation m a y be found in Lecuna (ed.), Proclamaa y
Diacursos. 327.
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The llanos opposed our invaders with all the incon
veniences presented by a desert.

If the enemy did penetrate

them, we knew h o w to keep from them any of the advantages
that the llanos held for us.
their march; however,

The rivers served to block

they were but a small obstacle to us,

for we knew h o w to cross their currents with as much ease as
if we had been born in the water.

All of these factors,

plus the hope that the people would finally become aware of
the sanctity and justice of the cause we defended, made us
disregard the formidable forces that pretended to subject us
again to the yoke of Spanish domination.
Our leaders could not agree on the action that should
be taken.

Some of them felt that we should go to B a r i n a s ,

while others felt that we should cross the Orinoco and join
[Manuel] Cedeno's party in Caicara.10

I felt that we should

attack and destroy the enemy that was in Achaguas.

Thus we

would be able to take possession of the Lower Apure and
there find the resources necessary to face Morillo.

This

would add to the advantage we would have already gained by

*°General Manuel Cedefto was born in Apure in 1784.
He enlisted in the revolutionary movement in Caracas in 1810
and was active in it until his death.
He was particularly
active in pursuing Boves in 1814.
On March 8 , 1815, he
defeated the Spanish Governor Cerriti and knifed the r e m 
nants of his forces in Caicara.
He joined Bolivar in the
Battle of Y a g u a l . He became Governor and Commandant General
of G u a y a n a . He was chief of the Second Division of the army
wh i c h freed Venezuela at Carabobo in 1821.
He was killed in
this battle.
Scarpetta and Vergara, Diccionario B i o q r & f i c o .
103-104.
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getting in touch with Cedeno and not being situated between
two enemy forces, both stronger

than ours.

M y opinion

finally prevailed.
Toward the end of September, we went to the Lower
Apure along the road that leads from Trinidad to Rincdn
Hondo and from there to Achaguas.

The Royalist Colonel, Don

Francisco L 6 pez, knowing that I was searching for him, came
out to meet me then.

He had been in Queseras Blanqueras,

not very far from us, when one of our men, called Ramon La
Riva, detached himself from the emigration, went before h i m
and told him among other things:
patriots in aui open field,

"Do not wait for the

for although they know very well

that they are inferior in number and weapons,
greatly on their skill in handling the lamce.

they rely
With this

we a p o n they do not fear the enemy in open-field combat.

Also,

keep in mind that these men are determined to seel their
lives at a high price,

and even to kill one another in the

event of misfortune."
Ldpez took heed of the information given to h i m by
that intelligent deserter.

He countermarched some leagues

to c l a im the left bank of the Arauca and take a strong p o s i 
tion in the farm of Yagual,
the name of Elizalde.
movement,

1

the property of a Biscayan by

When l received the news about that

marched with m y troops and the emigrants up to

the sand bank of the Araguayana,
from Achaguas,

sixteen or eighteen leagues

There 1 left the women, children,

and m e n

who were unable to fight under the custody of a select
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cavalry company led by Captain Pablo Aponte.

Then 1 Incor

porated in the army all who could carry arms and formed a
reserve corps consisting of c l e r g y m e n , men of letters,
those incapable of military service.

and

X placed the latter

group under the command of Captain Juan Antonio M i r a b a l . H
Since Trinidad de Arichuna,
been organized in three squadrons.

the patriot forces had
The first squadron was

u nder the command of General Rafael Urdaneta;

the second,

under General Servier; and the third, under Colonel
Santander.

All of these troops,

including the reserve,

formed a total of seven hundred combatants.
With this small army organized,

I still could not set

out until I had consoled those unhappy families we were
leaving behind with a few words of g o o d b y e .

I was leaving

them there with very little hope of any of us ever seeing
each other again in this world,
offered great obstacles.

for the coming campaign

The superiority of the enemy,

flooded rivers of the Lower Apure during that season,

the

and

the enemy embarkations defending its fords, were all going
to present us with a thousand difficulties.
in mind,

With all this

those families listened to m y goodbye while showing

signs of great anguish.

More than one tear,

too,

shone in

1 ^-Captain Juan Antonio Mirabal was born in San
Fernando de Apure.
On P A e z 's recommendation, Bolivar p r o 
m o t e d h i m to the rank of c o l o n e l . In 1830 he was Governor
of Angostura.
As General M u n o z ’s Chief of Staff, he fought
against his former chief. General PAez, in 1848.
He died in
San Fernando in December of 1849.
DAvila, Diccionario
B i o q r A f i c o . I, 368-69.
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the eyes of those brave men w h o were courageously going to
encounter the e n e m y .
After this moving scene, we started the march.

Our

weak and tired horses could barely travel three leagues a
day to search for an enemy that had provided its cavalry and
its reserve with good mounts.

The day after our departure

from Araguayuna, when the division was already on the march,
I went ahead about a league as usual.
nine people,
lies.

including aides-de-camp,

I was accompanied by
officers,

and or d e r 

I did not expect to find enemy troops in that vicinity.

However, when I got to a little house and asked its only
occupant,

a woman, whether she could tell me anything c o n 

cerning the whereabouts of the Royalists,

she replied that

one of their battalions had been in the farm of "Los Cocos,"
a mile away, on the previous day.
she mentioned,

Looking in the direction

I saw a cloud of dust.

that there were troops in that area.
m o unted in order to go attack them.

This was a sure sign
Immediately we all
In our position, we were

left no choice but to fight without intermission and to seek
out our enemy in all parts.

In effect,

that cloud of dust

had been raised by fifty-five Royalist cavalrymen.

They

were reconnoitering under the orders of Captain Facundo
Mirabal.

Thirty of them were armed with both rifles and

lances, and the rest had only lances.
When the leader of the enemy party saw that we were
approaching, he came out of the farm hurriedly and drove out
about one hundred horses so that we could not get them.
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Horses 1

Imagine what these meant to us then when we did not

have any 1

On the spot I decided to get them.

We marched

hurriedly toward the enemy w h o halted and faced us.

Without

hesitating, we hurled ourselves impetuously against them.
We charged with such courage and spirit,
yielded ground.

that they quickly

When they saw that neither the discharges

from their thirty guns nor the points of their twenty-five
lances could make us retreat,

they began to flee.

The

Royalists lost many from their ranks then,

including those

taken prisoners and those who were killed.

In fact, only

eight of them escaped,

and among them was Captain Mirabal.

He abandoned his horse and took refuge in the forest of
"Mata de la M a d e r a , " for he saw that Aramendi and I were
already pursuing him closely w i t h our lances in hand.
This unexpected stroke of good fortune was equivalent
to a great victory,

for we not only procured the horses we

needed so badly, but in addition our troops gained moral
strength.

They saw that the enemy's greater numbers were

not indicative of the final outcome of the ba t t l e — no matter
h o w desperate our position might seem to be.
All those who accompanied me in this encounter rivaled
each other in courage.
lieutenant,
Pena

They were as followsi

the courageous

Francisco Aramendi; the then-rankless Vicente

(whose life I had saved in Guas d u a l i t o ) ; Pedro Chirinos,

who was wounded in this encounter;

sergeant Ramon Valero;

First Corporal c o m e l i o Munoz, who later became a brigadier
general;

and soldiers Paulino Blanco, Francisco Ortiz,
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Francisco Villamediana,

and JosA Maria O l i v e r a . 1 2

The following day the division continued its march,
and we camped in A g u a d i t a s .
and about a league away.

The enemy now was to our right

I was purposely leaving the enemy

to one side in order to mount a large inlet that almost c o m 
pletely surrounds the Yagual farm.
moving and rested the horses.
march,

We stayed there without

That night we started the

filing off in a semicircle so that we could get behind

the enemy.

We endured a thousand hardships,

for it was dark

and the road was so swampy that our horses got stuck at
every step.

Furthermore,

there were ravines over which our

horses stumbled frequently and which impeded our m a r c h — a
march that necessarily had to be very silent in order not to
alert the enemy and have them encounter us at the exit of
the inlet.
Finally at dawn we came out on dry land and looked
over the enemy camp.

They had seventeen hundred cavalrymen

and six hundred infantrymen about a mile away from us.
Ldpez had formed the cavalry behind the house and the corral.

^ 2No other data were available on the other m e n m e n 
tioned except for C o m e l i o Munoz.
Corporal Munoz was born
in Venezuela.
He began his career in the revolutionary army
in the Battle of Guasdualito in 1815.
From then on, he
fought incessantly for the cause of Venezuelan independence,
taking part in the celebrated seizure of Puerto Cabello on
November 8, 1823.
In 1826 he was Governor of the province
of Apure and was promoted to the rank of General by Bolivar.
He died a natural death in Caracas, in 1852.
Scarpetta and
Vergara, Piccionario B i o g r A f i c o . 374-75.
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He had placed the infantry within the sheepfold, and its
door was defended by four pieces of artillery.

In the

Arauca River, which is almost a rifle shot's distance from
this farm,

the Royalists h a d four ships armed with cannons.

I wanted to attain two goals with this operation.
the first place,
desperation,

In

I wanted to force m y troops to fight with

for they could see that the land behind them

was occupied by the enemy.

Then secondly,

I wanted to get

all the horses that the Royalists were guarding at that
point.

The success of this operation would fulfill m y

wishes and hopes.
We approached the enemy and formed three lines.
Urdaneta's squadron was at the vanguard; Servier's,

in the

center? and Santander's,

consist

at the left.

The reserve,

ing of the prominent patriots whose names the reader already
knows, was located as rear guard, outside the range of rifle
fire because I wanted to preserve the lives of these eminent
men.

Nevertheless,

the clergymen,

Ramdn Ignacio M£ndez,

[Ricardo] Becerra, Trinidad Travieso,
Josd Felix Blanco,

and the Colonel Priest,

came to take part in the battle.

The

13Ram6n Ignacio M£ndez I la Barta was born in Barinas
in 1794 and was Archbishop of Caracas when the revolution
started.
On April 19, 1810 h e became a member of the govern
ing revolutionary junta and later became a member of the
Congress in Caracas.
He was P&e 2 's comrade in the Battles
of Arichuna, Achaguas, San Fernando, and Yagual.
In 1823
and 1826 he was a member of the congress of Colombia.
In
1827 he was elected Archbishop of Caracas.
Later he refused
to accept the Venezuelan constitution when it subjected the
church to the state.
In 1830 he was expelled to Curazao,
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example they set and the words they spoke greatly encouraged
the c o m b a t a n t s .
While Captain JosA Marla Angulo with a picket of
riflemen was reconnoitering the terrain to the right of the
enemy, he was attacked by the enemy's superior rifle forces.
If X m oved to reenforce Angulo with the rest of our company,
LApez would realize that a general attack could be started
along my right flank.

Following this line of thinking, he

from where he wrote PAez begging h i m to conciliate Church and
State.
PAez was able to accomplish this when Archbishop
MAndez signed the constitution and ended his exile in 1832.
Political events in 1836 forced his final exile from V e n e 
zuela.
He died in BogotA on August 6 , 1839 of natural
causes.
Ibid., 316-17.
Ricardo Becerra wrote Vida de Francisco M i r a n d a . 2
vols. (Caracas, 1896).
See Parra-PArez, Historia de la
Primera R e p u b l i c a . I, 112.
The Priest Colonel, JosA FAlix Blanco, was a native
of Venezuela.
He left the priesthood for an army career,
feeling that he could best serve his country in the latter
capacity.
He served as a colonel under PAez in many battles,
including those of Yagual, Calabozo, Carabobo, and Puerto
Cabello.
Bolivar promoted h i m to the rank of General in
1830.
Blanco, with the assistance of RamAn Azpurda, c o l 
lected and edited a fourteen-volume work entitled Documentos
Para la Historia de la Vida Pdblica del Libertador de
C o l o m b i a . Perfl y B o l i v i a . Scarpetta and Vergara, Diccionario
B i o g r A f i c o , 51.
Lecuna (ed.). Cartas del Li b e r t a d o r . XI,
349, 407, 408, 409.
^4josA Marla Angulo became a Colonel in the Venezuelan
army.
He was a native of Venezuela and h a d joined the army
at the beginning of the independence movement.
A brave
warrior of the lla n o s , he served under PAez in the Battles
of M a t a de la Miel, Achaguas, Yagual, Trinidad de Arichuna.
W h e n he was a Lieutenant Colonel, he was one of the one
h u ndred and fifty men selected by PAez to humiliate Morillo's
six thousand soldiers in Queseras del Medio.
He also fought
in the Battle of Carabobo.
Scarpetta and Vergara, Diccionario
B i o g r A f i c o . 20.
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ordered a squadron of his riflemen to flank our right.

These

men approached us at less than half rifle-fire range.

Here

they were favored by a ravine that was between us which was
full of water.

In addition,

this ravine formed several

curves which would make it necessary for us to cross the
water many times if we were to attack them.
When the enemy opened fire, most of the advantages
were on their side.

To begin with, there was the short dis

tance that separated us.

Furthermore, we did not have suf

ficient fire arms to am awer their discharges.

So, I decided

then to detach half of Santander's squadron, under the com
mand of the intrepid Genaro V&squez, and ordered it to cross
the ravine and dislodge the enemy from that favorable
position.

V&squez was able to accomplish this and had the

Royalists in flight when a squadron of lancers came to assist
the latter.

V&squez was forced to fight them and lost the

ground he had won.

Then I sent Colonel Santander with the

other half of the squadron,

and they were able to repel the

enemy a g a i n .
The Royalist leader was determined not to yield this
ground, and sent two squadrons for reinforcements.

I

counteracted this by ordering General Servier to advance
with the second squadron,

assist Santander, and simultaneously

attempt to flank and surround the enemy on the right.

When

Santander and Servier were most engrossed in a rigorous lance
battle, Colonel Torellas, who was Ldpez's second in command,
came out on the right.

He had a squadron of two hundred m e n
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under the orders of Commandant Mordn.
trusted leaders.

His objective was to destroy Santander's

and S e r v i e r 1s forces along the rear.
this objective.

one of Ldpez's m o s t

In order to achieve

Ldpez ordered the remainder of his cavalry

to attack them at the same time.

When I saw this movement.

I ordered General Urdaneta to encounter him.
Urdaneta myself,

I accompanied

and we attacked h i m w i t h such daring,

that

the Royalist commander did not have time to carry out his
operation.

In fact. Urdaneta even dashed Torellas against

the shore of the lake that was at their side.
desperate and bloody.

The fight was

Some of the m e n were finally forced

to throw themselves in the lake and swim across.

This

victory saved Santander's and S e r v i e r ’s brigades when they
were in difficult straits.
We pursued the Royalists vigorously.

We even charged

after them as far as the very door of the corral of the farm.
Here the valiant Captain Vicente Braca died w h e n he was
pierced by a lance that a z a m b o . called Ledesma, hurled at
h i m as if it were an arrow.

A great part of the enemy

cavalry left the field in defeat.

L6pez was left with only

some one thousand cavalrymen w h o had taken refuge behind the
infantry on the outskirts of the corral.
I reorganized m y forces quickly and remained the rest
of the day at half rifle-fire range from the enemy.

The

latter, having had enough for the day. did not dare to start
the battle again.

As for us. we could not have started to

fight again except poorly,

for LOpez maintained himself in a
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very strong position.

His infantry was protected inside the

corral fences and the corral in turn was defended by the
artillery.
Our horses were now on the ground panting out of sheer
exhaustion.

Night fell, and in order to avoid being attached

by surprise in the darkness, we got in a ravine on our right
that was full of water.

Had we failed to do this,

the

thousand cavalrymen led by Torrellas, who looked for us all
that night, would have attacked us.

But who would have

thought to look for us in the water?
On the following day we, who were masters of the terri
tory that was behind us and of the enemy horses that were
there, remounted our people.

Then we ate,

time to do so the day before.

for we had not had

That afternoon we attempted to

provoke the Spanish into a new battle.

They refused to

accept the challenge and retreated in the cover of night to
Achaguas.

They sent their wounded and their artillery to

launches which went down the Arauca River to its junction
with the Apure Seco River, and then on the Apure Seco to the
city it passes.

We pursued them, and on the following day

we got to the right bank of the Apure Seco River,
Achaguas.

There,

facing

from a woman who crossed the river in a

small canoe, we found out that the Royalists had retreated
from that point also.
Urdaneta,
[Tom&s] Montilla,

Santander,

Servier,

[Jos 6 Marla] Vergara,

I, and some others then crossed the river.
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two by two in the c a n o e . ^

We entered a house in the plaza

in order to find some newspaper or notice that would tell us
what was happening in the world.

We had not been in the

building long when we heard a shot.

We abandoned it hurriedly.

Immediately a dragoon presented himself to us and said that
he had been shot by the enemy who lay in ambush at the o u t 
skirts of the city, opposite the river.

We hurried to

^Undoubtedly, the Vergara P&ez refers to here is
Jos£ Marla Vergara who was born in Bogota December 8 , 1792.
He was educated in Spain, for his father had died while the
two of them were in route to C&diz, and the young boy had
remained there.
He became an officer in the Spanish Guards
and fought in the Peninsular wars in 1808 and 1809.
He
managed to return to his native state, however, when he heard
of the revolutions in Caracas and Bogota.
He served in
U r d a n e t a 1 s, Santander's and Servier's armies and fought in
the Battles of Cachiri, Los Cocos, Yagual, and Achaguas.
In
1819, Bolivar promoted him to the rank of General of Brigade.
He served as a member of the Congress of Angostura and did
research on the English jury system.
His productive years
ended in 1820 when a mental disorder gradually deprived him
of his reason.
He died thirty-six years later on June 19,
1857.
Scarpetta and Vergaga, Diccionario Bioqr&fico. 689-90.
See also Lecuna, Cartas del Libertador. XI, 121.
Of the two famous Montilla brothers, Mariano andTom&s,
P&ez refers here to T o m & s . A member of one of the most
illustrious and wealthy families of Caracas, Tom&s was one
of Bolivar's comrades in the Revolutionary Clubs and a p ower
ful member of the Junta of April, 1810. He was imprisoned
later by Monteverde when he refused to accept the agreement
the latter had made with Miranda.
On July 31, 1812 he helped
Bolivar to prevent Miranda's departure.
In 1813 Bolivar
named him Secretary of War.
In 1815 he sought out PAez and
fought in the Battles of Arichuna, Yagual, and the seizure
of Achaguas.
In 1818 he was Governor of Guayana and a member
of the Congress of Angostura.
He died of natural cause on
June 25, 1822.
Scarpetta and Vergara, Diccionario BiogrAfico, 345-46.
See also Madariaga, Bolivar. 188, 209, 249,
312, 315, 371; Lecuna, Cartas del Libertador. XI, 164.
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recross the river after I had sent orders to Captain Genaro
VAsquez,
men,

who had already crossed it with a company of r i f l e 

to take a defensive position in a plantation on the

riverbank.
Four enemy gunboats appeared navigating upstream,
obviously trying to cut off our retreat.

Then the enemy

infantry that had been in ambush ran up the shore of the
river and occupied a trench that had been prepared before
hand.

From this position,

they fired on those of us who

were on the opposite side of the river and also on VAsquez's
company which was to their right.

The boats also fired

cannon shots and approached intending to cut VAsquez down.
However,

aided by our riflemen, we forced the boats down

river five or six times.

In the meantime,

VAsquez made his

soldiers swim across little by little and used the canoe to
take weapons and clothing.
h a v i n g lost only twelve men,
scattered.

He was finally able to join us,
including the wounded and

Night put an end to the battle.

During the

night the enemy left Achaguas and went toward the San
Fernando plaza.
Ldpez h a d left beforehand to go with the cavalry and
some infantrymen to the town of Apurito.

He left the rest

of his infantry, which we found in Achaguas, under the
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command of Reyes V a r g a s . i n

the meantime, he crossed the

Apure River and situated himself on its left bank between
the towns of San Antonio and Apurito.

Then he appointed

Commandant Loyola to be in c o m m a n d , and he and some officers
embarked for the fortified city of Nutrias.
I sent Colonel Miguel Guerrero to Sam Fernando w i t h a
p a r t of my forces.
the town of Apurito.

W i t h what remained of them,

I went on to

I was unable to find the enemy there,

for Ldpez had already crossed the Apure River and taken a
position on its left bank to dispute our passage with four
gunboats.
We remained in that position for some days,

for we

positively lacked the means with which to cross the river.
Meanwhile,

Ldpez returned from Nutrias.

Knowing that I was

^ C o l o n e l R. Reyes Vargas was a full-blooded Indian
chief who, along with the priest Torellas, started a proSpanish movement in 1811 that swamped the first Republic.
Able to comm am d the entire Indian population of Venezuela,
this chief represented a powerful force for the patriots to
contend.
Reyes Vargas further injured the republican cause
when he saved Boves from the clutches of Escalona in 1812.
Finally in 1813, after he had inflicted much damage on the
patriot troops, one of Bolivar's commanders, Garcia de Sena,
was able to defeat h i m at Cerritos Blancos, not far from
B a r q u i s i m e t o . In October of 1820 he defected from the R o y a l 
ist cause and proclaimed ardently for the independence m o v e 
ment.
In January of 1822 he fought against Morillo and was
defeated, and in July of 1822 he was defeated b y Morales
also.
He was assassinated by Colonel Reyes Gonz&lez in 1823.
Bolivar, who h a d great affection for Reyes Vargas, had
Gonz&lez tried for the crime and then shot on the exact spot
where he had killed the Indian chief.
Madariaga, B o l i v a r .
194, 215-16, 220.
Scarpetta and Vergara, Diccionario
B i o q r A f i c o . 671-72.
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there, he asked for a conference.

Yielding to his wishes,

I

went with some officers to meet him in a canoe in the middle
of the river.

Lbpez embarked in a gunboat and received me

with great courtesy.

After exchanging the first civilities,

he began to praise my activity and commend my military feats,
lamenting that

did not consecrate my efforts to the defense

1

of the "sacred rights of the King."

He told me that he

believed that I had abandoned the King's service due to some
injustice that a Spanish leader might have wreaked on me.

I

responded that he was ill informed about my ever having
served in the King's army,
patriot ranks.

for I had begun my career in the

I told him further that I h a d never and would

never abandon these ranks,

regardless of h o w great our adver

sities might be or h o w flattering his words of seduction.

He

interrupted me then saying that he had not asked for an
interview in order to convert me, but rather to satisfy the
desire he had to k n o w me personally and to thank me for the
generosity with wh ich

1

had always treated prisoners,

especially "the poor Europeans."
returned to my camp.

We par t e d cordially and 1

Who would have made that m a n believe

then that his days were already numbered,

and that his life

would end shortly?
Returning,
river,

as 1 have said, to the other side of the

I ordered as many dragoons as would fit in the only

canoe we had to embark.

Their leader was Vicente Pena, w h o m

I had elevated to the rank of captain and they were to
operate against the enemy camp so that they would start
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firing and thus end the truce occasioned by the interview.
Pena manned the canoe with eight men,
ask me what he was supposed to do.
query,

and then he came to

I was angered by this

for I had already given him his orders.

Nevertheless,

I told him again to cross the river and attack the enemy
camp.

The leaders present there could not keep from pointing

out to me that this order was tantamount to ordering the
useless sacrifice of those few men.

1

remained deaf to their

indications and did not revoke the order.

I was relying on

the good fortune that had always protected my rash under
takings.

In truth, this undertaking could not have been any

more r a s h .
Pena carried out his orders perfectly,

and he crossed

the river without being seen by any of the enemy guards.
The latter were in the shade of a forest of mangroves and
were eating

(it was about n o o n ) , when our dragoons opened

fire and charged them violently.

They had barely fired one

hundred shots when the terrified Royalists began to flee.
They thought that they were being attacked by forces superior
to theirs.

Chief LOpez embarked and retreated without even

attempting to approximate the number of those who were
attacking.

1

ordered a company of lancers and eighty u n 

mounted riflemen to go to Pefia's assistance.

Before night

fall, 1 ordered the lancers to recross the river.

This was

so that Ldpez, who was watching, would believe that there
were no more enemy forces left on the other side.

Then,

in case he would come up stream to go to the plaza at

just
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Nutrias,

and this was probable,

1 ordered the riflemen to

divide in two sections; one was to be in ambush in the m a n 
groves,

and the other,

in the shelter of a flying sap w hich

was on an island of sand situated in the middle of the stream.
My supposition was correct.

At 8*00 p.m. L d p e z 's

squadron began to come up the river.
fire.

Two of the e n e m y ’s long,

of them got stuck in the sand,
abandon it.

Our ambushes opened

sharp canoes retreated.
and its men were forced to

We imprisoned them.

Ldpez, however,

succeeded

in p a ssing the point where our m e n were in ambush.
of the prisoners,

One

From one

1 found out that it was the Governor's

canoe that had passed.

Immediately I decided to capture it.

I had already sent a cavalry party to get another canoe on
the way to the town of Banco Largo,
Apurito.

This h a d been achieved.

ten leagues from
In order to take advan

tage of all the fruits of this victory,

I immediately sent

an order to that same party to come quickly in the canoe,
encounter L O p e z , and assault him while he was boarding the
ship.

Our canoe obeyed promptly.

Navigating downstream,

encountered L d p e z 's canoe at dawn the next day.
realized that our canoe was not friendly.

Ldpez

Aided by the c u r 

rent, he turned on the side to gain the advantage.
boats came downstream,

it

The two

chasing one another.

From our camp we could see that the first ship
belonged to Ldpez.

We wanted to cut off his retreat,

and to

this end we equipped one canoe with eight m e n and the canoe
we had captured the night before with all the people it
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could hold.

Then we went to encounter the boat that was

obviously fleeing.

Ldpez ordered his men to row quickly,

and we were unable to prevent his canoe from passing in front
our boats.

However, we continued to chase it, and finally a

bullet succeeded in killing the pilot of the Royalist launch.
Without its pilot and as it was ma k i n g a hazardous turn, we
were able to board the canoe.

Ldpez,

two officers,

and all

the crew fell into our hands.
Already possessing three armed launches,

I saw to it

that they were immediately put in a serviceable condition.
I w a nted them to attack smother four enemy launches that
were stationed in front of the town of Santa Lucia,
e ight leagues from Apurito.

six or

1 charged Captain Vicente PefLa

w i t h this commission and the command of these canoes.

With

the intent of deceiving the leaders who commanded the Royal
ist convoy,

I made Pena put on Governor Ldpez*s three-cor

n ered hat and go in the l e t t e r ’s launch.

Furthermore, he

was to sit at the p r o w so that he could answer the enemy's
"Who goes?" as if he were the Governor.

This way he would

be able to get close enough to board those ships without
firing a shot.

This was useless strategy, however,

Pena approached the Spanish,

for when

they ordered h i m to halt,

despite the title he assumed.

Disregarding this, Pena

ordered his men to row a h e a d .

When he was within less than

half-cannon shot range, he received the first shots.

He

boarded then with such courage and good fortune, that the
four canoes fell in his hands.

He went to Apurito wit h them
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in order to go back to the Apure and fight another squadron
which, under the command of Son Juan C o m o s , was in the port
of Nutrias.

I crossed the Apure then with all the forces 1

h a d there and went on to Nutrias.
After marching for two days,

I spent the night in the

town of Santa Catalina which is situated on the left shore
of the Apure River.

At dawn the next day I was informed

that there were five enemy launches a little ways from the
town.

These were the ones belonging to Comos.

means to attack them,
our launches arrived.

Lacking the

X decided at least to detain them until
To do this,

I had to get in the river

w i t h Aramendi and twenty-five lancers.

All of us got in

w a t e r up to our chests and stood on a bank of sand,

situ

ated in the middle of the river, where the Apure runs deep.
W e carried out this operation within view of the enemy.
immediately attacked us.

They

They fired grapeshot with their

cannons for more than an hour without inflicting damage on
us,

for we ducked in the water when we saw the flame from

the m o uth of the barrels.
W hen they finally saw that they were not harming us,
the enemy launches went back by the canal on the right.
got out of the water and mounted our unsaddled horses.

We
We

went up ahead a little and thrust ourselves in the river
again, determined to board at least one of the launches.
d id not succeed in our mission, however,

We

for the configura

tion of the deep h o l l o w of the river and its impetuous c u r 
rent scattered us so, that we did not have any unity of
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action.

We were fortunate that we did not have to lament any

personal misfortune in that crazy enterprise.
Within a short time our gunboats arrived,

for they

h a d been attracted by the sound of the enemy cannon.
by this time the enemy had gotten too far away.
1 continued my march toward Nutrias,
in the town of Santo Domingo.

However,

Therefore,

and I slept that night

1 left the following morning

and headed toward the river, which was not far away.

I

intended to obstruct C o m o s 's trip as much as 1 could.

I got

into a well-manned canoe and succeeded in delaying h i m for
more than three hours.

I would always attack the last of

the ships that they were withdrawing so that the others would
have to pull back and defend it.
ing our s q u a d r o n ’s sails,

The Spanish chief, d e t e c t 

continued his retreat,

thanks to a

favorable breeze and in spite of the shots that were fired
from both s h o r e s .
I continued m y march to Nutrias by land.
to this city,

though,

When I got

the enemy had already abandoned it.

Comos continued to sail upstream.

He took w i t h h i m all the

shipping that there was in the port of Nutrias and m a n y indi
viduals who belonged to the Royalist party.

Pena overtook

h i m at the mouth of the Masparro River and attacked h i m there.
He was able to take possession of all the e n e m y ’s armed and
unarmed ships,

a total of twenty-four.

glorious deed,

I elevated the intrepid Pena to the rank of

Lieutenant Colonel in the Navy.
forces under his command.

As a reward for this

I placed all our naval

All this might seem insignificant
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now.

To have achieved this then, was the equivalent of a

Roman undertaxing.
In Nutrias I appointed General Urdaneta to occupy the
capital of Barinas with all his forces.

He was to form an

army there and operate in accordance with what the cir c u m 
stances demanded.

Then I went with my squadron of twelve

launches down the Apure with the object of taking possession
of the plaza of San Fernando.

Before I left,

I ordered Pena

to continue descending the river as far as the mouth of the
ditch of Biruaca and there await my instructions.
I disembarked in the town of Apurito.

I went from

there to Achaguas to rejoin my second-in-command.
Miguel Guerrero, w h o was in Rabanal.
that I found in Achaguas,
Fernando.

Commandant

With the small guard

I continued my march toward San

Later I added Guerrero's forces to mine and sur

veyed the plaza by land.

Then I took two hundred cavalrymen

and sent them to the mouth of the ditch of Biruaca.

They

were to embark in the twelve launches and assault the plaza
during the night along the side facing the river, while I
attacked on land w i t h two hundred lancers that I had primed
for that purpose.
This plan was not as successful as I had expected it
to be,

for a Royalist named Herrera, whom we h a d imprisoned

and pardoned a few days before, warned the enemy of our
plans.

Herrera h a d found out all the details because he was

always at Guerrero's side.

Being Apureno, he was also very

familiar with the obstacles we would face just a little more
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than a mile from the plaza when we ran into a shoal that
forms at the junction of the Apure and Portuguesa rivers.
There our m e n would have to disembark from the launches and
carry them across.

Provided with this useful information.

General [Ramdnl Correa,

leader at the plaza,

ordered a strong

infantry column to take ambush on the shore of the river at
the spot that Herrera indicated.1-7
they opened fire on them,

When our men disembarked,

scattered them,

of eight of the twelve launches we had.

and took possession
Fortunately,

I had

ordered the two hundred men who were to attack the pla z a by
land,
it,

and w h o were already less than pistol-fire range from

to return to their horses and immediately take their

place in line if they heard any firing that was not directed
against the city.
I continued surveying the plaza on the south side.
With the purpose of cutting its communications with the
capital and the plains of Calabozo,

I ordered Commandant

Ranjel to cross the river with eighty men from Guardia at

17

'General Ram6n Correa was the commander of the Spanish
forces in Pamplona and C&cuta.
Bolivar had defeated h i m in
1813 in the Battle of Cticuta.
Later that same year, Correa
refused to meet Bolivar's forces in battle at Merida.
Correa
served also as Governor of Maracaibo.
In 1816 Morillo sent
him w i t h six hundred men to fight in the Apure area at
Nutrias.
He established himself then with the Fourth D i v i 
sion in Nutrias and Barinas.
In November of 1820 he was one
of the Spanish commissioners present at the armistice treaty.
His h o nesty was so legendary that Bolivar named h i m to repre
sent Colombia in the negotiations.
Lemly, B o l i v a r . 40, 41,
43, 45.
Lecuna, Crdnica R a z o n a d a . I, 10, 14, 363; II, 5, 34,
6 8 , 464, 465; III, 31, 32.
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the mouth of the C o p l e .

He was to surprise the town of

Guayabal and then camp on the road that leads to Calabozo
and Caracas.

There he intercepted a communique that Correa

was sending to Lieutenant colonel Don Salvador Gorrln.
This dispatch,

in answer to one dated in CamaguAn, which is

seven leagues from San Fernando,

told him that he was coming

with sufficient forces to aid him.

Knowing that Gorrln had

left calabozo with five hundred infantrymen,
cavalrymen,

three hundred

and five hundred horses with which to remount

the cavalrymen who were on foot in the plaza,
go attack that force.

1

I decided to

could not let these forces join

those beseiged in the plaza,

for this would give them great

advantages over us.
At the head of two squadrons,
Diamante hacienda.
dawn,

I marched toward the

We walked all night, arrived there at

and crossed the river.

also swam across the Apurito.

Two or three hours later we
Taking the Quayabal road,

I

went to rejoin Ranjel who was waiting for me at the Falital
Lake.

At that moment Ranjel's squadron of riflemen was

engaged in battle with Gorrln's,

1 hurried the march in

order to arrive in time to help my people.

l®Don Salvador Gorrln was born in the canary Islands.
He began his military career as a cavalry officer and later
became oflcial general in Margarita.
When P&ez beseiged San
Fernando, Gorrln marched to the aid of the Spanish there.
Morillo later appointed him to head one of the two major
Spanish cavalry divisions.
Lecuna,
Crdnica Razonada. I,
69, 509; II, 3, 6 8 .
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I had barely gotten my forces, which were augmented
then by Ranjel'a eighty men,
fire.

1

in formation when Gorrln opened

charged him on the front and on the side and

succeeded in making his cavalry flee.

Then I took possession

of the horses he brought for remounting.

After this first

charge, Gorrln formed an arch with the infantry

(whose line

was a picket of about fifty lancers) and the rest of the
cavalry he had brought.
1 divided my forces into four parts, and then I
hurled them simultaneously at the enemy's front,
rear guard.

flanks,

and

Despite the efforts we made to break that

formation, we were repelled by the infantry fire and by the
cavalry.

The latter, dismounted and with rapid lances,

resisted us tenaciously.
some of our men.

They lanced our horses and killed

However,

X did not desist in m y determina

tion to break the enemy because of this.
again in the same manner as before.

I formed our men

We charged again and

were repelled anew.

There I lost some of my best and most

courageous officers,

including the valiant Captains Pedro

Ledn Gdmez,

Remijio Caridad,

and Josg de la Paz Rojas.

The

gallant Commandant Francisco Hurtado was wounded.
I did not continue in this attack,
been imprudent.
against Gorrln,

for it would have

I recalled that when I started my march
I had received a bulletin from the town of

Mantecal telling me that General Morillo had occupied
Guasdualito.

Therefore,

I suspended the attack; and Gorrln,

aided by a column that came out of the plaza, entered San
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Fernando.
With this state
the

of

a f f a i r s ,I ordered our retreat on

same road by which we h a d come.

river,

After recrossing

I rejoined Guerrero in the site of Rabanal.

the

He had

retreated because he lacked sufficient forces to withstand
the sallies that might be forthcoming from the plaza.
I had left Commandant Freites in Guayabal with a c o m 
p a n y to recruit men with which to augment the forces we would
use to fight the enemy in those l l a n o s .19
rejoined Guerrero,

The day after I

the enemy came out through the forest at

the edge of the river.

Shielded by the woods,

they came to

Rabanal and ordered a company of riflemen to advance on my
guerrillas.

I charged them with a squadron of the Guard and

destroyed them completely.
the

Then the enemy countermarched to

p l aza along the same path they
With the object

had come.

of going to Achaguas and other towns

to gather forces with which to resist Morillo,
with m y Guard.

X marched

X left Guerrero in Rabanal at the head of

^Of the several Freites prominent in the independence
movement at this time, P&ez refers here to J. M. Freites, a
native of Venezuela.
He h a d been w i t h P & e z 1s forces from the
time he escaped from jail in Barinas.
He returned to Barinas
to free all his comrades who were imprisoned there and then
went on to fight the terrible war of the L l a n o s . He fought
at Mata de Le 6 n in 1812; at Estanques and Bailadores in 1814;
at Chire in 1815, and at the Battles of M a t a de la Miel,
Achaguas, Yagual, Palital, Rabanal and Paso del Frio.
He was
k illed in 1816 in Guayabal w h e n he he a d e d patriot forces of
three hundred m e n that were pitted against General Morillo*s
forces of over one thousand.
Scarpetta and Vergara,
Diccionario B i o g r & f i c o , 164.
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eight hundred cavalrymen.
turned to this spot.
completely,

A few days later the enemy re

They attacked Guerrero,

scattered him

and forced him to cross to the other side of the

Arauca along the Caujaral and Marrereno passes.

He notified

me from there of what had happened and told me that he had
been successful in reuniting only two hundred men.
awaited my orders there.

They

1 admonished Guerrero to stay at

that point.
Then I continued m y march to Mantecal by way of the
towns of Apurito and Banco Largo.

In Banco Largo I received

the news that Colonel Nonato P£rez and Governor Moreno of
Casanare, were in the Los Cocos farm

with some part of the

force that they had taken from Cuiloto.
immediately,

leaving the forces I had already gathered in

the plains of Mucuritas.
selves under my orders,
to Mucuritas.

I went to see them

When these leaders placed them
I returned with them and their people

There I incorporated them in our army.

I

organized a division of twelve hundred men and gave Nonato
P£rez the command.

I ordered him to march to Guasdualito

and fight Morillo provided that [Juan Vicente de] Arce,

the

Spanish chief who was coming down from Cticuta along the San
Camilo mountain, had not joined h i m . 2°

in case Arce had

already joined Morillo's forces and these combined forces

20p&ez must be referring here to Juan Vicente de Arce,
who had previously served as Spanish Xntendant for the
Caracas area.
Parra-P 6 rez, Historia de la Primera Repub
lics, I, 330.
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were to march against him, P£rez should always retreat w i t h 
in sight of the enemy.

He and his men were to join m e then

in the farm at Frio or the one in M u c u r i t a s .
After P 6 rez left,

1 returned to Achaguas to recruit

more men and then return to Mucuritas to wait for him.
was the place where I wanted to fight the enemy.
in Achaguas,

When I was

and after 1 had gathered some forces,

received fatal and unexpected news.

This

I

This news included the

defeat and death of Freites, who h a d assembled three hundred
men in Guayabal;

the destruction and death of Commandant

Roso Hurtado, w h o with six hundred men had been in the town
of San Jaime, province of Barinas;
General Urdaneta's division.
the capital of Barinas,
Nutrias.

and the scattering of

The latter,

finding himself in

retreated toward Apure by w a y of

He was pursued as far as the town of Santa C a t a 

lina by General Calzada who had come from N e w Granada using
the by-ways of M 6 rida.
This series of adverse happenings,

coupled with the

news that Morillo was already approaching with forces three
times as large as ours, made m a n y chiefs and officers feel
that

1

and m y few troops could not resist the numerous and

veteran ones led by the expeditionary general.

Some asked

me for passports to retreat to the province of Guayana,
while m a n y left without a passport.
example,

Following this pernicious

some rifle officers deserted with eight of their men

and took the two loads of stores which constituted our entire
armory.

Among those w h o abandoned me with a passport in that
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dangerous position were S a n t a n d e r , Conde,
[Manuel] Manrique,

[Manuel] Vald 6 z

Doctor [Francisco Javier] Yanez,

Blanco,

Carreno,

Doctor Josd Marla Salazar,

and the priestB M 6 ndez and

B e c e r r a . 21

^^Manuel Manrique was born in San Carlos in 1795.
He
participated in the revolutionary juntas of Caracas in 1809,
1810, and 1811.
He joined P&ez's ranks and fought w i t h h i m
in all the battles until the seizure of Achaguas.
Then he
left P&ez and sought Bolivar.
In 1821, he was in charge of
the defense line in the siege of Puerto Cabello.
With P&ez
again in 1822, he helped defeat Morales at Cumbre de V a l e n 
cia.
Finally in 1823, he beseiged Maracaibo and defeated
Morales.
He sent a silver k e y to Vice-President Francisco de
Paula Santander to the Fortress of San Carlos i Barras of
Maracaibo.
He died on November 30, 1823 in Maracaibo while
serving as Commandant of Zula.
Scarpetta and Vergara,
Diccionario B i o g r & f i c o , 289-90.
General Manuel Valddz was born in Caracas in 1785.
He embraced the revolutionary cause in 1810.
After the
Treaty of San Mateo between Miranda and Monteverde and the
consequent loss of Venezuela to the Spanish, Valdez joined
Marino in Trinidad and started to campaign against the Spanish
once again.
He fought bravely in the Battles of Bocachica,
San Mateo, Carabobo, La Puerta, and Angostura.
In 1819
Bolivar appointed him and Urdaneta in charge of foreign
troops and went on to Cundinamarca with them as Chief of the
Army of the South.
He defeated Colonel Ldpez in Pitayo in
1820.
Then Bolivar named h i m head of the first Colombian
division to aid Perd.
In 1926 he was Commandant of Arms in
Guayaquil and with Intendent Castillo formed the July act for
Colombian acceptance of the Bolivian constitution.
In 1831
he opposed General Montilla and was exiled from Colombia.
He died in Angostura in 1845.
I b i d .. 661-63.
Doctor Josd Marla Salazar was born in Antioquia, N e w
Granada, in 1785.
He was a Doctor of Jurisprudence and
Rector of the College of Mompox in N e w Granada when the r e v o 
lution broke out in 1810.
Miranda named h i m Minister Pleni
potentiary.
He went on to the Apure area later and in 1816
served as Auditor in P&ez's army.
Then he spent a few years
in Trinidad.
In 1820 he became a Minister of the Supreme
Tribunal of Venezuela and in 1827 he was Minister Plenipo
tentiary to North America.
He died in Paris in 1828 while
serving as Colombian Minister.
D&vila, Diccionario B i o q r & f i c o . II, 231.
Doctor Francisco Javier Yanes was Cuban, but he had
joined the republican cause in Venezuela in 1810.
He fought
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These great mishaps were not sufficient to make me
lose heart, however*

They could not force me to abandon

what had been half-started and what could be successfully
accomplished if only faith, daring,
lacking.

and confidence were not

When in any undertaking a man experiences that

extraordinary force called faith, he should always follow its
impulse,

and recall that a sacred oracle has told us that

faith works marvels and miracles.

In addition to this faith,

I had the firm conviction that those llanos of Apure, even
if the rest of Venezuelan territory was subjected, could
represent to us what the mountains of Asturias had for the
Spanish patriots after their disaster on the shores of the
Guadalete.
Fortunately for our cause,

the people of Apure in that

occasion were true to the pattern of heroic patritism which
they had demonstrated so many times before.

Thinking little

about the veteran forces that were coming to attack them and
the many laurels that these had won in other battlefields,
they prepared to resist them with the fury possessed by
lions when hunted in their native jungles.

The people of

Apure, although they had the indifference of the Spartans in
their civic virtues,

always showed all the daring of the

Cossack and the intrepidness of the Arab on the battlefield.

with P&ez in the Battles of Arichuma, Yagual, and Achaguas.
An attorney, he was a member of the Congress in Caracas in
1811.
He died in Caracas in 1842.
Scarpetta and Vergara,
Diccionario Bioqr&fico, 707.
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They had placed their haciendas at the disposal of the
patriot c a u s e , and they had consecrated their indomitable
courage to its triumph.

The number of heroes in the areas

that the Apure River bathes could be counted by counting the
number of its inhabitants.

How good, how courageous they

were!
To stop desertion as much as possible,

I sent a cavalry

party to overtake those who were leaving and did not have a
passport.

They were able to bring back only Lieutenant Josd

Marla Corboda

(later renamed General of Colombia), and C a p 

tain Ram 6 n Durin.^3
However,
Casanare,

a war council condemned them to death.

they were pardoned in the end,
Padre Trinidad Travieso,

for the Governor of

and the worthy Lieutenant

^ T h e r e is no further information available on captain
Ramdn Dur&n.
josd Marla Cordoba was born in Rionegro,
September 8 , 1799.
He was an engineering student when the
revolutionary war broke out.
In 1816 he was in the retreat
of the emigrants from Casanare, where his inseparable friend,
Servier, had been assassinated.
He fought with P&ez in the
Battles of Arichuma, Yagual, Achaguas, and Guasdualito.
After the Battle of Boyac& he attained the rank of Lieutenant
Colonel.
He helped to defeat the Spanish General Villalobos
in the Battle of Matara, and it was on his head that Bolivar
placed the crown of gold and precious stones that PertS con
ferred on him.
In 1828 he was Bolivar's Secretary of War and
later chief of the Army that went south to combat Obando and
Ldpez.
He rebelled against Bolivar in 1829, much to the
letter's chagrin and disbelief.
The three hundred men under
his orders were no match for O'Leary's three thousand!
so he
was defeated at Santuario on October 17, 1829.
While wounded
and alone in a hut, he was assassinated by an English officer,
Rupert Hand.
Scarpetta and Vergara, Diccionario Biocrr&fico.
112-12; Lemly, Bolivar. 291-93, 343, 353, 359, 360-62.

284
2*i

P edro Camejo,

alias the First,

interceded in their behalf.

I do not exaggerate when I say that if Morillo's
troops h a d fought the Apure forces then,

they would have dealt

a mortal blow to the patriot cause in Venezuela.
e nemy had secured control of that territory,

If the

it could have

taken all its immense resources and then marched against
[Manuel Carlos] Piar in Guayana and destroyed h i m c o m p l e t e l y . 2 4

22Trinidad Travieso has been identified previously.
Pedro camejo was known as "Negro Number One" because he h a d
been the slave of a proprietor of Apure, a certain Don
Vicente Alfonso, and because he fought so valiantly.
Don
Alfonso h a d enlisted Camejo in the Royalist army, but the
latter h a d become so disgusted w i t h the cause he was serving,
that h e deserted and h i d in the Apure area for a long time.
After P & e z 's victory at Yagual, Camejo presented himself to
P&ez and enlisted in his ranks.
He worshipped the brave,
active PAez, a m a n after his own heart, so to speak, and re
m a i n e d at his side after that until he was ki l l e d at the
Battle of Carabobo in 1821.
Both Bolivar
and PAez w e p t over
the loss o f this Negro, w h o m they had admired and loved not
only for his unsurpassed courage, but for
his w i t and humor.
Cunninghame Graham, P A e z . 189-90, 193-95.
24Manuel Carlos Piar was born to a Negro mot h e r and
white father in 1782 in Curasao.
He came to Colombian soil,
however, to defend the independence movement in 1810.
With
Miranda, he waged the first campaign against the Royalists
in 1811.
In 1813 in M a t u r i n he defeated Monteverde, w h o lost
his equipment and escaped miraculously.
He participated in
the siege of Puerto Cabello.
In 1817 he defeated Morales in
the famous Battle of San FAlix which Bolivar himself designated
as the "most brilliant success our army has had in Venezuela."
Later that year, however, Piar joined the unfortunate c o n 
spiracy of General Maririo and Bermudez against the authority
o f the Liberator.
Marino and Bermudez m a n a g e d to reconcile
themselves w i t h Bolivar, but Piar refused the pardon and p a s s 
port granted h i m and went to Angostura to stir u p a revolt.
O n October 15, 1817, he was unanimously court-martialed and
sentenced to death.
He was executed the following afternoon
in the presence of the entire army.
Scarpetta and Vergara,
Diccionario B i o o r A f i c o . 464-65.
See also Lemly, B o l i v a r . 13237, 142, 143, 144, 145-47; and Cunninghame Graham, PAez, 96,
106-107, 134.
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The enemy forces could have done the same to the other
leaders who had parties in the provinces of Barcelona and
Cumana.

Thus,

it was indispensable not to let the enemy

take possession of the Apure plains.
The fate of the Republic was determined in the llanos
of Apure in the Battles of Mata de la Miel, Yagual,
Mucuritas,

and

and in the 1819 campaign against Morillo.

It is

painful to note that those who have written the history of
our independence have not seen it this way.
understood this well, though,

General Morillo

for it was to the llanos of

Apure that he came three times when he believed N e w Granada
was pacified,

and he wanted to subject Venezuela.

Further

on I shall describe this General's plan in his campaign
against us in 1819.

However, now I want to pause briefly to

refute several errors that the historians of Colombia have
copied from one another.

They depict the army of Apure in

that epoch as a dispirited soldiery,

accustomed to stealing,

without respect or obedience to any authority.

I plead with

future historians to refute these statements and to keep
uppermost in their mind the data I am going to present in
order that they may do more justice to the heroic army to
which Colombia owed so many triumphs.
I had taken the most severe measures, dating from the
time I took over the command,
in this army.

to maintain order and discipline

Illustrative of this fact was the decree I

issued ordering capital punishment for those who were found
committing any act of violence.

Commandant RamOn Zapata was
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assassinated at that time by Second Lieutenant Lorenzo
Serrano, a Europe am,

and Sergeant Rafael Toro.

The latter,

k n owing the fate that would befall them if they fell in m y
hands, went over to the enemy.
prisoners,
death.

though,

I was able to take these men

and they were immediately sentenced to

I will not deny that some crimes were committed;

however,

their perpertrators were villains who had served in

other armies and not in the one I commanded at the time.
I shall copy n o w what Baralt [and Diaz] have to say
about these crimes on page 295 of the first volume of
Historia de V e n e z u e l a ;^5
Shortly after the battle of Yagual, Servier was
assassinated at the headquarters in Achaguas by men
who had the audacity to show their spoils of war
w i t h impunity.
The most singular thing about the
case was that this infamous crime had been whispered
about beforehand in the camp.
It seems that almost
everyone expected it to occur, but lacked the means
of preventing it.
Later on, the old Giraldot, father
of the celebrated Atanasio, and Lieutenant Colonel
Miguel Vald£z m e t the same fate.
When Senor Baralt returned from Paris,
had been printed,
I had noted in it.

after his work

I called his attention to some errors that
I lamented that he had not added respect

for justice and historical truth to the beauties of his
lyrical style.

He answered that many of the notes that he

ha d used for his history had already been given to h i m when
he sailed for Europe.

Also, he added that since he had been

away from the people who could have supplied h i m with data,

25<rhiB citation m a y be found in the 1939 Desclfte
edition of Baralt and Diaz, Readmen de la H i s t o r i a . I, 359.
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and since I had refused to give h i m any information on

the

events in which I

to

had participated, he had been forced

write only with the documents and the information that he
h a d in his possession.

Therefore,

I feel that I must correct

n o w what he wrote as truth when he placed too much confidence
on ill-intentioned individuals who deceived him.
General Servier left our headquarters at Achaguas with
m y permission to go in the country for a few days and rest
from the fatigues of a war that had ruined his health.

He

went toward "Chorreron," a place a league away from Achaguas,
to the home of a woman called Presentacidn.
there, according to what this woman said,
on

While he was

four men on h o r s e 

back came late at

night and knocked

the

door.

that they brought

an order from me for the General.

They said

He told

them to send it to him, but the men replied that it was a
verbal message and that they h a d to tell h i m in person.
Servier came to the door and was subsequently captured by
these bandits who must have been from the scattered forces
from Yagual.

They took h i m to a nearby forest and a s s a s 

sinated him.
An extensive investigation was conducted to find out
where the assassins were.
however,

The only witness to the event,

did not k n o w them.

to determine their identity.

No data were ever found later
In those times when there were

so many men loose in the fields who did not belong to the
army,

it was imprudent on the General's part to have gone

far from it.

This was especially so since he had more than
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enough enemies who h a d followed him from N e w Granada.
did not have any enemies among us,

He

for he h a d just come to

our soil and had behaved very well in the Battle of Yagual.
Giraldot, who h a d taken a passport to go to the p r o v 
ince of Guayana, was overtaken in his march and assassinated
near the banks of the Orinoco by two men.
followed immediately.
Juan Ignacio Garcia.
Yagual.

I h a d them

We overtook one of them,

a Lieutenant

He was tried and later killed in

His accomplice,

a certain Santa Maria, escaped to

Trinidad.
Baralt commits another error in placing Lieutenant
Colonel Miguel ValdAz among the number of victims of that
time.

Vald£z died on the banks of the Orinoco from cancer

of the f a c e . ^

This is verified by a letter written by his

doctor, Miguel Palacios, which I have in my possession.
Dr. Palacios still lives in Calabozo.

26P4ez's account of Valdez's death is verified by the
accounts given by D&vila, Diccionario
Bioqr&fico
and
Scarpetta and Vergara in their Diccionario
Biogr&fico*
D&vila states that P&ez's troops stripped Vald6z of all his
possessions before his death, with P&ez's approval.
But he
still says that he died of a grave illness.
D&vila, D i c 
cionario BiogrAfico. II, 359.
Scarpetta and Vergara,
Diccionario Bioqrafico , 664, state that he died of cancer.
2?Dr. Miguel Palacio Fajardo joined the ranks of the
patriot cause in 1610.
In 1816 he joined General Piez's
forces and served with h i m until 1821.
He was promote d to
Lieutenant Colonel of the cavalry in 1821.
In 1825 he
received his certificate as member of the “Order of Li bera
tors."
He died in Calabozo in 1871, ruined financially by
the federalist wars.
DAvila, Diccionario B i o g r A f i c o . II,
58-59.
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I recall nothing about Lieutenant Colonel Miguel
Santana, w h o m Montenegro places among the victims of that
time.

I do not remember either having heard any talk about

this event which even Baralt fails to mention.

CHAPTER IX
I Join Nonato PArez— Battle of Mucuritas— Defeat
of General La Torre— Operations in Barinas and
Casanare— Surprise Attack on the Royalists in
Chire— Dissensions in Casanare— I continue M y
Operations in Barinas— "Astonishing Boldness" of
[Guillermo] Iribarren in Banco Largo— Battalion
"Bravos de P&ez"— Defeat of Royalist Commandant
[Jacinto] Perera— M y Camp in El Yagual— Heroic
Deeds of Vicente Pena and Aramendi— We Take the
Things we Need in Barinas— Return to Yagual—
Arrival of the Commissioners Sent by the Libera
tor— I Recognize his Authority as Supreme C o m 
mander- -Our Cavalry Captures the Enemy Launches
at the Mouth of the C o p l A .
1817-1818
I ordered the people at the hospital and the civilians
to go to the Yagual farm, and then I left with five hundred
men to look for Nonato PArez.

The latter, who was already

in Mantecal, was to join me in Mucuritas at the Frio farm.
After four days' march,
find PArez,

I arrived there.

However,

I did not

for lack of water and horses had forced him to

retreat to a spot a league away.

For the same reasons,

found myself forced to go where I thought he might be.
forces had diminished so greatly,
on six hundred men.

His

that he could only count

The rest of the soldiers h a d left h i m

because of the poor manner in which he treated them.
chief,

I

This

though very valiant, was very haughty and despotic

with his subordinates.
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While the Spanish General Calzada, who had left
Nutrias w i t h a division,
Mantecal region.

joined forces with Morillo in the

General La Torre continued his inarch in

search of us w i t h three thousand infantrymen and seventeen
hundred

cavalrymen commanded by Colonel Remigio

Ramos.

This

cavalry

chief had distinguished himself greatly

since the

times of Boves and Yanez.
On January 27, La Torre spent the night at the Frio
farm, which was about a league away from the place I h a d
selected for the battle.

The following morning, when we

m a rched

to occupy this site, we noticed that La

already

marching through it.

Torre was

1 then h a d to march obliquely,

and double the pace until we were marching with the wind.
In the l l a n o s . and particularly those of the Apure, march i n g
against the w i n d is dangerous, particularly for the infantry.
This is because of the dust,
above all,

the powder smoke,

the wind,

and

the danger of fire starting from plugs in the

straw.
Once I attained the windward position on the plains,
I formed my eleven hundred men in three lines.

The first

line was commanded by the enterprising commandants Ram 6 n
Nonato P 6 rez and Antonio Ranjel;

the second,

by the

intrepid Commandants Rafael Rosales and Doroteo H u r t a d o . 1

1Commandant Rafael Rosales took an active part in the
m i l i t a r y campaigns of 1811, 1812, and 1813.
In 1814 he was
w i t h Urdaneta in the Araure campaign.
He was one of the
twenty-five officers who were turned over by Urdaneta to
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The third line, under the orders of the brave Commandant
Cruz Carrillo, was to remain in reserve.^
With both armieB facing each other. La Torre came out
accompanied by twenty-five hussars to reconnoitre my right
flank.
this.

He stopped when he reached a place where he could do
1 immediately detached Sergeant Ramdn Valero and

eight soldiers,

selected because of their personal valor,

attack that group.

to

I threatened them all with death if they

did not return to the formation with their lances stained by
enemy blood.

They set out on their agile horses;

and the

enemy hussars,

seeing them within firing range, discharged

their rifles.

Through the smoke my courageous cavalrymen

hurled themselves on the enemy,

lancing them with such fury

Miguel Antonio VAsquez.
From 1816 on he campaigned with
PAez.
He was with PAez in 1618 when General La Torre defeated
him in Cojedes.
In 1819 Bolivar promoted him to the rank of
Colonel.
He died a natural death in Valencia on August 18,
1845.
DAvila, Diccionario BioorAfico. II, 217-18.
Commandant Doroteo Hurtado was a citizen of the Prov
ince of Barinas.
In 1821 Bolivar promoted h i m to lieutenant
colonel in the cavalry, back-dating the commission to 1817.
From 1821 to 1825 and from 1822 to 1827, he served as Chief
of Arms of San Jaime.
He helped pacify the Alto Llano in
1829 and in 1830 PAez promoted him to the rank of Colonel in
the cavalry.
He died in Guadarrama in 1852.
I b i d ., I, 252.
^Cruz Carrillo was born in Trujillo in 1796.
He took
part in the military campaigns of 1813, 1814, and 1815.
In
1816 he was with PAez in the Battles of Mata de la Niel,
Yagual, and Achaguas.
He was also with PAez at the defeat
at Cojedes.
In 1819, after the campaign of BoyacA, he was
promoted to the rank of Colonel.
As Civil and Military Chief
of Trujillo in 1821, he helped to distract the Royalists from
Carabobo.
He was a representative in the Conorsso M m i r a b l e
of 1830.
In 1846 he helped to pacify Barinas, and in 1848 he
rose to the defense of the Congress killed by josA Tadeo
Monagas.
He died a natural death in 1865.
Ibid., I, 74-75.
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that only four or five of them remained alive to flee, terri
fied, to rejoin their army.

La Torre h a d judged it prudent

beforehand to retreat when he saw our men leave ranks to
attack them.
It is impossible to relate here the enthusiasm and
hurrahs with which the army welcomed that handful of valiant
men who returned covered w i t h glory and proudly showing the
lances they had stained w i t h the blood of our enemies.

I

took advantage of this opportunity— for my previous order
had had no other objective— to make my troops see that they
should count the enemy's numbers only in terms of the p r i s 
oners they could take or in the number of dead that their
lances could leave strewn on the battlefield.
Without losing time. La Torre advanced on us until he
had gotten within firing range.

When he opened fire, our

first line charged h i m vigorously.
charge,

Half-way across this

and in accordance with my instructions, our column

divided to the right and to the left.

These two sections

were to flank the cavalry that formed the wings of the enemy
infantry.

I had prepared m y men to retreat toward the summit

and feign defeat if they were repulsed.
the enemy.

This would deceive

Then the men of our first line were to turn

around when they saw our second line attacking the Royalist
cavalry from behind.

This operation had the desired success,

and soon the enemy was left with nothing but some two hundred
European hussars.

The rest of their forces were completely

defeated and scattered.
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At. this point,

the fifty men whom I had instructed to

furnish themselves with combustibles,
in different areas.

set fire to the llano

Immediately the llano became an inflamed

sea which issued forth waves of fire on the front, on the
right side,

and on the rear guard of La Torre's infantry.

Fortunately for the enemy,

the llanos to the left had been

burned a few days previous to this battle.
afforded them their sole means of retreat,

This coincidence
and thus saved

the Spanish army from perishing in a situation far more
terrible them that of Cambyses in the Libyan dessert.
so,

Even

in this retreat the Spaniards had to endure the repeated

charges of our cavalry who jumped over the flames and p u r 
sued them to Paso del Frio,
field.

a league away from the battle

There their persecution ended,

for the Royalists

took refuge in a forest on the right edge of the river where
it was impossible for our cavalry to penetrate.
Reporting on this battle later, Morillo wrote in a
manifestoi

"Fourteen consecutive charges on my tired bat

talions made me realize that those men were not a small gang
of cowards,

as I had been told, but organized troops capable

of competing with the best His Majesty the King h a d to offer."
This combat forced the Royalists to lose a great part
of their supplies, m a n y beasts of burden,

and a great number

o f weapons that their soldiers threw down when fleeing from
the fire.

Our losses, on the other hand,

consisted of the

death of the valiant Commandant Segarra and a few other
officers and soldiers.

This victory gave our cause a great
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moral strength,

for it represented the first reverse that

Morillo's army suffered after its arrival in Costafirme.
When Morillo, w h o was in San Vicente, heard about the
disaster that had befallen his lieutenant,
night to Paso del Frio to join the army.

he came that very
From there,

the

Royalists took the road to Banco Largo and headed toward
A c h aguas— always marching through the forests.
could not follow them there with m y cavalry,

Since I

X continued

marching on the plain in a line parallel to theirs.
they got to Achaguas,

I was there before them.

When

However,

refused a n e w battle and went on to San Fernando;

they

I continued

marching on the plains to San Juan de Payara.
From San Fernando, Morillo sent General La Torre to
operate against Piar in G u a y a n a .
Nutrias.

He also sent forces to

Leaving one troop to defend the n e w fortifications

he had constructed in the San Fernando Plaza, he marched
with the rest of his men from the province of Barcelona to
operate against the patriots who were on the island of
Margarita.
For my part,

I divided my forces also so that they

could operate from the province of Barinas in different
directions.3

I sent Captain Juan Galea with his company to

^P&ez inserts the following footnote here.
"Among the
forces that I designated to operate at different places,
there was a guerrilla force under the command of Captain
Correa and later under Commandant Hipdlito Cuevas.
It had
orders to take possession of the district of Rio Negro, in
Guayana, and achieved this with eighty men who imprisoned
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Casanare.^

He was to wage a discreet war in that province

and recruit all the men possible.

They were to join the

other guerrillas there who already amounted to a respectable
corps.

In his m a r c h , Galea encountered an enemy cavalry

column under the command of Don Antonio P16 and heading
toward Guasdualito.®

Despite the fact that Galea had only

forty men, he fought the Royalist troops and cleared a path
through them.
Casanare,

The Spanish leader [juli4n] Bayer, who was in

received confused notices about this encounter .6

the Royalists guarding these points.
At this time I received a communique
from Commandant
Orozco, who was imprisoned by the government of Brazil, I
do not remember for what reason, in which he asked me to
reclaim him as a Venezuelan.
Although he had served in the
Royalist ranks, I did not ignore his petition.
The follow
ing year, when I was with Bolivar in Potreritos Marrereflos,
Z succeeded in getting a satisfactory reply from the
Brazilian government.
Orozco joined my troops in the winter
of 1818."
4Juan Galea was a native of Casanare and attained the
rank of Colonel.
In "pacifying" the important province of
Barinas, he completely defeated the Spaniard A. P1A.
Later
in Cuiloto he defeated the Spanish Colonel Juli&n Bayer,
whom he shot.
In 1816 he helped to defeat the Spanish Cap
tain Manuel Jim 6 nez in Chire.
He participated with P&ez in
the attack on Puerto Cabello in 1823.
In 1826 he joined
Colonel Guerrero in helping formulate opinion against P&ez in
Achagua and Mantecal.
Scarpetta and Vergara, Diccionario
Bioqr&fico. 167-68.
^Don Antonio P1A was a Spanish Colonel.
He was in
command of two squadrons of the Lanceroa del Rev or King's
Lancers.
Lecuna, Crdnica Razonada. II, 193-94.
^Lieutenant Colonel Juli&n Bayer was in charge of the
second of the four columns that General Morillo had organized
to invade the Santa F 6 area from different directions.
He
h a d attempted and failed to penetrate the Atrato River area
in 1812.
Torrente, Historia de la Revolucidn. II, 238-39.
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Wanting to know the truth about it, he left Pore with six
huasars and four dragoons.

He arrived in Cuiloto after

Galea had joined his forces with those of Captain Francisco
R o d r i g uez . 7

The latter came out and attacked the enemy by

surprise with such luck that he was able to imprison Lieu
tenant Colonel Bayer and all those who accompanied him.
Thus united, our two chiefs marched on to Chire intent
on surprising an enemy cavalry squadron consisting of one
hundred and twenty men,

led by Captain Don Manuel Jimenez.®

The latter, not knowing of Bayer's disaster, was so unpre
pared that the guerrilla patriots even found a great number
of the Royalist soldiers still in bed.
were destroyed,

Consequently,

scattered, or imprisoned.

sion of their weapons and clothing.
seized Royalist uniforms,

they

We took posses

Disguised in these

our men marched on to Pore,

entered the city at bugle call, and imprisoned the guard
defending it.

Thus the province of Casanare was liberated

from the enemy.
Galea notified me of his victories and asked me at
the same time to appoint a leader for that territory.

I sent

7Francisco Rodriguez was commissioned a captain by
Vice-President Santander in 1826.
The commission was back
dated, 1816.
This indicates that he had served in the army
since 1816.
He served on the island of Margarita until
1821.
He retired with a salary in 1844.
D&vila, Diccionario
Bloqr&fico. I I , 180.
8Don Manuel Jim 6 nez was one of Morillo's "lieutenants."
He was considered to be a very competent officer.
Madariaga,
B o l i v a r. 296, 299.
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Ramdn N. Pgrez,

accompanied by Governor Moreno and the rest

of the Casanarenos that were in Apure.
one thousand horses.

I also sent Galea

Almost immediately difficulties began

to arise between the civil and the military authorities as a
result of p g r e z 'a outrages.

It got to the point that I found

it necessary to send Commandant Miguel Antonio V&squez to
assume command and send the turbulent P&rez to me as a
prisoner.9
It seems opportune here to correct the error Restrepo
makes in his Historia de Colombia in stating that the patriots
were divided between Juan Galea, whom I had appointed General
commander,

and the old governor of the province, Juan

Nepomuceno Moreno.

He further states that in order to support

m y favorite I was on the verge of moving to Casanare with my
Honor Guard.
this.

The Colombian historian was misinformed on

I have just stated how I had reconciled the divided

wills, without encountering opposition and without resorting
to the illogical plan of interrupting m y operations to adjust
a local question which at best deserved only a command.

I

was that certain that no one would fail to recognize my
authority or fail to submit to the leaders I appointed.
But let us return to our operations in Barinas.

The

9See Footnote 9 in Chapter VII.
l°This citation cannot be found in the 1858 Imprenta
Josg Jacquin edition of Restrepo's Historia de la Revolucidn
de la Repdblica de Colombia available in the library at
Louisiana State University.
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separate parties I h a d sent to operate in that province had
attained the desired goals of recruiting m e n and securing
all the h o r s e s , even those that were useless at the time to
k e e p the enemy from using them later.

At the end of March,

I gathered these separate parties and those that had been
o p e r ating in the province of Barinas at m y h e a d q u a r t e r s .
The enemy forces crossed the Apure,
in occupying both river banks,

and,

interested

they intrenched themselves

w i t h an infantry company in the town of Banco Largo. Knowing
this,

I sent Captain Guillermo Iribarren and his company to

attack the enemy t r e n c h e s . ^
thickets,

Marching under cover of the

Iribarren appeared unexpectedly before the enemy.

His troops assaulted the trenches before any but one lone
shot was fired— a shot which mortally wounded the valiant
Sergeant Roso GonzAlez.
To reward Iribarren for his conduct on this occasion,
I gave him a gold coat of arms with the motto,
Thrust."

"Astonishing

The prisoners he took then served to help me o r g a n 

ize m y first infantry battalion which

1

w i t h the requests of its leaders,

"Bravos de PAez."

the

called,

in accordance

H j u a n Guillermo Iribarren was born in Barquisimeto
in 1797.
After the campaign at Banco Largo, he participated
in the Battle of Yagual and the seizure of Achaguas.
In 1817
he took part in the seizure of Barinas; and in 1818, that of
Calabozo.
He fought in Cojedes and later participated in the
Junta de Guasdualito which resolved to let Bolivar wage the
campaign in N e w Granada and let PAez contain the Royalists
in the l l a n o s . He fought beside PAez in the famous Battle
of Carabobo in 1824.
He died April 26, 1827.
Scarpetta and
Vergara, Diccionario B i o g r A f i c o . 235-56.
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This formed the basis of the famous corps which distinguished
itself in many battles.

L a t e r , it was worthy of having its

name changed to Conquerors of BoyacA because of its heroic
conduct of this battle.
After the Battle at Banco L a r g o , a column of two
hundred infantrymen under the command of Commandant Jacinto
Perera arrived from Nutrias,

the center of enemy operations

This column intrenched itself in the town of San Antonio,
league away from the Apure River.

a

Four days later, using an

out-of-the-way road and circling around,

I came out in front

of this town at the same spot where the enemy had entered.
1 organized our attack immediately.

At full speed, we hurled

ourselves on the trench before us and dismounted hurriedly.
We destroyed a scouting party that was outside the trench,
and then we succeeded in entering one of the openings.
enemy took refuge in a second trench at the rear.
our men followed them there.
called Jos 6 Camacho.

The

Some of

Among these was a soldier

With machete in hand, he penetrated as

far as the parlor of the house, wounding and killing those
he encountered.

Finally, he fell,

stabbed like a sieve.

We organized anew, returned to the battle,
mounted with lance in hand.

and d i s 

Our men, protected by the

trenches and stimulated by the thought of the rewards I had

12commandant Jacinto Perera was a Venezuelan who had
joined the Spanish forces.
According to Lecuna, he defeated
P&ez's forces in this Battle of Sam Antonio— a fact which
P&ez does not relate here.
Lecuna, Crdnica Razo n a d a . II, 6 ,
7, 274.
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offered those who would seize rifles from the Royalists,
grabbed weapons from the enemy as they tried to take aim.
Finally,

aided by night and by the surrounding forests,

the

enemy abandoned that position and retreated to Nutrias.

We

went on to our camp at Yagual with our wounded.
At Yagual we found ourselves in the direst poverty.
In order to shelter all those people w h o had placed t h e m 
selves under m y protection, we had to construct ranch houses.
The rainy season was approaching and these emigrants were
accustomed to the comforts of civilian lifer therefore,
was necessary to provide some shelter for them.

it

Furthermore,

there were many invalids among them due to old age and sick
ness; and this did not include the women and children.

I

issued a decree ordering the civilians to give me all the
silver they might have with them so that I could return it
to them stamped and sealed.

Right then and there,

a silver

smith from Barinas, called Anzola, made a seal and converted
into m o ney all the metal those citizens had brought with
them when they had been forced to leave their homes.
Among the belongings which the citizens of Apure placed
at m y disposal were their slaves.
liberated all the territory.

I freed them when I

This provision was confirmed

later by the Congresses of Guayana and Cticuta in their laws
of manumission.
In the midst of these events and despite m y absolute
dedication to the war,

I never lost sight of the importance

of preserving the herds of cattle as a matter of vital
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interest to the country.
this project,

X gave my whole-hearted support to

and clearly showed it by the efficacious m e a 

sures I dictated to prevent the annihilation of the cattle.
I flatter mys e l f in believing that these measures preserved
a seed bed of riches which,

despite the long duration of the

war and the heavy consumption of the belligerent armies,
germinated later throughout the Republic.

This is evidenced

by the fact that the beginnings of all the farms that exist
in our country today have come from the Apure.
General Santander,

when speaking of our plight at this

time in his Apuntamientos H i s t d r i c o s , states
D uring the campaign in the llanos in 1816 and 1818,
w ar was waged on the Spaniards with cavalry and very
little infantry.
The mobility of the cavalry, the
ease of crossing the rivers and swollen ravines by
swimming, the practical knowledge of the terrain, the
abundance of cattle which furnished the only source of
nourishment for the troops, the lack of hospital,
armories, and provisions— all of these gave the inde
pendent troops considerable advantages over the
Spanish.
The horse and cattle were taken as common
goods wherever they were found, without any counting.
Those who h a d clothes wore them; those who did not,
rode naked on their horses in the hope of acquiring
clothing in the first encounter w i t h the enemy.
Accustomed as the llaneros were to living on meat alone,
and to securing strength from enduring the rain, they
were not afraid of the lack of other foods nor of the
harsh winter in that territory.
Swimmers by habit, no
river detained them in their marches; courageous by
nature, no risk intimidated them.
From this it can
be inferred that the officers, soldiers and civilians
who were not llaneros had to endure labors and p r i v a 
tions almost impossible to conceive.
The recruiting
was generally always made among all persons capable of
bearing arms.
No one was exempt.
Thus it happened

^ G e n e r a l Santander's Apuntamientos Histdricos were
unavailable, and therefore it was impossible to verify this
quotation.
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that in the Battles of Yagual and Mucuritas, lawyers,
priests, and all capable persons wielded their lances.
Until 1818 everyone, including the military and civil
ians, men and women, old and young, was forced to live
and march together.
Everyone was fed alike on roasted
meat, without salt, and everyone went barefoot.
In the month of June in 1817, eight enemy launches
convoyed by an enemy gunboat were coming up the Apure River
from Guayana toward Barinas.
hundred grenadiers.

These were protected by one

I knew that they were carrying clothingi

so I decided to seize this commodity which my troops needed
so badly.

With this goal in mind,

bongos that I had in Yagual,
Aided by a favorable wind,

I embarked men in five

armed with small cannons.

the enemy ships passed the point

at Apurito where our men had hoped to attack them.

My

b o n g o s . under the command of the daring Vicente Pena and
manned by men from my Guard,

followed the orders of Captains

Aramendi and Laurencio Silva and continued n a v i g a t i n g . ^

^ L a u r e n c i o Silva was born on September 7, 1792 in
Tinaco, Venezuela.
He joined the patriot army in 1810 in
Caracas and from then on fought unceasingly for the cause of
independence.
He fought in the Battle of Junin.
In 1817 he
participated in the attack on the enemy ships at Paso del
Frio and saved Aramendi's life on this occasion.
He fought
in the Battle of Carabobo and in the assault of Puerto
Cabello on November 8 , 1823.
Because of his deeds of bravery
at the Battle of Ayacucho, he was promoted to the rank of
General.
He supported Bolivar in the Bollvar-P&ez dispute in
1831; consequently, he was exiled from Cartagena on April 23
of this year.
Much later in 1849 he was M o n a g a s ' adversary.
In 1855 he was named Secretary of War and Councilor of state.
Silva was Bolivar nephew-in-law, for he had married the
l e t t e r ’s niece, Felicia.
Believing in a fusion of races
which would produce a new and stronger American racial type,
Bolivar had forced his niece to marry Silva who was a
mulatto.
General Silva died on February 27, 1873, after
having been one of the handful who had stayed with the
Liberator until his death.
Scarpetta and Vergara, Diccionario
Biogr&fico, 587-88.
Rourke, Man of G l o r v . 328-29, 355.
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They found the launches and the gunboat anchored a little
further up from Paso del Frio.
The enemy had barely seen our improvised and weak
squadron at a distance, when they started firing on it.
one of our cannon answered their fire,

When

it fell in the water.

Another one of our ships,

loaded with men, capsized on

firing the first volley.

The men who had manned it managed

to swim ashore despite the heavy firing from the enemy
launches that were also pursuing our b o n g o s .
much rowing, also managed to get to the shore.

The latter, by
Our men got

to land almost at the same time that their pursuers did.
Aramendi turned around and gave the grenadier who pursued
h im the closest a thrust and started yelling for the cavalry.
All the grenadiers were frightened by this and thought it
prudent to abandon the pursuit and reembark in their
launches,

taking only one of our b o n g o s .

The valiant

Aramendi was wounded in this encounter.
Frustrated in this plan,

1 returned to Yagual deter

mined to organize an expedition to march on Barinas and sieze
the goods that the launches carried to the warehouses there.
1

could not bear the idea that they might escape me,

especially since the clothing was indispensable to us.
Necessity forced us to fight not only men, but nature
also.

However, we determined to use the obstacles presented

by nature to our advantage.

We knew that the enemy relied

on these obstacles to feel secure and confident in their
position.

Who would have thought it possible for our cavalry
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troop to cross the Lower Apure at that time when so mu c h of
the terrain was covered with water and when,

above all,

several ravines and five rivers were all flooded at the same
time?

So I decided to take one thousand lancers mount e d on

dapple-gray horses and an equal number of reserve horses,
also dapple-gray.

The llaneros believe,

and I do too, that

a dapple-gray horse swims better than any other.
We got to Paso de Quintero on the Apure River.

For

tunately we did not encounter the enemy launches there,
they were in the p o r t of Nutrias.

for

I ordered seventy men of

the Guard to cross the river and attack the town of Pedraza
since the warehouses there contained some clothing.

These

men were to join me with their booty later in the town of
Canagua.
Barinas,

l warned them above all not to alarm the enemy at
for if the latter found out that some patriot

forces crossed the Apure River,

they would ascertain that it

was a p arty with the sole objective of pillaging the w a r e 
houses at Pedraza.

In the meantime,

I swam across the river

w i t h the rest of my troops and sent weapons across in a
canoe.
The men of m y Guard, having fulfilled their objective,
were returning from Pedraza when they were attacked at the
farm of Mamom by a strong guerilla force under the command
of Captain Teodore Garrido.

However,

they succeeded in

defeating this force wit h o u t any further misfortune than the
wounding of one of our officers.
and finally joined us in Canagua.

They continued their march
Garrido,

seeing our men
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countermarch toward the Apure, notified Barinas of this
movement.

He did not realize that I had taken advantage of

this stratagem to deceive the enemy there.
With all my forces reunited,

I headed toward Barinas.

We swam across the Canagua and Paguey rivers carrying our
saddles over our h e a d s .

We appeared so unexpectedly in

front of the plaza, that by a rare coincidence Remigio Ramos
at that very moment was assuring the inhabitants as a group
that the party of thieves from the Apure that had pillaged
Pedraza had taken refuge again in the territory from where
they had come.

I went to the street openings in the city

and sent three cavalry columns, along three different streets,
to charge the five hundred European infantrymen and one
hundred cavalrymen, which had arrived from Caracas and with
which Ramos opposed us.

The enemy's resistance was in vain,

for we swept away all who came before us on the points of
our lances and with the impetus of our horses.
with some officers and was pursued to Bocono.

Ramos escaped
The rest of

the enemy force remained in m y power.
The outcome of this surprise attack was that we were
able to seize the resources we needed with which the w a r e 
houses of Barinas were well-stocked.
eight launches had brought,

The goods that the

and the very reason for our p u r 

suit, also fell into our hands.

Furthermore, we got two

thousand equipped mules that served to transport all the
goods that we had secured— clothing, munitions, rifles, et
cetera.
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Leaving the fortified plazas of San Fernando and
Nutrias behind

(particularly the armed launches which were

in the latter p l a c e ) , and fearful that the guards of these
two plazas would invade the Yagual,
the Apure.

I hurried my return to

On the way to the town of Canagua,

I seized many

dry hides that I fortunately found in a warehouse t h e r e .
From these I made boats to cross the Apure River with our
load of confiscated g o o d s . 1 5
Thinking that the gunboats would locate themselves at
Quintero to prevent our passage,

I sought out an accessible

point that I knew, which was about two leagues further up
and a little below the Suripa River.

Commandant Don Juan

Comos, chief of that enemy squadron, went down the river in
his canoe,
point.

for he feared that we would cross it at another

With this in mind, we went into the Suripa,

tributary of the Apure.

a

Some patriot soldiers that were

going along the banks of this river told me they saw a canoe
which they thought belonged to Captain Como.

To prevent his

going into the Apure River and joining the rest of the
launches which would then dispute our passage,

1

ordered a

cavalry company armed with rifles to hide behind a parapet
at the mouth of the Suripa.

Comos tried in vain to force

J-Spdez inserts this footnote here.
"This boat-making
procedure is as follows.
You take one hide and, running a
rope through the holes that are made in its ends, you place
the goods inside.
Then you tighten the rope and knot it.
Then a man is able to pull this bundle across by carrying the
cord in his t e e t h . ”
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his w a y through, but our men repelled him.

Meanwhile,

I

crossed the Apure River and carried the cargo in the hide
boats we had made.
As I feared.

General Calzada had left Sam Fernando

w i t h five hundred m e n and headed toward the Yagual.
when he got to Achaguas,
to Apurito.

I was already theret

However,

so he went on

He surprised the small garrison 1 had there

under the command of Commandsmt Rebolledo, who died there.
Calzada returned afterwards to the San Fernando plaza via
the Apure River.
Thus ended this very risky undertaking.

In this

instance an urgent need h a d compelled me to weaken the Apure
forces by operating so far from my base.
at Yagual,

After m y arrival

the only notable event that occurred was the

arrival of the commissioners that the Liberator sent to
propose that I acknowledge h i m as supreme c o m m a n d e r .
Or. Felipe de Larrazabal has just published a pompous
eulogy of Bolivar in N e w York

(Life of B o l i v a r . 1886).

This writer has inflicted the Liberator with the incomparable
misfortune,

among his many and great misfortunes,

lishing himself as his Homer.
enemy.

of estab

Larrazabal is my merciless

He blames only me for Colombia's ills.

He finds no

16Felipe Larrazabal, Vida y Correspondencla General
del Libertador SimOn B o l i v a r . Enriouecida con la inaerciOn
de los M a n i f i e s t o s . Menaage s. E x p o s i c i o n e s . P r o c l a m a s . &,
Publicados por el Heroe Colombiano desde 1810 hasta 1830
(New York, 1887).
This volume was edited and brought up to
date by R. Blanco-Fombona who shortened the title to Vida
del Libertador SimOn Bolivar (Madrid, 1918).
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m e r i t in m y services,
American leader,
ingratitude,

nor in those of any other South

except Sucre.

This newspaperman, due to

swore vengeance on me and mine.

He does not

waste any opportunity to depict me as a savage,

incapable of

reasoning and always ready to rise up in arms.

It is an

immeasurable calamity that the greatest m a n of America,
Genius of Liberty of a Continent,

the

should suffer the p o s t 

humous grief of having his eulogy written by a stunted
author.

It is no less of a misfortune, however,

that in the

end a good m a n should be forced to defend himself against
the attacks of hatred.

This

"historian" accuses me always

of having opposed the Liberator.

The event which I am about

to relate and others that will appear later will be suffi
cient to convince those unfamiliar with the history of our
revolution of the falsity of L a r r a z a b a l 1s charge.
After I had defeated the Spaniards with untrained
soldiers in all the encounters we h a d had,

I had organized

in the Apure a cavalry corps and the famous Battalion P A e z .
victorious later in BoyacA.

Bolivar was not as surprised by

the fact that I had formed this army,

as b y the fact that I

had succeeded in maintaining it in a good disciplined state.
This was so because the greater part of this army was c o m 
po s e d of the same individuals who, under Yanez and Boves,
h a d been the scourge of the patriots.

To be honest, who

wo u l d have ever believed that those men,

classified as

savages by same writers and accustomed to venerating the name
of King as holy, could have ever decided to abandon their
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sacred cause to follow that of the patria— a name which held
no significance for them?

Who would have ever believed it

possible to make those men, who held everyone and everything
in contempt who could not compete with them in brute force,
understand that there was a force superior to this, to which
it was necessary to submit?
drawbacks,

Nevertheless, despite all these

I succeeded in aligning them with me.

to get them to suffer, content and submissive,
miseries, discomforts,
time,

and necessities of war.

1 was able

all the
At the same

I inspired in them a love for glory, a respect for life

and property,

and a veneration for the name of p a t r i a .

There in Apure I also came to possess the resources
of this province, which its inhabitants generously placed at
m y disposal.

It was calculated then that the properties of

Apure were as much as a million cows and five hundred thousand
riding horses.

had forty thousand of the latter, pastured

1

and ready for campaigning.

I also had under my command m i l i 

tary men of recognized merit.

Furthermore,

I exercised the

authority as supreme chief that had been conferred on me in
Trinidad de Arichuna by the remnants of the Republics of New
Granada and Venezuela.
N o w at this time, when I had at m y disposal all the
resources mentioned and had under my command an army of
invincible men who obeyed me with pleasure and loved me as a
father--now when

1

found myself vested with an all-embracing

authority— Bolivar, whom I still did not know personally,
sent Colonel Manuel Manrique and Vicente Parejo from Guayana
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to propose to me that I recognize him as supreme chief of
the R e public .1 7

If I had harbored ambitious designs,

there

could not have been a more opportune occasion to show them.
However, without hesitating a moment,

I respectfully received

the commissioners in the farm at Yagual.

Then I informed the

army of my resolution to acknowledge Bolivar as supreme chief
of the Republic.
The troops were very happy to know that he [Bolivar]
was in Guayana.

Still and all, when I told them I was going

to recognize him as chief, the greater part of the army and
the civilians pointed out to me that I did not have the power
to delegate the authority of supreme commander which I had
been granted.

Considering only the good of the country,

keeping in mind Bolivar's military gifts and the prestige
his name carried even in foreign countries,

and realizing

above all the advantages of having a supreme authority and a

l7Francisco Vicente Parejo was born in CumanA in 1780.
In 1810 he was a militia Captain in Chamariapa.
He fell a
prisoner in the attack on Angostura in 1811 and remained one
until he managed to escape in 1813.
He joined Marino's
forces then and fought with him in all the battles.
When
Bolivar arrived in Margarita in 1816, Parejo was filled with
joy and immediately recognized him as the head of the nation.
Then he joined MacGregor's forces.
In 1821 he participated
in the Congress of Angostura.
In 1825 he succeeded in getting
Cisneros to surrender.
He opposed PAez in the separation of
Venezuela from Colombia.
In 1836 he was promoted to General
of Brigade.
Since Bolivar was always the sole thought of
Parejo's public life and the only object of his disinter
ested affection, it seems appropriate that when he died on
July 24, 1864, his ashes were placed under the same roof as
those of the Liberator in the National Pantheon in Caracas.
Scarpetta and Vergara, Diccionario BiogrAfico. 439-40.
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focal point to direct the various caudillos operating in
different sections,
of General Bolivar.

I decided to subject m y authority to that
I ordered the troops that I had in

Yagual to get into formation.
Ignacio Mdndez,

Then I called Father Ramdn

later archbishop of Caracas,

to receive my

oath acknowledging General Bolivar as supreme chief in the
presence of these troops.

Later 1 ordered the troops to

follow my example and also commanded the corps in other
places to follow suit.
A few days prior to the arrival of these commissioners,
I had received a communique from the "Congress" of Cariaco
brought to me by Commandant Rebolledo,

in which I was noti

fied of the meeting of that group and asked in strong terms
to acknowledge and support its resolutions .^ 8

I openly

refused this demand and responded that although X was not
under Bolivar's orders,

I felt it necessary for all to

recognize him as supreme commander in directing the war and
smoothing over the difficulties that might stand in the way
of the meeting of a true national Congress.
Although Larrazabal does not make any accusations
against me in this instance,

I have wanted to delineate this

occasion fully to prove that I was against opposing Bolivar.

1 8 A1 though Marino had recognized Bolivar's supreme
authority in 1817, the minute Bolivar left Barcelona to go
to Guayana he attempted to usurp Bolivar's authority.
He
called a Congress at Cariaco which proclaimed a Federal
Republic.
Marino was soon defeated and lost Cumani and
Barcelona.
Mordn, History of Venezuela. 126.
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This was true even at a time when I exercised a boundless
authority with the unanimous approval of those who had con
ferred it.

Further on we shall see this same thing confirmed

in more them one act of my military life.
At this time,

fevers developed along the slopes of

the rivers and forced me to move to Achaguas,
had been abandoned for some time.

a city that

While I was there the

Spanish chief [Juan] Aldama threatened me from N u t r i a s . H e
informed me that if I did not submit to the King's authority,
he would come looking for me and reduce me to obedience .

He

asked me to remember that he was the victor of Barcelona and
that he brought victory in his p o c k e t .

I answered this boast

by saying that I would save him the trouble of crossing the
Apure to come and search for me,

for it was my intention to

be the first to test my forces against his.

Immediately,

I

detached Commandant Ranjel with a column of four hundred men.
They took possession of the town of Santo Domingo,

four

^-9Juan Aldama was a Spanish Colonel.
In the battle
that occurred on April 7, 1817 when he forced his way into
Casa Fuerte, his troops behaved with unbelievable cruelty.
On July 20, 1817 A l d a m a ’s division landed on the island of
Margarita in order to help Morillo maintain Spanish control.
Despite the fact that the Spanish troops advanced steadily,
Morillo evacuated Margarita when he heard of the loss of
Guayana and the threat to Caracas.
Now Morillo decided to
concentrate on the mainland, for by the end of 1817 he rea
lized that the troops of Aldama's division were the only
seasoned soldiers left him.
Vicente Lecuna and Harold A.
Bierck, Jr. (eds.), Selected Writings of Bolivar (New York,
1951), I, 141. Madariaga, Bolivar. 297, 302, 303.
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leagues away from Nutrias,

after having destroyed the small

garrison they encountered there.
toward Nutrias,

Ranjel continued his march

and for a few days had Aldama contained w i t h 

in the boundaries of the city.

When I found out that Morillo

and Calzada were going to join Aldama,

I ordered Ranjel to

return to m y headquarters.
Aldama marched to join Morillo and joined him on the
plain at the farm of Camoruco.

From here both marched to

occupy the town of Apurito.

They crossed the Apure, learned

that 1 was sick in Achaguas,

and ordered three hundred

cavalrymen under Commandant A. Ramos, to attack me by sur
prise.^®

Fortunately a soldier by the name of jos£ Marla

Ariza, who deserted them in the march,
was in.

flew to notify me of

the danger

1

civilians,

sending some by land and others in the ships there

1

hurried to evacuate the sick and the

were in that port to the shores of the Arauca.

I stayed

with fifty men on the other side of the river to attack the
enemy when they entered the city and to gather more forces
in the meantime.
I was about a league away seeking better pasture for
the horses when, about 8:00 a.m.,

I was informed that the

enemy had occupied the town [Achaguas].

Immediately 1 started

to march against these forces, but they did not stay.

They

left when they saw that there was no one in the city.

I

20Antonio Ramos was commandant of the Spanish squadron
of Ouayabal.
Later he took charge of a cavalry regiment.
Lecuna, Crdnica Razonada. II, 5, 6 8 , 263.
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pursued them for about a league.

Failing to overtake them,

I countermarched to Chorreron where some forces joined me.
There I discovered that the entire enemy army had already
crossed the river and was entrenched in the church in this
town, while the cavalry maintained itself posted a league
away.

I sent Colonel Aramendi with a squadron of lancers to

surprise this cavalry.
attack,

He was completely successful in the

for he kept his march a secret until he thrust h i m 

self suddenly on the camp, killing and scattering many people.
Meanwhile,

1 went to San Fernando with the Battalion P&ez and

some cavalry.2*

I arrived at that plaza at night and

attacked it vigorously— yelling "hurrahs"
the troops at Guayana.

for Bolivar and

The object of this was to call

Morillo's attention toward Calabozo and get him to abandon
the Apure campaign.
1

believe it was this false attack rather than the

cavalry loss sustained in A r a m e n d i 's surprise attack,

that

prompted Morillo*s forces to recross the river along the

2*P&ez inserts the following footnotet

"I was also
taking three hundred Cunabiche Indians.
They were under the
command of one of their own men, called Linache, w h o m X had
given the rank of general among his companions.— Before the
simulated attack on the plaza, knowing h o w cowardly the
Indians became on hearing the whistling of the bullets, I
distributed rations of whisky among them.
This liquor made
them gain so much spirit, that they pierced their tongues
with the points of their arrows and then bathed their faces
in the blood that came out of these w o u n d s . Then they
h u rled themselves, full of the greatest daring, against the
enemy trenches.
One of m y Indian captains, called DosReales, hurled himself ahead of time against a trench and
was killed by machete blows."
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same Apurito and road to San Jaime.

They crossed

Portuguesa River and w e n t to calabozo.

the

The Spanish General

h a d ordered the Fifth Division previously to locate in the
town of Guadarrama and the squadrons to form again in the
towns where they belonged.

These movements amounted to

giving Bolivar the advantage of being without Morillo's
opposition as he marched to join me in San Juan de Payara
Where I awaited him.
At the beginning of 1818, kno w i n g that Bolivar was
already in the farm of Canafistola,
Payara,

I went on to m e e t him.

chief army leaders.

about four leagues from

X was accompanied by my

He had barely seen me from a distance,

when h e immediately mounted to come receive me.
we dismounted and happily embraced tightly.

W h e n we met

X let h i m k n o w

that his being in the llanos was a very happy omen for the
patriot cause.

X hoped his privileged intelligence in find

ing new methods and utilizing the resources we placed at his
disposal would launch rays of destruction against the enemy
we were trying to conquer.

W i t h the generosity that c h a r 

acterized him, he answered me in flattering phrases.

He

p r a i s e d highly m y constancy in withstanding the dangers and
privations of every kind in defending the p a t r i a .

Then he

assured me that our mutual efforts could completely destroy
the enemy that oppressed us.
Bolivar was then in the prime of his life and possessed
a robustness which civilian life seldom gives.

Although h e

was not tall, he was not short enough so that a sculptor w h o
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wanted to depict a hero would ignore his stature.

His two

chief distinctive features were the excessive mobility of
his body and the brightness of his eyes which were black,
alive, penetrating,

restless,

and had the gaze of an eagle.

These factors were more than enough to make him outstanding
among his companions despite his slighter stature.

He had

black and somewhat curly hair, hands and feet as small as
those of a woman,

and a voice that was sharp and penetrating.

His skin, toasted by the sun of the tropics,

still maintained

the cleanliness and luster which the rigors of an outdoor
life and the continuous and violent changes in climate had
not been able to wrest from him.

Those who expect to find

the man of arms only in the robust athlete, however, would
have been disappointed on seeing Bolivar.

An artist, h o w 

ever, or any keen observer for that matter, could find in
him at a single glance the outward signs characterizing a
man who is tenacious in purpose and ready to carry out under
takings requiring great intelligence and great constancy.
Despite the agitated life that he had lived until then,
calculated to undermine the most robust constitution, he
[Bolivar] was still healthy and full of vigor.
happy and jovial disposition.

He had a

Though he had a placid char

acter in personal dealings, he was impetuous and dominating
in dealings of national importance.

Thus he combined the

pleasantness of the courtier with the spirit of the warrior.
He was fond of dancing and was very gallant and
susceptible to women.

Skillful in handling horses, he liked
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to gallop at full speed over the plains of Apure and pursue
the deer that were abundant there.

In camp he maintained

good spirits with opportune jokes.

On marches he always

seemed somewhat restless and tried to distract his impatience
by singing patriotic s o n g s .

He was fond of battles and p e r 

haps even squandered too much of himself on them.
while the battle lasted, he was completely serene.
failed to set the example,

However,
He never

to provide the commanding voice

and sword in order to restrain the defeated o n e s . ^
I must repeat that Bolivar's outward appearance, his
weak frame,

accustomed from infancy to the comforts of a

home, provided quite a contrast to that of the inhabitants
of the llanos; for the latter were robust athletes who had
never known any other way of life but the continuous struggle
with nature and wild animals.

It can be said here that the

two indispensable elements needed to wage war were joined
n o w — the intellectual force to guide and organize plans,
the raw material to carry out these plans.
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and

Both elements

Thomas Rourke in his biography of Bolivar includes
a quotation from a certain Fernando GonzAlez to describe PAez
which is both interesting and appropriate at this point.
GonzAlez says of PAez, "He was an innocent child, a primitive
who looked on Bolivar as a god and at other times, when he
was afar, as a devil.
He was a child even unto his crimes,
enamored of anything that shone."
Rourke, Man of G l o r v . 193.
Another apropos quotation reads as follows 1
"Bolivar is
real, PAez unreal.
Bolivar belongs to history, PAez to
legend; their cooperation has the smack of Bonaparte joining
hands with Achilles."
Thomas Russell Ybarra, The Passionate
Warrior, Simdn Bolivar (New York, 1942), 148.
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must help each other mutually and can do nothing without the
other.

Bolivar brought with him the knowledge of military

tactics learned in books and which he had already put into
practice on the battlefields.

For our part, we were going to

give him the experience acquired in places where it becomes
necessary to vary the plans conceived beforehand at each
step,

and to operate according to changes in the terrain.
Bolivar,

impatient to begin the campaign, had been in

San Juan de Payara for three or four days wondering how to
cross the Apure River with the army.

We did not have the

ships necessary to do so, and in addition,

the enemy was

guarding the only place where we could cross the river w i t h 
out exposing ourselves to the cannon of the plaza.

He was

in a state of turmoil pondering how to solve these problems,
while I kept encouraging him to start the march.
h i m that I would get him the necessary ships.
me,

"But, man, where will you get them?"

I assured

He kept asking

I told him that I

would get those that were at the river pass opposite to us.
"And h o w can we take possession of these?"
"With cavalry."
"Where is that water cavalry?" he asked me,

"For land

cavalry can not perform such a miracle."
Finally he decided to march and approach the river,
not with the hope that the anticipated operation would be
carried out, but to decide what means to take.
reaching the river,

A mile before

I begged him to halt the army so that I

could detach the men we needed to seize the enemy launches.
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Although he still felt that this was either a dream or a
joke, he yielded to m y wishes.
I took only fifty men from the Cavalry Guard,

and we

arrived at the river bank with loosened girths and without
cruppers so that we could roll our saddles on the ground
without dismounting.
at the same time.

We did this and all fell in the water

This unexpected operation shocked the

enemy so, that they only fired a few cannon shots.

Immedi

ately, the greater part of their men jumped in the water.
Our cavalry group hurried to place itself in front of the
plaza in order to prevent the enemy forces from informing
General Morillo who was in Calabozo.
ships,

We captured fourteen

including both the armed and unarmed ones.

was astonished.

Bolivar

He declared that if he had not witnessed

this act, he would never have believed it.
All I have to do now is to copy here the written
testimony of an English writer.

Although I do not know this

Englishman's name, he says he served under
tion will be long,
corrections,
reading.

m e .
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This cita

and even though the narration could endure

it is beautiful and true and certainly worth

The book is entitled, Recollections of a Service

of Three Years During the War-of-Extermination in the
Republics of Venezuela and Colombia— London,

1828, and states

as f o l l o w s . ^

2^The Englishman was Captain Cowie,

first name not

listed.
24captain Cowie (?), Recollections of a, Service of
Three Years, II, 173-87.
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Proceeding on toward the town of Barinas, I was
informed by some of the natives that Bolivar was
encamped a few miles from it, in the direction of the
Villa de Aranca, and I there joined him.
The brave
General PAez received me, though a stranger, with the
greatest cordiality, and seeing me weak from a wound
w h ich I h a d received in the engagement w i t h the
Spaniards, generously offered to yield up all his own
little accommodations till I should be quite recovered.
This heroic and noble-minded man has derived all
his ideas and virtues from nature.
Nurtured in a
country perfectly uncivilised, without the advantages
of either birth or fortune, he has, by his own personal
merit, his prowess and undaunted courage, raised h i m 
self, through the incidents which have from time to
time occurred to h i m during the revolutionary contest,
to the command of by far the most effective and useful
native force of any in the country.
He is a native of
the plains of Capac (s i c ) , and descended from the
horde of Llaneros, who have ever lived there in the
m o st barbarous and savage m a n n e r . When the revolution
was first agitated, he was then a young man, and a
private in one of the bands of Lancers w h i c h are
raised on the plains.
In this humble situation he
soon found means to distinguish himself.
His extra
ordinary courage and strength enabled h i m to beat all
competitors in the gymnastic exercises, to which the
Llaneros daily accustom themselves; and by the adroit
ness which, from continued practice, he h a d acquired
in the use of their favorite weapon, the lance, he
could w i t h ease beat them into submission when any
disputes arose.
These, together with the numbers he
always placed hors de combat in their numerous skir
mishes, procured h i m the respect of all his companions,
w h ile his mild and unassuming disposition ensured h i m
their respect and friendship.
He does not appear to
have entertained any wish to aggrandise himself at this
period, nor indeed at any subsequent one, as his conduct
has ever been marked w i t h a most perfect disinterested
ness and indifference, as to his own advantage, in every
action of his life.
The usual fate however of the
chiefs of these bands, and the general esteem in w hich
he was held, soon placed h i m in command.
The leader of
the party he belonged to having been killed in action,
the whole of the troops instantly and unanimously
elected h i m their chief, and in this station he enacted
so many deeds o f bravery, and with such universal
success, that his band was ho u r l y receiving volunteers,
and in a short time became augmented from about 300 to
above 2000.
With these he commenced operations on a
larger scale, and soon became the most formidable foe
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the Spaniards ever h a d in Venezuela, and to h i m may
certainly, w i t h the strictest justice, be attributed
in a great degree the independence of that part of
Colombia, while his exertions in the cause of N e w
Granada have been also great and extremely beneficial
to it.
He could not, at the time I served with him
either read or write, and, until the English arrived
on the plains, he was totally unacquainted w i t h the use
of knives and forks, so rude and uncivilized h a d been
his previous life.
As soon however as he began to
mingle w i t h the officers of the British legion, he
copied their manners, customs, and dress, and invari
ably acted as they did, as far as his previous habits
would admit, on all occasions.
He is about five feet
nine inches in height; his frame is very muscular and
finely formed, and he possesses wonderful strength and
agility.
His countenance is handsome and manly; his
hair thick, black, and curling; his temperament san
guine, disposition warm, generous and kind, and his
mind, though quite uncultivated, enriched with all the
virtues w h i c h most adorn human nature.
Open, frank,
and unsuspecting, he is the best of friends, and being
perfectly free from the baser passions, the most
generous of enemies.
He is particularly fond of the
English, calling them his brothers, and ever advocating
their claims to the gratitude of the country with the
greatest enthusiasm.
His intrepidity
rendered hi m
equally beloved by them, and, excepting General Marizio,
he was the most popular chief with them in Colombia.
Frequently, when the jealousy of the native officers
has led them to make h a r s h and unmerited observations
respecting the services of the British Legion, has he,
by a well-timed reproof, checked them; and he was, with
but two or three exceptions, the only one who ever
candidly acknowledged the benefit which the cause of
liberty derived from their services; and he alone ever
proposed a public testimonial of it on the part of the
Congress.
To enumerate all the anecdotes of this extraordinary
man would more than fill a volume, so numerous and
romantic are the actions of his life.
One of them,
which is truly characteristic of his bravery and r e s o l u 
tion in cases of emergency, and which illustrates his
military character, I will relate.
Bolivar was on the
plains of the Apure, w i t h his troops in a starving
condition, and without the means of procuring food for
his army, unless he took a circuitous march of many
leagues, to which the strength of the men was incom
petent, or found means to arrive at the point he wished
to gain, by crossing the river Apure, on those banks, on
the opposite side, were plenty of cattle, grazing within
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sight of the newly famished troops.
The latter could
not be accomplished, as he had no boats of any descrip
tion, or timber to construct rafts; but about midway
across the river was a fleet of sixty flecheras which
belonged to the enemy, and were well armed and manned.
Bolivar stood on the shore gazing at these in despair,
and continued disconsolately parading in front of them,
when PAez, who had been on the look out, rode up and
enquired the cause of his disquietude.
His Excellency
observed, "I would give the world to have possession of
the Spanish flotilla, for without it I can never cross
the river, and the troops are unable to march."
"It
shall be yours in am hour," replied PAez.
"It is impos
sible," said Bolivar, "and the men must all perish."
"Leave that to me," rejoined PAez, and galloped off.
In
a few minutes he returned, bringing up his guard of
honour, consisting of three hundred lancers selected
from the main body of the Llaneros, for their proved
bravery and strength, and leading them to the bank, thus
briefly addressed them:
"We must have these flecheras,
or die.
Let those follow Tio who p l e a s e . "25 A n d a t the
the same moment, spurring his horse, dashed into the
river and swam towards the flotilla.
The guard followed
h im with their lances in their mouths, now encouraging
their horses to bear up against the current by swimming
by their sides and patting their necks, and then shout
ing to scare away the alligators, of which there were
hundreds in the river, till they reached the boats, when,
mounting their horses, they sprang from their backs on
board them, headed by their leader, and, to the astonish
ment of those who beheld them from the shore, captured
every one of them.
To English officers, it may appear
inconceivable that a body of cavalry, with no other arms
them their lances, and no other mode of conveyance
across a rapid river than their horses, should attack
and take a fleet of gun-boats amidst shoals of alligators;
but, strange as it may seem, it was actually accomplished,
and there are many officers now in England who can tes
tify to the truth of it.
The strength with which nature has endowed General
PAez, is surprising.
He will at any time, for mere
sport, when his troops are catching wild cattle by means
of the lazo, sxngle out a bull from the herd, and

25cowie footnotes Tlo thusi
"Uncle.
A name by which
the Llaneros frequently address PAez, particularly the guards
of honour, who are more
privileged than the others." At
this point PAez makes no explanation of the discrepancy in
the number of men which
he says he took (50)
and the number
that Cowie says he took (300).
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following him on horseback seize him, while at full
speed, by the tail, by a sudden twist of which he will
throw the animal over on his s i d e .26 if upon any
excursion he meets with a tiger or wild boar, he
instantly transfixes him with his lance.
Prom thirty
to forty men have been known to fall by his single arm
in one engagement, and he is unquestionably the first
lancer in the world.
He has, since he has risen into
notice, generally had from 3,000 to 4,000 men under his
command, all of the Llaneros tribes, and these form by
far the most formidable native force in the Republic;
with their aid and by his own indefatigable assiduity
he was always able to hold Morillo in check.
P&ez has
ever proved himself a most inveterate enemy to the
tyrannical dominion of Spain, and a terrible avenger
of his country's injuries.
For weeks and months he has
followed the steps of Morillo, unceasingly clinging to
him like his shadow, and upon every opportunity dashing
into his camp at night with frequently not more than
150 to 200 men, slaughtering all whom he encountered,
and on every occasion cutting his way back with very
trifling loss.
At other times, when the Royalist army
was passing through the country, he would seize a
favourable moment, when they were fatigued by a h a r a s 
sing day's march, to drive off all their cattle and
baggage mules, leaving them without provisions.
It
was acknowledged by Morillo, that, upon one occasion,
when marching from Caracas to Santa-f£-de-Bogata, he
was deprived of upwards of 3,000 men, and the whole of
his military stores, by the unceasing attacks made
upon him by P&ez, and that he was in consequence
obliged to abandon the object of his expedition until
he was reinforced.
The Llaneros are natives of the plains of Capac and
the Apure.
They are raised in the manner of militia,
but receive no pay excepting what arises from their
plunder, which is equally divided amongst them.
They
are mounted on horses, which, from being long habituated
to abstince and fatigue, are the most serviceable and
hardy animals in the world, being trained to perform
almost everything their owners can desire.
When mounted
either in the field or for the chase, both horse and
rider appear as if they were actuated by the same
impulses; the sagacity of the one enabling it to

26cowie footnotes lazo thus*
"A slip knot, or noose,
which is thrown with great preciseness over the head of the
animal intended to be caught.
This operation has been so
well described by other travellers, that any account of it
here is unnecessary."
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comprehend the most trifling motion of the other.
The Llaneros are badly apparelled and accoutred;
their covering and appointments being of the same
scanty nature as that worn by the Guerillas, com
manded by colonel Montes, but they are far more
brave, and better qualified for field operations;
they are exceedingly dextrous and active, and perform
any required movements with amazing velocity.
Their
only weapon is the lance, the shaft of which is from
nine to twelve feet in length, light and elastic,
but tough and durable.
The lance itself has not what
is termed a shoulder, like those of European cavalry,
but is formed like the blade of a long knife, both
edges of which are as sharp as a razor of good metal,
substance, and temper.
This is lashed to the shaft
by cow-hide thongs, leading from the top of the
socket to about eight inches downwards.
From their
earliest childhood the Llaneros are accustomed to the
use of this weapon, small ones being made for such
practice by their parents.
Previously to their being
admitted to the ranks of the bands, it is necessary
that they should be duly instructed in the use of this
weapon, and that they should be able to catch a wild
horse, never before mounted, and after placing one of
their large and severe bits in his mouth, go with him
at once into action.
They are therefore trained to
horsemanship as soon as they can strike the steeds of
their fathers, and constant practice gives them a p e r 
fect fearlessness, so that they will ride on the brink
of a precipice and over rocks that would make a less
experienced horseman shudder to look at. No observance
of respect towards their superior officers is observed
amongst them; all appear on the same footing; but they
pay the most unlimited attention to their orders in the
field, where they know it is certain death to treat them
with levity.
In this point, I believe, lies all their
discipline; as out of the field they are dirty, irre
gular, and dishonest, and treat their officers (who are,
it must be confessed, but very little better than them
selves in any respect) with the same freedom as they do
each other.
It was a thing of usual occurrence to see
one of these ruffians approach General P&ez, and
address him by the appelation of Tlo, or compadre, and
ask for anything he might want, without the smallest
anticipation of a refusal, from his known good nature;
and if the chief happened to be absent when they wished
to see him, they would go all over the camp or town in
search of him, uttering the above names in a loud
sonorous tone, till he had heard and satisfied them.*7

27cowie footnotes Compadre as "Protector."
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At other times, while on service, if he were at his
meals, which were generally enjoyed in the open field,
should any of them take a fancy to the piece of
tassao, or other provisions, he was about to eat, they
would with peculiar adroitness go behind him and snatch
it away, at which he would only laugh, and cry out
animo Justo. . . .28
The Llaneros express themselves on most occasions
when they are deeply interested, and particularly in
their armours, in couplets, which are perfectly extem
pore; their rhymes are generally very happy, and their
meaning very applicable to the occasion.
They also
play on a guitar of rather rude construction, upon which
they accompany themselves while serenading their m i s 
tresses, and their songs are always extempore.
They
have a habit, which they derive from education, of
appropriating the property of others to their own use.

28

Cowie footnotes animo justo "Well done— right."
Paz omits an entire paragraph here,
since it was not p a r 
ticularly flattering to the llaneros. it appears to be worth
including.
"The Llaneros only yield in bravery to the
Sa m b o s , and this arises, 1 presume, from their not enter
taining the doctrine of fatalism; to all the remaining races
they are superior in courage.
They are decidedly the best
of the native forces, but are nevertheless obstinate, and at
times will yield to a very inferior force, not wholly
through fear, but for the sake of betraying any of their
officers, who may have offended them, into the hands of the
enemy.
Their evil propensities are to be ascribed to their
mode of living in their youthful days.
Exclusively bred on
the plains, not having any intercourse with the more civi
lised inhabitants of the Republic, and living as they do
beyond the pale of any law, they carry on a system of rapine
and murder from their childhood, over which the government
appears not to have the slightest control, but who will, I
apprehend, at a time perhaps not far distant, have to deplore
and dread the increased exercise of their lawless power."
Captain Cowie (?) Recollections of a Service of Three Y e a r s .
II, 182-83.

327
which becomes so natural to them that no dread of
the most condign punishment can divest them of it.29
The Llaneros are a tall, muscular set of men,
capable of great fatigue, and are commonly abstemious,
but they are deceptive, cunning, and prone to revenge.
The latter passion, they will employ every means in
their power to gratify, and that in the most cruel and
sanguinary manner they can devise.
They shed the blood
of their dearest ties on the most trivial occasions
with frigid indifference, and had they not been
restrained in a great degree by the active and powerful
energies of their leader, they would long before this
have had the whole of the wealth of the country in their
hands.
General P&ez possesses all the requisites of
commanding this horde, and of keeping them in subjection,
and is perhaps the only man in Colombia who could so
effectually restrain them in their rapacity and passion
for murder.
He has no laws by which he governs them,
but trusts solely to his own prowess to quell all dis
turbances, and to chastise all their delinquencies.
Whenever any of them commit acts which are deserving of
punishment, or express dissatisfaction at any regula
tion which may have been adopted, he tells them they
must meet him in single combat; and this they are
obliged by their own usages to do, or their comrades
would drive them from the ranks.
They thus receive the

2®Padz omits another paragraph and a half here from
his citation.
This portion is as followsi
"The horses
belonging to the officers of the British Legion, which were,
in most cases, of the Santa F6 breed, and are esteemed the
finest in the country, were always stolen, whenever the owners
of their servants left them but a few moments unguarded.
One
instance of this kind of theft is rather ludicrous, and, as
it shows their dexterity, it may be worth while to relate it.
"Major Manby had two very valuable chargers, and having
reason to apprehend that they would be stolen, as several of
his brother officers had met with similar losses, he was
determined to secure them if possible.
With this intention
he tied their halters, which were made of very strongly
twisted hide, to each of his own legs, leaving the animals
sufficient room to graze, and laid himself down under a tree
to sleep.
When he awoke he found, to his dismay, that the
horses were both gone, and his legs so firmly fastened to
the tree with the halters, that he was obliged to use his
sword to release himself from his bed.
There is no possi
bility of ever regaining animals thus purloined, as they are
immediately driven two or three hundred miles across the
plains to a place of security."
Ibid., 183-84.
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reward of their offences from the hands of their chief,
whose valour always prevails; and this circumstance
gains him more weight and respect with such troops than
any other method he could pursue.
General P&ez is subject to attacks of epilepsy upon
any violent excitement of the nervous system, and they
generally seize him either during an action, or immedi
ately after it. The manner of warfare followed by the
Llaneros, consists in charging repeatedly with the
utmost fury through the thickest of the enemy's lines,
until they succeed in throwing the whole into confusion,
on which they slaughter all around them.
On these
onsets the exertions of P&ez are so violent, that he is
seized with sudden vertigo and falls from his horse,
which is so trained that it will stop the instant it
feels his rider leaving its back, who remains on the
ground until some of his men raise him.
He is then
taken to the rear, and the only means used to recover
him are dashing cold water over him, or, if there be
sufficient at hand, by immersing him suddenly into it,
accompanied by a violent shaking.
These attacks have
subjected him to the most imminent danger, the enemy
having been known to pass over him several times
before his men could approach to rescue him.
He is
generally very weak for several days after these fits,
although he invariably re-enters the field, if suffi
ciently recovered to be able to retain his seat on
horseback, before
the action is finished.
In some
instances he has done this, notwithstanding he had been
nearly speechless from the severity of the fit.
In
short, he is altogether a most wonderful man; and were
the numerous extraordinary incidents of his life to be
formed into a narrative, it would have more the sem
blance of romance than authentic biography.
He is,
above all things, a sincere patriot, and certainly a
bright ornament to his country, which there can be but
little doubt he has been the principal means of con
tinuing thus long a Republic.
I repeat that this narrative could be corrected some
what,

and I must add that a few of these corrections would be

required by modesty.

But since so very much has already been

written against me, why not publish also what has been said
in m y favor?
Let us now continue the interrupted narrative.

CHAPTER X
March on Calabozo— I Seize the Cattle the Enemy
Had at the Outskirts of this City— Morillo Comes
out w i t h his Staff to Check the Proximity of our
A r m y — We Charged and Placed the Expeditionary
General in Grave D a n g e r — Defeat of Three Hundred
European Hussars— Bolivar's P l a n — M y Opinion of
This P l a n — Reply to the Charges of Insubordination
that Restrepo Has Made Against M e — The Campaign
Plan I Proposed to the Liberator— X Leave to Seize
the San Fernando Plaza— Encounters in the Ravines
of the Biruaca, the Negro, and the Enea Rivers—
Union of Colonel Ldpez's Forces w i t h Those of
General La T o r r e — Battle in O r t i z — Death of Genaro
V&s q u e z — My March Against L d p e z — The Liberator is
Saved Miraculously at Rincdn de Los To r o s — La
Torre's Movements— Action at C o g e d e s — I March to
San Fernando— Return to Acha g u a s — The San Fernando
Troops Name Me General-in-Chief— In Defense of the
Army of Apure.
1816
The event that I have just related occurred at the
m o u t h of the Copl£ River,

less than a mile from San Fernando,

and proves that there is no greater danger than unprepared
men.
speed,

The army crossed the river then w i t h the greatest
and Bolivar immediately started the march on Calabozo.

He did not use the highway,

but an out-of-the-way road

instead to avoid having some enemy patrol detect h i m and
notify Morillo.

Before his departure he stationed Colonel

Miguel Guerrero with a squadron in front of San Fernando to
prevent the m e n in the plaza from getting supplies.

Guerrero

was also to expedite our communications and maintain our line
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of operations with Apure and Guayana.
We succeeded in completing the march without being
discovered.
farm.

We crossed the Guarico River at the Altagracia

Then we crossed the Orituco River at the pass of Tres

Moriches and spent the night on the right bank,
from Calabozo.

three leagues

At four in the morning we raised camp, and I

went on ahead with a cavalry party.

My plain was to seize

the cattle that were in a corral at the outskirts of the
city which the enemy garrison used to ration its tr o o p s .
succeeded in accomplishing this at dawn.
behind us,

We

Putting the cattle

I remained at the outskirts of the city,

in the

open plain that bears to the Southwest.
When Morillo was told that the cavalry party that had
seized the cattle was still at the outskirts of the city,
apparently waiting for smother enemy army to join it, he
jumped from bed and exclaimedi
here?

Did it fly here?"

"What army was able to get

To further ascertain this matter,

he mounted his horse and rode out to the outskirts of the
city accompanied by his staff and two hundred infantrymen
that he left in ambush behind him.
accompanying an enemy officer,

When l saw cavalry

I surmised immediately that

it must be Morillo and his staff.

With my comrades,

I

approached them little by little until they turned to go
back to the city.

Then 1 charged them fu11-blast in order

to lance them before they entered the plaza.

Morillo waited

for us until he felt it imprudent to let us get any closer.
Then he turned around.

We charged with such tenacity and
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got so close, that the Intrepid Aramendi almost lanced
Morillo.

He was prevented from doing so by a Captain Carlos

in Morillo's staff who came between the two and received the
mortal blow intended for his chief.
At this point the infantry Morillo had left in ambush
behind us, opened fire on us.

This precautionary measure

Morillo had taken proved to be his salvation and that of his
staff, for without it not even one of them would have escaped.
We were finally forced to return to the llanos by breaking
through this ambush.
We were bemoaning the fact that such an important
prisoner had escaped us, when Captain
Francisco Guerrero saidt

(later general)

"Here comes an infantry and cavalry

column, which I know does not belong to our army,
coming from an opposite direction."^

for it is

We went to reconnoitre

and discovered that it was a corps of three hundred infantry
men and three hundred hussars,
posted in the

all Europeans.

They h a d been

MisiOn de Abajo with orders to march to Apure,

for this was where Morillo planned to go when the cavalry
joined him.

We charged them, were repelled, and then pursued

by the hussars.

When we saw that the latter had separated

^General Francisco Guerrero was a native of Venezuela.
A companion of the very intrepid Colonel Francisco Aramendi,
he participated in the Battles of Chire, Guasdualito, Mata
de la Miel, los Cocos, Hato del Frio, and Carabobo in 1824.
He was very instrumental in organizing am auxiliary division
in Carabobo for Perd.
He supported and assisted P&ez in
setting up the government of Venezuela.
Scarpetta and
Vergara, Diccionario Biocrr&fico, pp. 201-202.

332
from the infantry, we turned around and defeated them c o m 
pletely.

Only about sixty of these men were able to go to

the plaza.
The Liberator,
firing.

approaching with the army, heard the

He ordered the Apure Guard to go at full gallop and

reinforce us.

Later he also sent a company of scouts from

the Barcelona Battalion under the command of Captain Jos6
Maria Arguindiguez.

Bolstered by this aid we continued to

attack the enemy with greater vigor.

They, too, had been

reinforced by two hundred men that had been detached for this
purpose when Morillo got to the outskirts of the city.

Our

Guard charged the Royalist infantry in square formation six
or eight times without being able to break the square.
Finally our Guard dismounted.
by the scouts,

Lance in hand and accompanied

they advanced and destroyed that entire force

— a force that had defended itself with unequaled d a r i n g . 2
By this time our army, consisting of two thousand infantrymen,
over two thousand horses,
arrived.

and four artillery pieces, had

It formed in front of the city in the open plain.

Despite this, however,

the Royalist Battalion Castilla, which

was in Misidn de Arriba,

succeeded in getting into the plaza

^PAez footnotes this as followst
"The Spanish soldiers
fought with such desperation that our llaneros, commenting
that night on the events of the day, said that (and I will
allow myself to repeat it in their very words), 'When there
were four left, they defended themselves c... with c....'
This is to say, that even four of them formed a square.
This was very true.
They would not surrender, and it was
necessary to kill them."
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without further losses than its equipment and some men that
we had taken prisoners.
Morillo,

finding himself without food stuffs even for

as short a period as eight days, already thought himself
lost.

In effect we would have been able to finish h i m then

if Bolivar had abandoned the idea of leaving him in the
plains to go seize Caracas.

He attached such great impor

tance to the occupation of the capital,

that the idea of

leaving the Spanish Chief in an area where he could very
soon gather forces and then march in search of us, did not
detain him.
We started the march,

and the army recrossed the

Guarico at the San Marcos pass.
the town of Rastro.

From there we went on to

But first, we left Commandant Guillermo

Iribarren and his squadron in front of Calabozo to observe
enemy movements.
In the town of Rastro,
and on the way to Caracas,
ference outside the house.

three leagues from Calabozo

Bolivar summoned me to a c o n 
He wanted to know what I thought

of his plan to leave Morillo in Calabozo in order to go march
on the capital.

He told me that his objective was to take

possession of it, not only for the moral strength that such
an acquisition would give the cause, but also because of the
certainty that he would be able to recruit four thousand
citizens in the valleys of Aragua and Caracas to reinforce
our army.

I responded that although I was always ready to

obey his orders,

I did not share his opinion on this matter.
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I told him that none of his arguments seemed sufficiently
strong to me to warrant exposing ourselves to the risk of
leaving Morillo as rear guard.

Morillo would quickly be

able to assemble the forces that he had distributed in
various places not too far from Calabozo,
together were greater them o u r s .

and these all

I pointed out also that

our superiority over the enemy was in our cavalry,

and that

this superiority was nullified the moment that we entered
hilly,

rocky territory covered with forests.

further,

Elucidating

I told h i m that it was unwise to leave the fortified

p l a z a of San Fernando in Apure.

Then I added that even if he

were successful in recruiting all the m e n he hoped to, we
still would not have any equipment for them.
ence was so long and heated,

This c o n f e r 

that it attracted the atten

tion of those who were watching from a distance and who
perhaps thought that we were quarreling.
At dawn the following day, while Bolivar was still
undecided,

a communique came from Iribarren.

The latter,

the reader will recall, had stayed close to Calabozo observing
the enemy.

He informed us now that Morillo had evacuated the

city in the middle of the night,
k n o w what direction he had taken.

and that as yet he did not
Bolivar immediately

ordered the army to countermarch to Calabozo.

He insisted

on this order although those familiar w i t h the area told h i m
that if we continued the march toward Caracas we would be
able to recross the Guarico River at the Palomas ford and
appear unexpectedly before the enemy.

He felt that it was
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always more convenient to follow the enemy's tracks;

there

fore , it was indispensable to go to Calabozo and find out
exactly which road they h a d taken.
I particularly call the reader's attention in this
instance to compare this account with the one that Larrazabal
copied from Restrepo.^

He will be surprised to see h o w events

are distorted when related by those who have found out about
them through ill-intentioned channels or those who report
w h a t they have not witnessed.
We marched to Calabozo then, which was already o c c u 
p i e d by Iribarren.

There a certain Pernalete told me that

someone h a d told Bolivar that I had come ahead with m y forces
so that I could loot the city.4

Full of indignation,

immediately before Bolivar, who was in the plaza.
h i m that if such a thing had been said to him,

I went

I told

X was d e t e r 

mined to punish the person who had been vile enough to invent
such a perfidious lie w i t h the very sword that I wielded in
defense of my country.

Bolivar was extremely irritated on

hearing about this falsity.

He told me that the man w h o h a d

3p&ez refers here to Larrazabal's statement that
Bolivar wanted to pursue Morillo's fleeing forces but that
P&ez and some other chieftains objected.
Larrazabal foot
notes this in a manner which removes any doubt but that he
secured this information from Restrepo. Vida v Corresoondencla
del L i b e r t a d o r . II, 126-27.
4in his biography of P&ez, Cunninghame Graham m e n 
tions this incident and cites Pernalete*s name.
However, he
gives no additional information about this informer.
Cunninghame Graham, P&ez. 142.
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said this was a liar.

He urged me to name the infamous liar

so that he could have h i m shot immediately.

I was satisfied

with these assurances, and I did not want to expose Pernalete
to suffer the consequences of Bolivar's anger.
It is very probable that some who witnessed this scene
interpreted it as lack of respect for the supreme chief.
Certainly it must have been because of this that it began to
be rumored that we were at odds with each other and that c o n 
sequently were going to abandon pursuing Morillo.
believed this were wrong, however,

Those who

for after ha v i n g lunch

together that very day, we left about twelve to pursue
Morillo.

Despite the time we lost in Calabozo, we still

could have overtaken him with all the army had it not been
for a mistake.
Calvario instead

Unfortunately, our infantry took the road to
of the one to Sombrero

its steps more them a league.

and h a d to retrace

As we marched, we took the

stragglers as prisoners.

When I came out at Uriosa,

spacious and clear plain,

I took only fifteen cavalrymen w i t h

me,

a

among them were the brave leaders General Manuel Cedeno

and Colonel Rafael Ortega.

I overtook the enemy's rear guard

then and imprisoned those 1 found drinking water in a rain
pool and successively all those who came to this spot.
in all,

All

I took four hundred prisoners without ever seeing

the enemy chief.
The above
was setting,
cavalrymen,

and

occurred at 5s00 p.m.

At six, w h e n the sun

reinforced by some one

hundred and fifty

I attacked the enemy who were separated from us
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by the Uriosa ravine.

My objective was to fight seventy

hussars that h a d advanced about rifle range from their army,
and comprised the only cavalry the enemy had.

These hussars,

although good soldiers on h o r s e b a c k . did not withstand our
charge.

They fled and when they got to where their infantry

was. the latter opened fire on them and on us.

Seven hussars

and three horses died from bullets fired by their own c o m 
rades. while we were repelled without any losses.
By 9*00 p.m. our army was assembled in Uriosa.
we continued the pursuit at that hour.

and so

The next morni n g we

were about a mile from the town of Sombrero where the enemy
awaited us.

They had already set up their defensive m e a 

sures at the pass of the neighboring river.

We waited for

the Liberator here so that he could hear the testimony of a
deserter from the Royalist hussars who had come to us mounted
on the horse of the Spanish leader. Don Juan J u e z .^
advised us not to go by the real river pass,

He

for he said

that Morillo had set from seven to eight hundred men. c o u n t 
ing both grenadiers and scouts,
opposite this pass.

in ambush on the cliff

He also suggested that since the ascent

to the cliff was very narrow,

it would be better for us to

take a nearby path where we could cross the river without
opposition and approach the town from the open plains.

^Don Juan Juez was a colonel in the Spanish army and
the Commandant General of the l l a n o s . In September of 1817
he defeated Julian Infante near the valleys of Barvacoas and
Camatagua.
Lecuna. Crdnica Razonada. II. 67.
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Bolivar arrived.

When he was informed of all this,

he preferred to listen to the dictates of his impetuous
nature rather than to all the observations made by the
hussar.

When the infantry joined us. he saidt

the enemy is right there in the river.
drink water 1

Long live the p a t r i a 1

‘'Soldiers,

Let's break them to

At a trotl"

Our infantry got to the river bank and in less than
fifteen minutes of heavy fire was repelled.

We suffered

considerable losses, particularly among the officers.

For

tunately, we had left the cavalry in the depot at Sam&n.
When the enemy noticed it, they abandoned their pursuit and
retraced their steps

to occupy their first positions on

opposite bank of the river.

the

This gave us the advantage

of

having sufficient time to assemble our scattered men.
That afternoon we crossed the river at the place indi
cated by the hussar.

We still did not achieve our objective,

for Morillo had continued his retreat that very night,

taking

the road to Barbacoas and going into sloping territory where
it was not possible to continue pursuing him.
horses were very bruised,
who were dead,
short.

sick,

As a result,

Calabozo.

and the infantry,

By then the

counting the men

or had deserted, was four hundred men
we left Sombrero and returned to

Here Bolivar consulted me about the best plan

possible for us to adopt in these circumstances.
At this time 1 reiterated that 1 believed it supremely
important not to take one step forward without leaving our
base of operations assured.

The latter 1 thought should be
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the San Fernando plaza which we would have to wrest from the
enemy.

Under enemy control,

this plaza became a threat to

Guayana in the event that we should suffer a defeat.

I also

said that in addition we should occupy all the towns situated
in the plains of Calabozo and that we should try to win the
inhabitants to our side.

Until then,

been enemies of the patriots.

these people h a d always

If we were successful in doing

this, we would augment our cavalry with the one or two
thousand men they had serving under the Royalists at the
time; and we would also prevent future enlistments from this
section in the Royalist army.

In my opinion the capture of

San Fernando would contribute much to this objective.

I

reminded Bolivar that the scourge of the patriots in the
years 1813 and 1814 h a d come from these l l a n o s ; and that in
the final analysis,

it seemed too risky to leave them behind

us as we went to intern ourselves in the valleys of Aragua
to battle an enemy who was strong in numbers,
w e l l disciplined.

brave,

and

I also warned h i m that half our cavalry

w o u l d not reach those valleys,

for the terrain that we had

to cross was rolling and rocky and would render our horses
useless.

If fortune did not grant us a victory in the

valleys or Aragua or while we were passing through them, our
complete ruin would be more than probable.

For the llaneros

of Calabozo would be certain to finish us off before we
reached the Apure.

and the enemy army then could pursue us

up to their fortified plaza at San Fernando.

From here they

could easily embark one or two thousand men in five or six
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days and go downstream to Guayana, which they could occupy
w i thout encountering opposition since we h a d no forces there.
If Angostura were occupied by the Royalists, the Orinoco
Carnal, by which we received our war supplies from abroad,
would be closed to us.
We all knew that the hope that Miguel Guerrero would
take Sam Fernando was in vain,
chief so much,

for the enemy scorned this

that they frequently and openly would leave

the plaza to forage for supplies on the right shore of the
Apure and on the edges of the Biruaca ditch.

Later they

would return to the city loaded with foodstuffs without
having encountered the slightest opposition from their
beseiger.

For all these reasons, Bolivar agreed that I

should go take San Fernando.
When I got to the plaza,

I found Guerrero reinforced

by two hundred m e n that had come from G u a y a n a .
tightening the siege,

Before

I sent a delegation three times to the

chief of the garrison, offering h i m and all who accompanied
h i m a pardon.

However,

he refused to accept this offer; and

on March 6, at 3:00 a.m., he left the plaza with his entire
garrison.

He took the road that leads to Achaguas with the

intent of heading toward the province of Barinas.
sued these men heatedly,
in the ditch of Biruaca.
attack.

We p u r 

and at 7*00 a.m. we overtook them
Here they tenaciously resisted our

The forests surrounding the ditch facilitated their

retreat to the ditch at the Negro [River], which was not
very far.

A second battle ensued here in which they repelled
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m y vanguard of two hundred scouts b y using bayonets.
A little further u p from the Negro, w e had another
encounter and forced the enemy to retreat up to the site of
Enea.

Here at the edge of a thick forest they stood and

resisted us w i t h admirable courage.

It got dark then,

both of us retained our respective positions.

and

Night hushed

the clamor of arms.
At dawn the next day, we opened fire again and the
Royalists surrendered within a few minutes.
uttered our victory cries,
officers fled.

However,

several of their chiefs and

since in the Apure area the Royal

ists could not find anyone to help them,
finally taken,

While we

they were all

except for four or six w h o managed to save

t h e m s e lves.
Jos« M. Quero,
Royalist troops.**

from Caracas, had commanded these

A man of proven valor, he continued

dauntlessly to command his people each time they were
attacked even though he had received two wounds during the
first attack,

and one of them was mortal.

lost seven cavalry officers,

On our side, we

among them Captain Echeverria

and three others of this same rank.

The brave Commandant

®The Spanish historian Torrente lists jos6 Marla
Quero and the division he commanded in San Fernando de Apure
as repeating the "magnificent example of the old heroes of
Numancia and Sagunto."
He further states that Quero w i t h 
stood three attacks and was finally shot the last time while
in the hammock in which he was being carried around on the
battlefield.
Historia de la Revolucidn. II, 451-52.
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Kermenegildo Mugica was also wounded.

Our other casualties

included twenty dead and thirty wounded.
This simple account of what occurred is sufficient to
belie the error in Sehor Restrepo's work when he states that
I marched to take possession of San Fernando against B o l i v a r 's
wishes and decision.®
desertion on my part,

Such conduct would have amounted to
and I certainly would not have returned

to join h i m as soon as he notified me from the city of
Victoria that he needed help quickly in a very precarious
situation.

This communique was the first news I received

concerning his march toward C a r a c a s .
Colonel Don Rafael Ldpez,
Bolivar suffered in S6men,

after the defeat that

came out from Tiznados with

almost a thousand cavalrymen to cut off the latter's

7P4ez inserts the following footnote heret
"In the
principle plaza, we found the head of the honest, courageous,
and very refined gentleman. Commandant Pedro Aldao.
It had
been placed as a jeer on a pike by B o v e s 1 c o m m a n d , who had
sent it from Calabozo as a trophy.
When we took it down to
honor it and give it a Christian burial, we found that a
little bird had formed its nest in the cavity and had two
offspring there.
The birds were y e l l o w — the distinctive
color of the p a t r i o t s .H
®Restrepo states that Bolivar was not interested in
or planning to stop long enough to take San Fernando.
Rather
he wanted to give the impression that this was his objective
so that the Spanish leaders would be taken off guard when he
attacked the troops stationed at Calabozo.
Revolucidn de
la Republica de C o l o m b i a , n , 437.
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retreat.9

In the plains of San Pablo at a place called

Mangas Largas he surprised Commandant Blanco, who was lead
ing some of those w h o had been defeated,
those who fell in his power.

and knifed all

Fortunately,

the Liberator had

left that place and was in Calabozo; and many others had
h eaded in other directions from the town of Ortiz,

six

leagues from Mangas L a r g a s .
La Torre marched at the head of the victorious army
of SAmen,

and Ldpez joined him in the pass at Caiman, where

he executed his last slaughter.

From there they marched

together u p to Banco del Rastro,

a league away from the town

of the same name.

That very day I arrived at Banco del

Restro with twenty-two hundred men,

including both infantry

and cavalry, on the Guardatinajas road.

I immediately n o t i 

fied the supreme chief of m y arrival there,
was a league away,
battle.

that the enemy

and that I was ready to engage them in

My communique was taken b y an officer who found him

9Colonel Rafael Ldpez, though a native of Barinas, was
La Torre's second in command.
At this point, Morillo named
h im Commandant General in the llanos and gave h i m orders to
attack the patriots wherever he found them and to prevent
Bolivar's reunion with P&ez.
Cunninghame Graham, P & e z . 146.
Restrepo, Revolucidn de la Republica de C o l o m b i a , II, 456.
The Battle of SAmen took place on March 16, 1818.
According to Mordn this battle occurred after Bolivar tried
to surprise General Morillo at Calabozo on February 12,
1818 and chased the Royalist army toward Caracas.
Mordn
statest
"PAez could not or would not bring his men to leave
their chosen fighting terrain, the llanos, so that Bolivar,
advancing in the Valleys of Aragua, was forced to retreat by
Morillo, reinforced by fresh troops under his lieutenant
Calzada, before being defeated in a battle at Semen on March
16th."
History of V e n e z u e l a . 127.

344
at Lake Chinea,

two leagues from Calabozo.

that I was to wait for him where I was then.

Bolivar replied
The following

day he joined me with three hundred men, counting the
soldiers and emigrants from the valleys of Aragua.
The day prior to this reunion,

General Cedeno h a d

asked me for twenty-five men from m y Guard to go provoke the
enemy cavalry.

However,

the latter did not move from their

camp, despite the fact that our men got within rifle range.
General La Torre, who commanded the entire army now
that Morillo was wounded,

retreated toward the town of Ortiz

when he discovered m y arrival at Rastro.^O

However,

as soon

as X was reunited with Bolivar, we began the march to o v e r 
take h i m at a double pace.
the plain,

for he,

We were not able to do this on

too, doubled his pace until he reached

the rolling terrains and narrow passages.
The Royalist General, while passing through the plain
of San Pablo,

ordered Ldpez to situate himself in the

Tiznados in order to sever our line of communication with
Calabozo and Apuret
Ortiz.

so LQpez waited for us in the town of

Here he placed himself in a favorable position in

the elevated area dominating the entrance to the town.

Here

Bolivar engaged in a six-hour battle which was more than
frightening,

for our cavalry could not participate because

of the terrain.

Several times our infantry ascended the

10p&ez includes the following footnote heret
"In the
Battle of semen the then-Captain Juan Pablo Farf&n wounded
h i m with his l a n c e ."
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slope and was forced to return in defeat.

This occurred

despite the fact that Bolivar was repeatedly told that there
was a point on our right from which to overcome that hill.
As the situation stood,
sage.
others,

it was impossible to force our p a s 

Here we had to lament the irreparable loss,

among

of Colonel Genaro VAsquez, who was mortally wounded

when the corps of two hundred riflemen in his command d i s 
mounted and succeeded in reaching the top of the hill.
VAsquez was wounded,

When

an enemy infantry column descended on

another side and came up to the spot where the rest of our
infantry was in formation and pushed it back some two hundred
yards.

However, with the quick and efficacious help that 1

was able to give our infantry by ordering Iribarren to
charge vigorously with a cavalry column,
to the top of the hill.
able to rejoin us.
soldiers.

the enemy returned

Then VAsquez and his column were

VAsquez arrived wounded, carried by his

He died that very night.

The sun was almost setting,

and since we were all

terribly thirsty and h a d no water there, Bolivar ordered our
retreat to a place about six leagues behind us where there
was some.

The enemy took advantage of this movement and

started their retreat up to the valleys of Aragua,

approxi

mately eight or ten leagues from O r t i z . H

U p A e z inserts this footnote here.
"The loss of
Genaro VAsquez was very painful for me, for he was one of
the champions from Apure on w h o m I h a d always relied for any
kind of undertaking, regardless of h o w risky it might be.
A
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Bolivar marched with the rest of the army to San Josd
de los Tiznados with the intent of operating against the
enemy west of Caracas.

Thus h e changed his line of operation,

for till then the road to La Puerta had been dismal for
him.^

When we got to the town of San Jos6 de los Tiznados,

he decided to go to Calabozo with part of the troops to
organize forces with a column that came from Guayana.

I

received orders to march toward San Carlos so that Colonel
Ranjel could join me there.

The latter with a cavalry corps

had been ordered to operate in the West.

I was to go across

grateful patria must not forget the name of this valiant man
because there is no monument to commemorate the names of
those who died for h e r on the battlefields.
Fourteen years
after his death, I gathered the remains of this gallant
comrade-in-arms and took them to Valencia.
In his memory I
named a lake that is in the patio of my San Pablo farm— the
place where he was first b u r i e d . ”
l^The author refers to the three bloody battles the
patriots h a d lost at this site.
Early in 1814 the forces
Bolivar organized under Campos Elias to prevent Boves from
advancing further north after his victory over the patriots
at San Marcos were routed.
On June 15th of the same year
both Marino and Bolivar were totally defeated in La Puerta
by Boves' men.
Few of the patriot soldiers escaped the
bloody carnage that followed this terrible disaster.
Again
in 1818 on the plain watered by the Semen rivulet, close to
La Puerta, Morales and his troops, aided by the fresh troops
brought by Morillo, completely routed Bolivar's troops.
Morillo led the attack against the patriots himself.
Although
he received an almost fatal wound in this encounter, he
inflicted the following losses on Bolivar's forces— eight
hundred dead, four hundred prisoners, and all Bolivar's
papers.
From this it m a y be deduced that P&ez was mil d in
his evaluation when he states that the road to La Puerta was
"dismal" for Bolivar.
Restrepo is more dramatic and perhaps
more accurate when he describes La Puerta as a "funeral site"
for the patriots.
Restrepo, Revolucidn de la Reodblica de
C o l o m b i a . II, 223, 258-59, 450-51.
Madariaga, B o l i v a r . 224,
227, 229-30, 231, 307, 400.
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the province of Barinas,

and at the same time see if I could

defeat Ldpez who was in the Pao of San Juan Bautista.
latter refused the battle that I offered him,
to Canada along the Valencia road.

The

and retreated

However, when he saw that

I had crossed the Pao, he started toward Tiznados along the
mountain range headed toward Cocuizas.

His goal was to fight

Bolivar w h o m he figured by then was coming to join me with
seven hundred cavalrymen and four hundred infantrymen.
While LOpez was in the town of San jos 6 waiting for
the Liberator,

the latter camped with his forces a league

away at Rincdn de los T o r o s .

When he got to this town and

discovered that LOpez was very near, he sent General Cedeno
w i t h twenty-five cavalrymen to tell me to stop and let me
k n o w he was already marching to join me.

That very night

one of our sergeants went over to the enemy and revealed the
saint and sign of the division,

the strength it counted on,

and the place where the Supreme Chief r e s t e d . ^

Ldpez c o n 

ceived the idea then of attacking the Liberator by sur
prise.^4

He entrusted this operation to Captain Mariano

^ R e s t r e p o * a account is at variance with P&ez's in
this instance.
He states that Lbpez captured a servant of
B o l i v a r ’s aide-de-camp and forced this information from him.
Revolucidn de la Repflblica de C o l o m b i a . II, 456.
^4Restrepo states that it was Renovales, and not
Ldpez, w h o conceived the idea of surprising and killing the
Liberator that night of April 17.
Ibid.

348
Renovales and eight other men selected for their c o u r a g e . 1 5
Meanwhile Bolivar rested in his hammock which was hung
between trees a short distance from camp.
w h e n Colonel Santander,

About 4*00 a.m.

Chief of Staff, was going to tell

the Liberator that all was in readiness for the march, he
stumbled on R e n o v a l e s ' men.

After demanding the saint and

sign, he asked the nature of this patrol.

Renovales responded

that he had come from reconnoitering the enemy camp in
accordance with orders he had received from the Supreme Chief.
He was trying to find h i m n o w so that he could report the
findings of his commission.
him,

for he,

Santander told h i m to come with

too, was going to find Bolivar and notify him

that all was in readiness for the march.
When they got to the outskirts of the group of trees
where Bolivar and his retinue had hung their hammocks,
Santander pointed out Bolivar's white one to them.
ately the Royalists fired on his hamm o c k . 1**

Immedi

Fortunately,

Bolivar had left his hammock just a few minutes before to go
mount his mule.
the mule,

He already had his foot in the stirrup when

frightened by the shots, broke out running and left

15Both Restrepo and Lecuna give Renovales' first name
as Tom&s.
Restrepo states that he was a Captain of Dragoons
in Ldpez's army, and Lecuna states that he was a native of
Calabozo who was in the service of Spain.
Lecuna, CrOnica
R a z o n a d a , II, 191.
Restrepo, RevoluciOn de la Repflblica de
C o l o m b i a , II, 456*
^ P & e z footnotes this as follows*
"Bolivar himself
told me what happened here.
The shooting killed some of
those who accompanied the Liberator."
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him.

Surprised by such close shots,

himself.

Bolivar tried to save

In the darkness of the night, he could not find

the camp site.
This event has been related with considerable inac
curacy by some Colombian historians.

There have even been

those who have recorded it in both a ridiculous and d i s 
honorable manner for the Liberator.

It should not be surpris

ing that he could not find the camp,

for even the best llanero

w ho gets lost in the dark in those places finds himself in
the same predicament as the navigator who,
the ocean,

in the middle of

loses his compass on a stormy night.

I have

thought myself lost in the llanos during an entire night,
only to discover at dawn that I had been at the foot of the
same tree many times.
The confusion that resulted in the camp when Bolivar
failed to appear was great.

Everyone thought that he was

either dead or held prisoner by our enemies.

Consequently,

when the Royalists attacked our camp at dawn,

they encount

ered very little resistance,

for panic still reigned.

Some

of our brave leaders died in this attack, while others were
imprisoned and shot later by Morillo's orders.

Our compen

sation was that Rafael LOpez was killed here, and he had been
the best cavalry leader that the Royalists had,
his courage as for his wisdom.

as much for

He was a native of Pedraza,

province of Barinas, and a member of one of its best-known
families.
General Cedeno,

although he slept far from the camp,
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heard the combat fire and countermarched to find out what
had happened.

When he arrived at the camp, he

either friend nor

foe.

h a d suffered a disasteri
for Bolivar.

did not

find

Still he realized that the patriots
so he went to Calabozo to search

In the m e a n t i m e , the scattered forces of Rincdn

de los Toros found the Liberator and gave him L O p e z 1s h o r s e ,
w h i c h Commandant Ronddn h a d seized after the rider's
I received news of the disaster.
not send me a counter order, however,

death.^

Since Bolivar did

I continued my march

toward San Carlos where La Torre was with three thousand men.
When we got to this city, we encountered a party of hussars
leaving it, and we mowed them down with our lances.

To do

this, we had to go up to the very plaza where the troops
were quartered in

two-story houses.

They fired on us,

we were forced to

retreat outside the city.

and

General La Torre left San Carlos then and took a
position in the small San Juan hills.

17

For five days I stayed

Madariaga states that this horse was such a good
one, that Bolivar thought that Colonel Ronddn meant to trap
h i m and deliver h i m to the enemy.
B o l i v a r , 308.
Commandant Ronddn is Juan JosA Rondon.
Born in
Caracas in 1790, he served in the Royalist ranks until 1817
when he joined Bolivar and PAez.
He fought so well under
PAez in the Battle of Queseras del Medio when ordered to p r o 
voke the enemy with twenty of his lancers, that PAez himself
shouted at him, "Bravo!
Bravlsimo com m a n d a n t e I " To this
Ronddn replied, "This is the w a y that the sons of the Alto
Llano fight." He also fought heroicly in the Battle of
BoyacA and the second Battle of Carabobo.
In the Battle at
Cerro de Valencia, he got wounded in the foot, contracted
tetanus and died as a result on August 23, 1822 in the city
of Valencia.
Scarpetta and Vergara, Diccionario B i o g r A f i c o .
541-42.
Lecuna, Crdnica Razo n a d a . I, 510; II, 6 6 , 280, 281;
III, 234.
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In the plains in front of him.

Finally,

suspecting that he

was w a i ting for reinforcements,

1 thought it wise to retreat

to the town of Cogedes and summon Ranjel who was in Cabudare,
which was almost a suburb of Barquisimeto.

Ranjel came, but

h e only had two hundred cavalrymen with him.
that the rest of this column had deserted.
that m y forces were not strong,

He informed me
Despite the fact

I decided to return to San

Carlos and fight against whatever numbers might present them
selves.

The same day that I left Cogedes,

Camoruco,

in the site of

I unexpectedly encountered the enemy.

They were

looking for me after having been reinforced by fifteen h u n 
dred men, mostly cavalrymen.
I was forced to countermarch,

for since the terrain

in those areas is hilly and very wooded,
a field in which to form my men.

I did not even have

The enemy attempted to

trample me with a battalion while I was retreating.

However,

at a turn in the road my Honor Guard, which I had left posted
there,

fell upon them.

They killed some m e n and forced the

enemy to abandon the road and separate to either side of it.
Then I was able to continue an orderly retreat to the plain
of Cogedes.

Here I decided to wait for the Royalists.

I

formed m y troops at the edge of the plain, with their backs
to the town that was about half a mile away.
Although I saw that the enemy was very superior in
forces,

for they h a d close to a thousand men,

lose h o pe of obtaining a victory that day.

I still did not

This shows what

great confidence 1 had in the courage and daring of m y troops.
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I set m y three hundred infantrymen in a two-line battle
formation.

1

placed the cavalry guard under the command of

Cornelio Munoz to the right, and Iribarren and his squadron
to the left.

The rest of the cavalry, under Ranjel's command,

formed the second line.
1 communicated my plan of attack to General Anzo&tegui
who commanded the infantry,
to my chief of staff.

18

to the rest of the leaders, and

This plan amounted to waiting for

the enemy without firing a shot until they were very close.
Then we were to open fire while both the Guard and Iribarren's
squadron charged the enemy cavalry.
defeated,

After the latter was

and I held this to be almost certain, we would

execute a flanking movement while maintaining the formation
we had.

This would place us at the enemy's left flank and

within rifle range.

This move was intended to prevent the

i@General Jose Antonio Anzo&tegui was born in Barce
lona, Venezuela in 1789. When the republic was reestablished
due to Bolivar's heroic efforts, he joined in the terrible
campaign of 1813-1814.
When Venezuela was subjugated anew
by the Royalists, he went to New Granada with the remnants
of Urdaneta's army.
Under Bolivar's orders, he attended the
unfortunate struggle with the Government of Candinamarca.
In 1815 he retired from military service and went into exile
in the English colonies.
In May, 1816 he presented himself
to Bolivar with the daring project of invading Venezuela!
so
Anzo&tegui was one of the three hundred officers who went to
destroy Ferdinand's empire in Venezuela which was supported
by more than 10,000 soldiers.
He became Commandant General
of the inf am try and second in command in the Occidente army.
At the Battle of Boyac&, the Liberator promoted him to divi
sion General.
When he was marching to assume command of the
army of the North, he died suddenly on November 15, 1819 in
Pamplona.
He was only thirty years old.
Scarpetta and
Vergara, Diccionario Bioqr&fico. 21-23.
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e n e m y , when they saw themselves forced to move and without
cavalry,

from trampling us as they sought refuge in the

forest and town that were behind us.
lent to all; however,

The plan appeared excel

Anzo&tegui begged me three times not

to advance with the cavalry,

for he felt that m y presence

was needed in order to carry out the movement.
At this time,

I confirmed the common saying that there

is no sane man on horseback.

Forgetting my promise,

I

advanced with the Guard and trampled almost all the enemy
cavalry and also broke an infantry battalion that was on
reserve.

The havoc that m y three hundred infantrymen wreaked

on the enemy was horrible.

Even the Royalists themselves,

letters that were later intercepted in M e w Granada
of that event,

telling

said that there were bullets that went

through three men.

This is completely credible,

enemy advanced in closed column,
they were within pistol range.
and charging,

in

for the

and we opened fire on l y when
In that moment of both firing

that compact corps of men swayed as woul d a

tree that is bending under the woodcutter's ax.
In the heat of battle,
ised Anzo&tegui,

I remembered what I had p r o m 

but it was too late then.

I held m y horses

back and saw that my men were fleeing scattered, without
k n owing why.

Immediately I ordered m y cavalrymen to abandon

the rich booty they were gathering.
five men that I assembled,
could save my infantry.

With the first twenty-

I charged the enemy to see if I

It was too late.

The enemy also abandoned the camp.

They were fleeing.

They left their wounded
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with their weapons and went to seek refuge in the town sur
rounded by forests.
w i t h m y Guard.

I remained,

then, master of the terrain

Soldiers from the latter joined me little by

little as they returned from pursuing the enemy.

I stayed

on that battlefield all night and until 8s00 a.m. the follow
ing morning.

We had thirty-six dead.

I collected all our

rifles and those belonging to the enemy that were scattered
throughout the camp.

Then I distributed two hundred of these

among the soldiers of my Guard; and forming files with the
rest that we left abandoned,

I started my retreat along the

same road that my scattered men had taken.
In the village of Araure I found out that all of m y
men had united and had passed by there.
picket to overtake them,
Guamito.

I dispatched a

and they found them in the site of

There they waited for me.

When I joined them,

I

placed the leaders and officers, with the exception of
Anzo&tegui and the infantry officers, under arrest.

I

entrusted the custody of the prisoners to a squadron and c o n 
tinued my march toward the Apure,

intending to try them there.

However, yielding to General Anzo&tegui'a pleas,

to w h o m they

had manifested h o w disgraceful it would be for them to arrive
at Apure in that manner,
D uring our march,

I freed them.
Ranjel asked m y permission to go

occupy the city of Nutrias which was a few leagues away to
our side.
to him.

I gave it to h i m and turned two hundred m e n over
He did occupy it in effect; but the Indian Reyes

Vargas, who was in that vicinity,

arrived there also w i t h a
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column of four hundred infantrymen.

After a rough b a t t l e ,

Ranjel was defeated with very heavy losses.

Thirteen of our

chiefs and o f f i c e r s , all very courageous, were killed.

One

of them was the daring colonel Cuesta.
Ranjel succeeded in assembling fifty of his cavalrymen
in the site of Caiman,

and so at midnight he turned again on

the enemy that was camped outside the city.

He slaughtered

a great number of them, but finally he was repelled.
crossed the Apure River the following day,

He

and sent me a

communique telling me of the disaster from the town of
Setenta.

1 ordered him to stay there, gather the scattered

men who had left Nutrias,

and augment his forces with men

from the towns of Mantecal and Rincdn Hondo.
1 arrived at Achaguas.

Accompanied by my Guard,

went on to San Fernando where the Supreme Chief was.
I h a d been there two or three days.

I

After

General Cedeno arrived.

He had been defeated by Morales in the Patos Lake and had
lost all his infantry.

Cedeno was extremely mortified by

this disaster and attributed it to the little cooperation of
the cavalry chiefs, particularly Colonel Aramendi.

When

these two met in the street they exchanged offensive words.
Cedeno pulled out his sword to wound Aramendi, who was
unarmed.

The latter,

Cedeno on the ground.

in the manner of the llanos, knocked
However, when Cedeno shouted and

ordered his men to kill Aramendi,

the latter started to run.

Pursued by Colonel Fajardo and twenty-five lancers who were
on foot, he came seeking refuge in m y house.

When he told
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me about the case,
moment.

I took h i m under my protection for the

Then I took h i m myself to the Principal as a

prisoner.

The Liberator,

informed of this disagreeable event,

appointed a council of war to try Aramendi.
entreaties,

Yielding to my

though, he decided to take him with him to

Angostura that day

(May 24) so that he could be tried there.

As they were about to embark, Aramendi escaped and remained
hidden for some time until X took h i m in and offered him my
personal guarantee.
I have related this event to show h o w much importance
was attached to obedience in the army of Apure.

In order to

maintain it, even such a deserving officer as Colonel A r a 
mendi was not given special consideration.
After C e d e n o 's defeat in the Los Patos Lake, Morales
sent a column of his troops to Guayabal,
away from San Fernando.

a town three leagues

Immediately I ordered the cavalry

Guard to cross the river and attack them by surprise.

The

latter carried out m y order successfully on the night of May
28, destroying the enemy and taking possession of the town
again.

This unexpected blow made Morales, who was in Cala

bozo, retreat toward Sombrero.
ing on h i m again.

Instead,

He thought that we were turn

I ordered our men to abandon

Guayabal so that I could concentrate my forces, organize the
army of Apure,

and herd and pasture the horses because these

were the elements that gave us superiority over the enemy.
Historian Restrepo's observation that Cedeno and I
should have concentrated our forces in Apure seems very just
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to me,

for at this point it seemed that the campaign did not

present advantages for those remnants of the a r m y . ^ 9

I

w o u l d have liked to have done this, but an order to do this
would have had to come from the Supreme Chief and not from
either one of us who, under his orders, were operating
together.
When I accomplished the objective which I mentioned
previously,

I sent cavalry parties along different roads to

accost the Royalists in the plains of Calabozo,
and Barinas.
great,

San Carlos,

The advantages achieved by these parties were

for despite the swollen rivers and their consequent

overflows across the plains,
the heart o f enemy territory.

they were able to penetrate to
Some of these parties,

abusing

the liberty given them to operate against the enemy at their
discretion,

committed excesses against peaceful citizens.

This was particularly true of the ones that patrolled the
province of Barinas and the llanos of San Carlos,
quently,

conse

I was forced to order them to retire to Apure. Some

w ho had obtained good profits from the vandal-like excursions
repeated them without m y knowledge.

X found myself in the

position then of proclaiming a general order that threatened

^9The Colombian historian states*
"In Cojede, PAez
allowed his brilliant courage to be wasted by engaging in a
battle w i t h the Royalist Army, which was double his in size
and more than triple in infa n t r y ; the result was to be
expected— defeat.
Finally, Cedeno, who could have saved the
last remnants of the Republican army by going to the Apure,
sacrificed them in 1*08 Patos, also engaging in a field battle.
Restrepo, RevoluciOn de
Reodblica de C o l o m b i a . II, 464-65.
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w i t h the death penalty those w h o went into enemy territory
w i thout m y permission.

In carrying out this o r d e r , I had to

shoot four m e n — the famous commandant villasana,

a very

brave captain of the Guard called Garrido# a second lieu
tenant,

and a sergeant.

Thus I succeeded in ending hostile

actions against the peaceful citizens that lived in enemy
territory.
In August of the same year of 1818,

the troops that

guarded San Fernando proclaimed an act appointing me Generalin-Chief.

They succeeded in getting other army corps in

other places to follow their example.

I was at my h e a d 

quarters at Achaguas at the time, unaware of what was
happening, when this act came into my hands.

It was signed

b y all the army corps with the exception of the garrison at
Achaguas and m y Honor Guard.

I was very surprised.

Fearing

that this might be the first step toward some disorderly end,
I embarked for San Fernando immediately since it was obvious
from the acts that the idea had originated here.
arrival,

Upon my

I summoned all the chiefs and officers and asked

them what h a d prompted a resolution which I did not approve
and w h i ch they had no authority to draw.

They answered that

they h a d done this in the belief that they had the proper
authority.

They asked me then to overlook their error,

it was only evidence of their good intentions.

for

They had h a d

no desire to create confusion or disavow the authority of the
Liberator.

The chiefs and officers of the other divisions

excused themselves with similar reasons.

Thus,

contrary to
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what had been feared, the existing order was not disturbed
in the slightest.
When I was informed that the English Colonel Wilson
h a d taken a very active part in drawing up this resolution,
I ordered h i m to leave for A n g o s t u r a . I

wanted him to p r e 

sent himself to General Bolivar so that he could order him
to another post.

The Liberator, who embarked in San Fernando

for Guayana on May 24, was in Angostura.

He did not return

to Apure until the beginning of the year 1819.
Had a real revolution against Bolivar occurred in
Apure, would not Bolivar have stopped sending me resources of
all kinds for the troops under m y command from the time he
arrived in Guayana?

This fact alone is more than sufficient

20p&ez is referring here to Colonel Henry Wilson, w h o
was authorized to raise the Second Venezuelan Hussars (Red
H u s s a r s ) . When Wilson was ordered to take Colonel Robert
S k e e n e *s place as Lieutenant-Colonel of the First Hussars
and let Skeene, who had been promoted to colonel, command
the Second Venezuelan Hussars, he refused to accept this
arrangement and decided to make himself responsible for the
equipment of a regiment of his own.
This is a prelude to
his later action when he "tried to tamper with the loyalty
of General PAez, suggesting that he shake off his allegiance
to his superior officer and declare himself commander-inchief . . . arranged a grand review at which he led the right
of the line, parading his Englishmen in their gaudy n e w u n i 
forms.
After the review a proclamation was read and signed,
declaring PAez captain-General of the army."
Though PAez
seemingly gave his consent to this act of disloyalty, he sent
Wilson to Angostura with letters of recommendation to
Bolivar.
Wilson was immediately thrown into prison on his
arrival there.
He demanded a trial, but there were not
enough British field officers to compose a courtt
so he was
dismissed from the army and allowed to escape from the for
tress at Old Guayana where he was confined.
When he left
Venezuela, Wilson did all that he could to injure the cause
he had so recently defended.
Hasbrouck, Foreign L e g i o n a r i e s .
47, 49, 58, 70, 72, 76-78, 371, 382.
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to refute the falsity with which Larrazabal comes out in his
work when he deals with this e v e n t . 2 1
No less unjust, Baralt [and Diaz] directs his [their]
attack against the army of Apure, believing it to have been
in revolt against Bolivar's authority.

To prove this he

[they] states that the dissenting Apurenos wanted to halt
General Santander's march in Cariben,

and that the latter

was fortunate enough to get to the destined place only because
his enemies were late in arriving at the ambush s i t e . ^
order for everyone to give it its proper importance,

1

in
shall

now relate the event to which Senores Baralt [and Diaz]
allude exactly as it happened.
General Santander prepared to leave and carry out the
mission that Bolivar had assigned to him.

He wrote a letter

to Colonel Pedro Fortul, who was in Guasdualito,

telling him

about the task that had been conferred on him and the
resources that he carried to organize an army in

C a s a n a r e . 2 ^

2 1 Larrazabal, Vida y Correspondencia del Libertador.
II, 160-61.

22Almost these exact words can be found in Baralt and
Diaz, Roadmen de la H i s t o r i a , I, 427-28.
21Pedro Fortul or Fortoul was born in Cdcuta in May
of 1789.
He joined the patriot ranks in 1810 as a Lieu
tenant and by 1829 was a Division General.
He served on the
Staff of Operations in the North; Commandant of the militia
Corps of cdcuta; second chief of the second cavalry line of
Apure; second chief of the vanguard of the army of opera
tions on N e w Granada; first chief of operations in the North
(1619); and Commandant in Chief of the army of operations
situated in Cdcuta (1822-24).
He governed as Intendant and
Commandant General of the Department of Boyacd for five years.
Until 1820, he received no compensation of any sort for his
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He invited h i m and the other citizens of G r a n a d a , who were
in A p u r e , to come join him.
saidi

Among other t h i n g s , the letter

"It is necessary for all of us Granadinos to unite in

Casanare in order to free our country,
pride of those malign,

and to knock down the

lazy V e n e z u e l a n s .

I do not recall h o w this letter came into Colonel
Miguel Antonio V A s q u e z 1s h a n d s .
immediately.

But he gave me the letter

I was much alarmed by the words which I have

just cited; consequently,

I sent the letter to Bolivar.

At

the same time I ordered the then-Captain Laurencio Silva to
go with a cavalry party to the mouth of the Meta and detain
Santander.

I wrote the latter and told h i m that some

unfavorable news I h a d received from casanare demanded that
h e h a l t until the matter was cleared up.
Santander was and gave h i m the letter.

Silva got to where
Santander halted,

but he wrote asking that I grant h i m permission to go on,

for

even though the Royalists h a d made incursions in casanare,
h e was sure it could not have been more them as a simple

efforts.
Since the Spaniards completely destroyed all his
property and holdings, he was consequently destitute.
He
died in Cdcuta on January 5, 1837, still sick in his soul as
a result of the poverty and mis e r y to which he had subjected
his beloved family in fighting for his country.
Scarpetta
and Vergara, Diccionario B i o a r A f i c o . 160-61.
2^This incident is m e n t ioned in the Archivo S a n t a n d e r .
24 vols. (BogotA, 1913-32), I-1I, 357-58.
A copy of the
letter is not included.
This letter is not included either
in Vicente Lecuna (ed.), cartas de Santander. 3 vols.
(Caracas, 1942).
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threat since they h a d retreated immediately.
wrote me,

too,

The Liberator

and told me that informed of the contents of

the letter, he authorized me to operate as 1 believed most
prudent.

Then X decided to let Santander go on.

From what I have just said,

it is easily understood

that I never disregarded the authority of the Supreme Chief.
I informed h i m of everything that came to m y attention and
always waited for his decision.

It can also be seen that

the step that I took here was not an ambush spread out for
Santander, but a precautionary measure that I saw myself
forced to adopt while Bolivar resolved this grave matter.
N o one will think any the less of me for insisting on
defending the army that I had the honor to command as many
times as I might think it necessary, nor for insisting on
pr oving that Colombia owes the triumph of its independence
in great measure to that army.
Casanare,

In effect,

the troops of

composed of Granadines and Venezuelans,

that c o n 

quered the obstinacy of the Apurenos in Palmarito, Mat a de
la Miel, Mantecal,

and Yagual,

and that later joined these

in the action of Mucuritas, undoubtedly saved the patriot
cause.

What would have become of the patriots if the enemy

had taken possession of the valuable resources of the Apure
and marched against the forces that occupied some points of
the province of Guayana and operated in other places?

Did

their leaders have sufficient resources to resist the veteran
expeditionary troops had the latter h a d the devotion of the
inhabitants of the llanos and possessed all the elements that
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these offer an army on campaign?

W h y would Morillo insist

on concentrating all his attention,

coming three times with

all his forces, against the defendors of Apure?

If I had

not exerted myself so much in 1819 to keep from compromising
the army I commanded in a field battle in order not to lose
the infantry which was greatly inferior in numbers and in
discipline to that of the enemy, what army would the patriots
have used to go liberate N e w Granada?
It is not an exaggeration,

then,

to assert that the

future of Colombia was being decided in Apure.
the battles already cited had been lost,

If any of

it is very doubtful

that the cause of independence would have triumphed.
Senor Restrepo,

speaking of the guerilla chieftains

that operated in different places in Venezuela,

states that

they operated as great lords of feudal times, with complete
independence;

and that it was slowly and with strong repug

nance, particularly in the case of this writer,

that they

subjected themselves to the authority of the Supreme Chief.
This historian forgets that there was no central government
at that time.

Necessity forced us,

the military chiefs,

to

exercise an independent authority until Bolivar returned
from abroad and asked us to acknowledge his authority as
Supreme Chief.
Finally,

in order to prove that order and subordina

tion to authority were my principles, whether operating
independently

qt

under the orders of a chief,

I will copy

completely what the Liberator said at the Congress of
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Angostura.

This can be seen in Volume One, page 195 in the

Documentos de la Vida Pdblica del L i b e r t a d o r t2 5
General P&ez, who has saved the relics of N e w
Granada, has the provinces of Barinas and Casanare
under the protection of the arms of the Republic.
Both provinces have political and civil governors,
and such organizations as circumstances will permit.
Order, subordination, and good discipline reign in
all parts there, and it does not even seem as if war
agitates these beautiful provinces.
T h e y have
recognized and given their oath of fielty to the
supreme authority, and their magistrates deserve the
confidence of the government.

25The correct title of this w o r k is Coleccidn de
Documentos Relativos a la Vida Pflblica del Libertador de
Colombia y del Perti, SimOn B o l i v a r , para servir a la_h i s toria
de la independencia S u r a m d r i c a n a . 21 vols.
(Caracas, 18261829).
The rest of P&ez's citation is correct.

CHAPTER XI
Bolivar's Return to Angostura— Morillo Appears
before San Fernando— Heroic Patriotism of the
Inhabitants of this City— Interesting Incident
in my Campaign Against Morillo— Battles Between
m y Forces and the Royalists— My Advice Concern
ing the Plan of Operations to Adopt Against
Morillo— Glorious Victory in Queseras del Medio—
Flight of the Royalists— Bolivar's Proclamation to
the Brave Men of Apure.
1819
Early in January of this year, the Liberator returned
to San Juan de Payara.^

However, he had to return to Angos

tura immediately in order to attend the opening of the
Congress that was going to assemble there.

He left me in

command of the army and with the power to operate at my dis
cretion in defending the Apure territory— an area which
Morillo was threatening to invade with a strong army that
had been organized for over two months at the site of
Chorreron,

two days' troop-travel time from San Fernando.

I had set up m y headquarters in this location [San
Fernando] shortly after Bolivar's departure, when Morillo

P&ez inserts the following footnote heret
"He asked
me at this time whether I feared that the events £ have
previously mentioned might not have bad results.
I answered
in the negative, for the authors of the plan had been
recalled.
Convinced that it was not in their power to take
that step, they had begged me to forget what had occurred.
Then Bolivar was at p e a c e . ”
365
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appeared before that plaza with five thousand infantrymen
and two thousand cavalrymen.
were four thousand men,
and cavalrymen.

All I h a d at m y command then

including both infantrymen

(recruits)

Since this army of the Apure was the

strongest one that the Venezuelan patriots had,

I did not

deem it prudent to expose it to forces that were superior
not only in numbers,

but in quality also.

For this reason I

d e c i d e d to adopt another type of w a r f a r e — a w a r of movement,
marches,

and countermarches.

1

hoped in this manner to lead

the enemy to the deserts of Cariben.
Having made this decision,
the citizens of San Fernando.

I called a meeting of all

1 told them of m y decision to

abandon the town and let the enemy cross the Apure and Arauca
rivers without any opposition in order to lure them to the
aforementioned-deserts.

Those brave citizens accepted m y

decision unanimously and proposed that we reduce the city to
ashes in order to prevent the enemy from using it as a very
important military base of operations.

They told me at this

time also that they were all ready to set fire to their homes
w i t h their own hands when the need arose and then take arms
and join the liberating army.

This sublime resolution was

carried out when the Royalist army appeared on the left bank
of the river.

Oh I

Those were the times when there was a

true love of liberty!
When Morillo saw the fires, he could do no less than
confess the impossibility of subjecting peoples of such
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calibre.^

This action on the part of the citizens of San

Fernando reveals once again that "the citizen who is inter
ested in promoting the triumph of the cause for which the
soldier is fighting, will not hesitate to make any sacri
fice.
It occurs to me now to relate an interesting incident
that occurred during this campaign.

The Royalist army

crossed the Apure River without opposition,
to the other side of the Arauca.

and we retreated

When Morillo had his army

ready the following day to march in search of us,

I ordered

four savage horses brought to the edge of his camp, approxi
mately within rifle range.

Since it was 10:00 p.m.,

ordered my men to bind the horses

1

I

tails with rawhide or

thongs and release them in the direction of the enemy camp
while they simultaneously fired some shots.

The horses

bolted out furiously through the camp, and the Spaniards
believed that a tremendous cavalry charge was upon them.
Several corps started firing, and disorder spread throughout.
Our horses wreaked greater havoc in their impetuous flight
than did the two thousand oxen that Hannibal launched on the
Roman camp.
day*

The Spaniards were not able to march the next

In fact, they lost two or three days reorganizing

^Torrente in his account of this event does not note
any such thought on M o r i l l o 's part.
Rather, he mentions the
exceptional bravery with which Morillo personally led his
men in the attack of the burning city.
Torrente, Historia
de la Revolucidn. II, 516-17.
^This is P&ez's quotation.

their forces.
After this brief interval, Morillo continued to search
for us.

He encountered us at the Caujaral pass on the Arauca

River.

W e h a d decided to resist his attack here, where we

were entrenched w i t h some artillery pieces.
uninterrupted fire for two days.

Finally,

We exchanged
the Spanish chief

realized that he could not force our position,
h e a d e d toward the Marrereno pass.
on February 4.

and so he

He arrived there at dawn

I had situated Commandant Fernando Figueredo

with a squadron of riflemen here,
leagues from m y headquarters.

approximately three or four

Figueredo was attacked

vigorously w i t h artillery and inf sultry.

Although he resisted

w i t h admirable daring, h e was not able to prevent the R o y a l 
ists from crossing further down the river,
the Marrereno pass,
Sam Fernando.

a half-mile from

in six canoes which they had brought from

When 1 learned from Figueredo that he was

b e i n g attacked by the entire enemy army,

I started mar ching

w i t h six hundred lancers to reinforce him.

However,

when I

arrived, more than one thousand enemy infantrymen had already
crossed the river.
At this point, when we had the enemy in a position
where the river served as rearguard,
m y plan.

X started to carry out

I placed m y infantry on Urbana Island,

the O r inoco River.

The rest of the cavalry,

the remounts,

and the emigration from the neighboring towns,
safely.
enemy.

situated in

I located

Then X left with eight hundred men to search for the
I encountered General [Francisco Tom&s] Morales with
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three thousand men coming toward the farm at C a n a f i s t o l a . ^
Realizing that this was not the entire enemy army,
it.

However, Morales,

the Arauca,

I attacked

favored by the forest on the shore of

started a retreat toward Caujaral which was

about half-league's distance from Morillo and the rest of
the army.

Our attack now cost Morales dearly,

for he lost

the squadron that had been assigned to him for the purpose
of getting cattle.
of his predicament.
rest of the army.

He sent four of his m e n to tell Mo rillo
The latter came to his aid with the
N o w 1 organized m y eight hundred men into

four parallel columns forming a square and started a retreat.
However,

this was only after issuing orders that if the

enemy cavalry charged us,

as I expected judging from the fact

that they outnumbered us two to one,

the two rear columns

were to move forward, pass between the front two,
flank out to the right and to the left.

and then

The remaining columns

were to follow suit and engage the unsuspecting enemy forces
face-to-face.
Morillo pursued us from 8x00 a.m. until 6x00 p.m.,

4p&ez refers here to Francisco Totn&s Morales w h o had
been sent by General Morillo to Venezuela in 1816 to organize
a Royalist force.
Morillo gave Morales only a company of
foot soldiers and a group of officers.
With these and B o v e s '
old warriors, Morales was to form two battalions of 1,200
troops e a c h — the Tercero del Rev and los Cazadores del R e v .
According to Morillo, his name and influence in Venezuela
were tremendous.
It is true that Morales' arrival in
Valencia frustrated Bolivar's attempt to disembark in Ocumare.
Later he operated against P&ez in the Apure campaign.
Lecuna, Crdnica R a z o n a d a . I, 414; II, 264.
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almost alwayB at rifle-range distance.

Even though his

cavalry was numerically superior to ours, he never saw fit
to engage it.

We h a d only a light skirmish which was p r o 

voked when Commandant Narciso Ldpez and a squadron of rifle
men approached to fire from the rear.^
men to charge h i m suddenly.
prise,

I ordered twenty-five

This caught Ldpez so by sur

that he ordered his riflemen to dismount,

their rifles did not have bayonets.

even though

He was saved only because

our men did not carry out my orders to charge as a platoon.
Morillo spent that night in Congrial de Cunabiche,
very close to the entrance of the Cariben desert.
not press forward,

He did

revealing his tactical experience.

He

had been warned that he would not find any resources and in
the event of a compulsory retreat, he would also have to
combat the traps X planned to set at his rear flank.6
the following night, he countermarched,

On

recrossed the Arauca,

^Torrente refers to this as the campaign of the
trapiche de la G a m a r r a . Noting a Royalist "victory," he lauds
the h e roism of the "coronel
fflprir-ann don Narciso L 6 p e z ."
Torrente, Historia de la R e v o l u c i O n , XI, 519.
Narciso L 6 pez was a Spanish squadron chief and Morales*
subalternate.
At one time he was charged with watchin g the
coast of Chuao preventing Bolivar's possible disembarking.
He assisted actively and capably in Morillo's Apure campaign.
Lecuna, Crdnica R a z o n a d a . I, 464, 473; II, 261-76, 280, 422.
This Narciso Ldpez is not to be confused with the
Cuban filibusterer w h o operated in the 1850's.
Further
information on the Cuban Ldpez will be provided in Chapter
XX, footnote 7, of this manuscript.

g

The Royalist historian agrees with P & e z 's evaluation
on this point.
Torrente, Historia de la R e v o l u c i o n . II, 520.
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and established his headquarters in the city of Achaguas.

I

pressed his retreat with my eight hundred men, and m y guer
rillas molested his front,
We took prisoners daily.

flanks, and rear guard constantly.
Above all, we were successful in

preventing the enemy from getting cattle easily for food
r a t i o n s.
One of the guerrilla groups composed of thirty men of
the Guard, under the command of the untiring Aramendi,
vigorously attacked the enemy cavalry as it crossed the
Arauca River along the Caujaral pass.

Despite the feats of

marvel Aramendi performed during his successive charges, he
was repelled.
captured.

He lost twelve men,

counting the dead and

Our enemy lost some men, too.

Among them was

Commandant Antonio Ramos who was wounded by a young soldier
of the Guard called Juan Torralba .7

Torralba, who was being

pursued by Ramos, had leaped off his horse,
with his lance,

run him through

and taken the Spanish leader's horse.

Mean

while Commandant Juan G&mez, who had been ordered to operate
between the towns of San Fernando and Guasimal,

succeeded in

7Captain Juan Torralba or Torrealba joined the patriot
army in 1813. When Boves subjugated the area to Spanish rule
again in 1814, he emigrated with Urdaneta to New Granada.
In
1816 he joined the guerrillas in Casanare and went on to
Apure where he fought with P&ez until 1821.
Bolivar promoted
him to cavalry captain in 1820, back-dating the commission to
1819.
He was Adjutant Major in Colonel Ranjel's Regiment of
"Valientes . 11 Torrealba served as Military Commissioner of
Barinas and in 1823 became Tobacco Administrator in Barquisimeto.
He sided with P&ez and not Bolivar in the break-up of
Gran Colombia.
He died in Barquisimeto in 1854.
D&vila,
Diccionario BioarAfico. II, 312-13.
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destroying the squadron led by the Royalist Commandant Paloma
near Guasimal as he collected foodstuffs to supply the plaza
o f San Fernando.8
Such was the state of the campaign when Bolivar
arrived at m y headquarters in Caujaral de Cunabiche at the
end of March determined to seek out and attack the Royalists.
Having assumed command of the infantry that was in Urbana
and the rest of the cavalry, he asked me for information c o n 
cerning the numbers of the enemy army.
they m ounted up to six thousand m e n . 9

I assured him that
This was the reason I

h a d not engaged all m y forces in general combat.

Instead I

was k e eping the enemy busy far away from Caracas in order to
give Urdaneta time to occupy that city with the fifteen
*

h u n d r e d men that Bolivar had placed at his disposal on the
island of Margarita.

If Morillo marched against them,

it was

®There were m a n y men b y the name of Juan Gdmez in the
wars for Venezuelan independence.
P&ez does not give enough
information to identify this one.
There was no further infor
m ation
available on the Royalist Commandant Paloma.
9PAez inserts the following footnote heret
“The
Liberator did not want to believe that the enemy had such
strength.
However, the European prisoners he had called
before him gave h i m the same numbers that I had.
He still
refused to believe it.
Asking them the number of battalions
they had, he counted the troops which composed these, and
thus ascertained that the enemy could not possibly ha v e more
than three thousand men.
Later, when Bolivar had an inter
view with Morillo, the latter confessed to h i m that during
this time he h a d seven thousand men."
Lecuna cites that on
January 30 of 1619, Morillo reviewed his troops of six
thousand two hundred men.
Crdnica R a z o n a d a , II, 260.
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m y intent then to pursue h i m with all the army.
Bolivar approved this plan, but he remarked that p e r 
haps we were too far from Morillo to overtake h i m w h e n he
m a r c h e d on Urdaneta.

We informed h i m then that if we got

any closer with the entire army,
force us into battle.

the Spanish General could

Although he agreed with m y o b s e r v a 

tions, he felt it was necessary for the army to cross the
Arauca in order to expedite the pursuit of Morillo.

We

crossed at San Juan de Payara and then decided to marc h to
Achaguas to attack Morillo.
Five leagues from Achaguas, we encountered Valencey's
second battalion commanded by [jos6} Pereira and two hundred
cavalrymen led by Narciso Ldpez at the Gamarra sugar mill,
which was completely surrounded by forests.*0

Bolivar

ordered four battalions to attack and dispatched them in less
than fifteen minutes.

The enemy,

finding out through some

prisoners that we still had a battalion and two thousand
cavalrymen in reserve,

retreated toward Achaguas.

Bolivar

then busied himself reuniting the scattered men, and later
countermarched toward the Arauca bank.
The following day, w h e n he learned that Morillo was
going to attack us,

Bolivar called me and asked my advice

concerning the strategy to adopt.

I was somewhat offended,

for he had not heeded m y previous observations.

I simply

*°Commandant jos6 Pereira was the Royalist Commandant
of the Pardos de Valencia.
Lecuna, Crdnica R a z o n a d a . II,
181

.
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told h i m that I was ready to follow h i m in whatever plan he
m i g h t adopt,

regardless of whether it h a d my approval.

He

w as not satisfied with this; and as if to force me to give
m y opinion, he convoked all the chiefs in a war council.
General [Carlos] Soublette stated that Bolivar had called
the m e e t i n g with but one object in m i n d — to hear my
opinion.H

It n o w seemed foolhardy to me to withhold my

advice any longer.
previously.

I repeated then what I had told Bolivar

I added that we should do everything possible

not to expose Guayana,

for this was our only source of

securing supplies from abroad;
serve the infantry,

that we should try to c o n 

for then Morillo could not march on this

port as I was certain he wanted to do; and that above all,
w e should try to maintain the army intact for at least a
year in order to inspire confidence in the patriots.

11-General Soublette was born Carlos Soublette in
Caracas.
He joined the independence army in 1810 and became
General Miranda's Secretary and Aide in 1811.
After the
disaster of the Battle of La Puerta, he became Major General
of the Palacios Division.
Then he became second in command
of Mac Gregor's army.
He took part in the Junta de Angostura
and helped to organize the government of the Republic.
Soublette then took an army that had been victorious in such
battles as Vargas and BoyacA to join PAez in the Apure region.
He assisted in taking Caracas in 1821.
As Vice-President of
Venezuela, he activated the campaign of Coro, which he lost
to Morales in 1822.
This same year he served as civil and
m i l i t a r y chief of Venezuela.
In 1826 he was Secretary of
War and N a v y in BogotA.
When the separation came between
Venezuela and Colombia in the Juntas of Caracas in November
of 1829, Soublette followed PAez as his Secretary General.
Later, he was PAez's Secretary of War and Navy.
The people
o f Venezuela elected him to the Presidency in 1837.
He died
in Caracas on February 11, 1870.
Scarpetta and Vergara,
Diccionario B i o g r A f i c o . pp. 201-202.
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After the conference,
proffered at the meeting,

Bolivar,

following the advice

ordered us to cross the Arauca

River to avoid an encounter with the enemy.

The following

day, M orillo arrived on the left bank of this river.
camp in Mata del Herradera,
we were.

He made

a mile further down from where

At 3i00 p.m. on that very day a cavalry officer

called Vicente Camero crossed over to us and, before p r e 
senting himself to the Supreme Chief,

informed me that

Morillo was planning to make me a prisoner.

Morillo's

strategy would be to attack me with his army as I harassed
them as usual,

separate me from my army,

and then send two

hundred select cavalrymen on his best horses to pursue and
imprison m e .
At this point,

I feel obliged to relate an event that

occurred when the army began to cross the Arauca,

for this

helps to explain the h atred the Spanish chief had for me.

I

had left that morning very early with about nineteen c o m 
panions to take the offensive.

The enemy h a d barely seen us

when Morillo hurled all his cavalry against me.
m y men into small sections.

1 ordered Aramendi, who was in

charge of one of them, to fire,
pursuing his harassment.
w i t h the rest of the men.

I divided

advance,

and retreat, without

I supported him at the same time
In one of those attacks and

retreats, Aramendi and Commandant Mina found themselves in
serious trouble,
enemy lines.

for they h a d penetrated too far into the

Had I not hurried to help them personally,

would have been completely surrounded.

they

It was then that the
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Royalists suspended the attack, having lost some cavalry.
Our only loss was a wounded horse.

One can easily understand

n o w why the Spanish General could not forgive this loss of
face,

and w h y he would be anxious to make me pay for it with

interest.

I would not be a bad captive for him.

After I heard the officer's account,
Bolivar and related Morillo's plan to him.

I ran to see
1 told h i m that

if he permitted me to cross the river with a small number of
m y men,

1 would attract the Royalist forces so that they

would come right in front of where we were.

He could set an

ambush on the river bank, using the companies of infantrymen
and cavalry with all their artillery,
a hard blow.

and deal the Spaniards

I could charge head-on at the same time that

the ambushed forces attacked the enemy's flank.
acceded to my wishes,

and X crossed the river immediately

w i t h one hundred and fifty men.
Morillo*s camp.

Bolivar

At a gallop we headed toward

The latter moved to execute his plan.

We

kept h i m busy with frequent charges and retreats until we
led his forces right in front of the spot we h a d selected for
the ambush.

Immediately,

the cavalry division posted there

opened fire against the Royalists; however,

this division was

not as strong as I had agreed with Bolivar that it should
be.

12

Our situation was very difficult then,

for the enemy

l-^ljecuna terms this an unjust recrimination of Bolivar
by PAez.
He states that the official bulletin dictated by
Bolivar on that day reveals that the battle took place beyond
where Bolivar's infantry was situated.
Furthermore, he
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was corralling us on both sides with cavalry and was pursuing
us relentlessly with rifle and cannon fire.

Fortunately at

this point the valiant Royalist commandant Don Narciso Lbpez
inadvertently gave me the opportunity to take an advantageous
offensive.

This occurred when Ldpez preceded the infantry

with his squadron of riflemen.

I immediately ordered C o m 

mandant Ronddn, one of those leaders in whom valor is a
custom, and twenty men to charge at open lance and retreat
post haste before the two divisions of the enemy cavalry
fenced them in.

After that,

I wanted them to unite, return,

and attack the enemy vigorously.

Ronddn charged with the

speed of lightning, and Ldpez imprudently dismounted with his
riflemen.

Ronddn killed some of Ldpez's men and was able to

effect his retreat without being hemmed in.

Then seeing

that the two enemy cavalry sections had united,
objective of Ro n d d n 's attack fulfilled,

and the

I ordered my men to

wheel around and attack with the spirit and courage they
used in their most desperate moment.
It was now that the lance, arm of the heroes of
antiquity,

in the hands of my one hundred and fifty men,

wreaked no less havoc than it did during Homer's times.

It

has become part of historical legend how three hundred
Spartans, arms in hand and at the mouth of a narrow passage,

states that P&ez recrossed the Arauca at the mouth of Cancero
and returned to camp the next day at seven in the morning,
ample proof of the fact that the fighting had taken place
far from the camp.
Crdnica Razonada, II, 281-82.
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resisted until death the assaults of the armies of the King
of P ersia— armies so numerous that their arrows clouded the
sun.

it has also been related that one sole Roman disputed

the passage of a bridge to an entire enemy army.

Is not the

action now executed by the one hundred and fifty patriots of
Apure comparable to these feats7

Homer's heroes and the

companions of Leonidas h a d but to deal with the personal
valor of their adversaries.

The Apurenos,

on the other hand,

w i t h their bare arms, had to also battle that enemy element
that Cervantes called a "diabolic invention, with whic h an
infamous and cowardly arm, that perhaps trembles as the
m a c h inery goes into operation,

cuts down and terminates in a

m oment the thoughts of life of someone who deserved to enjoy
them m any y e a r s ."
As I saw Randdn gather so m a n y laurels on the field
of battle,

I could do no less than exclaims

i m o , C o m m a n d a n t e ."

"Bravo, Bravls-

"General," he answered and alluded to m y

reprimand after the charge made on Ldpez a few days earlier,
"General,

thus fight the sons of the Alto Llano."

Everything contributed to giving that battle a quality
of terrible sublimity.
its shadows.

The night approached accompanied by

The dust raised by the horses of both sets of

combatants mingled with the powder smoke.

It all recalled

the sublime exasperation of the impetuous Ajax when he begged
the Gods to scatter the clouds so that he could fight the
Greeks by the clear light of the sun.
The enemy cavalry fled.

The infantry saved itself b y
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taking refuge in the forest.
on the field.

The artillery left its pieces

However, we could not see the latter because

of the darkness of night.

Finally,

long before dawn, Morillo

started a retreat toward Achaguas.
Bolivar and the rest of the army chiefs had witnessed
the fray from across the river.

Later he confessed to me

that he had not been able to sleep that night for fear that
I might have been killed.

Yet on that very morning of April

3, a few hours before Camero had come to me, Bolivar, with
his characteristic impetuousness, had been most impatient
with the army's state of inactivity and had wanted very much
to enter into action.
"Patience,
there is a plain.

General," 1 said to him.

"Behind a hill

He who knows how to await the good he

desires, does not take the road of losing patience the
minute it does not arrive."
"PatienceI

Patience 1" he answered me.

"Many times

there is as much laziness as weakness in allowing oneself to
be directed by patience.

How much of this virtue do we need

to resist the bitter privations that we suffer— the sun
blazing like fire itself; the wind, dust, and carbon; the
meat from a thin bull, eaten without bread or salt; and as a
complement, dirty water.

If I do not desert,

it is because

I do not know where to g o ."
These temper fits on Bolivar's part were not brought
on because his spirit failed him in adversity.

Rather,

they

were only the result of the natural impatience possessed by
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men of impetuous character who w i s h to gather the fruits of
their vigilance and fatigues as soon as possible.

When we

joined Bolivar after the battle, he gave the Cross of
Liberators to the one hundred and fifty warriors and issued
the following proclamation.
To the Brave Hen of the Army of Apure
"Soldiers 1

You have just executed the most e x t r a 

ordinary feat that the military history of nations cam c e l e 
brate.

One hundred and fifty men, or rather one hundred and

fifty heroes,

guided by the dauntless General P&ez,

deliber

ately attacked Morillo's entire Spamish army head on.
Artillery,

infantry,

cavalry,

nothing has been too m u c h for

the enemy to use to defend itself from the one hundred and
fifty companions of the very intrepid P & e z .

The cavalry

columns have succumbed to the b l o w of our lances; the
infantry has searched for am asylum in the forest; the fire
of their cannons has stopped before our horses.

Only the

shadows could have saved that army of vile tyramts from c o m 
plete and absolute destruction.
"Soldiers 1
what you can do.

W h a t has been done is only a prelude to
Prepare yourselves for battle and rely on

the victory that you carry implicit on the points of your
lances and of your bayonets.
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"Headquarters in the Potreritos Marrerenos, April 3,
1819.
B o l i v a r ."^
This battle took place at Queseras del Medio.
in his account calls it the Herradera.
torian, Torrente,

Morillo

The Royalist h i s 

to make the defeat appear less shameful,

states that ours were five hundred llaneros of gigantic
stature and herculean m u s c u l a t u r e .^
dead counted,

Bolivar had the enemy's

and the number came close to five hundred.

h a d only two fatalities,
Manuel Martinez.

We

Isidoro Mugica and first corporal

Our wounded included among others,

tenant Colonel Manuel Arraiz,

Lieu

and Captains Francisco Antonio

Salazar and Juan Santiago T o r r e s . 1 5

The width of these men's

i^This proclamation can also be found in Lecuna
Proclamas y D i s c u r s o s , 237.

(ed.),

14rorrente *s exact quotation is as follows i *'E1
faccioso P&ez perdid u n a gran parte de su cdlebre quardia de
h o n o r . compuesta de 500 feroces llaneros de los mas aguerridos
i diestros en el. maneio del c a b a l l o i los realistas ouedaron
sorprendidoa al examiner el campo de b a t a l l a . cubierto de
cadaveres de figure g i g a n t e s c a . i de hercules m u s c u l a t u r e .
Tales fueron las tropes vencidas en dicha B a t a l l a ." Historia
de la R e v o l u c i d n . II, 519.
1 5 No

biographical data can be found on Captains S a l a 
zar and Torres.
Lieutenant Colonel Manuel Arraiz was a
native of Venezuela.
His military career in these wars of
independence is intimately linked with P & e z ’s military c a m 
paigns.
He fought in Mata de la Miel, Mucuritas, Calabozo,
Misidn de Abajo, semen, and Ortiz among other battles.
His
biographers list h i m as having been wounded on June 22, 1819
at the Battle of la Cruz rather than at Queseras del Medio.
Scarpetta and Vergara, Diccionario B i o q r & f i c o . p. 31.
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wounds and the fact that they were on the men's backs,
revealed to us that they had been wounded by our own men in
the confusion and darkness of the battle.

CHAPTER XII
Pursuit of M o r i l l o — Encounter in "Sacra Familia"
— I March Against Mor a l e s — The Ambush in Caramacate
— Bolivar Joins Me in Achaguas— March to Barinas—
Bolivar Orders Me to March to Guasdualito to Arrest
Nonato Pdrez— M y Opinion About Marching to New
Granada Instead of Going Toward Barinas— The Liberator
Writes Me at Guasdualito— Joins Me at This Place—
Marches to N e w Granada and I Remain Operating in the
Apure— Action at La C r u z — Heroic Defense by the
Spaniards— Penalties Suffered in the March to
Achaguas— Capture of Eleven Royalist Ships— Occupa
tion of the Apure by the Forces Under My Command in
the Year 1820— Morillo Sends Commissioners to the
Patriot Generals— Interview between Morillo and
Bolivar in Santa Ana— Armistice— My Opinion About
the Suspension of Hostilities— Morillo Embarks for
Spain— Evaluation of Morillo's Campaigns.
1819-1820
When Morillo marched toward Achaguas,

Bolivar immedi

ately recrossed the Arauca and ordered Colonel Munoz and the
Guard to follow him.

The following day while we were m a r ching

westward on the left bank of the Arauca, we saw some distance
from us, close to the Trujillo farm,
or animals on the plains.

We could not distinguish beyond

this because of the morning fog.
sent me out to reconnoitre.

a group of either people

Bolivar ordered a halt and

I discovered an enemy squadron

corralling cattle for the army stationed in the aforementioned
farm.

As I approached,

rest of the army.
Bolivar.

the squadron retreated to rejoin the

Discovering this,

I hurried back to tell

He resolved to fall back to the bank of the river
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and recross it again to avoid an encounter,
it w o u ld be too risky.
Morillo,

for he thought

Since the Guard was away pursuing

and the rest of the cavalry under Ranjel and other

leaders h a d gone to take Nutrias and operate behind Morillo,
we did not have sufficient forces to oppose the enemy.
A t the same time Morillo raised camp and continued
retreating toward Achaguas.

In so doing he escaped the sur

prise ambush that the Guard had set the previous night in a
m a t a next to the camp while the Royalist were eating.^
Munoz,

the leader of the Guard, notified the rest of us of

Morillo's movement and said that he would continue pursuing
the latter.

However, his communique arrived after we h a d

recrossed the river and missed the favorable opportunity to
finish off the Spanish army.

Already demoralized by the last

defeat in Queseras del Medio,

this army would not have been

able to resist us if we,
thent

assisted by the Guard, h a d attacked

so we continued our march toward the West along the

right bank of the Arauca to the "Caraballero” farm where we
again forded the river.
Hondo.

From there Bolivar went to Rincon

The Guard and I continued marching toward Achaguas.

M y advance guards notified me then that Morillo had ordered
a cavalry section and some infantry to herd cattle.

I

ordered a part of the Guard to attack them immediately.

They

encountered the Royalists in a place called "Sacra Familia"

Ip&ez footnotes this as followst
"A mata is a portion
of terrain populated with trees of only one spe c i e . ”
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where they forced them to abandon the animals they had
already corralled.

After a few losses the R o y a l i s t s , aided

b y the thickets that covered the area,

returned to Achaguas.

After the Guard rejoined us, we continued the march
toward Achaguas.

I h a d to interrupt this march, however,

when I learned that Morillo was abandoning this city and
h e ading toward the province of Barinas w i t h his headquarters
and part of the army,

and that the rest of the forces under

Morales 's command were heading in the direction of San
Fernando.

I decided then to overtake Morales; but X was

unable to do this despite all m y efforts.
About 7i00 p.m. that day w e captured a m a n from the
C anary Isles who had stayed behind w i t h some supplies.

He

informed m e that the Royalist army was camped in that
vicinity.

Since that terrain was too wooded,

to attack Morales there.

Flanking his forces,

X did not want
I decided to

set am ambush at the spring at Caramacate and attack h i m by
surprise the next day as he passed.
We mar c h e d all night and arrived at this place.
dawn X haul begun to carry out m y plan.
ambush.

A little ahead of the spring,

By

I set m y men in an
I pl a c e d a company of

riflemen w i t h orders to fire as if w a n t i n g to dispute the
enemy's passage.

At this moment the m e n were to come sud

d e n l y out of ambush and try to cut the enemy in the center.
With this stratagem I hoped to destroy a part of the Royalist
army.

I k n e w that a lack of infantry and the wooded terrain

w o u l d k e e p me from destroying it completely.
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The enemy approached and would have surely fallen into
our trap had not one of those errors which are so fatal in
wars,

occurred about a mile from us to frustrate our wise

plans.

The advance guard that led our munitions had stayed

a little behind,

and it was attacked by a squadron of our

cavalry under the command of captain N. Sandoval who was
looking over the area of the San Fernando plaza.

He and the

Guard both believed they had stumbled on part of the enemy
army and fired on each other within sight of the enemy.

The

latter stopped to find out what was happening.
When I heard the shooting and was told that the
advance guard had been taken prisoner,
dent to remain in ambush any longer.
saw the enemy nearby,
victimized us.

it did not seem p r u 
When I came out and

I realized the fatal mistake whi c h had

Because of this the Royalist army was able to

continue its march with impunity.

Still and all,

it always

bordered the forest until entering the plaza a league away.
Meanwhile I marched toward Achaguas where Bolivar
arrived after ordering his infantry to Mantecal.

From

Achaguas we left together and headed toward Barinas.

When

the army was united in the farm of canafistola, next to the
Setenta Pass where w e were going to cross the Apure River,
Bolivar ordered a halt.

He commanded me to go to Guasdualito

to arrest colonel Nonato P 6 rez and to take charge of his
forces,

including over five hundred horses that he had

p a s t u r e d there.
The night before my departure I h a d a conference with
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Colonel Ranjel,

and I told h i m that 1 did not approve of

Bolivar's march to Barinas because we would not find
resources there for an army which was already suffering
scarcities of all kinds.

Instead of going to Barinas, where

Bolivar said that we would at least get tobacco to sell in
Guayana and thus get some money,

I thought that greater

advantages could be gained if Bolivar directed his ma r c h to
N e w Granada through Casanare.
Ranjel,

The plan seemed very good to

and he begged me not to leave without telling the

Supreme Chief about it.
did not,

Even though I offered to do this,

I

for I was still most reluctant to give Bolivar m y

opinion on plans and operations.
While I was in route to Guasdualito,
Lara a r r i v e d . 2

Colonel Jacinto

He had been sent by General Santander to

2General Jacinto Lara was born in Carora in 1780.
He
joined the revolutionary forces in 1810 and participated
actively in Miranda's campaign.
When Venezuela was recon
quered by Spain in 1812, he joined Nicolas Bricefto and
together they went to Bolivar in Cticuta and there w i t h one
hundred and forty-three cavalry formed the nucleus of a V e n e 
zuelan fighting force.
They were defeated by the Spanish
General Tizcar in Barinas in 1613.
He escaped this attack
m i r a c u o usly and rejoined Briceno and General Marino.
Later
h e fought with P&ez in the Battles of Los Cocos, San Fernando,
and M a t a de la Miel.
He accompanied Santander in the C a s a 
nare campaign on N e w Granada.
In 1820 he took Santa Marta.
Bolivar added h i m to his army, took h i m to the Battle of
Bombona, and then joined h i m to General ValdAz w h o headed
the first auxiliary Colombian Division to Peril. in 1824 he
lost the Battle of Matara.
Then he joined Sucre and c o m 
m anded the reserve battalions in the Battle of Ayacucho.
With Sucre he entered La Paz in 1825.
Although he was exiled
from Perti in 1827 by Colonel Bustamente, he returned to serve
it ably.
Decorated with the Order of Liberator and medals of
Liberators of Venezuela, BoyacA, Junin, and Ayacucho, he died
in Barquisimeto in 1859.
Scarpetta and Vergara, Dlccionario
B i o q r A f i c o , 251-53.
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inform the Liberator of the favorable results of his opera
tions in Casanare and of the enthusiasm of the Granadines
for the Independence Cause.

A junta was convoked over which

Bolivar presided.

Its members were AnzoAtegui,

Torres,

Ranjel,

Soublette,

Ambrosio Plaza,

Pedro LeOn

Iribarren, Pedro Briceno Mendez,
■J
and Manrique.
They unanimously approved

^General Pedro Ledn Torres was born in Carora in 1790.
He joined the independence army in 1810 as a sublieutenant.
General Monteverde imprisoned h i m in 1813, but he escaped and
sought out Bolivar.
He fought in the Battles of San Mateo,
Maturln, La Puerta, Sombrero, SAmen, and Cojedes with aston
ishing bravery.
He was Bolivar's companion in the expedition
of Los Cayos and in the glorious march of Ocumare.
He stayed
and fought with Pdez in Venezuela.
In the Battle of Bombona,
he received both the Order of the Liberator and his mortal
wound.
He died in 1822 in Yacuanquer, having been defeated
only once {La Hogaza) in the thirty battles in which he fig
ured prominently.
I b i d .. 631-32.
General Pedro BriceHo Mfendez was born in Barinas and
studied Philosophy and Law at the Universities of MAr i d a and
Caracas.
He married Benigna Palacios, daughter of Juana
Bolivar, the Liberator's sister.
He joined Bolivar in CCicuta
and served as his Secretary in the campaigns of 1813, 1814,
and 1815.
In 1816 he went in the expedition of Los Cayos
and w e nt on in Aguacates with MacGregor.
In 1817 he was
Piar's Secretary.
He returned to Bolivar's service as a
colonel and became Secretary of War and N a v y in Angostura.
Accompanying Bolivar in the Campaign of N e w Granada, he was
one of those who signed the Treaty regulating war in 1820.
In 1823 he was promoted to General of Brigade and was Secre
tary o f War and Navy in BogotA until 1825 when he became
Minister Plenipotentiary to the Congress of Panama.
He was
a Senator in Colombia in 1627, and in 1828 became PAez's
Secretary and Intendant of Venezuela.
In 1835 he became a
Venezuelan Senator and died that same year in Curazao.
DAvila, Dlccionario B i o q r A f i c o . I, 49-50.
General Ambrosio Plaza was born in BogotA in 1790. He
joined the revolutionary cause and Bolivar in Cdcuta.
With
Bolivar he entered Trujillo in 1813 and was with h i m also in
M A r i d a w h e n he announced his "war to the death."
In 1814 he
was victorious in BogotA.
Later he was forced to emigrate
and join PAez in the llanos where he fought at the Battles
of Achaguas, Yagual, Barinas, and Canafistola among others.
He was killed at the Battle of Carabobo in 1821 while
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the plan of moving the campaign to N e w Granada.
The day after 1 got to Guasdualito,
accompanied by Lieutenant Juan Jose Flores,

Ranjel came to me
later General

and President of Ecuador, w i t h a note from Bolivar,
own handwriting.

in his

In this letter he told me that Ranjel had

informed h i m of my opinion on the advantages of going to N e w
Granada instead of heading toward Barinas.
of this idea,

Since he approved

I was to wait for him in Guasdualito.

There I

could decide which of the two of us would be the leader to
go to New Granada.

If I went, he would go to the East to

form an army against Caracas.

If he were selected to go,

then I was to remain in the Apure and safeguard it at all
costs, even if all other areas were lost.
When Bolivar joined me in Guasdualito,

I thanked h i m

for the deference he h a d shown me in his letter, and I told
h i m that then as always I was ready to approve and carry out
whatever he decided.

He told me that he thought it was

better for h i m to go to N e w Granada,
there,

for he was better known

and for me to stay in the Ap u r e — an area, which as he

h a d stated in his letter,

it was necessary to preserve at

all costs.
On June 4th Bolivar was already in the town of Arauca,
and by the eleventh of the same month he h a d joined

attacking the retreating Spanish Valencey Division.
His
close friend and rival. General Cedeno, was also killed in
this attack.
Scarpetta and Vergara, Diccionario Biog r & f i c o .
473-74.

Santander's division.

In accordance with what we had agreed,

I remained safeguarding the Apure with the special charge of
diverting the enemy's attention along the road from San
Camilo to Cdcuta,

and to penetrate if possible as far as the

valleys of this name.

To do this it was necessary to destroy

some strong guerrilla forces, which under the command of
Commandant Silva, had taken shelter in Guaca.
attention to this immediately,

I directed m y

for it can easily be seen

that it would be unwise to leave them behind me.
in dispersing these guerrillas; however,

I succeeded

I could not destroy

them completely since it was impossible for me to pursue
them in those wooded areas that were inaccessible to our
cavalry.
While I was in Guaca,

I found out that the enemy had

one place between Cticuta and San Cristobal that was fortified
and garrisoned,

called San Josesito.

It was impossible to

take this place, particularly with cavalry, because to reach
it we would have to traverse twenty leagues of wooded area
and clay pits that had no pasture for our horses.

In v i e w of

these insurmountable obstacles,4 i decided to return to

4p&ez inserts the following footnote here.
"Baralt
says that I did not want to go to Cdcuta in accordance with
the instructions that the Liberator had given m e . The reader
has already seen the obstacles that prevented us from doing
so.
Furthermore, remember that Bolivar had recommended
nothing as highly to me as safeguarding the Apure, which
w o u l d have been abandoned if I insisted on committing the
reckless undertaking of penetrating into the Valleys of
Cdcuta."
This quotation may be found in Baralt and Diaz,
Resflmen de la Historia, II, 457.
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Achaguas to organize an infantry and cavalry force with which
to penetrate to Ouanare in the province of Barinas.

Here 1

proposed to prevent General La Torre from crossing to aid
the Royalists of N e w Granada.
After organizing m y forces,
the Frio Pass, however,

I started marching.

At

seeing the obstacles presented to us

b y the flooded plains and overflowing rivers,

1

ordered the

infantry composed of Creoles and Englishmen to return to
Achaguas.

1 headed toward Guanare with only the cavalry and

left the city of Nutrias to one side,

for I could not attack

the plaza here without sufficient infantry forces.

Before

leaving I gave Colonel Aramendi orders to attack the capital
of Barinas wi th the regiment of "La Muerte," to disperse or
distract the forces he had defeated a few days earlier,

and

then to join me in G u a n a r e .
On the seventeenth I continued my m a r c h along the
road that leads to the town of La Cruz, which was the best
one according to m y guides,

in order to enlist the guerrillas

that operated in that area.

After a march of three co n s e c u 

tive days, without finding any provisions for our troops nor
even a dry spot on which to rest, we camped on the evening
of the nineteenth a league away from La Cruz.

My spies

informed me n o w that a column of three hundred and fifty
infantrymen and some riflemen, under the command of Lieutenant
Colonel [Juan] Duran, h a d just taken possession of the town.
Their objective in doing this was many-foldt
guerrillas;

to defeat the

to continue operations in those areas; to burn
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the town; to destroy the plantations; and to take the inhab
itants prisoners to Nutrias.
I prepared immediately to attack this column.

By

dawn of the twenty-second, with the enemy unaware of our
movements, we were at the edge of the town.

While I was

organizing the attack, one of my riflemen fired a shot acci
dentally.

In order not to give the Royalists time to prepare

a defense,

1 ordered the Guard to advance immediately on the

plaza.
forces.

This could not be achieved without arousing the enemy
They had fortified themselves in the Church by the

time the Guard got there, and easily repelled their attacks.
I charged with the rest of the forces as far as the corners
of the plaza where the Church was located.
entered the battle.
of the plaza,

My hussars

When they had penetrated to the center

I ordered the Guard to attack again.

One

hundred Royalist lancers from the Barinas regiment charged
m y hussars with bayonets and forced them to fall back to a
corner of the plaza as the Ckiard penetrated to attack the
Royalists from the rear.

By an unfortunate coincidence,

the

lancers of Barinas were dressed in uniforms like those of my
hussars.

This deceived the Guard, particularly because the

dense powder smoke prevented distinguishing objects clearly;
consequently,

they suspended the attack immediately.

Royalists then broke out with a terrible firing,
Guard was forced to retreat.

The

and the

In this charge Colonel Urquiola

and Captain Prado were among those killed.
officers and soldiers were wounded.

Several other
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The enemy, realizing that the Church did not offer
them a very advantageous defense,

abandoned it and took

cover in a tiled house with a mud-wall fence that was about
a block away from the Church.
repeated attacks.

Here they rejected our

We would return to charge with such courage,

that the officers even cut the balusters of the windows with
their sabers and the soldiers strained themselves in knocking
down the big door of the house.

Exposed to the killing fire

that the Royalists could discharge from their advantageous
position, we had to suspend the attack on more than one
occasion.

In one of these attacks Captain Pedro Juan Gamarra

was killed while penetrating through an opening formed
between the fence and the walls of the house.^
The greater part of the Spanish officers had been
killed or wounded by this time.
led by a corporal,

These valiant men had been

a Venezuelan, who exhorted his companions

to let themselves be killed rather than surrender to the
enemies of the King.

I realized then that it would be impos

sible to penetrate there without the necessary tools to open
a breacht

so I gave orders to suspend the attack.

I assured

m y men that by that very night we would be masters of the
house.

I placed four groups of unmounted hussars in the

^Captain Pedro Juan Gamarra enlisted in the indepen
dence cause in 1816, joined P&ez, and participated actively
in the Apure campaigns.
He was promoted to the rank of
Captain in 1818 and died heroically in 1819 at the Battle of
La Cruz.
D&vila, Diccionario Biogr&fico. I, 167.
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adjacent houses and ordered them to fire at the windows
occupied by the Royalists.
their defenders now,

M y men wrought great havoc on

crowded together as they were in that

n a r r o w enclosure and obstructed by a multitude of cadavers.
At nightfall I organized m y forces for the attack.
Rather late,

I had discovered a path that h a d escaped my

observation during the mor n i n g assaults.

We attacked the

house at this spot and occupied it with little resistance.
The Commandant,

thirty soldiers, and the heroic corporal

escaped at the moment our m e n entered,
ful American,

Captain Yarza.

guided by the u n g r a t e 

We found only a multitude of

cadavers and wounded m e n in the house.

With reason the

Spanish said in the communique they issued on this encounter
that "that house was not defended by troops of the King, but
by a sad hospital overflowing w i t h blood."
was very favorable for us, however,

This capitulation

for we took munitions and

over two hundred stored rifles.
Our losses consisted of five officers,
and two soldiers who were killed,

four sergeants,

and eleven officers and

eighty-five soldiers w h o were wounded.
the already-cited Colonel urquiola.

Among the dead were

Lieutenant colonel Navarro,

Captain Pedro Juan Gamarra and Lieutenant Pedro GOmez.6
the w o unded were Colonel Juan GOmez,
Manuel Arraiz, Captain RamOn Esteves,

Among

Lieutenant Colonel
Lieutenant Fructuoso

^Except for Pedro Juan Gamarra, no information is
available on any of these men.
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Esteves and Second Lieutenants Romualdo Salas, Encarnacidn
Castillo,

Eusebio Ledesma, Julian Pena, LeOn Esteves,
7
Olivar and Juan Aspre.
General Torres, Colonel Ranjel, Colonel Munoz,

Pedro

and

Lieutenant Colonel Laurencio Silva distinguished themselves
for their daring and courage and were the first to assault
the windows with their swords.

Colonel [Francisco] Carmona,

Lieutenant Colonel Jacinto Mirabal,

and Lieutenant Tom&s

Castej6n also distinguished themselves for their bravery.®

7 N o
further information was available on Captain Ramdn
Esteves, Lieutenant Fructuoso Esteves, and Second Lieutenants
Romualdo Salas, Encarnacidn Castillo, Eusebio Ledesma, Ledn
Esteves, Pedro Olivar and Juan Aspre.
Juli&n Pefia received a
commission in the cavalry from the government of Gran Colombia
in November of 1826, back-dating it to 1819.
In 1826 he was
stationed in Barinas and retired in 1830.
DAvila, Diccionario
Bi o g r & f i c o , II, 80.

®No further information is available on Lieutenant
Colonel Jacinto Mirabal.
Colonel Francisco Carmona was a
native of Maturin.
By 1812 he was fighting against the Royal
ists in the Battle of Puerto Cabello.
He fought with Marino
and was at the victory of Bocachica in 1814.
Displaying
marked bravery, he was at the Battle of Carabobo.
He was part
of General Piar's Honor CAtard when Bolivar sent Cedeno to
arrest the latter; Carmona allowed Piar to be captured only
because he wanted to obey the Liberator's order.
In 1819 he
was one of the one hundred and fifty men selected by P&ez to
cross the Arauca and defy Morillo's six thousand.
He also
fought in the Battles of Quesera del Medio and La Cruz. After
liberating Ocana in 1820, Carmona went on to defeat the
Spanish in the Santa Marta province.
In 1830 he supported
the m o vement in Santa Marta favoring Urdaneta as Commandant
General of the liberating army.
He was defeated by General
Mosquera in 1841 during the Revolution of 1840.
In 1853 he
was assassinated in his home.
Scarpetta and Vergara,
Diccionario BioqrAfico. 89-91.
Lieutenant TomAs Castej 6 n joined the revolutionary
cause in 1814 and fought in the Apure c a m p a i g n s . In 1819 he
was promoted to Lieutenant and to Captain in 1830.
In 1835 he
fought against the Reformistas and retired in 1636.
DAvila,
Diccionario B i o q r A f i c o . I, 77.
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The events that we have just related gives proof that
the Royalist soldier did not slacken before danger.

This

was particularly true when they had leaders such as the one
that resisted us in the town of La Cruz.
The forces under my command were weakened after this
h e ated b a t t l e . and it was not possible for me to continue the
m a r c h to Guanare.

I decided then to retreat toward Achaguas

and guard m y wounded in such a manner that they would not be
imprisoned by the enemy troops stationed at the plaza at
Nutrias as we passed close to it.
privations during this march,
crossing flooded estuaries,

We had to endure great

subsisting only on wild fruits,

and swimming across some deep

ravines.
W h e n we got to the town of Santa Catalina.
the wounded to Achaguas.

I shipped

I crossed the Apure River by the

Frio Pass and again established my headquarters in that city.
On September 3 commandant Antonio Diaz joined me here w i t h a
fleet of g u n b o a t s . 9

Knowing that the enemy had another

9Antonio Diaz was a naval captain and
was born in V e n e 
zuela.
He fought in the Battle of Cartagena and the siege of
Puerto Cabello.
In January of 1816 he left the Cayos with
Bolivar to undertake the invasion of Venezuela.
Later this
year he helped board and capture the ships Intrepido and R i t a .
Assisting Admiral Bribn in 1817. he helped recapture the ships
lost in Casacaima.
He was victorious at the Battle of Guiria
in 1818 and again in Pozuelos in 1819.
His fame was wellestablished after his victory at Apure Seco.
He assisted
Bribn in the Magdalena campaign and was part of the brilliant
squadron that took Santa Marta in 1820 and Cartagena in 1821.
Later he assisted in securing the surrender of Maracaibo and
Puerto cabello.
He became Commandant General of Angostura in
1824.
Scarpetta and Vergara. Diccionario B i o q r A f i c o . 130.
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squadron of eleven armed launches in the port of Nutrias
ready to come down to join those in San Fernando,

I ordered

Diaz to locate his ships at the mouth of the Apure Seco and
remain hidden there to make a surprise attack on the enemy
fleet as it came down the river.

Diaz did this on September

30 in front of the town of Apurito.

He won a complete victory,

for he took possession of all eleven enemy ships.

According

to m y further orders, Diaz then came down with his fleet to
the mouth of the Portuguesa River to prevent any supplies
from reaching the San Fernando plaza along this river or the
Apure.

While he was there, he was attacked by the enemy

fleet from San Fernando.

He routed this fleet to the point

that the m e n thrust their launches on the left bank of the
Portuguesa and defended the ships carrying the enemy infantry
from land.

Diaz then returned to Achaguas with the wounded.

The only fatality in this battle was D i a z 1s second in com
mand, Commandant M. Munoz.
Early in October, while I was in m y Yagual Farm,
eral Soublette came to see me on his way to Angostura.

Gen
He

informed me that there were fifteen hundred recruits in
Guasdualito under the command of Colonel Justo Briceno that
the Liberator had ordered be placed under m y c o m m a n d . X

10General Justo Bricefio was born in MArida in 1790.
He joined the revolutionary cause against the Spanish in 1810
and emigrated to Trinidad in 1813.
He fought w i t h Marino in
the Battles of Tucupedo, Lizania, Bocachico and Carabobo.
He
w as forced to emigrate again, joined the Cayos expedition,
and was named chief of the Cazadores battalion.
He was
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ordered these to come down from Achaguas.

With these

recruits and others that were arriving continually from New
Granada, we formed several battalions.

After being dis

ciplined in Apure, these battalions served to reinforce the
Liberating army that was to operate west of Caracas when 1
opened the campaign of 1820.
Almost all of the year 1820 was spent in enlisting and
disciplining recruits and pasturing the horses.

We also

herded and castrated bulls and then pastured them in order
to have a ready meat supply when the army opened the ca m p a i g n .
We also sent arms to N e w Granada.
inactivity during this period,

Despite our relative

the army of Apure remained a

permanent threat against the Royalists forces in Venezuela
and thus prevented their union with those in New Granada.
The only movement made during this time was a march
to Barinas in January.

We ran into Bolivar on the way,

he was coming from New Granada headed toward Guayana.

for
He

spent one night with me, and I told him then that this march
was solely a diversion.

It would protect the guerrillas I

had operating on the plains of Calabozo,
very province,

San Carlos,

and that

and at the same time offer my troops some

defeated in carupano and Aguacates in 1814; but he went on
to fight victoriously in the Battles of carabobo, Cumbre de
Valencia, and Puerto Cabello.
Accompanying Valero, he was
part of the auxiliary army to Perd.
He opposed P&ez in the
pronouncement of 1826, and in 1830 defended Bolivar's d i c 
tatorship.
In 1848 he defended the Monagas dictatorship and
by 1865 was General in chief.
He died in Caracas in 1868.
Ibid., 63-64. DAvila, Diccionario BioorAfico. I, 51-52.
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movement and activity.

Bolivar approved this and continued

his march toward Guayana.
occupied the city.

I continued toward Barinas and

After staying there a few days.

I returned

to Apure on the Nutrias road without encountering any diffi
culty.
While I was in San Juan de Payara in August,
tenant Colonel JalOn came to me.

Lieu

He had been commissioned by

Morillo to propose a suspension of hostilities.

I answered

that my operations depended on orders from the government and
that I was not authorized to enter into any sort of negotia
tions with the enemy.

Morillo then sent two commissioners,

Don Juan Clres and Don josd Domingo Duarte,
negotiations.

to propose peace

The Congress replied on July 11,

"That it was

anxious to establish peace and would listen with pleasure to
all the propositions made by the Spanish government if these
had as their basis the acknowledgment of the sovereignty and
independence of Colombia."
Commissioners were also sent to Bolivar.

Since he was

away, he delegated his power to Pedro Briceno Mgndez and to
Urdaneta.

These two openly refused to accept the proposition

made to them to return to obedience to the King, despite all
the guarantees that were offered Colombia.

They also replied

to the Spanish that the patriot leaders were deeply offended
by the promise made to preserve their ranks in the Spanish
army in return for helping effect a reconciliation with the
old metropolis.
For the time being the negotiations failed to produce
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any results.

A little later Bolivar wrote Morillo from Sam

CristobAl on September 21, telling h i m that notwithstanding
the h a r m that could befall the Republican forces in suspend
ing hostilities, he had decided to enter negotiations for the
armistice that he had proposed as long as Colombia was
granted the guarantees and securities that she h a d a right to
demand.

Morillo,

in a letter dated October 20 in San Carlos,

answered by inviting Bolivar to enter the preliminary
negotiations necessary to sign an armistice.
After having filled the thoughts of the reader w i t h
the terrible scenes of war,

it is indeed pleasant to mention

one of the most notable episodes of these times when passion
ceded to reason and ended the horrors that h a d been committed
as m u c h b y those who defended the sacred rights of the father
land as b y those w h o supported despotism.
1820 the leaders of the belligerent forces,

On November 21,
anxious to end

the war of extermination with which they had horrified the
world,

concluded a treaty in Trujillo to regulate the conduct

of the war according to the practices of civilized countries.
They agreed to treat prisoners of war generously;

to exchange

them for others of equal rank and class; to respect the
inhabitants of the towns occupied by military forces; and
finally,

to do all those things that civilized countries are

apt to do during times of war.

Among the articles it is

n o t e w o rthy to call attention to the seventh, couched in these
terms t

"Since this war started because of differences of

opinion w i t h the combatants finding themselves allied b y very
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close ties and relations and thus anxious to prevent as much
b l o o dshed as possible,

it is n o w established that the m i l i 

tary or employees w h o h a d previously served either of the
two governments and w h o had deserted its banners and then
enlisted on the other side,

cannot be subject to capital

p u n i s h m e n t . — The same shall be understood with respect to
the spies of one or the other side."
With the treaties of November 25th and 26th concluded,
General Morillo invited the Liberator to a conference in the
town of Santa Ana.

Bolivar,

accompanied by his staff,

arrived and was received by the Spanish chief with every
respect,

offers of friendship,

and professed admiration.

After ten years of horrors and hatred to the death,

Spain

and Colombia seemed to have reached a reconciliation that no
one w o uld have deemed possible.

Spanish character,

noble and

generous always, did not belie itself in that conference
between men who h a d fought like beasts in one hun d r e d b attle
fields.

All of the participants,

setting aside inveterate

hatreds, praised each other and cited w i t h admiration the
most glorious deeds performed by the enemy while they broke
the bread of fraternity in a friendly b a n q u e t .

General

M o rillo proposed that a monument be erected on that spot to
recall that memorable day,

and the Liberator embraced the idea

w i t h the enthusiasm w i t h which he always viewed all acts of
generosity.
embraced.

The first stone was laid,

and both generals

The officers that accompanied them followed suit.

At the banquet the Liberator toasted "the heroic
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tenacity of the combatants of both armies— their constancy,
sufferings,

and unequaled valor; the worthy men that despite

the horrors of w a r sustained and defended their liberty; the
w o u n d e d of both armies who manifested their intrepidness,
their dignity,

and their character.— Eternal hatred to those

who desire bloodshed and will spill it unjustly.
General Morillo responded by saying:

"May God punish

those who are not animated by the same sentiments of peace
and friendship that we c u r e . "
said to Bolivar,

The Spanish General La Torre

full of enthusiasm:

"We shall descend

together to the hells in pursuit of t y r a n t s ."
History does not present a more beautiful or grandiose
scene.

Such a spectacle proves that the human heart,

no

m a tter how hard passions might make it, always maintains a
remnant of sensitivity that needs only a simple act to reveal
all its grandeur.
The historianCsl Baralt [and Diaz]

state that some

patriot chieftains disapproved of this a r m i s t i c e . ^
m y silence n o w could include me in this group,

since

I want to

m e ntion something in order to eliminate this possibility.

H-A copy of this toast made in Santa Ana on November
27, 1820 may be found in Lecuna (ed.), Proclamas y D i s c u r s o s .
253.
P&ez omitted one phrase:
"to those who died gloriously
defending their country or their glory."
l 2Baralt and Diaz state that this armistice met with
the disapproval of "almost all the chiefs that operated some
distance from Bolivar's camp; was ill-received in Quayana
although it produced great results."
Restimen de la H i s t o r i a .
Ill, 270.
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W h e n Bolivar passed by the Apure to attend the conference
w i t h Morillo,

I presented h i m w i t h a written plan in w h i c h I

expressed that I felt prolonging the armistice as long as
possible would give us additional time to discipline our
troops well and receive armaments with which to organize a
reserve army in N e w Granada.

This would enable us to maintain

control over this territory, which seemed to depend on the
outcome of one sole battle.

The patriots h a d lost it only

after the defeat of their troops in Cachiri, while the Spanish
lost it in the Battle of Boyac&.
Shortly after the celebration of the armistice on
December 17, Morillo left for Spain despite the protests of
the most prominent Royalists.

He left the command of the

expeditionary troops to General La Torre.

The Spanish General

had come to the realization that it was impossible to subju
gate the so-called insurgents; consequently, he wanted to
retire from the scene before events forced him to do so.
This was a prudent measure on the part of someone who could
not have foreseen such an end!
Morillo had committed grave errors in his mission as
pacificator.

In adopting orders of extreme severity to sub

jugate the country, he h a d alienated even the most indif
ferent souls.

He h a d been w r o n g also in looking disdainfully

on those ill-advised soldiers who, under the orders of Boves
and Monteverde, h a d wreaked disaster on their compatriots.
It w o u ld be unjust, however,

to deny h i m the valor and

audaciousness that he showed under all tests.

He possessed
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a great constancy, military talent,

and all those qualities

needed to inspire faith and confidence in subordinates.
Nevertheless, Morillo did not fail to make some mili t a r y
errors in his campaigns in V e n e z u e l a . ^
The first of these errors was to have divided his army
in San Fernando,

after the action of M u c u r i t a s .

He sent La

Torre with one part to Guayana and went himself w i t h the
other to the island of Margarita.

This plan reveals more of

an excessive confidence in his troops and disdain for those
of the enemy,

than the idea of attacking the two patriot

strongholds simultaneously.

Instead of dividing his army

like this, Morillo should have led all his army personally
to G u a y a n a .

There he sould have routed the Republicans and

closed the canal by w h i c h they imported war materials from
abroad as far as the interior of N e w Granada.

Embarking from

San Fernando, he could have arrived in Angostura within five
or six days.

If he h a d not h a d the number of ships there

necessary to carry his army, he could have ordered the ones
that were in Baul and Nutrias to come down.

l-^The Spanish historian Torrente expresses the opinion
that the only grave error Morillo committed was to leave his
command at a time when the expeditionary forces were strong
and the cry "Morillo v i v e I" was sufficient to inspire such
terror in the hearts of the patriots, that it could hold back
the emigration from La Qiaira.
Torrente states that Morillo
should never have abandoned the American shore and forsaken
his compatriots here and his King, for only he "could have
p r e v ented the loss of the dominions of Ultramar."
Historia
de la R e v o l u c i O n . Ill, 115.
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At the end of the campaign of the year 1818, he should
have gone immediately to Guayana instead of talcing winter
quarters.

He could have accomplished this with great ease,

for the patriots at that time did not have an infantry with
which to oppose his march.

Thus he could have prevented the

assembling of the Congress of Angostura— a congress that gave
the independence cause the prestige of an already-established
government with members gathered to deliberate freely and
without any opposition.
The third mistake committed by the Expeditionary Gen
eral was the vain hope of destroying the army under my command
in the Apure with the idea of enlisting the insurgents in
Guayana.

I say vain because he should have had very much in

mind the inconveniences with which he would have to struggle
in a place where the numerical superiority of his troops
would be worthless when pitted against the knowledge we had
of the terrain and the resources it offered us to wage the
war of movement which I have already m e n t i o n e d . ^

l^PAez footnotes this as follows.
"I have omitted
accounts of a multitude of disputed encounters that occurred
before the armistice was signed between the Royalists and my
guerrillas under the command of the valiant chiefs Rafael
Rosales, Fernando Figueredo, Doreteo Hurtado, C o m e l i o Munoz,
Juan Gdmez, Valentin Cort6s, and Jos6 Ldpez, in the llanos
of Calaboso, San Carlos, and Barinas.”
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CHAPTER XIII
End of the Armistice— M y Sad March to Guanare to
Rejoin the Liberator— General La Torre Sends Him
a Flag of T r u c e — La Torre Anxious to Know if I
Had Rejoined Bolivar— Countermarch to Cara b o b o —
Glorious One Day's March in the Carabobo L l a n o .
1821
The occupation of Maracaibo by Urdaneta's troops,
under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Jos6 Rafael Heras
who h a d entered this plaza according to an agreement with
its governor,

the Venezuelan Francisco Delgado, promulgated

the p r otest by the Royalist chief.^

Bolivar did not answer

this protest in a satisfactory manner.

Therefore,

the h o s 

tilities, which h a d been suspended by the celebrated armis
tice of the previous year, would commence anew on April 28.
All the leaders prepared for the n e w operations.

I received

Colonel Rafael Heras was a native of Habana, Cuba.
He joined the Venezuelan independence cause as early as 1810.
He emigrated when the first campaign failed.
He returned to
Venezuela and joined Bolivar in the campaign for Cticuta.
In
N e w Granada he fought at the Battle of Boyacft in 1819.
In
1821 h e he l p e d defeat General La Torre in the Battle of
Carabobo.
Heras was killed in the Battle of Hata de Juana
de Avila in 1822.
Scarpetta and Vergara, Diccionario
B i o q r & f i c o . 216-17.
Lieutenant Colonel Francisco Delgado, a citizen of
Maracaibo, was the Royalist Governor of the city who defected
to the patriot side and proclaimed the independence o f V e n e 
zuela on January 26 and 29.
When the city thus "spontaneously"
declared for the Republic, Heras felt free to occupy Maracaibo,
despite the truce.
Madariaga, B o l i v a r . 385-86.
407
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orders from Bolivar to march with the army under my command
and rejoin his headquarters in Guanare t
Achaguas with one thousand infantrymen,

so, on May 10 I left
fifteen hundred

cavalry, two thousand reserve horses and four thousand
recruits.

I crossed the Apure by the Enriquero Pass.

It is impossible to relate the grievances and hard
ships evoked on us by marching with such a large herd.

Every

night the horses would escape in throngs, and we did not have
sufficient men to stop them.

Fortunately,

since the horses

had always been herded in droves in the pasture grounds,

they

would gallop together and this made it easier for us to follow
them by their hoof prints in the s a n d s .
worse, the sands were very soft,
season.

To make matters

for we were in the rainy

These escapes occurred every night at eight,

for

once the marvelous instinct of those animals had discovered
the possibility of escaping to their pasture grounds,

they

always redoubled their efforts at the same hour on the follow
ing day.

When my llaneros would finally capture them and

rejoin us the following day,

I would accelerate the march in

order to rejoin Bolivar as soon as possible.
In the town of Tucupido I found out that Bolivar had
moved on toward Araure, which La Torre had abandoned in order
to fall back to San Carlos.

He abandoned San Carlos also

when he found out that Bolivar had occupied Araure, and
finally retired to Carabobo where he proposed to give battle
to the Republican troops.
Knowing that the Liberator had very little cavalry,

I

409
left the infantry under the command of Colonel Miguel
Antonio v&squez and I went on ahead to San Carlos with the
cavalry.

Together we overtook the General-in-chief.

the infantry was assembled and ready to march.
Torre sent a flag of truce to the Liberator.

After

General La
This flag was

carried by the Spanish Colonel Churruca w h o m Bolivar,

inviting

me to accompany him, went out to receive in the town of
Tinaco,

four leagues away from San Carlos.

Churruca's s u p 

p osed objective was to propose a new armistice, but his real
one was to see whether I had rejoined Bolivar so that he
would know whether to attack him immediately.
Churruca arrived at dinner time? consequently,

before

tending to the matter that had brought him to the Republican
camp,

Bolivar invited him to eat.

During dinner the Spanish

commissioner asked about me and Bolivar immediately intro
duced me.

After the dinner they went on to the conference,

and Churruca stated that the purpose of his commission was to
bring h i m La Torre's offer of a n e w armistice.

During this

armistice the Republican troops were to retire to the right
bank of the Portuguesa River boundary and let this river
serve as the dividing line between the two enemy armies.
Since this proposal was equivalent to demanding that we lose
all the territory we had gained,

Bolivar did not accept it.

Churruca returned to La Torre's camp, notified him of the
results of the interview, and told h i m that I had already
joined forces with the Liberator.
As I have stated previously,

the enemy had concentrated

its forces in Carabobo since early June after being expelled
from San Carlos.

From Carabobo they openly detached recon-

noitering forces to Tinaquillo.

We sent Lieutenant Colonel

JosA Laurencio Silva against them,

and he succeeded in

capturing these forces after an encounter during which the
Spanish Commander died.

It was then that the enemy deemed

it prudent to withdraw a detachment from the summits of
Buenavista.
quently,

Naturally,

the patriot army occupied it subse

and from there we observed that the enemy was p r e 

paring to prevent our descent to the plain.
march.

The first division,

of the British Battalion,
hu ndred horses.
of the Guard,

We continued our

under my command, was composed

the Bravos de Apure,

and fifteen

The second division consisted of a brigade

the firing battalions,

the Sacred squadron

under the command of the intrepid Colonel Aramendi,
BoyacA and Vargas Battalions,
deeds.

and the

names which recall heroic

General Cedeno, w h o m Bolivar called the bravest of

the brave, was the leader of this second division.

The third

division, under the orders of the intrepid Colonel Plaza, was
composed of the first brigade of the Guard,
Battalions Rifles,

Grenadiers,

aided by the

Vencedor en BoyacA,

AnzoAtegui,

and a cavalry regiment under the command of the courageous
Colonel Rond 6 n.
Everyone, officers and men alike, understood the
importance of a decisive victory for our cause.

Some of the

braver men would tell their companions not to commit th e m 
selves too recklessly,

as was their custom, nor to take
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foolish chances if they wanted to achieve the glory of sur
viving the victory and finally seeing their patriotic desires
fulfilled.
The Spanish army that awaited the patriots was c o m 
p o s e d of the flower of the expeditionary troops.

Their

leaders h a d come to America after gathering m a n y laurels on
the battlefields of the Peninsula fighting heroicly against
the armies of Napoleon.

Knowing this, we continued our

m a r c h full of enthusiasm and ignoring all past and present
fatigues.

We were determined to go out into the plain

through the mouth of the narrow passage at the end of our
path.

W hen we saw its summits occupied b y the Valencey and

Barbasto Regiments,

however, we turned toward the left flank

w i t h the intent of bending the enemy's right flank.

We

executed this movement despite heavy enemy artillery fire.
The Spanish general left the two aforementioned regi
ments at the mouth of the narrow passage and came to challenge
our descent into the valley with the rest of his army.

To do

this he occupied a small hill that rose at a small distance
from the point Pica de la Mona through which we intended to
enter the plain led by a guide that Bolivar had taken
prisoner in Tinaquillo.

The Apure Battalion vigorously

resisted the enemy infantry fire while descending into the
woods,

crossed a riverlet,

and maintained its fire until the

British Legion arrived under the command of its gallant
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Colonel [Thomas] Farriar.^

These brave men, worthy com

patriots of those who a few years before had fought with
such serenity at Waterloo,

stood their ground and endured

the enemy fire until they got in battle line.
continued and when
of ammunition,
Subsequently,

1

The battle

saw that these men were already short

I ordered them to charge with their bayonets.
this British Legion,

the Apure Battalion,

and

two rifle companies under the command of the heroic comman
dant Heras,

finally forced the enemy to abandon the hill and

take a new position on a neighboring one to the rear.

From

here the Spanish sent their cavalry and the Reina Battalion
against our left flank.

I ordered Colonel VAzquez with the

Chiefs of Staff^ and a company of the Honor Guard commanded
by Captain Angel Bravo to face them.^

They were able to

^The name of this British officer is variously spelled
as Ferrier, Ferrer, Farriar, and Farrar.
Hasbrouck in his
work on the foreign legionaries who fought in the wars for
Spanish American independence prefers to list him as Colonel
Thomas Ferriar.
He succeeded Colonel Blosset as commander
of the British Legion after the latter had been killed in a
duel with colonel Power.
Credited with being much more effi
cient than his predecessor, Ferriar organized the British
Legion to make a glorious stand at the Battle of Carabobo
making it possible for the Bravos de Apure to reform and com
plete the destruction of the Spanish battalions. Unfortu
nately, Colonel Ferriar was mortally wounded in the first
charge made by the Spanish.
Hasbrouck, Foreign Legionaries.
79, 138, 236, 241, 244, 372, 384.
^The author footnotes this as followsx
"This was com
posed of some thirty-four individuals, counting the chiefs
and officers affiliated with them."
^Captain Juan Angel Bravo began as an enlisted man in
the independence army in 1816.
He became a sergeant in 1817,
a lieutenant in 1819, and a captain in 1821.
He fought in
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repel the enemy and continued fighting with the enemy cavalry
at the rear.

This officer,

Bravo,

fought with such bravery,

that later the fourteen lance marks he had received in the
encounter, wit h o u t having been wounded, were visible on his
uniform.

This prompted the Liberator to remark that he

deserved a uni f o r m of gold.
The Royalist Valencey and Barbastro Battalions,
that the rest of the army was losing ground,

seeing

abandoned their

p o s i t i on in order to join the main body of their army.
h u rried to propose that they surrender.

I

I was accompanied

by Colonel Plaza who had left his division and joined me out
of a desire to take part personally in the skirmish.

During

the charge a bullet mortally wounded this very brave officer
who ended his services here to the fatherland.
Reinforced b y three hundred cavalrymen who came out
from the highway,

1 charged the Barbastro Battalion and

forced it to surrender.

Immediately we attacked the Valencey

Battalion, which was a short distance away and seeking p r o 
tection in the carabobo Ravine.

It resisted our attack.

On

this occasion I almost mi s s e d surviving until the victory,
for I was suddenly seized by one of those terrible attacks
that deprived me of m y senses.

During the heat of battle,

I

was in the midst of the enemy forces and would perhaps have
b e e n killed if Commandant Antonio Martinez,

from the Morales

the following battiest
Apurito, San Fernando, Calabozo,
Queseras del Medio, carabobo, and Puerto Cabello.
He died in
Sam Fernando in 1643.
DAvila, Dicclonario B i o a r A f i c o . I,
47-48.
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c a v a l r y , h a d not led me a w a y . 5

He seized the reins of my

horse and mounted a patriot lieutenant by the name of
Alejandro Salazar,
the saddle.

alias Guadalupe, behind me to hold me in

Both carried me safely over to my s i d e . ®

At this time the valiant General Cedeno,

inconsolable

because he had not been able to enter the action with the
troops under his command,

advanced with a detachment of

cavalry as far as a quarter of a mile in front of the ravine.
When he reached the enemy and charged,

he fell over dead

from a bullet wound.
When 1 was coming to m y senses,

Bolivar joined me. In

the midst of triumphal exclamation, he offered me the rank
of General-in-Chief in Congress's name.
This was the glorious day at Carabobo.

With its

important results for the independence of Columbia,

it may

very well be compared to that of Yorktown for the United

5Cunninghame Graham mentions Antonio Martinez as a
"Llanero from the town of Calabozo, though serving wi t h the
royalists."
He also states that when Mirabal surrendered to
P&ez later, he brought Martinez with him.
P&ez pardoned him
immediately, only to have Martinez lead a revolt against him
in Calabozo the following year.
P & e z , 188-89, 197, 200.
®PAez inserts this footnote heret
"I still do not
k n o w what prompted Martinez to execute that unexpected and
for me providential act.
He was a llanero from Calabozo and
had always served the Spanish since the time of Boves and
was rightfully known as one of their deadliest lancers.
He
was with us the night after the action at Carabobo, but was
gone from our camp by dawn.
We will encounter h i m again
l a t e r . 11
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States in N o r t h A m e r i c a . 7

B o l i v a r in his p r o c l a m a t i o n said

that the vic t o r y h a d c o n f i r m e d the p o l i t i c a l birth of the
Q

Republic of C o l o m b i a and t h a t * 0
O n l y P & e z 's division, c o m p o s e d of two infantry b a t 
talions and fifteen h u n d r e d cavalry, of w h i c h only
a few w e r e able to fight, w e r e sufficient to de f e a t
the Spanish army in forty-five minutes.
If all the
independence army h a d been able to ope r a t e in that
c e l e brated battle, h a r d l y any o f the enemy w o u l d have
escaped.
The independence of C o l o m b i a was sealed at
Carabobo.
The indomitable valor, the acti v i t y and
intrepidness of General P&ez c o n t r i b u t e d beyond m e a 
sure to the c o n s u mm ation of the very splendid victory.
B arely recovered from the attack I h a v e mentioned,

I

s p u r r e d m y infantry on to continue the pursuit; but Bolivar,
k n o w i n g that our army h a d e x h a u s t e d all its a m m u n i t i o n in
the battle,

o r d e r e d them to h a l t until the Rifle and

Grena d i e r Battalions w e r e ahead and c o u l d pursue the enemy.
At this time a very h e a v y rain began to fall and m a d e the
sides of the ravine so very slippery,

that we were not able

to p u r s u e the enemy w i t h the speed we desired.

It w a s only

7W h e n Bolivar w o n the Battle of Cara b o b o on June 24,
1821, V e n e z u e l a v i r t u a l l y became i n c o r porated into Gran
Colombia.
Thus the results of this battle w e r e far-reaching,
for it s ecured the independence of both V e n e z u e l a and N e w
Granada.
In addition, it allowed the Liberator to turn his
a ttentions to affairs further south in the continent.
M o r 6 n,
H i s t o r y of V e n e z u e l a . 133-34.
For a d e t a i l e d account of the
m i l i t a r y tactics involved in the Battle of Carabobo, see
Lecuna, C r d n i c a R a z o n a d a . Ill, 46-56.
® A car e f u l search through L e c u n a (ed.), Procl a m a s y
D i s c u r s o s . and b o t h c o l l e ctions of documents p e r t i n e n t to
S imdn Bolivar's public life, C o l e c c i d n de D o c u m e n t o s . and
B l a n c o and A z p u r d a (eds.), D o c u m e n t o s P a r a la H l s t o r l a . have
failed to reveal this quotation.
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because of this that the Valencey Battalion and the remains
of the Spanish army were able to escape being made prisoners.
Only fifty Republican cavalrymen and a few chiefs and o f f i 
cers who h a d left their divisions to take some part in the
victory were able to pursue the enemy closely.

Of these,

several were wounded including the Portuguese C o m m a n d a n t ,
Jos 6

[Ignacio] de L i m a . 9

Colonel

[Juan] M e 11ado fell dead

in the Barrera Ravine and so did Lieutenant Olivera in
T o c u y i t o .1 0

9Colonel Jos€ Ignacio de Lima was born in Brazil to a
rich and noble family.
When his father was executed in 1817
for having taken part in a revolutionary attempt at inde
pendence, de Lima fled prison and went to Colombia.
Incensed
by the terrible deeds being committed by the Royalists under
Figueroa in northern N e w Granada, he joined the revolutionary
army and fought in the campaigns of N e w Granada and V e n e 
zuela.
In 1819 he accompanied Soublette when he moved the
Irish Division to the Eastern part of Venezuela, and in 1822
he commanded the Colombian forces in Maracaibo when they
seized the Spanish sloop of war, the Marla F r a n c i s c a . He
went to North America to seek war materials for the war in
Venezuela where he served as P & e z 1s aide-de-camp.
He was
honored with the medals of Liberator of Venezuela, Cundinamarca, Boyaci, Puerto Cabello, and Carabobo.
In 1831 he
returned to his native country and remained there until his
death.
Scarpetta and Vergara, Diccionario B i o g r & f i c o . 260-61.
l^No additional information is available on Lieutenant
Olivera,
Colonel Juan Mellados was born in Venezuela.
From
the very beginning of the outbreak of hostilities against
Spanish control, he fought under P & e z ’s command and was v i c 
torious with h i m in the Battles of Estangues, Guasdualito,
Palmarillo, M a t a de la Miel, Achaguas, and Yagual.
In 1819
he participated in the famous Battle of Queseras del Medio
and later in the Battle of BoyacA.
On June 24th, 1821 he was
k illed while pursuing the fleeing Valencey Battalion in the
famous Battle of Carabobo.
Ibid., 315.
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O ur cav a l r y was n o t able to overtake the enemy i n f a n 
try corps because it w a s u n a b l e to cross the ravines.
B o l i v a r , seeing that the e n e m y was a p p r o a c h i n g the city of
Valencia,

o r d e r e d two h u n d r e d grenadiers to m o u n t and o v e r 

take the enemy forces that w e r e m a r c h i n g off b y files en
route to Puerto Cabello.

W e e x c h a n g e d firing in the corrals

at the entrance of the streets of Valencia.
the f i g hting w o u l d be fierce
w e n t on to the plaza.

T h i n k i n g that

in the h e a r t o f the city,

I found it e n t i r e l y deserted.

the doors and w i n d o w s of the h o u s e s w e r e closed,

X
All

and there

was not a single p e r s o n in sight we c o u l d ask w h a t dir e c t i o n
the e n e m y h a d taken.
While X was going d o w n the street w h i c h I imagined
led to Puerto Cabello,
open window.

I saw c i t i z e n D o n Pedro Guillen at an

He informed me that the o t h e r street par a l l e l

to the one we w e r e on was the one leading to that plaza.
I followed this direction.
D i e g o Ibarra,

A little later, however.

Bolivar's aide-de-camp,

So

Colonel

came to inform m e that

the e n e m y was at the bridge that leads from V a l e n c i a to
Caracas.H

I turned b a c k and in effect d i s c o v e r e d a column

^ C o l o n e l D i e g o Ibarra was b o r n in Guacara in 1798.
H e w a s g reatly d e v o t e d b o t h to the cause of i n d e p enden c e for
his c o u n t r y and to S i m 6 n Bolivar.
He enli s t e d in the r e v o 
lu t i o n a r y army in 1810 im m e d i a t e l y after the o u t b r e a k of
hosti l i t ies.
in 1813 he joined Bolivar in his camp a i g n in
Venezuela.
W i t h Garcia de S e n a in 1814, h e fought in los
Callejones.
A f t e r the Battle of A r a u r e he e m i g r a t e d to
M a r g a r i t a in 1816.
L a t e r he took p a r t in the Battles of
BoyacA and Carabobo.
In 1821 Bolivar sent h i m to Perti w i t h
im p o rtant p a p e r s for San Martin.
He returned to Guayaquil
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of hussars there.
Goes."

Two of them came forward and asked,

"Who

When we answered "the Fatherland," they fired on me

and the group of officers that accompanied me.

We charged

those that were at the bridge, killed the two hussars who
h a d just fired on us,
orderly flight.

and set all their comrades into a dis

They fled over the road to Vigirima in the

direction of Puerto cabello.

Night fell about that time,

and the Liberator ordered the pursuit of the enemy suspended.
The Royalist army,

fatigued from the hurried march

they had made from Carabobo,

spent the night at the foot of

the hill that was three leagues away from Valencia.
following morning,

On the

the enemy forces began to ascend this hill

and succeeded in entering the plaza of Puerto Cabello.

On

June 25 Bolivar left [Santiago] Marino,

to

Chief of Staff,

h e a d the troops in Valencia and marched with me and a

in 1823 with Bolivar and later fought in the Battle of Junin.
Bolivar sent h i m to Venezuela to demand troops with which to
aid PertS in its struggle for independence.
P&ez later sent
Ibarra to tell Bolivar of the uprising in Valencia in 1826.
Ibarra remained Bolivar's aide-de-camp and was with the
Liberator when he died in San Pedro.
He was decorated with
the medals of Liberator of Venezuela, junin, and Boyac&.
After his death in Caracas in 1852, he was buried at the
foot of Bolivar's gravesite.
I b i d .. 229-30; DAvila,
Diccionario Bi o g r & f i c o . I, 254-56.
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b attalion toward C a r a c a s . W e

arrived at this city.

It

h a d been evacuated by [Colonel Jos 6 ] Pereira on the night of
June 29 after he he a r d about the defeat of the Royalists in
Carabobo and about the proxi m i t y of the L i b e r a t o r . ^ 3
Pereira, unable to disembark because of the lack of
ships, pretended to leave by the coast of Sotavento for the

12General Santiago Marino was born on the island of
M a r g a r ita in 1788 of a rich and illustrious family.
When
the revolution for independence broke out in 1810, he was in
Caracas with the rank of sublieutenant in the Spanish army.
He resigned from this army, joined the revolutionary army,
and was immediately given the rank of Captain.
He fought so
gallantly and brilliantly, that before Miranda's capi t u l a 
tion he had attained the rank of colonel.
He emigrated to
Trinidad and from there along with Bermudez, Piar, and
another forty-five men, h e h e l p e d organize an expedition
against the Spanish in 1813.
These patriots defeated Boves
in Bocachica.
In 1814 Marino joined Bolivar in La Victoria.
As Bolivar's second in command, he fought at the first battle
of Carabobo.
He was defeated at the siege of La Puerta.
In
1816 he was named second Chief of the Army, and in 1817 he
went to Bolivar's aid in Barcelona.
He suffered two severe
defeats in this same year at Cariaco and Cartipano.
Bolivar
appointed h i m Chief of the Oriente army in 1819.
This same
year he lent his support to the Congress of Angostura.
Prom
1822 to 1827 he ably assisted P&ez in governing the V e n e 
zuelan territory.
In 1827 in Queseras del Medio Bolivar p r e 
sented Marino w i t h a sword.
When P&ez led Venezuela away
from Gran Colombia, Marino accompanied h i m as Secretary of
War and General-in-Chief.
He retired from public service for
a while but returned in 1848 to serve as Commandant General
of Caracas.
Marino died on September 4, 1654, in La V i c 
toria.
Scarpetta and Vergara, Diccionario B i o g r S f i c o . 294-96;
M o r 6 n, History of V e n e z u e l a . 133, 156-57.
l^Colonel Jos 6 Pereira was the commander of the Spanish
Battalion, Los Pardos de Valencia.
He was chief of opera
tions in Barcelona, and he defeated Bermudez's forces in the
Calvario of Caracas.
In 1821 he surrendered at La Guaira as
a result of the defeat of the Spanish at Carabobo.
Lecuna,
Cr d n i c a R a z o n a d a . II, 181,262, 365; III, 53, 55.
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town of Carayaca with the object of finding out if the
Spanish squadron w o u l d come there to take him aboard.

Since

the squadron did not appear, he returned to La Guaira to
gather strength there,

always hoping that the ships from

Puerto Cabello would help him.

Finally he h a d to capitulate

to the Liberator on July 4 when he saw that no Spanish vessel
appeared at the p o r t . ^

The articles of his capitulation

m a y be seen in Volume II of the Documentos de la Vida Pflblica
del L i b e r t a d o r .^
M y staff officers w h o died in this memorable battle
included Colonel Ignacio Melean; Manuel A r r a i z ; Captain Juan
Bruno; Lieutenant Pedro Camejo[a]; the Negro P r i m e r o ; L i e u 
tenant Jose Maria Olivera;

and Lieutenant Nicoles Arias.

Of

14p&ez footnotes this as follows*
"Torrente states*
'When the French Admiral Jurien refused to admit the Royalist
Troops on board by professing the strict neutrality he was
forced to observe, he offered his mediation, nevertheless, so
that an agreement could be reached between Pereira and
Bolivar by which those soldiers would be given the freedom
to choose between remaining in the service of the Republic
or embarking for Puerto Cabello.
Of the seven hundred
negroes [s i c l . mulatoes, and zambos of wh i c h the infantry
was composed, only six embraced the first o f f e r . This
formed a strange contrast to the cavalry which was composed
m a i n l y of Europeans and v e t h a d a greater number of individ
uals abandon the banners of. the K i n g , even though their total
force did not reach s e v e n t y . 1 Among those six that Torrente
says remained in the service of the Republic was that c o r 
poral who h a d so heroicly resisted us in the city of La
Cruz."
This quotation m a y be found in Torrente, Histo r i a de
la R e v o l u c i O n . Ill, 245.
l^The author refers again here to the ColecciOn de
D o c u m e n t o s . The articles of capitulation m a y be found in
Volume II, 299-301.
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all these men I recall C a m e j o , generally known then b y the
nickname of

Negro P r i m e r o .

with the greatest affection.

A

slave at one time, he had taken a great part in some of the
events to which I have referred in the course of this n a r r a 
tion.

He had come to me when I had gone down to Achaguas

after the Battle of Yagual.

M y soldiers from Apure recom

me n d e d that I take h i m into the army,

for it was clear to

them that he was a m a n of great valor and above all a very
good lancer.
to me.

His robust constitution recommended him highly

Shortly after talking with him,

I noticed that he

possessed the candidness of m a n in his primitive state and
one of those likable personalities that quickly attracts the
affection of those with w h o m they deal.
Camejo h a d been a slave of the proprietor citizen of
Apure, D o n Vicente Alfonso.

The latter had placed h i m in

the service of the King because the Negro's character,
jealous of its dignity, h a d frightened him.

very

After the

action of Araure he had become so disgusted with military
service,

that he fled to the Apure and had hidden there for

some time until he came to me following the Battle of Yagual.
After 1 admitted h i m to m y ranks, he was always at m y side
and proved to be a most valuable acquisition.

He gave such

proofs of valor in all the embattled encounters we h a d with
the enemy,
Negro

that his own companions gave h i m the title of

Primero.

They had great fun w i t h him,

for his home-

spun humor and observations on all he witnessed kept their
m o rale very high.

Invariably they were seeking h i m out to
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give h i m new topics of conversation.
When

Negro Primero

heard that Bolivar was coming to

join me in the Apure, he ardently begged everyone not to tell
the Liberator that he had served in the Royalist army.

This

was enough to have the men tell Bolivar enthusiastically and
immediately upon his arrival about the Negro and his anxiety
to keep from him that he h a d been in the service of the King.
Consequently, when Bolivar saw h i m for the first time, he
went u p to h i m affectionately and after congratulating h i m
on his valor,

asked him*

"But whatever prompted you to serve

in the ranks of our enemies?"

The Negro looked at those

around h i m as if he wanted to twist them for the indiscretion
they had committed,

and then said*

"Sir,

it was greed."

"What do you mean?" asked Bolivar.
"I had noticed," the Negro continued,

"that everyone

went to war without a shirt and without a peseta and later
returned dressed in a very handsome uniform and with money
in his pockets.

Then,

too,

1

wanted to go in search of my

fortune and more than anything get three silver spurs— one
for the Negro Mindola,
one for me.

another for Juan Rafael,

and another

The first battle we had with the patriots was

the one at Araure.

They had more than one thousand men,

1 told m y friend Jos 6 F€lix.

We had many more men,

begged to be given any weapon with which to fight,
certain w e were going to win.
ended,

1

so

and I
for I was

When I thought the battle had

got off my horse and went to remove a very handsome

coat from a dead white man.

At that instant the Commandant
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came screaming,
this war ended?

Get on your horses 1

Why? I asked.

It most certainly was not ended,

Isn't
for there

were so many men coming that it looked like a flock of v u l 
tures ."
"What did you say then?" asked Bolivar.
"I wanted us to go out to pasture then.

There was

nothing left to do but flee, and I started running away on
m y mule.

However,

the blasted animal got tired on me,

had to take to the woods on foot.

and I

The following day Jos 6

F61ix and I went to a ranch to see if we could get some food.
When the owner found out that I was with Nafia's [yaflez]
troops, he looked so hard at me, that it seemed best to flee
and go to the A p u r e . 11
"They s a y , " Bolivar interrupted him,

"that you killed

cattle there that did not belong to you."
"Naturally," he replied,
I have eaten?
he called me)

"for if I hadn't, what would

Finally the superintendent
came to the Apure,

(for this is what

and he showed us what the

fatherland was and that the dia b l o c racia wasn't anything
bad.^

since that time I've been serving the patriots."
Conversations such as these maintained in a language

sui generis served to amuse Bolivar greatly.

During our

marches the Negro Primero was indeed a source of great d i s 
traction and entertainment for us.

He continued in my

^ O b v i o u s l y the illiterate Negro had confused the two
words d i a h l o . meaning devil, and d e m o c r a c i a . meaning
democracy, and made one word out of the two of them.
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s e r v i c e , always distinguishing himself in all the most impor
tant battles.

The reader may have already seen his name

among the heroes of Queseras del Medio.
The day before the Battle of C a r a b o b o , which he said
was going to be c i s i v a . he harangued his comrades and imi
tated the language he h a d heard me use in similar c a s e s . ^
In order to infuse them with valor and confidence, he told
them with the fervor of a Moor, that the doors of Heaven
would open to the patriots that died on the battlefield,

but

would close to those who died fleeing from the enemy.
The day of the battle,
m o r t a l ly wounded.
in all the army.

at the first shots, he fell

News of this later produced a deep sorrow
When Bolivar heard about it, he considered

it a misfortune and openly lamented the fact that he had
been deprived of the pleasure of introducing this man in
C a r a c a s — a man whom he considered without equal in simplicity
and p a rticularly notable for the inimitable style in which
h e expressed his ideas.

J-7In this instance the Negro Primero h a d to mean
decisiva or decisive.

CHAPTER XIV
My Return to Valencia— The Liberator Marches Toward
New Granada— I Am Named Commandant of One of the
Military Districts Into Which He Divided Venezuela—
Operation of My Forces Against Some Royalist Chiefs
— Morales Leaves Puerto Cabello, Disembarks at Some
Points Along the Coast, and Finally is Forced to
Return to that Port— The Royalists Leave Puerto
Cabello and Head Toward Valencia— Destruction of a
Royalist Division in Patanemo— I Lay siege to Puerto
Cabello— Illnesses Force Me to Lift the Siege—
General Calzada Takes Command of the Plaza.

1821-1822
Shortly after I had arrived in Caracas,

Bolivar ordered

me to return to Valencia to head the army.

He stayed at the

capital conferring with the Vice-President,

General Soublette,

about certain points of government and administration.
he joined me in Valencia.

Later

Early in August he marched toward

N e w Granada with some army corps,

leaving Venezuela p r o 

visionally divided into three military districts.

I was named

Commandant General of the one that was formed with the prov
inces of Caracas, Carabobo,

Barquisimeto, Barinas,

and A p u r e .

Two hundred Creole cavalry from the Royalist forces
defeated at Carabobo had gone to Puerto Cabello.

They were

joined there at the same time by none other than that famous
chief of B o v e s ' cavalry. Colonel Jos6 Alejo Mirabal, who had
just returned from the Peninsula.

La Torre gave Mirabal

command of this Creole cavalry and named him commandant
425
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General of the Calabozo llanos with orders to operate at our
rear.

He augmented his forces not only with the soldiers

that had escaped from Carabobo and were found scattered in
those territories, but also with partisans of the King that
he found t h e r e .
Alejo [Mirabal] left Puerto Cabello by Mor 6 n and sur
prised a detachment we had in Canoabo.

He marched to the Pao

de San Juan Bautista without meeting any opposition,

for

unfortunately the forces we sent to encounter him did not
arrive at the right time at the place I had designated.
Alejo came out to the llano where, operating with the activity
which was characteristic of him, he was able to increase his
forces to five hundred cavalry.

With these he beseiged

Colonel Judas Tadeo Pinango who was in command in C a l a b o z o . 1
Discovering that I had left Valencia with the Apure Guard
and was approaching Calabozo, he lifted the siege and went

^General Judas Tado Pinango was born in Caracas. When
Bolivar left Caracas in 1812 with a passport from Monteverde,
Piffango begged to accompany him and thus began his services
to the independence cause.
He fought in the Magdalena cam
paign and in the Battle of Cticuta in 1813.
He was victorious
in the Battles of Barbula, Trincheras, Vijirima, Araure, and
La Victoria but was defeated along with Urdaneta at Mucuchies.
In 1815 he helped defend Cartagena and in 1821 fought at the
second battle of Carabobo.
He defeated Colonel Tello in 1822
in Chipare but was later imprisoned by General Morales.
When
Puerto Cabello was assaulted by P&ez, Pinango was rescued and
then helped in the pursuit of C i s n e r o s . He supported P&ez in
the separation of Venezuela from Gran Colombia and became
chief of the Venezuelan troops.
He was Killed in Caracas in
1848 while trying to stifle a mutiny.
Scarpetta and
Vergara, Diccionario Bioqr&fico, 470-71.
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on to the town of Guardatinajas.

I sent the Guard to pursue

him and they surprised h i m and annihilated his men in the
vicinity of that town.

After wandering for some days,

the

military chief of the villa of Pao de San Juan Bautists sur
rendered. ^
On my way to Valencia and near that city,
go by on foot.

I saw a man

There was something suspicious about him*

I had him searched.

so

We found a communique on him from Mira

bal to Morales in which the former told the latter about the
events that had forced him to present himself to the Repub
lican authorities.

Mirabal hoped by this stratagem to get

near to Puerto Cabello and easily take refuge in this plaza
if he did not receive aid beforehand.
munique was read,

As soon as the com

I ordered Mirabal brought to my h e a d 

quarters under heavy guard.

When he tried to escape,

accord

ing to what Commandant of the Guard Guillermo Iribarren later
told me, he was killed instantly by the sentinel that guarded
him.
On November 1 of this year,

1821, Morales left Puerto

Cabello and headed toward the shore with eight hundred men.
He embarked these on the frigate Liqera.

Taking a brigantine

and eight schooners also, he came close to Chichirivichi;

^The author adds this footnote here.
"I sent a pardon
for Commandant Antonio Martinez who had saved my life in
Carabobo, for he had left Puerto Cabello with Mirabal.
One
of the latter's officers, by the nickname of Zainito, found
Lt. V. Campero, who had the pardon, at the pass of the
Guardatinajas River, took possession of the paper, tore it,
and even killed Campero."

428
but on the w a y he lost one of the schooners which was cap
tured by the Colombia brigantine V e n c e d o r .

On the fourteenth

at 10(00 a.m. this convoy appeared before Macuto,

and on the

afternoon of the fifteenth some of the ships approached the
coast of Naiguat* but did not dare disembark.
teenth they headed leeward toward La Guaira,

On the six
and on the

eighteenth they returned to Catia and disembarked six hundred
men.

The latter went to Ocumare while the ships followed in

the same direction carrying the rest of the forces.

On the

nineteenth the Commandant of the Valleys of Aragua came close
to get them with a small column of militia.

However,

he was

forced to retreat when he was attacked by superior forces in
Trapiche.

Morales,

not daring to penetrate into the interior,

reembarked and returned to Puerto Cabello.
N o t i n g from the communiques I was constantly receiving
that the Spanish squadron was heading toward the windward
side,

I left Valencia with a battalion to go to the aid of

Caracas.

While in that city I found out that the squadron

w as coming down toward Puerto Cabello.
time,

Without losing any

I countermarched in the direction of Valencia.

In

M a r a c a y I received a communique from colonel Manrique, w h o m
I h a d left in charge in Valencia.

He informed me that a

column of five hundred men, under the command of Colonel
[Basilio] Garcia, had left Puerto Cabello headed toward
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Valencia and was already in the town of N a g u a n a n g u a . ^

I

ordered Manrique to evacuate the city and go to Guacara where
I would join h i m immediately.

My plan was to march from

Guacara along the road to San Diego that leads to the foot
of the hill.

There I would cut short the Royalist retreat

if they advanced as far as Valencia and destroy them with
far superior forces.

However,

Garcia did not judge it

prudent to march to Valencia and countermarched hurriedly
toward Puerto Cabello.
Things remained like this until the month of April of
1822 when I went with a battalion to the town of Patanemo to
surprise a Royalist detachment there.

1 also wanted to get

in touch with Commandant Renato Beluche, who was crossing
windward from Puerto Cabello with two armed schooners,
was already preparing to lay siege to the plaza.^

for I

I managed

3The Spanish Colonel Basilio Garcia had been General
Calzada's second in command in the Battle of Boyac&.
He was
in charge of the Spanish forces at the Battle of Bombon&.
Lecuna, CrOnica R a z o n a d a , II, 351; III, 100.
^Renato Beluche was born in N e w Orleans in 1780.
He
was only seven when his father died leaving five children and
a pregnant wife; consequently, Beluche went to sea at an early
age and within a few years was part owner of two privateers
sailing under letters of marque from Guadaloupe.
In 1814 he
was in Cartagena helping transport troops for the n e w Repub
lic.
For this service he was awarded the rank of naval
lieutenant in the Cartagena navy.
Beluche remained in this
service for three years and reputedly destroyed more than a
m i llion dollars worth of Spanish shipping— particularly after
the Battle of N e w Orleans when he and two hundred Baratarians
raided Spanish shipping under letters of marque from Carta
gena.
In 1816 Beluche superceded Luis BriOn in command of
the Los Cayos expedition during the attack on Spanish ships
off the coast of Margarita.
He now became a commodore in the
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to rout said detachment,

and I continued my exploration as

far as the town of Borburata without being able to talk to
Beluche.

From here I countermarched to Valencia along the

same road I had come.

Without losing time I followed the

Cumbre road to go and lay siege to Puerto Cabello.

1 took

possession of Pueblo A f u e r a . and I also immediately occupied
Borburata.

I laid siege to Mirador de Solano

(La Vigia) and

forced Captain Montero, who guarded it with a company,
surrender.5

to

He had been communicating all m y movements to

the plaza by telegraph.®

Colombian Navy and helped P&ez seize Puerto Cabello in 1823.
After the wars for South American independence were over, he
became a Venezuelan citizen and continued to participate in
turbulent episodes.
He died at 79 and was buried in Puerto
Cabello.
jane L. de Grummond, The Baratarians and the
Battle of N e w Orleans (Baton Rouge, 1961). 4, 5, 6 , 8 , 17,
155, 156, 157.
Williamson (De Grummond, ed.), Caracas D i a r y .
1835-40, 127, 128, 164, 165.
®The author interjects this footnote.
"The Spaniards
shot this officer in Puerto Rico for having surrendered."
N o other information is available on Captain Montero.
®PAez footnotes this as followsi
"During the siege 1
was forced to leave my troops in order to prevent the o u t 
break of a rebellion in the Apure caused by the indignation
of the inhabitants over the tyrannical conduct of the g over
nor, Miguel Guerrero.
The latter had treacherously had the
intrepid Aramendi assassinated, according to a declaration
made by Cabaneiro, one of the accomplices.
He had also had
three officers shot because they censured this act, and
finally had mistreated some good officers of the Guard and
returned them handcuffed to my headquarters.
M y presence
calmed everyone, and that province remained quiet."
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At the b e g i n n i n g of M a y the V a l e n c e y Battalion v e n 
tured o ut of the p l a z a taut r e t r e a t e d after h a v i n g lost m a n y
men.

At this time La Torre h a d such few provisions,

h u r l e d m o r e than two h u n d r e d persons,
children,
ever,

and useless men,

that he

including women,

from the plaza.

On June 2, h o w 

he recei v e d foodstuffs bro u g h t by the C o m m a n d e r o f the

S p a n i s h squadron,

Don Angel Lataorde,

in the frigate L i g e r a . 7

Laborde h a d m a n a g e d to enter the p o r t d e s p i t e the opposi t i o n
made b y our small squadron.
D u r i n g these circumstances

General Soutalette, M i n i s t e r

of War, w e n t to the p r o v i n c e of C o r o to inspect the o p e r a 
tions of the forces commanded by Pinango.
e v e n t of Dabajuro,

w h i c h forced h i m to retreat to Carora, he

fought against Coro a g a i n . 8
this time,

F o l l o w i n g the

M o r a l e s did not w a i t for h i m

but emtaarhed instead on the V e l a on June 16 and

a r r i v e d in Puerto Cab e l l o w i t h the greater p a r t of his troops
to s u cceed La Torre in c o m m a n d of the army.

The latter h a d

been n a m e d C a p t a i n General of Puerto Rico.

7A n g e l Laborde was d e f e a t e d by the p a t r i o t naval C o m 
m a n d e r Pad i l l o at M a r a c a i b o in 1822.
Lecuna, C r d n i c a
R a z o n a d a . Ill, 287.
®Deepite the victories of the p a t r i o t forces in V e n e 
zuela, it is interesting to n o t e that the interior pro v i n c e
of C o r o h a d p r o n o u n c e d in favor of Spain.
General Soublette
h a d gone to C o r o to reen l i s t its support in the p a t r i o t
cause.
On J u n e 17, 1822 he was d e c i s i v e l y d e f e a t e d by
Morales' forces at Dabajuro.
Torrente, H i s t o r i a de la
R e v o l u c i O n . Ill, 346-47.
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In the middle of June I suspended the siege of Puerto
Cabello and retreated toward Valencia because my troops had
been decimated to little over one thousand.

Malignant

fevers had taken the lives of the rest of the three thousand
seventy-nine men with which I h a d started the siege of the
plaza.9

^The author includes this footnote at this point.
"General Hilario LOpez, ex-president of N e w Granada, who c o m 
m anded one thousand militia men from the valleys of Aragua in
the next to the last siege of Puerto Cabello and who d i s 
tinguished himself in many of his more risky operations,
writes as follows in Volume I, page 127 of his M e m o i r s i "The
u n heard of efforts of General P&ez were insufficient to c o n 
strict the plaza or assault it.
This chief hurled himself
at it m a ny times as if defying the most imminent dangers. At
times he would dress as a common soldier and operate under
the orders of a corporal against the fortification.
Then
again h e would put on his magnificent uniform and station
h i mself near the fort, coolly serving for long periods of
time as a target for the good shots w h o defended it.
At
other times he would embark on a small ship and get in the
most dangerous position.
Our navy, composed of small ships,
tried to resist the entrance of three Spanish ships that left
Curazao to bring foodstuffs and could not prevent it, even
when the plaza was at the point of surrendering due to lack
of f o o d . '
"'I again charge y o u , ' Santander told me in a letter
dated June 15, 1822 in Bogota, 'not to expose yourself n e e d 
lessly to getting shot without cause.
Your life is precious,
and for the sake of your very honor you should prevent expos
ing it unless there is a great and urgent necessity. . . . Do
not act in a crazy manner when there is no need.
I say this
for your actions in Puerto Cabello have been foolish ones
born out of rashness.
W ithout a navy we can accomplish
nothing.
I have known this for a long time, but not e v e r y 
one knows that I have not had the means nor the manner with
w h i c h to acquire i t . 1"
The above citation from General Hilario Ldpez may be
found in the Editorial edition of the Biblioteca Popular de
Cultura Colombiana Publication of M e m o i r s . 2 vols. (Bogota,
1942), I, 198-99.
A copy of the Santander letter cannot be
found in the Archivo Santander or in Lecuna (ed.), Cartas de
Santander.
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On August 10 Morales allowed himself to be seen at
the top of the hill that descends to the plain of Naguanagua.
At this time 1 was at Palito with the Anzo&tegui Battalion.
I h a d a little over two hund r e d cavalry and was wait i n g for
the column of five hundred m e n under the command of the
Royalist commandant, Don Simon Sicilia, that Morales had
sent along the coast toward Puerto cabello.
four leagues in my rear,

About three or

at a place called Agua Caliente,

1

h a d left a mil i t i a battalion just in case Sicilia took that
road.

On the day following Morales'

Sicilia defeated this militia.

Then,

arrival at the hill,
to avoid an encounter

w i t h the troops that w ere coming from Palito along the trail
called Miguija,

Sicilia entered Puerto Cabello.

On the afternoon of this same day,
news of Morales'

arrival at the hill.

m a r c h i n g with m y forces.

I received the

Immediately,

I started

I went on ahead myself w i t h fifty

cavalrymen after sending a message to Valencia ordering them
to send me immediately the five hundred recruits garrisoned
there and the three hun d r e d veteran grenadiers— all the forces
that were in Valencia.
desired speed.
had,

My orders were carried out with the

At six o'clock on the morning of the 11th I

in addition to m y fifty cavalrymen,

eight hundred

infantrymen from Valencia.
At this very time. Morales was descending into the
plain.

When he completed his descent, he got ready to attack

me and divided his

forces into three columns.

One column

was composed of the Battalion Leales Corianes and marched
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toward my left flank.

Another column of four hundred

European riflemen under the command of Colonel
Lorenzo marched on m y right f l a n k . I n

[Manuel]

the meantime Morales

and the rest of his forces, which totaled two thousand men,
approached m e in front at regular pace.
operation,

When I saw this

I detached one hundred veterans,

m i litia men,

one hundred

and twenty-five cavalrymen under the command of

the intrepid Colonel Ronddn and ordered them to attack the
Leales Corianes.

W i t h the same number of forces under the

command of the daring Colonel Mina,
forces on my right a t t a c k e d . I

I ordered the enemy

faced Morales with my

remaining forces.
The first two enemy columns were defeated within a
short time,

for the charges made by my cavalry were innumer

able, particularly on L o r e n z o ’s column.
forced to form a square.
guerrilla bands,

The latter was

Then our infantry, dispersed in

ravaged its ranks to the point of forcing

^ C o l o n e l Manuel Lorenzo h a d been the Spanish Chief
of Operation in Cardpano, Rio Caribe, Barquisimeto, and
Yaracuiy.
Lecuna, Crdnica R a z o n a d a . II, 422; III, 43, 46,
52.
^ C o l o n e l Juan Antonio Mina was born in Venezuela.
He fought nobly for the independence of his native country
at the side of Colonel Francisco Aramendi and Colonel Cedeno.
In 1821 Urdaneta appointed h i m Governor of the Province of
Coro immediately after the Royalists abandoned it.
With
PAez, he helped defeat General Morales in Valencia in 1822.
He also distinguished himself in 1829 in the Battle of
Tarqui against the Peruvian invading army.
Scarpetta and
Vergara, Diccionario B i o g r A f i c o . 327-28.
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t h e m to take to the h i l l s in a direc t i o n opposite to the one
that M o r a l e s occupied.

The column that atta c k e d Rond d n d i s 

p e r s e d w h e n it was impossible to form a square.

However,

its s c a tt e r e d m e m b e r s w e r e able to reunite w i t h the center
c o l u m n w h i c h was already falling back also, m a u l e d b y the
force that 1 p e r s o n a l l y d i r e c t e d against it.

We followed in

p u r s u i t of the enemy u p to the first two turns in the hill.
T h e n it became p r u d e n t to turn b a c k because the n a r r o w p a s 
sage o f f e r e d the enemy s t r o n g positions.

It was h e r e that

C o m m a n d a n t RondOn rece i v e d a w o u n d in his foot.

Tetanus set

in a few days later and the very brave and likable
o u r c a valry ended his g lorious career.

chief of

We also lost c a v a l r y

C a p t a i n Santos Garrido and c a v a l r y Lieutenant Alvarez
this b a t t l e .^-2
wounded,

in

All the v e t e r a n grenadier offi c e r s w e r e

but there w e r e not m a n y losses in the rank and file.

The Royalists lost five h u n d r e d m e n c o u n t i n g the dead, wounded,
a n d those taken prisoner.
A n h o u r after the struggle,
arrived.

the An z o A t e g u i Bat t a l i o n

The cavalry that 1 h a d left that very n i g h t on the

r o a d to Palito also arrived.

It seems that the roughness of

the t e rrain and the dark n e s s of ni g h t h a d p r e v e n t e d them from
m a k i n g as h u r r i e d a m a r c h as was needed.

Three or four days

^ 2 N o additional information w a s available on L i e u t e n 
ant Alvarez.
Cap t a i n Santos Garrido p a r t i c i p a t e d in the
Apure c a m p a i g n as e a r l y as 1817.
He was w i t h Bol i v a r in the
t r i u mphal Battle of C a r a b o b o in 1821.
W h i l e h e l p i n g to beseige P u e r t o Cabello, Garrido was killed.
DAvila,
D i c c i o n a r i o B i o g r A f i c o . 182.
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later,

the Minister of War,

General Soublette,

some of the corps he h a d in Coro.

arrived with

X was reinforced with

these.
Morales remained on the hill ten or twelve days w i t h 
out daring to come down.

Undoubtedly, he was waiting for

the results of a revolution that was to break out in the
plains of Calabozo in favor of the King led by Commandant
Antonio Martinez, my saviour in Carabobo.

This rebellion

did break out in the town of Guardatinajas,
immediately suppressed.

but it was

Probably this was what finally

decided Morales to retire to Puerto Cabello.

He embarked

from here on the 24th for Maracaibo and left the plaza under
the command of General Don Sebasti&n de la Calzada.

Morales

disembarked in Cojoro and marched with his army, enlarged by
some Indians,

to the port of Sinamaica.

There he forced the

officer who commanded it to abandon it and occupied Maracaibo
after the action of Salina Rica.
Baralt [and Diaz] state
Hardly had Morales found himself in control of
Maracaibo when he issued a decree imposing the death
sentence and confiscation of property on the foreigners
that were found armed.
Not content with this scanda
lous infraction of the Treaty of Trujillo, he later
declared many of its articles impossible to fulfill.
After several reclamations were made by the government
of the Republic and the Commandant of the Anglo-American
naval forces in the Antilles, P&ez ordered the Co l o m 
bian troops under his command to follow strictly the
provisions of the treaty despite the enemy's flagrant
v i o l a t i o n s . This was a noble and worthy act meritorious
of the highest praise.

^ T h i s citation m a y be found in Baralt and Diaz,
Restimen de la Historia. II, 105-106.
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When General [Lino de] Clemente, Commandant of M a r a 
caibo,

embarked for Betijoque,

province of Trujillo, he

specifically ordered the Governor of the Fortress of San
Carlos,

Colonel Natividad Villasmil,

to remain in it without

entering into negotiations of any kind with the e n e m y . ^

14General Lino de Clemente, a native of Venezuela,
attended the patriotic juntas in Caracas in 1809 and 1810
and was one of the forty-four members of the Congress that
declared Venezuelan independence on July 5, 1811.
He fought
in the Battles of Tenerife, Banco, Mompos, Ocana, Niquitao,
Puerto cabello, Carabobo 10, and Rincdn de los Toros among
others.
In 1819 he was a member of the Congress of Angostura
and in 1821 he participated in the taking of Cartagena.
In
1821 also he was defeated by General Morales in Salinarica.
Clemente was tried and exonerated for Villasmil*s delivery of
San Carlos to General Morales.
In 1826 he was Secretary of
State and Intendant and Commandant General of Zulia.
Although he was married to one of Bolivar's sisters, he
worked assiduously to assemble the junta in Caracas that led
to the separation of Venezuela from Gran Colombia.
Scarpetta
and Vergara, Diccionario Bi o g r & f i c o . 107-108.
Colonel Natividad Villasmil (or sometimes listed as
Villamil) was born in Maracaibo about 1788.
He had become a
member of the garrison guarding Maracaibo in 1805 and in 1812
was implicated in the attempted revolt of this garrison.
Imprisoned by the Governor of Maracaibo, Pedro Ruiz de Porras,
he was sent to Puerto Cabello and then to Spain.
He managed
to escape from the latter and to go Habana where he was recap
tured.
When he was being shipped to Puerto Rico, a patriot
corsair rescued h i m from this, and he was able to rejoin
Bolivar in Haiti.
He went with Bolivar to Margarita and there
fought under Arismendi and F. E. Gbmez.
When he got on the
mainland again he fought with Colonel Rafael Jugo, Tom&s
Montilia, and with Bolivar in the Apure.
In 1822, while
participating in the Maracaibo campaign and as Commandant of
the San Carlos Fortress, he capitulated to General Morales,
reportedly for the sum of five thousand dollars.
Also in
1822 he suffered the defeat at Garabuija.
In 1823 he found
himself obliged to defend himself in the newspapers from the
public censures heaped upon him as a result of these two
defeats.
I b i d .; D&vila, Diccionario B i o g r & f i c o , 393-94.
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This cowardly chief, however,
first threat was made.
resistance.

capitulated as soon as the

He did not even offer the slightest

Relying on the fact that the San Carlos Fortress

was occupied by patriot forces,

I marched with two thousand

men to the province of Trujillo,

hoping that perhaps the

enemy squadron could not enter the l a k e .

In that case it

would be easy for me to cross it in the many small boats that
were there.

Then Morales and his army could not escape being

imprisoned.

However, w h e n I reached Trujillo I got the news

that the fortress h a d capitulated and that the Spanish fleet
had entered Maracaibo.
I countermarched to Valencia and took a skilled sand
bar p i lot called Iribarren with me.

I sent h i m on to General

Soublette and told the latter that this pilot could take our
fleet into the lake without risk.

Soublette sent h i m out to

the fleet and ordered its commander.
to carry out the o p e r a t i o n . ^

General [josfi] Padilla,

It was executed with only the

15General Jos6 Padilla was born in Riochacha in 1778.
H aving joined the Spanish navy, he fought in the Battle of
Trafalgar and was imprisoned for a while in England.
Freed
from there in 1808, he returned to Cartagena as a boatswain.
There he contributed to the revolutionary movement of 1811.
In 1814 he took part in the naval action of T o l u . He was
the brave defendor of Cartagena in 1813 and later was able to
emigrate to Jamaica and join Bolivar in the Cayos expedition.
Joining forces with Luis Bridn's squadron, he helped take
Riohacha in 1820.
With Montilla he helped defeat S&nchez
Lima in Laguna Salada.
In 1823 Padilla and Montilla occupied
Santa Marta.
His conduct of the naval Battle of Maracaibo,
termed the "most daring naval enterprise of the wars for
independence," was heroic.
He was also victorious in the
Punta de Palma campaign.
In 1828 General Padilla was judged
to be the cause for the revolutionary movement in
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loss of one bergantine.

The squadron then combined its

movements with the land forces led by Colonel Manrique in
the Puertos de Altagracia and attacked the Spanish led by
Don Angel Laborde.

The l a t t e r 1s defeat decided the Maracaibo

campaign.
Senor Restrepo mentions disagreements between
Soublette and me during this period and accuses me of aspir
ing to the position that this General held with the approval
of all.16

to

resolve this,

I will now copy the letter I

wrote Vice-President Santander answering the unjust charge.

17

SR. BRIGADIER GENERAL FRANCISCO DE P. SANTANDER
Valencia, May 28, 1822
Esteemed Comrade and Friend:
I shall return the confidence with which you di s 
tinguished me in your treasured letter of this past
February 15th answering mine of this past January 15th
by frankly disclosing all m y feelings.
I wish that in
this case, more than in any other, the human heart were
necessarily candid.
This is not to say that mine is
not, but rather so that you and the world could easily
believe that m y expressions are sincere.
You told me that 'when you tenaciously refused to
accept the vice-presidencv and complained of your l o t .

Cartagena.
He was shot on October 2 and thus ended "the
precious life of the Colombian Nelson."
Scarpetta and
Vergara, Diccionario Biogr&fico. 421-22.
^ R e s t r e p o ' a allegation may be found in the Josd
Jacquin edition, Revolucidn de la Republica de C o l o m b i a . Ill,

200

.

^7This letter cannot be found in the Archivo Santander
although several other letters written by P&ez to Santander
appear.
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it. was because you saw in Venezuela a country
devastated by w a r , scanty of r e s o u r c e s . inhabited
by peoples of a strange character that had repre
sentatives in the upper eschelons accustomed to
acting on their o w n , with discontent l l a n e r o s .
that you despaired of being able to remedy so m a n y
e v i l s . 1 If I had been near you at that time, I
w o u l d have taken the liberty of assuring you that
the strange character of the Venezuelans was to be
the fertile fountain from w h i c h were to spring many
blessings.
The unquiet and resolute genius of the
Venezuelans, in m y opinion, is accompanied by m u c h
good judgment.
The progress I have observed in the
revolution has forced me to believe this, for the
Venezuelans have been aware of their own best inter
ests more them any other country.
They believed they
should separate from Spain, and for this objective
they have sacrificed part of their will, part of
their strength, their comfort, their properties, and
even the love of their families.
The people of
Venezuela, like any other people, are incapable of
discerning the justice or injustice that has served
as basis for the law.
This is reserved for p h i l o s 
ophers.
However, they have known h o w to obey the
laws, and this public moral is a great consolation for
me, as it must be for you.
I have convinced myself
that Venezuela might suffer shortages, but it shall
be the last to disturb the national t r a n q u i l i t y .
You also told me in your letter that in order not
to offend m y delicacy and generosity you did not want
to talk about the situation in which I find myself,
following the path ma r k e d out for me by the pilot.
My
dear friend, I speak to you w i t h all honesty.
Nothing
that you tell me offends me, not even the advice you
give me, which is highly appreciated.
What does offend
me is the reason for your doing it.
You have m i s u n d e r 
stood what I have said.
Senor S o u b l e t t e . wo r t h y and
m o s t honorable superintendent of V e n e z u e l a , is because
of his t a l e n t s , a b i l i t i e s . and political and military
k n o w l e d g e , the best m a n and perhaps the only one that
you could have selected for the elevated and very sad
destiny you have given h i m . I am very far from having
been displeased even once while serving under his
o r d e r s . On the c o n t r a r y , an amiable leader such as h e .
without p r i d e . without any resentments toward m e . helps
m e to carry the enormous burden you have pl a c e d on m y
s h o u l d e r s . I wish that you could enter m y h e a r t and,
searching m y innermost feelings, could be convinced and
satisfied that £ have not aspired to be superintendent
of these p r o v i n c e s . Rather I am heartily convinced
that neither I nor m v friends wo u l d be capable of
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fulfilling this job with the p r u d e n c e . t e n a c i t y .
m a t u r i t y , and dexterity with which Sefior Soublette
is performing it for the general welfare of the
p e o p l e . Please do not think X b e g y o u , not even for
an i n s t a n t , that e n w or ambition could have entered
m v h e a r t . I do not sacrifice anything in obeying
Senor Soublette's orders because I follow them with
great pleasure.
W hen I told you that I did nothing
but follow the path pointed out by the pilot, it was
only to reveal to you that in m y character as C o m 
m a ndant General of the army, I did not have the
responsibility of guiding the war, but of marchin g and
commanding the operations of the army where I was told.
1 thanked Heaven a thousand times because the
government of the Republic h a d not chosen me for this
task.
To prove m y truthfulness, I must add that in
times of peace and tranquility when order is e s t a b 
lished I w o u l d perhaps be flattered by the title of
superintendent.
Today I could not have accepted it,
for I would not be able to surmount the m a n y obstacles
presented by politics nor find the strength to e s t a b 
lish law and order.
Soublette was the m a n needed in
V e nezuela for this p u r p o s e . and I repeat and will
repeat a. thousand times that you were right in select
ing h i m . If l have said something about h i m , it is
what I_ would say to h i m in a friendly m a n n e r . It is
because of m y fierv temperament that I cannot kee p
some thoughts to m y s e l f , particularly w h e n I. believe
that expressing them might be of some v a l u e .
I well k n o w h o w great and heavy the obligations are
on me as Commandant General of the army.
I try to ful
fill them in the b est possible manner, and I will do
everything necessary on m y part so that Colombia's
armies will not fail to be triumphant because of lack
of activity or interest.
Other generals might have
commanded and m a y be commanding armies without p r o v i 
sions.
I, too, have led them naked, and I believe that
no other soldiers have suffered as much as those of
Venezuela.
Having been in war constantly, the country
is devastated and without resources.
If I have told
you about this more ardently, it has been out of a
desire to alleviate the privations.
It did not mean
that I will stop doing all that is necessary on m y
p a r t to make the soldiers extraordinarily content and
to console them and alleviate their fatigues.
You recommend very h i g h l y to m e that I sacrifice m y
person, my goods, m y rights, and m y sentiments for my
country.
I do not k n o w if it is as a result of. the
rare character of the V e n e z u e l a n s , or the frankness
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that is peculiar to me, that I am going to tell you
everything that I am about to.
1 have not made any
sacrifices for m y country, and m y country has made a
thousand sacrifices for me.
.1 have been one of those
upper-eschelon representatives accustomed to acting
on his o w n . 1 was placed in that elevated position
by circumstances, and I left it of m y own accord.
The
last day of my absolute command was the first day of
m y real contentment.
Since then I have done what the
governing leaders have wanted me to do, and my c o n 
science does not bother me for ever h a v i n g failed to
obey.
I find myself n o w one of the happiest beings
in the revolution.
If anyone tends to believe that I
have been insubordiante, my acts have belied this.
Few men have been given a more ample opportunity to
testify what they are to the world.
During all the
time I commanded, I did not do one single thing that
revealed ambition.
I commanded a considerable corps
of men without any laws other them my will.
I
engraved money and did everything that an absolute lord
can do on his estates.
Yet no traces can be found of
m y even having desired to perpetuate my name.
It would be in vain for me to spend time repeating
m y desires for order and tranquility.
I have attained
the rank of General-in-Chief and look upon this title
as a wife looks upon the dress and jewels she puts on
on her wedding day.
Occupied as she is in the more
important business of pleasing her husband, she
sacrcely remembers them.
Thus I barely remember the
rank of general except to be of great use to m y country,
for my head is filled with the desire to destroy my
enemies.
If they were eiq>elled from the territory
tomorrow, m y sole ambition would be to govern and a u g 
m e n t the properties m y country has given me.
I would
very happily become a citizen even if this were not
the mode or manner of representative governments.
To
leave a command by force is for someone w h o loves to
command.
I would leave a command because of m y c h a r 
acter and for my peace of mind.
M y country has covered me with h o n o r s . It has more
than recompensed me for the efforts I made for my own
defense and independence.
I leave to superior talents
the task of establishing civil liberty and order.
I am
always quick to act like a soldier wherever I am sent.
The less freedom I have in m y command, the happier I am.
While I was absolute, I triumphed over the enemy.
I
have ended this career w i t h glory, and if I could n o w
retire with the reputation I have, I would be a lucky
mortal.
I cannot rise any higher in the esteem of my
fellow citizens, and I very much fear losing what I have
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acquired.
It is only a sense of honor and the desire
to repay my country that keep me in command.
I will do
everything possible not to be unworthy of its confidence
and to certify to all my constancy, m y obedience, and my
gratitude.
Forgive me, my dear friend, for writing this long
letter as proof of my desire to erase whatever slight
unfavorable impression my letter of January 15 might
have made on you.
Receive it as proof of the esteem
in which I hold you, for I do not want my cherished
friends to think ill of me unjustly.
Please always
write me with frankness, for I appreciate it very much.
If I am guilty of error, I believe I am docile enough
to correct myself.
If I am not, I will have the oppor
tunity to remove the impressions that possibly the
speed of the pen can project.
I have taken too much
time from a man who has as much to do as you.
Correct the country for u s . I know it is time now
for you to leave this letter and return to arranging
the great affairs of the Republic.
Believe me to be
sincerely your friend, and do not hold as insignifi
cant someone who wants to prove to you that he had the
honor of being your attentive servant and friend.
Jos 6 A. PAez.

CHAPTER XV
Siege of Puerto C a b e l l o — U l t i m a t u m to C a l z a d a —
His R e p l y — 1 Decide to Assault the P l a z a — Dange r o u s
E n t e r p r i s e — Surrender of the Plaza and the F o r t —
Losses of the Royalists and Patriots.
1823
W h i l e I wa s in La Guaira getting p r o v i s i o n s and
m a t e r i a l s for the siege of Puerto Cabello,

I very secretly

w r o t e the C o m m a n d a n t of the Plaza, D o n S e b a stian de la
Calzada,

on Septe m b e r 17 and u r g e d h i m to lay down his arms

in order to avoid u s e l e s s bloodshed.

Furthermore,

I offered

h i m twenty-five thou s a n d pesos for the expenses that might
be incurred by his depa rture from the plaza.
the Spaniard,

Don J a c i n t o Iztueta,

very h a p p y w i t h the R o y a l i s t s . 1
take these letters.

I also wrote

a m a n w h o m 1 k n e w was not

X selec t e d two prison e r s to

Wi t h o u t remo v i n g their handcuffs,

sail w i t h these p r i s o n e r s in the corvette U r i c a .

I set

I dis

p a t c h e d t h e m from O c u m a r e in a canoe to Puerto Cabello,
i nstru c t ing them to p r e s e n t themselves to the S p a n i s h leader

1Jaci n t o Xztueta was a n a t i v e of Biscay.
In 1811 he
w a s an e n t h usiastic sup porter of the "banner of Castilla."
H e later w a s imprisoned at Puerto C a b e l l o bec a u s e he was an
ardent Royalist.
Pa r r a P 6 rez, H i s t o r i a de la P r i m e r a Repflblica. II, 83, 278, 339, 348.
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as escapees from -the prisons of La Guaira.
Calzada did n o t delay long in answering me,
also.

secretly

He told me that his honor and military responsibility

did not permit h i m to take the step

1

proposed to him, and

he ended b y saying that he had resolved to defend the plaza
until the bitter end.

Consequently,

beseiged the port,

1

for

I went ahead then and

saw that it was impossible to con-

quer the bold obstinacy of the enemy in any other manner.
The plaza at Puerto Cabello was divided in two sec
tions.

The first section,

called Pueblo I n t e r i o r , formed a

peninsula that by means of an isthmus joined the town called
Pueblo A f u e r a .

The latter town originated in said isthmus

and extended toward the continent.

The interior town was

separated from the exterior by a canal that ran from the sea
to the heart of the bay.

This canal bathed its waters at the

foot of the battery called Estacada, which with a battery at
the East called Principe and another at the West called
P r i n c e s a . defended the plaza on the South.

On the East the

enemy h a d a battery called Picavo or ConstituciOn w h i c h was
set u p at the edge of town across from the extensive p l a n t a 
tion of mangrove trees that were on that side of the bay.

^P&ez footnotes this as follows.
"On one occasion I
h a d to leave temporarily in order to go to Valencia to ask
for food provisions, wh i c h were very scarce.
The inhabitants
of this city, always most generous w i t h their country and
with me, not only gave me the necessary provisions, but in
addition anything that could serve to please the troops
during the fatigues of the siege."

446
On the N o r t h , the plaza had no other defense than the battery
of C orito and the fortress of San Felipe.

The latter were

constructed in front of an island situated on the mout h of
the canal that forms the entrance to the port.

The mo u t h of

this canal was closed by a chain that stretched between the
aforementioned fortifications.

All these points were p e r 

fectly m o u n t e d with c a n n o n s . From the Corito battery ran a
rampart to the south until it joined the P r i n c i p e , but this
h a d no artillery.

The exterior part of the town was in front

of the Estacada and behind a clear space of about two hundred
and fifty yards.

In front of this part of the town and

c oming from within,

there was an established,

fortified line,

defended on the West by a fort which was situated at the
m o u t h of the San Est 6 ban River and along a canal in front of
Calle Real [Royal Street] of the inner town.

From there to

the East the line curved to leave the path free for fires
from the P r i n c e s a .
Even under the sure fire of the enemy's excellent
artillery,

I started trying to mount artillery on the

Trincherdn battery.
battery,

On October 7 we took possession of this

situated at the edge of the mangrove plantation,

p l a c e d a twenty-four pounder.

and

The Royalist Lieutenant Don

Pedro Calderon came in a long, narrow,

armed canoe along

the n a r r o w passage formed by the mangroves and the Trincherdn
ba ttery at the foot of the hill,

and he prevented us from

bringing our materials of war from the port at Borburata.
Later he h a d to retreat from here with great losses.

From
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then on the path was clear for us to aim the other batteries
against the plaza.
On the eighth the San Luis battery was mounted west
of TrincherOn.

it offered the advantage of giving us greater

protection for the war materials coming from Borburata.

On

the twelfth we were successful in constructing a battery in
Cocos which dominated the mouth of the river and kept those
besieged from coming out and getting water.
us to attack the fort.

It also enabled

The enemy took advantage of the fire

that resulted from this battery when a grenade exploded and
attempted to come out.

This attempt was repelled by Captain

Laureano LOpez, and the enemy was forced to return to the
plaza.3
West of the Cocos battery we placed a mortar and set
up the batteries of Royal Street against the canal on the

3General Laureano LOpez was born in Popay&n and was
the brother of General J. H. LOpez.
He was with the Republi
cans that General Narino led in the brilliant campaign of the
South and thus fought in the Battles of Palacio and Calibio.
In 1815 he was victorious in the Battle of Palo.
He was
defeated in the Battle of Cuchilla del Tambo and later fell
prisoner in the Battle of Las Cruces.
The Spanish forced
h i m to serve as a soldier in their ranks then until the
Battle of BoyacA in 1819 when he was rescued.
He fought at
the second Battle of Carabobo under PAez with such distinc
tion , that PAez later selected him as one of the captains to
lead the assault on Puerto Cabello.
He was wounded in this
attack and received a special commendation.
In 1826 he was
promoted to Sergeant Major and ten years later he attained
the rank of Lieutenant Colonel.
By 1851 Ldpez had become a
General.
He died in PopayAn in 1852.
Scarpetta and Vergara,
Diccionario BioarAfico. 272.
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outside line.

Rebote battery was to confront Princesa and

some launches that the Royalist had posted in the mangrove
plantation.

We h a d already come so close to the walls,

that

we h a d opened a breach in the fort and in the masthead.

The

enemy had good workmen, however,

and they repaired the d a m 

ages received during the day at night.

By now the enemy

force that had occupied the Mirador de Solano h a d capitulated.
This point now served us as it h a d the enemy before— as a
lookout point from which to observe the interior of the
besieged plaza.
The story which I am going to relate now is what made
me hope we could take the plaza b y assault.

Every morning

we found human footprints on the beach on the way to
Borburate.

I posted men there and was successful in having

them surprise a Negro who waded in that terrain,
water,

in the dark of night.

covered with

This Negro told me that he was

called Juli&n, was Don Jacinto Iztueta's slave,

and that he

h a d left the plaza with orders to observe our position.
set h i m free to return to the plaza,
with some gifts.

I

and 1 presented him

Charging h i m to say nothing of what had

occurred that night,

I told h i m that he would never be p r e 

vented from returning to the plaza so long as he promised
that he would always come to me.
many times,
side.

After he had come and gone

I was finally able to win the Negro over to m y

1 h a d him stay with us and finally persuaded h i m to

show me the weak point at the mangrove plantation through
which he was wont to make his nightly excursions.

I sent
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three o f f i c e r s — C a p t a i n M a r c e l o Gdmez,
Albornoz,

Lieutenant Juan

and JosA F e r n A n d e z — to accom p a n y h i m one night.^

T h e y r e tu r n e d w i t h i n two hours and reported they h a d gotten
close to land w i t h o u t ever h a v i n g left shallow water.
H a v i n g twice p r o p o s e d to C a l z a d a to enter an agreement
to p r e v e n t

further bloodshed.

I finally sent h i m an ultimatum

to surrender the p l a z a and gave h i m twenty-four hours to
decide.

If he refused to capitulate.

I threatened to take

the p l a z a by force and kn i f e the entire garrison.
t w e n t y - f our h o u r s elapsed,

W h e n the

he answ e r e d me saying that the

C a p t a i n M a r c e l o Gdmez was born in Guasdualito about
1795 and became a cit i z e n of A c h a g u a s . He enli s t e d as a
s o l d i e r in C o m m a n d a n t O l m e d illa's cavalry.
In 1814 he was
w i t h Garcia S e n a in the d e f e a t at Barinas, but in 1815 he
p a r t i c i p a t e d w i t h O l m e d i l l a at the vic t o r y in Guasdualito.
He h e l p e d d e f e a t C a l z a d a in Chire while serving un d e r General
Ri c aurte in 1815.
By 1816 Gdmez h a d joined PAez in Palmarito
and was p r o m o t e d to corporal.
W h i l e serving u n d e r PAez, he
was w o u n d e d at the Battle of Barinas and p r o m o t e d later to
the rank of Lieutenant.
He served under Bol i v a r in the
Battles of C a n a f i s t o l a and Gamarra in 1819.
He was again
promoted, this time to captain, and fought at the second
Battle of Carabobo.
In 1822 he p a r t i c i p a t e d in the siege of
Pu e r t o Cabello.
He became a m e m b e r of the Lanceros de la
V i c t o r i a and served in this regi m e n t u n t i l 1827.
In 1831 he
c a m p a i g n e d in the A l t o Llano.
DAvila, D i c c i o n a r i o B i o q r A f i c o .
I, 192-93.
Juan Ignacio Albor n o z was b o r n in Barcelona, V e n e 
zuela.
In 1814 he was a lieutenant and in 1817 h e l p e d defend
the fort at Barcelona.
He was in N e w Granada in 1819 and in
1821 fought at the Battle of Carabobo.
He p a r t i c i p a t e d in
the siege of Puerto C a b e l l o in 1823.
Albo r n o z was k i l l e d in
1835 w h i l e fighting against the Reformistas.
Ibid., 6 .
JosA FernAndez was a c i t i z e n of Caracas.
In 1822 he
a t t a i n e d the rank of S u b l i e u t e n a n t in the Granderos de la
CXiardia.
He p a r t i c i p a t e d in the siege of Puerto Cabello.
Ibid., 143.
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p l a z a w as defen d e d by old soldiers who k n e w h o w to fulfill
their d u t y and w e r e resolved as a last resort to follow the
g lorious examples of Sagunto and Numancia.
me to p e n e t r a t e those walls,

they w o u l d

If fate allowed

follow m y orders

a l t hough they expected that I w o u l d not w a n t to stain the
lustre of m y sword by an act w o r t h y of the times of the b a r 
barians .
W h e n the gr o u p that had gone
plaza,

for conference left the

the troops lined u p along the w a l l s and challe n g e d us

w i t h great huzzas to come run them through w i t h a knife.

It

w a s then that I d e c i d e d to enter the p l a z a on the side of
the m a n g r o v e plantation.

In order that the enemy w o u l d not

b e l ieve that we were go ing to c a r r y out immediately the
threat w e h a d m a d e to Calzada,

I p u t five hund r e d m e n to

d i g g i n g ditches d u r i n g the night.

I thus twisted the course

of the river so that the besi e g e d e n e m y w o u l d believe that I
w a s thinking only of lengthening the siege and not of a s s a u l t 
ing the w a l l s of the p l a z a for the time being.
o c c asion I m i r a c u l o u s l y e s c a p e d w i t h m y life,
i n s p e c t ing the w o r k very early that morning,

On this
for w h i l e

a cannon ball

h i t the p i l e of sand I was standing on w i t h such force,
it h u r l e d m e v i o l e n t l y into the ditch.

However,

that

I was n o t

h u r t at all.
A l m o s t certain that the enemy did not suspect that I
w as ready to assault,
at five

I orde r e d all our guns to st a r t firing

in the m o r n i n g and not stop until

I sent a counter
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order.

My intention was to call the enemy's attention to

the front and tire h i m so we could catch h i m unprepared that
night.

Then I assembled m y troops and ordered them to d i s 

robe, keeping only their weapons.
On the night of November 7 at ten o'clock,

four

hundred men from the Anzo&tegui battalion and one hundred
lancers were moved from Alcabala under the orders of Manuel
Cala and Lieutenant Colonel Jos 6 Andres Elorza and c o m 
missioned to assault in the following order.^
First, Lieutenant Colonel Francisco Farfan was to take
possession of the batteries Princesa and Principe with two
companies under the command of Captain Francisco DomlnguesCz]

5No further information is available on Manuel Cala.
Lieutenant Colonel Jos 6 Andres Elorza was born in San Felipe
el Fuerte.
As a lieutenant in 1813 he served under Colonel
Olmedilla in the attack on Pedroza.
He became ill and was
taken prisoner.
Managing to escape, he joined Garcia de
Sena and participated in the unfortunate siege of Barinas in
1814.
He then emigrated to M 6 rida.
Serving under Captain
Ranjel, he was victorious at the Battle of Bailadores.
In
1815 he was in Casanare with Olmedilla and General Ricaurte.
From 1816 on he served under PAez and fought at the Battles
of Yagual, Achaguas, Nutrias, and San Fernando.
In 1817 he
participated in the triumph at Mucuritas.
He suffered the
defeats at Cojedes and Ortiz.
By 1819 he had become a Lieu
tenant Colonel and in 1821 at the Battle of Carabobo he c o m 
manded a cavalry column.
He fought brilliantly at the siege
of Puerto Cabello and in 1823 campaigned in Riohacha at the
head of the Dragones de Venezuela.
He attained the rank of
Colonel in 1826.
Elorza died in Achaguas.
I b i d ., 123-24.
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and fifty lancers under the command of Captain Pedro Rojas.®
On hearing the first firing, they were to charge hurriedly
on the ramparts and bastions without giving the enemy time
to bring out artillery pieces to repel them.
Second,

a company under the command of Captain

Laureano Ldpez and twenty-five lancers under the orders of
Captain Juan JosA MArida were to occupy the dock.7

Captain

Joaquin PArez with his company was to take over the battery
at Corito.

Captain Gabriel Guevara with another company was

to attack the battery ConstituciQn.

Lieutenant colonel JosA

de Lima with twenty-five lancers was to occupy the door of

^Colonel Francisco Farfan was born in Ecuador.
He
fought under PAez in the Battles of Mata de la Miel, Yagual,
Achaguas, Mucuritas, Los Cocos, and Queseras del Medio.
Serving under Bolivar, he was victorious at Paya, Gameza, and
Vargas.
In 1819 he fought at the Battle of BoyacA and later
at the Battle of Carabobo.
In 1823, serving under PAez, he
helped in the siege of Puerto Cabello.
Later the same year
he helped in the Pasto campaign.
Bolivar named him Minister
of the Superior Military Court in 1826.
Scarpetta and
Ve r g a r a, Diccionario BiogrAfico. 149.
Captain Francisco Dominguez was born in CumanA.
He
started his services to his country in 1811 in Angostura.
He
was wounded while fighting at the Battle of Barinitas. Later,
he was taken prisoner while attempting to occupy Margarita.
He escaped and fought under P A e z 1s orders at the Battle of
Carabobo in 1821 and later participated in the siege of
Puerto Cabello.
I b i d .. 133.
Captain Pedro Rojas was also born in CumanA and joined
the independence cause as early as 1811.
He fought at the
Battles of Bocas del pao, CumanA, Barcelona, Aragua, Cara
bobo, and Puerto Cabello.
I b i d .. 537.
7Captain Juan josA MArida was born in El Tinaco and
was a merchant.
Although he had been in the revolutionary
army much earlier, the first written record available con
cerning his activities in battle start with the Battle of
Carabobo in 1821.
He also participated in the siege of
Puerto Cabello in 1823.
He died in El Tinaco in 1841.
DAvila, Diccionario BiogrAfico. I, 364.
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the E s t a c a d a .

This was the point where the force which

covered the outside line could enter the plaza.

The company

of riflemen under Captain Valentin Reyes along with Mayor
Cala was to form the r e s e r v e . 8

The launches I h a d posted in

Borburata were to fake an attack on the dock of the plaza.
There will be some who will consider this risky o p e r a 
tion rash.

We m u s t take into account, however,

in war ceases to be imprudent,

that rashness

no matter h o w risky the u n d e r 

taking, when one is certain the enemy is unprepared for an
unexpected blow and thus virtually assured of success.
We spent four hours crossing the mangrove plantation
w i t h w ater up to our chests, walking on very muddy terrain,
and without being s e e n — thanks to the dark of the night.
passed so close to Princesa battery,

We

that we heard the guards

exclaim over the great numbers of "fish" that were agitating
the water that night.

We also passed very close to the prow

of the battle corvette Bailen,

and we were successful in not

8Captain Valentin Reyes was born on the island of
M a r g a r i ta in 1803.
He joined the independence cause in 1815
in Margarita and under Arismendi's command fought in the
Battles of Guacuco, Caranta, and the Fort of Santa Rosa.
In
1816 h e went to the mainland w i t h Bolivar.
He then fought
under Mac Gregor as first sergeant,
in 1817 he participated
in the fruitless assault on Angostura.
He was w i t h Marino
in 1818 in Cariaco and in 1819 became a Lieutenant.
He went
to N e w Granada in 1820 and returned with Bolivar in 1820.
He fought at the second Battle of carabobo as a Captain.
U n d e r P&ez's orders, he helped beseige Puerto Cabello.
In
1829 Reyes was promoted to Commandant.
He died in the
cholera epidemic of 1856 in his estate at Tamanavere.
I b i d ..
II, 157-58.
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being seen by the Spanish launches patrolling the bay.
The attack was made.
the best possible results.

As was to be eaqpected,

it had

The enemy forces defended them

selves with desperation until they saw the futility of all
resistance.

They had been forced to fight face-to-face and

had been unable to retreat to the fortress,
precautions I had taken.

thanks to the

With the plaza occupied,

the

exterior line was attacked by a company from the Battalion
of Grenadiers that I had left stationed there to deceive the
enemy.

This line was forced to surrender.
At dawn two priests came and told me that General

Calzada h a d taken refuge in a church and wanted to surrender
to me personally.

I went to see h i m immediately.

gratulated me for having "sealed m y glories"
words) with such a risky operation,
his sword.

I thanked him,

He c o n 

(these were his

and then he surrendered

took him by the arm,

and led him

to drink coffee at the house he h a d occupied during the siege.
While I was on the side of the plaza that faces the
fortress and a trumpeteer was sounding the truce,

four cannon

grape shots were fired from the fortress, killing one of m y
sergeants.

However, when the enemy soldiers heard the

trumpet announcing the truce,
suspended the firing.
explosion.

they raised a white flag and

Almost immediately I heard a terrible

I turned m y head to where the dense smoke was

rising and realized that the enemy had blown up the war c o r 
vette Bailen anchored in the bay.
tion at such an act to Calzada.

1 manifested my indigna
He attributed it to the
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rashness of the Commandant of the fortress, Colonel Don
Manuel Carrera y Colina, and offered to write him ordering
h i m to cease all hostilities as long as the garrison of the
plaza and its chief were at the mercy of the conqueror.®
That Commandant responded that if General Calzada were a
prisoner, he was forced to cease recognizing his authority
as his superior officer.

1 returned Calzada's sword to him

then and sent him to the fortress.

He wrote me from there

shortly afterwards telling me that Carrera had recognized
his authority on seeing him free, and that in his name he
invited me to lunch with him at the fortress.
fiding in Castilian chivalry,

Always con

I went to that fort.

I was

received with military honors and with all the gallant
courtesy that X could esq>ect from such valiant adversaries.
While we were having lunch,

the soldiers who had sur

rendered in the Mirador de Solano came befc :e me and told me
that they were still being tried.

I interceded on their

behalf, but since they always presented the argument of the
need for severity in military discipline,
dispatches on the matter.

I asked for the

With a brusqueness which the

Spanish leaders forgave me because of my good intentions,
put them in m y pocket.

1

I

then returned to the plaza where

we entered into negotiations which ended with a most generous
surrender.

^Torrente mentions that Carrera y Colina in his com
munications with General P&ez had "assured an honorable
surrender." Historla de la Revolucidn. H I , 440.
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The historian[s] Baralt [and Diaz] after telling
briefly about the previous acts,

conclude with these w o r d s * 1 0

Thus succumbed Puerto Cabello, the last precinct
that still held Spanish weapons in the vast territory
that lay between the Guayaquil River and the m a g n i f i 
cent delta of the Orinoco.
HERE ENDS THE W A R OP
INDEPENDENCE.
Henceforth the weapons of the republic
will not be used except against bands of robbers,
which the peninsular tenacity armed and nourished for
some time, or in aiding sister towns outside its
boundaries in the conquest of their rights.
The Royalist losses on this occasion amounted to one
hundred and fifty-six dead,

fifty-six wounded,

and fifty-six

officers and five hundred and thirty-nine soldiers taXen
prisoner.

This included the fort garrison.

dead and thirty-five wounded.
and Marcelo GOmez,

We had only ten

Captains Sebasti&n Taborda

in addition to the ones already cited,

distinguished themselves.

The patriots seized sixty pieces

of every type of artillery without counting the dismounted
cannons,

six hundred and twenty guns,

weights of powder,

three thousand h u n d r e d 

six cannon launches,

and a multitude of

military and naval implements.

l°This citation is in Baralt and Diaz,
Historia. Ill, 114-15.

Roadmen de la

CHAPTER XVI
Efforts of the Patriots to Get Aid from the European
Powers and from the United States— Sympathy of the
English and American Peoples for the Cause of South
American Independence— Recognition of Colombia—
Brief Reflections on the Monroe Doctrine— Congress
of Panam&.

1822
When the drama of the Colombian revolution ended
following the capture of Puerto Cabello,

the new Republic

believed itself to have the right to be recognized as an inde
pendent nation b y European powers and the United States.
During our struggle with Spain,

friends of liberty in both

hemispheres had contented themselves with giving sterile
signs of sympathy for the South American patriots,

and

despite our efforts, we were never able to get the assistance
of any foreign power.
Smith and Mr.

When in 1804 Colonel W.

[William S.]

[Samuel] Ogden of N e w York placed the two c o r 

vettes Leandro and Emperador with rifles,

ammunition,

and two

hundred volunteers at Miranda's disposal, we received the
first foreign aid.^

^The author is referring here to Colonel Willia m S.
Smith, who was ex-President John Adams's son-in-law and an
Inspector or Collector of Customs, and Mr. Samuel Ogden, who
was a N e w York merchant.
They assisted Miranda in outfitting
this filibustering expedition in 1806 in N e w York apparently
457
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In 1810 the junta of Caracas h a d commissioned Senores
Luis Ldpez MAndez and Simfin Bolivar to secure a treaty
obtaining Great Britain's h e l p . 2

They were not able to get

it because the interests of that nation were identified then
with those of Spain in the fight against Bonaparte.

That

same year this junta also sent Telesforo Orea and Vicente
Bolivar to the United States to interest this nation in the
struggle Colombia was sustaining for her inde p e n d e n c e . 3

The

with the tacit consent of President Thomas Jefferson and
Secretary of State James Madison.
Lemly, B o l i v a r . 6 .
2Don Luis Ldpez M&ndez was the financial agent for the
Caracas government in London and perhaps a prototype of the
South American financial agent of those days.
He was profuse
in his promises to the British soldiers coming to fight for
Venezuelan independence regardless of whether he intended or
was capable of implementing these promises.
Cunninghame
Graham, P A e z . 152-53, 169.
3Telesforo Orea or de Orea and Juan Vicente Bolivar,
the Liberator's brother, arrived in Baltimore on June 5, 1810.
They were cordially, though not officially, received by Dr.
Thornton, a close friend of President James Madison.
Later
they were received by Secretary of State Robert Smith, and
still later by the President.
Although Smith did not accept
Juan Vicente Bolivar's credentials, he expressed his e n t h u s 
iasm for Venezuelan independence.
Juan Vicente did not wait
for a later appointment with Smith and left immediately for
Philadelphia to see the Spanish Minister there, Don Luis de
Onis, and negotiate an agreement.
The plan he offered the
latter was moderate, for he was willing to leave the constitu
tional status of Venezuela unaltered if complete equality
were granted in office-holding to Creoles and Spaniards and
if Creoles were given a share in the economic administration
of the country.
Orea, who h a d left for Caracas when Juan
Vicente Bolivar went to Philadelphia, returned now with the
authority to oust Juan Vicente.
Onis reported to his govern
ment n o w that Juan Vicente told himi
"that instead of an
agreeable answer, he had received letters from his brother
and friends to the effect that he was being superseded by
Don Telesforo de Orea, born in Tenerife, one of those lenaves
without good blood or property, who are leading the
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North American people gave then,
pathy for our cause; however,

as always, signs of sym

they were unable to get the

federal government to depart from the policy of neutrality
which it maintained in foreign affairs.

Despite this

failure, Manuel Palacio [Fajardo] was sent to Washington in
1812 to inform the President that the peoples of New Granada
could no longer support themselves alone in the unequal
battle which they had started against

despotism.4

The

revolution, and that the people shout for his head and the
confiscation of his property which is the largest in the
country, only because he had negotiated with me.
1 saw his
brother's original letters in which he advises h i m to leave
for Europe and on no account return to Caracas."
By 1811,
Simdn Bolivar had been able to free Juan Vicente's property
and allow him to return and report on his mission.
In July
of 1811 the latter perished at sea during a storm off the
Bermudas while he was returning home.
Madariaga, Bolivar.
154-55, 161-63.
M a n u e l Palacio Fajardo was born in Mijagual, Vene
zuela, in 1784 to a wealthy and patriotic family.
He
finished his studies in law and medicine at the University
of Santa F 6 de Bo g o t a . When the cry for independence broke
out in Caracas, Palacio flew back to his country.
He was
immediately elected to the first Congress which met in 1811
and to membership in the Sociedad Patriotica. His speeches
and actions in this Congress were brilliant.
Joining arms
with Miranda, he counseled the higher governmental echelons.
In 1812 he emigrated to Cundinamarca and there was charged
with the commission to obtain arms in the United States and
Europe.
He failed to get any assistance in the United States.
Acting on Mr. Serrurier's (French minister in Washington)
recommendation, he went to Paris in 1813 to seek aid from
Napoleon.
Palacio Fajardo was negotiating with Napoleon's
Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Duke de Bassano, when the
Battle of Leipzig occurred (October, 1813) which spelled
Napoleon's defeat,
in 1817 he wrote and had published in
English a most significant work entitled Outline of the
Revolution in Spanish America (London, 1817).
In 1818 he was
named Secretary of State of the Angostura government.
He
died on March 8 , 1819 in Angostura just as he was putting all
his enormous talents into play for his country's benefit.
Scarpetta and Vergara, Diccionario Bioqr&fico. 427-28;
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government, in Washington gave that emissary this responses
"That although the United States had no alliance and was at
peace with Spain and thus unable to help the patriots,
inhabitants of the same continent,
efforts would be successful."

as

they still hoped that our

This emissary lost hope of

securing help from the cabinet in Washington and went to the
French minister in that city, Mr. Serrurier.^

The latter

advised him to go see Napoleon; however, when Napoleon seemed
best disposed to second the efforts of the South American
patriots,

the Battle of Leipsig occurred and forced him to

think only of defending his territory from invasion by the
Allies.
In 1815 the Senate of N e w Granada sent Pedro Gual to
W a s h i n g t o n .6

The following year Bolivar sent General Lino

Caracciolo Parra P6rez, Una Misidn Diplomatica ante Napoleon
en 1813 (Caracas, 1953), 7-89.
^Mr. Serrurier (sometimes spelled Serurier) was sup
posed to try to get the secret support of the American federal
government for the insurgents.
He also offered to send on to
Paris whatever communications the Republican government needed
to send.
Parra P£rez, Historia de la Primera Republica, II,
217, 219, 222.
6 Dr. Pedro Gaul was born in Venezuela.
He took part
in the revolutionary junta in Caracas in 1810, and in 1814 he
helped assemble an electoral college to revise the constitu
tion.
After helping to defend Cartagena in 1813, he was
forced to emigrate to Jamaica.
He returned in 1819 to Vene
zuela and was of great help to Bolivar in the task of govern
ing the country.
He became one of Bolivar's Finance Ministers
and later became Secretary of State.
He retired from public
service in 1830 and dedicated himself to the practice of law
in BogotA.
He broke his prolonged retirement only twicet
the first time to fulfill a diplomatic mission for Ecuador
in Spain in 1842 pertaining to the settlement of the war

461
C l e m e n t e , for he believed that the government o f the United
States would be more disposed to lend its powerful help to
aid Colombian independence n o w that an expedition was being
armed in Louisiana in favor of the Mexican patriots.
dent Madison,

Presi

faithful to the traditional policies of his

predecessors of maintaining the strictest neutrality in the
affairs of other countries and of not forming entangling
alliances,

ordered that expedition to be dissolved by p r o c l a 

ma t i o n in December of that year.

This was also authorized

by Congress and prohibited American citizens from selling
war ships to subjects of any foreign belligerent power.
Despite this,

the people of the United States did not

cease to manifest their sympathies for the South American
patriots.

In 1818 the legislature o f Kentucky,

the eminent orator H[enry] Clay,

inspired by

invited the federal govern

ment to recognize the independence of the Hispanic-American

debt and negotiating a treaty for commerce and navigation;
the second time to assume the Presidency of Venezuela only
temporarily in 1861.
PAez, who was his Minister of War and
Navy then, tried to negotiate w i t h the Federalists.
Gual
disapproved of this action and asked P&ez to resign his
ministry.
It was then that the commander of the garrison
stationed in Caracas asked Gual to resign, arrested him, and
proclaimed P&ez the dictator.
Gual was forced into exile
in Ecuador where he died in Guayaquil in 1862.
Scarpetta
and Vergara, Diccionario B i o a r & f i c o , 199-200.
Harold A.
Bierck, J r . , Vida Pdblica dfi. Q&D. Pedro Gual (Caracas, 1947),
11-569.
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c ountries . 7

Now arms and munitions were sent secretly from

the United States.
The names of colonel [William] Duane, Lord Holland,
and Sir Robert Wilson must be recorded h e r e .8

Later they

were worthy of receiving a tribute of thanks from the
Colombian Congress for the interest they manifested in favor
of the independence cause.
In his message to the Congress of the United States
in December,

1819, President Monroe,

the doctrine by this name,

the reputed author of

said that the South American

struggle was of great interest to the United States.

However,

he added that he considered it of great importance to the

7The author interjects this footnote at this point.
"This is the same man who later as Secretary of State gave
the instructions to the commissioners to the Congress of
Panama that I shall copy later."
For a detailed account of
the life of Clay see Calvin Colton, The Life and Times of
Henry C l a y . 2 vols. (New York, 1846).
8 No

further information was available on Lord Holland.
Colonel William Duane was an American who was sent to Colombia
in 1822
to settle claims against the Colombia government,
among which was the Jacob Idler claim.
After completing his
mission, he wrote & Visit to Colombia in the Years 1822 and
1823 (Philadelphia, 1826), Jane L. DeGrummond, "The Jacob
Idler Claim Against Venezuela, 1817-1890," The Hispanic
American Historical Review. XXXIV (May, 1954), 131-57.
Sir Robert Wilson was a General in the British Army.
He sent
his third son, Captain Belford Hinton Wilson, to
Colombia and asked Bolivar to appoint him to his staff as his
aide.
Young Wilson served Bolivar well and faithfully, and
the latter attested to this in his will.
Sir Wilson pro
nounced an eulogy on Bolivar in Parliament and later was
voted a thanks from the Venezuelan Congress for his efforts
in promoting the cause of independence.
Hasbrouck, Foreign
Legionaries. 335, 392, 394.
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national character and morality to prevent any violation of
the laws of neutrality.
We owed the English people some help in the unequal
struggle we maintained against the metropolis.
year 1817,

During the

six ships left England carrying seven hundred and

twenty men recruited by Colonels [Robert] S. Keene
S k e e n e ],
Campbell,
Donald

[Belford H . ] Wilson,
[J. A.] Gillmore

rs i c . Me D o n a l d ] . 9

[Gustavus] Hippisley,

[sic,

Gilmour] and

fs i c .
[Donald]

[Donald] Mac

Despite the fact that part of the

9Colonel Robert Skeene was a retired Lieutenant Colonel
in the British Cavalry.
He temporarily accepted the rank of
Brigadier General in the First Venezuelan Hussars.
Ibid., 48.
The Wilson P4ez refers to here is Colonel Belford
Hinton Wilson (see Footnote 8 in this C h a p t e r ) . He was
educated at Westminster and Sandhurst and joined Bolivar just
in time to be present at the Battle of Junln.
In 1824 he was
granted a leave for health reasons, but he returned in time
to make his remarkable ride carrying the Bolivian constitu
tion to Sucre.
The latter feat won him his promotion to
Colonel.
Wilson remained w i t h Bolivar until his death in
1830.
In 1832 he was appointed British Consul General in
PertL, and in 1849 he was given a similar post in Venezuela.
Ibid., 334, 335.
Colonel Gustavus Hippisley was appointed a Colonel in
the First Venezuelan Hussars.
With Lbpez M£ndez's encourage
ment and backing, he agreed to complete the organization of
the First Venezuelan Lancers and receive an appointment as
Brigadier General in return.
In December of 1817 he left
England w i t h thirty officers and one hundred and sixty n o n 
commissioned officers on the E m e r a l d . By 1818 this regiment
h a d been so reduced by sickness, resignations, and desertions,
that Colonel Hippisley was able to crowd them all on board
the Tiger and sail for the Orinoco.
After his arrival at
Angostura, he and Colonel Wilson consolidated the remnants of
their regiments in one brigade known as the "British Brigade."
Then Hippisley received orders to join Bolivar at San F e r 
nando de Apure where he encountered the wild confusion of
the Republican army retreating before Morillo's Spanish
forces.
Colonel Hippisley's m e n deserted h i m now due to the
poverty, hardships, and privations.
It seems L 6 pez M 6 ndez
h a d not been able to fulfill any of his promises regarding
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troops that arrived in 1818 succumbed to the inclemency of
the climate,

General [John] D 'evereux [s i c , D'EvereauxJ,

pay, housing, and rations.
When he saw that the patriot
treasury could not give his men and officers better rations
and pay, Hippisley resigned.
When he arrived in London, he
ordered Lbpez M 6 ndez arrested for non-payment of the debt due
h i m by the Republic of Venezuela.
He also spread m a n y
calumnies against Bolivar.
I b i d .. 47, 48, 55, 58, 67, 70,
72, 73, 74, 75, 371.
Colonel Donald Campbell was appointed Colonel of a
rifle regiment by LOpez M 6 ndez*s "factory of colonels."
He
was an experienced infantry officer and was so efficient,
that he was one of the first to embark his regiment on a ship
he had chartered from his brother.
Feeling that the other
colonels were his brothers-in-arms, he generously offered to
wait for Colonel Hippisley and finally embarked along with
the latter on the Dawson with thirty-seven officers and
almost two hundred non-commissioned officers.
When this regi
ment arrived in the West Indies, it dispersed because of
desertions and resignations.
Yellow fever added to the chaos.
When Colonel Campbell's son, Duncan, died from this fever, he
h i mself resigned and sailed for home.
Ibid., 49, 50, 53, 58,
69.
Colonel J. A. Gilmour was appointed Colonel of an
artillery brigade and sailed in 1817 on the Britannia accom
panied by ten officers and eighty non-commissioned officers.
When he realized that guns were not forthcoming due to lack
of funds, he was forced to disband the organization.
This
did not daunt his loyalty to the patriot cause, however, and
he later helped Bolivar assemble an artillery brigade on the
island of Margarita.
I b i d .. 49, 58, 6 8 , 78, 118-19.
Colonel Donald Me Donald had been commissioned by
L 6 pez M4ndez to recruit the First Venezuelan Lancers.
He
h a d been so impatient to get to the scene of action, though,
that he sailed before his regiment was fully organized and
left its completion to Colonel Hippisley.
In reality, Me
Donald had hoped to obtain a higher rank by arriving early
and reporting to Bolivar as an independent volunteer.
He
was prevented from achieving this when he was forced to put
into port at the Madeiras by a severe storm.
There he and
his m e n left a trail of riot and disorder.
When they finally
arrived at the Danish Island of St. Thomas, Me Donald boasted
so loudly about his anti-Spanish feeling, that the Governor
of that island, fearing reprisals from the Spanish Governor
of Puerto Rico, ordered his ship, the Two F r i e n d s . expelled.
The Captain slipped away one night and left Me Donald and his
men on shore.
Then captain Lane, an American, offered to
convoy Me Donald as far as Amelia Island where he could
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justly called the Lafayette of South America,

during the next

year organized a legion of one thousand seven hun d r e d and
twenty-nine Irishmen for the service of Colombia.1°

Before

report to MacGregor. He finally arrived in Angostura in 1819
on board the ship G r a c e . While ascending the Orinoco River,
Me Donald's incorrigible vanity induced h i m to p u t on his
elaborate uniform for a boat excursion ashore.
A part y of
Indians mistook his magnificent uniform as belonging to the
Royalists, shot arrows at him, and killed him.
Ibid., 47,
6 6 , 81, 159-62, 163.
^ G e n e r a l John D'Evereaux was born in Ireland, but he
h a d become a citizen of the United States after he was exiled
from his native land as a result of the part he h a d taken in
the uprising of 1798.
He had been introduced to Bolivar in
Cartagena while employed as supercargo of a vessel loading at
this port, and he offered to raise an Irish Legion of five
thousand m e n for the Liberator and also provide the requisite
arms, ammunition, and military stores.
In return for this,
he w anted to be given a command with the rank of General of
Division and to be paid one hundred and seventy-five dollars
for each soldier he brought to Venezuela.
When these c o n 
ditions were granted, he returned to Dublin w i t h the rank of
Major General and started issuing commissions in the Irish
Legion.
D'Evereaux left for the N e w World months after his
Legion h a d departed and reached Venezuela.
Since he h a d
made no provisions for this Legion, the men suffered untold
hardships on the island of Margarita.
Consequently, they
defected and General D'Evereaux spent months trying to find
his "orphan legion."
While he was at Ctlcuta he managed to
pick a quarrel with General Antonio Narino, the Vice-P r e s i 
dent, over a supposed insult to General E n g l i s h ’s widow.
N arino ordered D'Evereaux confined to a dungeon.
In 1821 he
was h o norably acquitted by a Congressional committee of
inquiry and confirmed in his rank of Major General by Bolivar.
The Liberator even absolved h i m from any blame in the matter
of the defection of the Irish.
D'Evereaux remained in the
service of the Colombian army for two more years.
In 1823
he was appointed Colombian envoy extraordinary to the courts
of northern Europe.
While traveling in Italy for his health
in 1825, he was arrested by the Austrian authorities for his
role in the South American revolutions.
He was eventually
released by M e t t e m i c h on the request of the Duke of W e l l i n g 
ton.
Returning to the United States then, he lived on a
pension from the Venezuelan government until his death in
1854.
D'Evereaux was then buried at the National Pantheon
at Caracas.
Ironically, this m a n w h o never took part in a
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leaving with his troops, D'Evereux [sic, D'Evereaux] attended
a banquet that his friends gave for him in Dublin and there
he said he believed he was serving his country while fighting
in the provinces of South America,

a "land blessed by God and

damned by m a n , prodigious in all that nature can conced e ;
but wasted during centuries by the most frightening tyranny
that ever hurt or humiliated humanity."

This same year.

Colonel [George] Elsom [s i c , Elsam] and [James T.] English
also recruited two thousand and two individuals in Europe,
among which were three hundred G e r m a n s . A t

the same time

single engagement with the Irish Legion and whose sole c o n 
nection with this group lay in organizing it as a speculation
from which he made a considerable profit, has been char
acterized as the "Lafayette of South America."
Ibid., 137,
164, 165-67, 168, 170, 172, 186, 187, 257, 379, 384, 395,
401.
^ C o l o n e l George Elsam was authorized by Bolivar to
recruit one thousand men in London.
For this he was to be
paid fifty pounds sterling for every mam he lamded in South
America and receive the rank of colonel.
Elsaun found recruit
ing a relatively easy matter, for at this time the Allied
armies had been withdrawn from France and Belgium and many
regiments had been demobilized, thus leaving England full of
discharged soldiers.
He also enlisted many Germ am veterans
of the Napoleonic wars.
As soon as the men were recruited
and vessels were secured. Colonel Elsaun sent them to Vene
zuela.
He arrived there himself in April of 1819 with one
hundred amd ninety-two more men, raising the total number of
his commamd to seven hundred men.
Unfortunately, Elsaun was
not able to lead this force in battle, for he died soon after
landing.
I b i d .. 83, 85, 105, 112, 113, 115, 119.
Colonel James T. English had been authorized also by
Bolivar to recruit soldiers in Englamd under the same con
ditions as colonel Elsaun with reference to payment, except
that his rank was to be that of Brigadier General.
He made
especially alluring offers to both officers amd enlisted men,
promising them more pay, land gramts, amd bonuses.
Thus he
orgamized the British Legion.
On April 7, 1819 General
English arrived at Margarita.
There General Urdaneta claimed
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the Scotch General Mac Gregor brought six hundred m e n and
Colonel [FrancisT Meceroni
hundred.

12

*

[sic, Maceroni]

another three

we suppose that these British leaders were not

moved b y a spirit of avaricious ambition to abandon their
country to fight in favor of a people oppressed on the A m e r i 
can continent,

but rather b y the ambition of military glory,

an affinity for n e w and dangerous adventures,

and that

passion for excitement wh i c h makes the Englishman seem like
a crazy man sometimes and a hero at o t h e r s .
Some years after the independence of Colombia was won.
Lord Byron left the peace of the cities to go fight in the
mountains of Greece for a people who,

like the South A m e r i 

cans, w anted to win their independence.
understand w h y a Pole,

It is easy to

as a lyric Italian says in speaking

that the promises English h a d made his men were impossible
for the Republic to fulfill and that the Colonel k n e w that
w h e n he made these promises.
When his officers and men
mutinied,General English ordered the lash to be used on the
leaders and the m e n to be drilled in the h o t sun six hours a
day.
When General Urdaneta wo u l d not attack Agua Santa, he
assumed charge and responsibility and led the attack.
Colonel
English was defeated and even his own men blamed h i m for this
disastrous defeat.
Shortly afterwards, probably due to the
disgrace and remorse, he was sent back to Margarita and died
there of a fever.
Ibid., 82, 105, 112, 113, 115, 117, 124,
128, 129, 164, 171, 173, 382, 384.
^ C o l o n e l Francis Maceroni was an international soldier
of fortune w h o assisted Jos 6 Maria del Real, the diplomatic
agent from N e w Granada, in recruiting soldiers in England.
It was reported that for a sufficiently large amount of money,
he w o u l d bestow the baton of Field Marshall.
I b i d . . 139,
143-45, 148-49, 150.
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of his compatriots servi si m a oqnor frem e n t i . will fight
w herever an oppressed people raise the standard of l i b e r t y .
However,

13

it is not easy to understand why an Englishman, who

finds all the happiness a citizen can aspire to in his
country, will abandon it to aid oppressed p e o p l e . ^
can only be attributed to the noble character,
adventuresome,

This

determined and

of the descendants of that King w h o m they

called the Lion Hearted.

I am happy to have the opportunity

n o w to p a y tribute on m y country's behalf to the valiant
champions of the British Legion and the Battalion of Carabobo.
At this same time,

I want to openly express my deep ad m i r a 

tion for the English people to w h o m the world owes the belief
that it is possible for people to guide their own destenies
and to w h o m in addition humanity is in debt for many p h i l a n 
thropic institutions that honor them in the highest degree.
After the capture of Puerto Cabello, on December 9,
1823,

the first minister that the United States sent to

* 3The Italian phrase means "serve me yourself,
p l e a s e ."
l ^ a s b r o u c k does not find it h a r d to understand why
the English left their country to fight elsewhere.
After the
Battle of Waterloo, the reduction in the English army and
navy left literally thousands unemployed; consequently,
Hasbrouck states that "recruiting was a relatively easy
matter; for just at this time the allied armies had been w i t h 
drawn from France and Belgium, m a n y regiments h a d been d e m o 
bilized, and London, Liverpool, Manchester, Dublin amd Brus
sels were full of discharged soldiers, yearning for the free
companionships of the army, and eager for a renewal of their
lives of adventures."
Foreign L e g i o n a r i e s . 105,
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Colombia, Mr.
Bog o t a .1 5

[Richard C.] Anderson,

finally arrived in

On October 3, 1824 the first treaty between these

two countries was signed.

France and England had already

sent their representatives.
The peoples of South America, who counted on the inter
vention of the United States or felt that at least these
States would be obligated openly to facilitate means with
w h i c h to resist their European enemies, must not give much
value to the acts I have related.

This is because of that

doctrine which they say President Monroe proclaimed in one
of his messages.

If we did not see this doctrine invoked by

the North Americans relative to the Mexican Empire, we would
d e e m it unjust and unreasonable to exact from them the semiquixotic sacrifice of peace and exposure to the perils of war
in order to defend another nation threatened b y a foreign
power.
This Monroe Doctrine seems to have been interpreted in
two very different manners.

For some,

it represents a s u p 

posed right that a nation has of not letting another one take
possession of a territory that in case of a question of
ownership should belong to no one but her.

For others.

15Richard c. Anderson presented his credentials to
Santander on December 17.
He brought instructions to n e g o 
tiate a treaty of commerce in which the Colombian government
tried to include a compulsory arbitration clause that the
American government rejected.
Madariaga, Bolivar. 494, 551.
D e xter Perkins, The Monroe D o c t r i n e . 1823-1826 (Cambridge,
1927), 185.
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undoubtedly more generous,

it is the holy alliance of the

American peoples against the unjust pretensions of a league
of European governments.

However, history does not present

but one sole example of this principle being put into p r a c 
tice from the times of Monroe until those of President
[Andrew] Johnson.^-®
The idea behind that doctrine would have been great,
indeed sublime,

if it had been accepted more actively than it

has been until now,
following manner.

and if it h a d been formulated in the
It could have been a League of all the

Hispanic-American Republics dedicated to opposing all foreign
attempts to reestablish their monarchical reign in countries
where they had been defeated.

These Republics could also

have pledged their sacred respect to the territorial b o u n d 
aries in America so that none could extend their limits at
a n o t h e r ’s expense except by a transfer of property made in a
national congress.

In this manner an American equilibrium

could be maintained,

and no one would ever have accused the

noble eagle of the North unjustly of being the most voracious
of the birds of prey.
The peoples of South America with adjacent territories
or common interests would have formed alliances in case of

^6PAez refers here to the pressure put by the United
States on France immediately after the Civil War to get out
of Mexico.
Arthur P. Whitaker, The Western Hemisphere Ideat
Its Rise and Decline (New York, 1954), 66-67, 74.
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danger without being forced by any doctrine.

After all,

this has been and always will be the policy of wise govern
ments.

In this same manner, no one can prevent distant

peoples from manifesting their sympathies for any cause in
w h i c h they have no further interest them that which is
awakened by community of origin or similarity of political
i n s t i t u tions.
It is easy to understand w h y the United States could
not look with indifference at the consolidation of an imperial
government within the confines of her territory.

For the same

reason Spain could not ignore the establishment of a Repub
lic adjoining the Pyrrenes, nor another France on this side
of the La Mancha Canal,
Fenians in Ireland.

and England could not tolerate the

Perhaps the time has come when the

United States has to put into practice the so-called Monroe
Doctrine,

not out of respect to the republican ideal which

they represent in America,

but out of consideration for the

inconveniences to its political existence that the nearness
of a government whose principles are not analagous to theirs
could bring.
In case of danger,

the South American Republics should

not rely on anything but their own strength and at the most,
the assistance of their neighbor if it suits its interests.
Nearly all of these countries have long coastlines.
want to be prepared to resist foreign aggression,

If they

they must

fortify their ports well and try to form a fleet to help
defend them.
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When the so-called Holy Alliance was formed in Europe
to secure the thrones and defend the religious principles
which they proclaimed,

the emancipated peoples of America

believed their independence was threatened.

It was natural

for Spain to seek allies to reestablish her dominion in
America,

even though she might be forced to divide her terri

tories with them.

From this surged Bolivar's great idea of

forming an American confederation in order to pit a Holy
Alliance of the American Republics against the one of the
European Kings.

This confederation considered Spanish c o n 

trol over the islands of Cuba and Puerto Rico as a threat to
the life of the new Republics.

Consequently,

these same

Republics planned to use their combined efforts to free them
from the Hispanic yoke.
A plan was already in existence by 1825 in Mexico to
assemble an expedition in Florida,

if the united States p e r 

m itted it, destined to free Cuba.

The United States, Mexico,

Colombia,

Buenos Aires, Perti, Chile,

and Santo Domingo were

to contribute m e n and ships for this purpose.

Unfortunately,

the plan did not materialize beyond being a threat to Spain.
More successful was Bolivar's proposal to gather representa
tives from all the American nations on the isthmus of Panam&
— "Center of the globe which looks at Asia on one side and at
Africa and Europe on the other."

The United States was

invited to send delegates to that assembly,

and the govern

m e n t in Washington accepted the invitation, naming Seflores
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Richard C. Anderson and John Sergeant as c o m m i s s i o n e r s .^
The instructions given these men reveal the great prudence
w i t h which this great nation has always acted in serious
matters,

and the good faith and respect it holds for the

nations with which it lives in peace.

The advice that the

U nited States gave all the commissioners and the instructions
given its own were as follows.
The Congress of PanamA finally assembled.

Its results

l^It is interesting to note that President Adams
appointed these two m e n amidst many objections from Congress,
including that he was trying to involve the United States
in an entangling alliance.
While the Jacksonian Democrats
filibustered in their attempt to discredit A d a m s ' adminis
tration, Congress delayed this PanamA mission so long that
it became futile.
One of the American delegates died on the
w a y to the conference, and the other arrived after it was
over.
Ibid., 38, 41-42.
Perkins, The Monroe D o c t r i n e .
204-22.
18The author included a translation of the general
instructions given Anderson and Sergeant.
These are omitted
because a copy of the original instructions may be found in
H e n r y Clay, Spanish A m e r i c a . Observations on the Instruc
tions Given by the President of the United States of America
to the Representatives of that R e p u b l i c , at the congress
H e l d at Panamfr. in 1 8 2 6 : on the Conduct of M r . P o i n s e t t .
Minister of the United States in M e x i c o ; and Generally on
our Relations with Spanish A m e r i c a : with a copy of the
Instructions (London, 1829), 28-65.
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m a y be seen in what I copy from the work of the historian
[Cesar] C a n t u . 1 9
The Americans, inexperienced in public affairs,
jealous of a liberty that they still were not
familiar with and thus ignoring all the prudence it
requires, and unable to tolerate a social state
that would harness loose passions, could arrive at
nothing.
The North Americans attended this Congress, but
did not take part in its deliberations.
Chile was
agitated by internal turbulence.
Buenos Aires
rejected the idea of the convention.
Perd, or rather
Bolivia, was still not recognized as an independent
State.
Paraguay was isolated.
Brazil, having
declared its freedom in a different manner, was not
invited to attend.
Thus only the delegates from
Mexico, Guatemala, Colombia, and Perd swore to m a i n 
tain the perpetual federation; a popular, repre
sentative, and federal type republic; and a constitu
tion similar to that of the United States, except
that it did not grant religious tolerance.
I was in this part of my Memoirs when the diplomatic
correspondence about French intervention in Mexico between
the eminent statesmen Mr.
of France, Mr.

[William H.] Seward and the Minister

[Edmond] Druyn [s i c . Drouyn] de Lhuys, was

made p u b l i c . I

cannot resist the desire to insert an

IQ
.
.
.
X7Cesar Cantu was born in B n v i o , Italy on December 5,
1804 and died in Milan in 1895.
He was a historian, philos
opher, and poet who had embraced an ecclesiastical career
which he abandoned before he was ordained. When his father
died, he took over the task of supporting his large family of
ten children.
At seventeen he was already a grammar profes
sor.
In 1836 he started publishing his monumental storia
Unive r sale, which he finished in 1847 with a total of thirtytwo volumes.
Although Cantu wrote many other works on diverse
subjects, this is his most famous work.
A Spanish translation
of Storia Universale by Fern&ndez Cuesta was published in
Barcelona.
It is from this translation that P&ez is undoubt
edly quoting.
Enciclopedia Universal Ilustrada. XI, 279-81.

to Frederick Bancroft*
"One of the
striking facts connected with the negotiations about
^According
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extract from a document that is so precious to American
interests.

It states as follows in the section that refers

to the Monroe Doctrine and the accusations which have been
directed against Mexico for the anarchy which has reigned in
the country since its independence.
Wherever the peoples of a country have established
and subjected themselves voluntarily to a monarchical
institution of their own choice, free from all foreign
coercion or intervention, like in Brazil today or
M exico in 1822, the United States shall not refuse to
maintain relations with these governments nor try to
topple over such institutions by means of propaganda,
force, or intrigue.
On the other hand, if a nation
has established republican and domestic institutions
similar to ours, the United States shall maintain in
their favor that no foreign nation can legally inter
vene by force to subvert these Republican institutions
and establish those of an opposite character. . . .
Mr. Druyn [s i c . Drouyn] de Lhuys maintains that
M a x i m i l i a n 's government is undergoing the fate that
is very common to new powers, particularly since it has
the misfortune of having to endure the consequences of
the discords produced under the previous government.
Mr. Druyn [s i c . Drouyn] de Lhuys manifests that this
misfortune and this fate are in effect the m i s f o r 
tune and fate of governments that have not encountered
armed competitors and that have enjoyed an authority
during peace without any opposition.
He allegates
that revolutions and civil wars are the natural state
in Mexico.
He also insists that the opposition made
by some military caudillos against the establishment
of an empire under Maximilian is only a natural result
of the same lack of discipline and the same continua
tion of anarchy which have victimized those who have
preceded h i m in the government of Mexico.

intervention in Mexico is that the Monroe Doctrine, though
constantly appealed to at the time by the sensational n e w s 
papers and politicians, seems not once to have been mentioned
in any official dispatch from the United States government.
France violated the doctrine continuously for five years.
But Seward k n e w that it was no part of international law."
The Life of William H. S e w a r d . 2 vols. (New York, 1900),
II, 441.
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It is not the intent, nor would it matter to the
character of the United States, to deny that Mexico
has been the theatre for factions and internal wars
for a long time.
The United States confesses this
w i t h sorrow, so much more sincerely because Mexico's
experience has been painful not only to its own people,
but unfortunately served as a pernicious influence in
other nations.
On the other hand, the United States
would be unjust and would not be living up to the
friendship professed for Mexico if it dragged its past
calamities before these people or invoked or approved
the infliction of a punishment for its political errors
by a foreign nation.
The people of Mexico and their
status have peculiarities that are undoubtedly well
understood by France.
At the beginning of this century
they saw themselves forced by convictions which humanity
cannot but respect, to defeat a foreign monarchical
government which they deemed incompatible with their
well-being and growth.
They saw themselves forced at
the same time by convictions which the world must
respect, to test the establishment of Republican
institutions without the complete experience, practical
education, and usage which would necessarily assure the
success of these American institutions and i d e a s . They
h a d African slavery, colonial institutions, and eccle
siastical monopolies.
They shared the first one with
the United States, while we were happily exempt from
the o t h e r s .
We cannot deny that the anarchy in Mexico which Mr.
Druyn [s i c . Drouyn] de Lhuys complains of was necessary
and even wisely tolerated in the efforts made to e s t a b 
lish a sure base for full Republican liberty.
I do not
k n o w if we can expect France to agree with us in this
viewpoint which in our opinion mitigates the errors,
misfortunes, and calamities of Mexico.
However it may
be, we return again to the opinion we hold that no
foreign power can legally intervene in trials such as
those of Mexico, or that, under the pretext of wanting
to correct these errors, be able to deprive the people
of their natural right to domestic and Republican
liberty.
All the damages and wrongs that Mexico has
committed against any other State have already been
severely punished by the consequences that legitimately
followed their commission.
Nations are not authorized to correct each other's
errors except when it is necessary to avoid or unravel
a wrong that is very dear to them.
If one power has
the right to intervene in another to establish order,
constituting itself the judge of the occasion, then
each State has the same right of intervening in the
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affairs of other and being the only judge of the time
and occasion.
In this manner, carrying the principle
of intervention to its practical end, all sovereignty
and independence would come to be uncertain and false
and so would all peace and international friendship.
Everyone has to admire the diplomatic tact and good
faith with which this document handles the issue of having
the United States declare the meaning of the Monroe Doctrine.
Fortunate is the nation that can rely on men Lilce the one
who drafted this interesting document!
I shall end the chapter by translating what ex-president [James'] Buchanan has published on Mr.

[George} canning's

plan to oppose the projects of the Holy Alliance which
resulted in President Monroe's celebrated message.

21pAez's translation of what President James Buchanan
wrote relative to Mr. George Canning's plan is being omitted
because the original m a y be found in a section on the origin,
history, and nature of the Monroe Doctrine included in James
Buchanan, Mr. B u c h a n a n 1s Administration on the Eve of the
Rebellion (New York. 1866), 276-83.

C HAPTER XVII
Triumphal March from Puerto Cabello to Caracas —
Congress Orders the Drafting of Fifty Thousand
M e n — Revolutionary Movement in Petare— Claims of
Captain Dupotet of the French N a v y — My Replies—
My Proclamation Abolishing the Edict of the
Assembly.
1824-1825
On December 1, after leaving the plaza of Puerto
Cabello under the command of General [J u a n 3 Escalona,
M a r i n o B e r m d d e z , and I left Puerto Cabello and headed toward
Caracas.2

in the towns we passed along the way, we were

^-The author interjected the following footnote here.
“This general had accompanied me during the siege.
However,
when Bermtidez came w i t h reinforcements from Maracaibo, he
sent MarifSo to Caracas and La Guaira to bring a corvette that
was at the latter port and to ask General Soublette for r e 
sources with which to continue the siege.
Marino arrived
two days after the plaza was taken."
2General Juan Escalona was born in Venezuela and was
an untiring champion of the independence cause.
He figured
prominently in the early juntas in Caracas and in the battles
against Monteverde.
In July of 1811 he was a member of the
Congress that signed the Declaration of independence.
When
Monteverde took over Caracas after his treaty with Miranda,
Escalona joined Marino and accompanied him in the Oriente
campaign.
In 1814 he was with Marifio at the formidable
Battle of Bocachico.
He was in Valencia when it was beseiged
by Boves amd later fought bravely at the Battles of BogotA,
Chire, and Caflafistola.
In 1819 he was a member of the C o n 
gress of Angostura and Governor of Coro.
In 1824, in PAez's
absence, he was chief of Puerto Cabello.
By 1826 he was
Intendant of Caracas amd later Commissioner of the Departments
of Venezuela and Apure.
Scarpetta and Vergara, Diccionario
B i o o r A f i c o . 140.
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received with extraordinary demonstrations of enthusiasm and
joy.

The capture of the plaza that had been believed almost

impregnable, produced this great glee,

for the Royalista h a d

occupied it since the year XII [1812'] without the Republicans
being able to wrest it from them.

This spot, Santander said,

seemed enchanted and gave the uninformed a false idea of the
R e p u b l i c 's s t r e n g t h .
At the end of 1823,
Spanish obstinacy,

the fear still existed that

relying on the co-operation of the p a r t i 

sans of the old regime who had remained in the country, would
still try to reconquer the territory.

Congress then had to

take some precautionary security measures such as granting
extraordinary powers to the chiefs of the departments.

The

Executive authorized them to expel the Royalists from the
territory of Venezuela in the event of an outside invasion
or any armed commotion in any of the p r o v i n c e s .
Nothing noteworthy occurred in the Republic during the
year 1824 if we exclude the pursuit of those isolated parties
that in the name of Royalism,

such as the bandits of Calabria,

committed major atrocities without being caught.
the pathless terrains and hidden mountain paths,

Knowing
they eluded

the pursuing Republican troops or resisted them from such
advantageous positions,

that it was almost impossible to

attack them.
These bandit parties founded their hopes on the
promises made to them in the press by the raging Royalist
and unworthy Venezuelan who had taken refuge in Puerto Rico,
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Don Jos£ Domingo Dlaz.^

He told them that a formidable

expedition would arrive soon at the Venezuelan coast.

The

principle leaders of these bands were Jos4 DioniBio Cisneros,
Juan Centeno,

and Doroteo

Herrera.4

All of these officers

had distinguished themselves in the Royalist ranks and after
the Battle of Carabobo captained guerillas supporting the
"Catholic Monarch"
of Guarenas,

in the Tuy Valleys and in the Districts

Petare,

was Cisneros,

and Guires.

The most notable among them

the Fra-Diavolo of Venezuela.

He had been a

sergeant in M o r a l e s 'a troops amd had assembled a band of
thieves, claiming that a religious m a n from Caracas ordered
h i m to make

"war on all whites and acknowledge only Santander

3Don Jos£ Domingo Diaz has the reputation of being one
of Simdn Bolivar's severest critics.
The letters he wrote
and published in Puerto Rico chastized the Liberator so
vehemently, that the latter suffered some loss of prestige.
Diaz was also the author of Memoriae de la Rebelli 6 n en
Caracas (Madrid, 1829).
In this work he confessed that in
the beginning the Republican Government was not interested
in p e rsecuting or killing the Spaniards.
In this same work,
he greatly exaggerated the strength and number of B o v e s '
troops.
Lecuna, Crdnica R a z o n a d a . I, 69, 71-80, 283, 342-67.
Torrente, Historia de la R e v o l u c i d n . Ill, 569.
4jos6 Dionisio Cisneros is listed by the Spanish h i s 
torian Torrente as am Indian w h o led the Royalist forces in
the area of Santa Lucia, Charallave, and La Guaira de Paracotes.
Historia de la R e v o l u c i O n , III, 569.
Juan Celestino Centeno was the Commandant of the
Royalist forces in the Guires area.
Torrente mentions h i m
as a pardo of quality.
He had been an infantry Captain and
Commandant of Arms in the town of Valle de Pascua until the
revolutionists occupied that territory in 1821.
In 1824 he
became the Royalist Commandant of the Lealtad Battalion and
was promoted to Colonel.
I b i d .. 572.
Doroteo Herrera was also a p a r d o . He was named C o m 
m a nder of the Lanceros squadron which was composed of two
h u n dred and thirty men armed with lances.
I b i d .. 572-73.
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as the true defendor of the Spanish throne"
Further on in this narrative we

(Torrente).^

will have occasion to

deal

w i t h these bandits again.
When the war ended,

it was necessary to dismiss a

great part of the troops that had served under m y orders.
Since the treasury of the Republic was unable to p a y these
me n in coin,

they were given instead,

according to their rank,

a certain number of cavalry horses and cattle taken from the
confiscated Royalist herds.

The men receiving these h a d to

themselves take possession of the animals that had been given
in payment for their services.

From this arose great d i s 

orders which Senor Restrepo has not hesitated to label as
armed robbery.6

Cattle were slaughtered in such great n u m 

bers for their hides and fat,

that the llaneros constructed

barricades at the gates of the corrals w i t h their skeletons.
Truthfully,

there were times when those herding the cattle

resorted to violence in order to take possession of unbranded
cattle belonging to some farmers.

These disturbances,

a

result of an Imprudent amd thoughtless governmental order,
forced me to take certain measures,

such as forming overnight

camps which under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Facundo
Mirabal quickly put an end to the disturbances and r e 
established order in the Apure territory.

5

I b i d .. 580-81.

6Restrepo,
Ill, 413-14.

Revolucidn de la Republica de C o l o m b i a .
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On M a y
thousand men,

6

, 1824 Congress ordered the drafting of fifty

for rumors were spreading that the European

H o l y Alliance was threatening to destroy the independence of
the n e w States.

Congress was also considering sending troops

to Perti where the Liberator urgently needed help to free that
country from the considerable Spanish forces occupying it.
Consequently on August 20,

I sent a division of two thousand

six hundred and forty-four men under the command of colonel
Jos4 Gregorio Monagas from Puerto Cabello destined for
Perti.7
The need for supporting troops outside the territory
of the State and the fears of a new Spanish expedition made
it necessary for the Vice-President of the Republic,
Santander,

General

to order a general draft of all the citizens for

the purpose of forming a militia corps or filling those

^Colonel Jos4 Gregorio Monagas was born in Maturln in
1795 and was General Josd Tadeo Monagas's brother.
He en
listed his efforts in the revolutionary movement in 1810 and
fought his first battle against the Royalists in March of
1813 at Maturln against Fern&ndez de la Hoz.
He was destined
to fight here again in M a y of the same year against General
Monteverde and in October and December of 1814 against General
Morales.
He also fought in the Battles of Bocachica, Arado,
La Puerta, Carabobo, and Urica.
Governor Gorrino, Colonel
Ldpez, and Generals Morales, Morillo, and La^Torre felt his
military strength in the Battles of Carraqueno, Alacran,
Juncal, Calabozo, and S 6 men.
After independence was won,
Monagas put u p his sword until the movements of 1831 and 1836
wh e n he came out in their support.
In 1646 he was a c a n 
didate for the Presidency of Venezuela but was defeated; h o w 
ever, he was elected to this h i g h office in 1854.
This very
year h e h a d Congress declare all the slaves free.
In 1858
his enemies h a d h i m imprisoned in Puerto Cabello where he
died of natural causes.
Scarpetta and Vergara, Diccionario
B i o g r & f i c o , 336-37.
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already established.

This decree was not well received,

and

it fell my lot as Commandant General of the Departments of
Caracas and Apure to enforce it.

To m y detriment,

I had to

carry this out despite the observations of the recorder and
the Municipality of Caracas.
The Intendant of Venezuela,

General Juan Escalona,

offered me his assistance in carrying out the governmental
measure.

I called the citizens together so that they would

agree to the draft.

Only a few came,

convene them again on January

6

.

and I was forced to

Since they did not obey the

decree even then, perhaps encouraged by the leniency with
which I proceeded,

I was forced to send small detachments

from the Anzodtegui and Apure Battalions to bring the
citizens they found in the streets to the convent of San
Francisco.

Escalona offered to enforce enlistment on these.

It was then 1 suspended the order I had given previously.
The following day,

the Intendant, pretending to be a jealous

defender of the rights of the people, wrote to the Executive
denouncing as abusive the measures I had taken to carry out
the governmental orders.

The Municipality of Caracas e x 

pressed similar complaints.

From this was born the accusa

tion against me that I shall deal with in one of the
following chapters.
On December

6

, 1825 a revolutionary movement of d oubt

ful character broke out in the village of Petare,
leagues away from the capital.

two

The anxiety which is habitual

among some people of always fearing caste revolutions found
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an opportune occasion in this act for increasing the value
of money.

This was the significance later given to the

tumult of Petare.
alarmed,

Since the capital and its tribunals were

they sent a commission composed of Colonel

(then)

Diego Ibarra and Dr. Cristobal Mendoza, Minister of the
Superior Court,
C aracas.8

to Maracai where I was and asked me to go to

Carried away by their unfounded fears,

they

imagined that there was a conspiracy of great ramifications,
and they wanted to be supported by m y presence during the
proceedings and different judicial inquiries which had
already been started.
twelve persons,
matters,

I went,

and I called a meeting of

selected for their knowledge in judicial

to examine the dispatch and give me their opinion

on what I should do.

These men told me that it was not a

clear case of conspiracy,

and that therefore it would be

8Don Cristobal Mendoza was born in the city of T r u 
jillo, Venezuela in 1772.
He was an intellectual who
embraced the ideals of the revolution as soon as it broke
out in 1810.
He was a member of the Supreme Junta, the Fed
eral Congress, and of the Triumvirate that represented the
Executive Power of Venezuela.
In 1812 he was forced to e m i 
grate to Santa F 6 . Later the same year Bolivar named h i m
Governor of the Province of Cdcuta.
in 1814 h e presided
over the junta at Caracas that judged Bolivar's conduct.
Also in 1814, he was forced to emigrate to Jamaica.
There
he wrote under the pseudonym of Un P a t r i o t s . In 1821 Dr.
M e ndoza returned to Caracas and was elected Minister of the
Supreme Court.
P&ez's political movement of 1826 did not
meet with his approval or support.
He died in Caracas in
1829, an impoverished m a n . it is interesting to note that in
addition to his political career. Dr. Mendoza fathered six
teen children.
Ibid., 318-19.
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wiser not to give it great importance.

Realizing that the

event was not really of the magnitude imagined and that it
h a d assumed its gravity from unjust warnings,

1

also con*

vinced myself of the need of preventing our society from
being deeply perturbed by the indefinite prosecution of a
lawsuit that was assuming such an alarming character.
order to do this,

In

I removed the lawsuit to a superior court,

which I was able to do in my capacity as Commandant General
of the Department.

Militarily,

I ended the affair by

punishing only three of the principal offenders and thus
left ineffective the actions involving a great number of
persons.
Immediately after I issued a proclamation on December
21 in w hich 1 announced h o w I had evaluated the event.

1

revealed my conviction that the evil character and magnitude
attributed to this revolution stemmed from fearful suspicions.
I stated that patriotism was invoked at times in a torturous
manner,

amd that the public tramquility could not only be

disturbed by the enemies of the State,
geration of spontaneous fears.

Also,

but also by the exag
I let it be known that

my authority would not take into account a p e r s o n 1s rank if
I were forced to use this authority.

Finally I sealed the

matter with a general and absolute pardon to end the anxiety
of all those who were afraid, and I signed it on the follow
ing day, December 22.

With this, confidence was restored

and the capital breathed easily once more.
acts m a y be found in Volume

6

(Both of these

on pages 107 and 109 of the
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ColecciOn de Documentoa Relativo a la Vida Ptkblica del
L i b e r t a d o r .)9

Thus ended the alarming Petare revolution.

Had it been handled by tribunals,

it could have enveloped

the country in hatreds and persecutions and carried many
citizens to the gallows.
Despite the prudence with which 1 proceeded in this
affair,

a deputy from Caracas, Dr. Jos£ Antonio P£rez, wanted

to accuse me before the Senate.

Because of this,

I directed

the following address to the Executive Power of the Republic.
MOST EXCELLENT SENOR VICE PRESIDENT:
I k n o w from a respectable source that Dr. Jos6
Antonio P&rez, deputy from Caracas, has moved in the
House of Representatives that 1^ be accused before the
Senate for having declared Venezuela under martial
l a w : and with reference to the occurrence at Petare,
stated that 1 was dominated bv a faction from C a r a c a s .
as if to prove by this that I did not take all the m e a 
sures required out of consideration for the declared
faction.
This is an atrocious, unpardonable insult
which can only be aborted b y the most vehement passions
and which holds out as most important that I consider
the least.
This is especially so when one considers
that the lawsuit was conducted according to the govern
mental decrees of the Military Commandant of Caracas
and in which all persons who participated in that event
appeared.
Truthfully, there was not a person there I
k n e w and by whom it is supposed I was dominated.
This
proposition was supported by the other deputies of the
same province, except for Dr. Osio.
When a deputy advances such a bold proposition in
Congress as to accuse me before the nation just a few
minutes after I contributed, along with m y conrades in
arms, to its independence in the best w a y I could, let
us go beyond the ingratitude surrounding this act to
examine the motive for the honorable Dr. P 6 r e z 's
accusation.

^This citation m a y be found as the author states.
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In the first p l a c e , it should be noted that this
m e a sure has been found strange only when I p u t it
into practice.
It has never been opposed by any
m ember of the government during the very recent times
w h e n these very departments and others in the Republic
have been placed under martial law and when we generals
of a superior rank have obeyed those of an inferior
rank.
However, it seems that the ways of military men
are appreciated only in times of dangers, and found
annoying when these dangers are no longer feared.
The insults made to a m a n in public life resulting
from an administration are not the kind directed to a
private individual.
In the latter case generosity or
scorn can take place, but in the former case it is not
possible to put their vindication aside according to
the laws that govern us.
I can at least p a y m y gratitude to the majority of
Congress that set aside Senor Pferez'a proposition.
However, I cannot continue being worthy of the c o n f i 
dence of the public and of the government unless this
m a tter is made known with all the dignity w h i c h is due
the government itself and a General of the Republic
w h o does not have the slightest reason for concealing
even the least imputation.
This is to be considered
even less if attention is paid to the fact that
governments should act on qualified events and not on
invectives or conjectures, for then no citizen will be
able to depend on his individual security.
I shall not cite persons nor singular events.
I
invoke the testimony of the departments in which this
measure was necessary, and I challenge my adversary to
present one single person before me that was molested
b y the military during the period about which we are
speaking.
On the contrary, there are some who grasped
it as a refuge from the civil authority.
H o w much blood
would have been shed in the capital of Caracas if I had
followed the advice of some men of letters and of those
who, unaccustomed to fight against the enemy on the
field of honor, seek this fight from across their desks
in the midst of peace, wanting to avenge personal
injuries under the sacred pretext of the public cause.
Senor P4rez should prove the reasons he has h a d to
accuse m e before Congress, and name the faction to
wh i ch he refers.
If he has enough data to do so in a
legal argument, I will submit myself to the law.
Other
wise, I want a public testimony exonorating me from the
accusation.
While a decision is pending, I ask the
government to relieve me from the office of Commandant
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General of the Department of Venezuela and from the
task of directing the war, where I frequently find
obstacles which oppose the reverence due its very
authority.
It must be well understood that it will
not be sufficient for the Executive Power alone to
show itself satisfied with my procedures.
I beg Your Excellency to take this matter through
all the channels of law, keeping in mind that I am
determined not to yield in anything I have expounded.
God keep Your Excellency many years.
p

Ae z

Achaguas, March 28, 1825.
The response I received to the above address is the
one that follows*
OFFICE OF THE N A V Y AND WAR-CENTRAL DEPARTMENT
Palace of the Government in Bogota
June 7, 1825 — X V
To the Most Excellent Senor General in Chief, Jos6 A.
P&ez.
I have had the honor to answer in the government
office Your Excellency's letter dated in Achaguas this
past March 28, where you ask to be removed from the
office of Commandant General of Venezuela and that of
conducting the war which has been entrusted to you
because of the motion made by the honorable Deputy Jos6
Antonio P4rez to the House of Representatives proposing
that Your Excellency be accused before the Senate for
having declared the Department under your command under
martial law and for other declarations that arose out
of the occurrence in Petare.
You demand legal proof,
or in its stead, a public testimony which will p u t Your
Excellency's conduct in this instance out in the open.
I have received orders to answer Your Excellency as
followst
'Article 66 of the Constitution is opposed to
the very worthy General P&ez's entreaty and just as
this chief should rest easy in the judgment he owes the
Executive Power, he should also be satisfied by the fact
that in this case the House of Representatives rejected
Deputy P6rez's motion.
This proves that it did not
find it just and that consequently the conduct of the
Commandant General of Venezuela is believed to be
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according to the law and circumstances.'
I enclose
the above resolution from the Executive Power in
answer to Your Excellency's entreaty.
God keep Your E x c e l l e n c y , etc.
PEDRO GUAL.
On January 10,

1825 a French squadron presented itself

before Puerto Cabello.
two schooner brigs,

It was composed of a frigate of sixty,

and a schooner.

of navy Captain Dupotet.

It was under the command

He had barely sounded the depths

of the water, when he sent a communique to the naval C o m 
mandant General of this port asking him for satisfaction in
the name of Admiral Julien, who was Commandant at this time
of the French Antilles.

This was to be for the supposed

insult he said had been given in front of Portobelo by the
Commandant of the frigate Venezuela to the Commandant of the
French schooner G a z e l l e , forcing the latter to send an
officer on board. ' In addition,

this Admiral demanded the

return of all the cargo of the merchant corvette Urania that
h ad been captured with Spanish goods on board b y the captains
of the corsairs Poli-Hampton and C e n t e l l a .
The tone in which this Captain formulated these unjust
claims,

addressing subordinates rather than the government

of the Republic,

together w i t h the violation of our coastal

area by those foreigners,

even after satisfactory answers

were made by the naval Commandant General of Puerto Cabello,
made me exceedingly angry.
Department of Venezuela,

As commandant General of the

I demanded an explanation from the

chief of the French squadron.

With the dignity warranted by
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the occasion,

I reminded h i m that the Venezuelans had the

constancy necessary to defend their rights when foreigners
did not know h o w to respect them.
The Frenchman left the coast of Ocumare free.

Since

he directed these unjust claims later to the supreme govern
ment of the Republic,

the latter answered h i m in almost the

same terms that I had at the beginning.
Prior to this event,

the Spanish Captain Don jos£ del

Cotarro had presented himself in La Guaira in order to turn
over the brigantine Roma Libre to the Colombian government.
He had become disgusted seeing that the constitutional system
in Spain had been defeated and that the absolute regime had
been reinstated.

He brought a cargo of Negroes on his ship,

and they were freed immediately.
After citing the above events,

Restrepo states

As much because of the combined attack by France
and Spain that had been feared in Venezuela, as because
of some movements that were perceived in Baruta and
Tucupido, in the Sombrero and in other points in that
section of the Republic, it was feared that the peace
could be disturbed.
Commandant General P&ez was
authorized, consequently, with extraordinary powers by
the National Executive dating from the early days of
this y e a r — an authorization that was later amplified
on March 17 in accord and with the consent of Congress.
It was believed, not without sufficient reasons, that
a considerable part of the territory of Colombia, far
from the center which occupied such an advanced p o s i 
tion and which contained so many elements of discord,
would be unable to remain quiet unless there was a
strong and immediate power to keep a vigil in preserving
order.
However, the frequent declaration of e x t r a 
ordinary powers, and the ability of said departments to

iORevolucidn de la. Republica de C o l o m b i a . Ill, 457-58.
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declare martial law, made the Venezuelan lover of
liberty angry despite the good use that General
P&ez made of the extensive power conferred on him.
The decree mentioned dated March 17 was a reason
for avoiding the clamors of the municipality of
Caracas, which addressed the House of Representa
tives to complain against the Executive Power.
While this step did not produce consequences, it
increased the discontent against the central gover n 
ment at a time when it still did not possess the
necessary strength because of its newness and because
it had barely been recognized.
(Page 457, Volume 3,
History of C o l o m b i a .)
On March 8, 1825 I issued a proclamation in whi c h I
gave an account of all these events,
state of the Republic.

and of the interior

In it I revealed the reasons that

h a d compelled me to declare the Departments of Venezuela and
Apure under martial law at a time when the Republic was
threatened by an invasion of two thousand men which the
Peninsula thought to send against Colombia and which had
already been assembled on the Canary Isles.

The procl a m a 

tion states t h u s :
Jos6 Antonio P&ez, one of the liberators of
Colombia, decorated with the Medal of Puerto Cabello,
General-in-Chief of the armies of the Republic, C o m 
mandant General of the Department of Venezuela, and
Director of War in the Departments of Venezuela and
Apure, etc., e t c .
Although the inhabitants of the departments where
I direct the war surely are not unaware of the reasons
that led me to declare martial law, according to the
edict of November 29 of the past year, 1 find the need
very much in accordance with the principles that govern
us to express, although succintly, the reasons for
adopting these measures, just as there are reasons
now to rescind them.
News that h a d been verified by different sources
that there was a foreign expedition in the Antilles
was sufficient cause, if not to imagine that the
designs on the part of that government were completely
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hostile, at least to call the attention of the m i l i 
tary authorities who were charged with the defense
of the Departments of the Republic.
The news from
Spain that some forces were set aside to go to America,
and the fact that there were war ships in Habana were
sufficient in themselves to merit some precautionary
measures.
A movement that took place just a short time ago in
the vicinity of the capital of Venezuela confirmed the
need for martial law.
The need for measures to stop
the progress of the Guires faction demanded that a
military government exist during the time it was being
destroyed.
Some domestic arrangements pertaining to
the formation of am armed force encountered obstacles
in the diversity o f jurisdiction.
It was for these
reasons that it was believed necessary to declare the
Departments of Venezuela and Apure under martial law.
Fortunately, circumstances have changed and now permit
the reestablishment of affairs to the state in which
they should be in accordance with the laws of the
Republic.
Some debates with the chief of a French naval force
have made known the care given to certain claims with
respect to its commerce until now.
According to the
last communications, to these are added the securities
of the general government of the Republic.
The opera
tions of our adversaries by themselves did not demand
great efforts until now.
However, this does not mean
they are looked upon with indifference by those
entrusted with the security of this territory.
The occurrence near the capital, which has been m e n 
tioned, ended happily as all have seen it as an absurd
project.
There were not any persons involved in it in
any state who were capable of causing the government
anxiety.
Had there been any, though, they could have
been deterred by the good conduct of the existing
military authorities.
By virtue of this, I have deemed it convenient to
abolish, as I do abolish in the present decree, the
measure I adopted for the previously-cited month of
November, of declaring the Departments of Venezuela and
Apure under martial law, which was verified then
according to Articles 1 and 5 of the decree of August 15,
1824.
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The military authorities of Venezuela and Apure
shall publish and fulfill the present order.
A c h a g u a s , March 8, 1825 — XV.
JOSE ANTONIO P A E Z .
FRANCISCO CARABANO,

Secretary.

CHAPTER XVIII
Accusation Before the Colombian Senate— General
Santander's Apparent Dupli c i t y — The Saddest Period
of My Public Life— Pronouncement of the Venezuelan
M u n i c ipalities— The Towns Become Anxious for Reforms
— Assembly in the Convent of San Francisco de
Caracas.
1826
When a nation such as ours has won its independence,
three types of actors are w o n t to appear on the political
scene.

The first type includes those who w i t h sword or pen

fought for the fatherland during the struggle and aspire to
collect the prize for their efforts and fatigues,

for not

all men are satisfied as were Cincinatus and Washington with
posthumus glory and the appreciation of generations.

It is

very common to find this type among those who had been
caudillos in the military armies,

and who in peace time still

maint a ined the severity of character that became habitual
while commanding the armies.

These men very quickly alienated

the will of the people who regarded them as little tyrants
aspiring to rule them.
The second type is composed of those men who took no
p a r t in the fighting but still aspired later to occupy high
positions in the government of the nation.
positions,

To attain these

they constitute themselves as censors of the
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government,
affairs,

denouncing the faults of those who direct public

and slandering those who served the country during

its most destitute times.
To the third type belong those w h o adhere to the old
order of things.

Of them it m a y be said that it was only

sheer force that made them accept the change.

Vengefully,

they strive to prove with their conduct h o w little society
has gained from the n e w organization given to it.
These were the elements that already composed the
C olombian people when the old rulers were expelled from the
country.

The person in charge of directing internal policy

w ould have to deal with them.
The exaggerated enthusiasm of some men also serves
sometimes as an obstacle

to the peaceful march of society

which needs the union of

all its members to organize in

stable manner,

and to carry out the necessary reforms.

a
These

individuals imprudently go forth proclaiming flattering
theories that the people accept with enthusiasm,
flatter their passions.

From this stems the fact that anarchy

is wont to follow the conquest of independence.
vain to preach the modus

It is in

in r e b u s . for a n e w country is

an individual in his youtht
p a s t until,

for these

it disdains the lessons of

at the cost of innumerable evils,

like
the

it acquires an

esqjerience it pays for very dearly.
After 1814 and 1815, when the Republican governments
were dissolved in Venezuela and N e w Granada after the d i s 
asters suffered by the patriots,

forces had been raised in
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these two territories to combat the common enemy.
forced by circumstances, had acted independently,
was no central government.
in one province,

The chiefs,
for there

When the patriots were conquered

they would go fight the Royalists in another.

Here they would unite their forces with those operating in
that territory out of a spirit of patriotism and not because
of any governmental order.

Venezuela and N e w Granada for

their mutual interest lent each other aid.

However, the

thought of uniting the two territories under one sole autho
rity did not come about until December 17, 1819 when the
Venezuelan Congress proclaimed the Republic of Colombia.
Its constitution was adopted later by another Congress that
m et in Cdcuta on August 30,

1821 and recognized a supreme

government.
The vast extent of Colombian territory,

the very diffi

cult communications between the provinces and the central
government that was established in Bogota,

and the jealousies

and rivalries between the Venezuelans and the N e w Granadans,
all indicated that the Republic of Colombia would have a very
ephemeral existence.
now,

In this period that we are dealing with

the symptoms of an inevitable separation were already

being felt--a separation that sooner or later would have to
be carried out without anyone being able to stop it.
I have already stated earlier that as a result of the
measures I took to fulfill the urgent governmental draft
orders,

the Municipality of Caracas accused me of having

exceeded my authority by using violent measures.

Letters
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w e r e sent from that c i t y to its deputies in Bogota.
latter cre a t e d a terrible scandal in the House
sentatives].

Hie

[of R e p r e 

The clergyman [juan Nepomuceno] Azuero

figured among m y p r i n c i p l e enemies in this instance w h i l e
Doctors O s i o and A r v e l o defen d e d m e . 1

One of the latter p r o 

p o s e d that the E x e c u t i v e ask immediately for information on
the h a p p e n i n g s in Caracas,

and for the provisions that I

m i g h t have dict a t e d on this affair.
approved,

the Presi d e n t of the House sent am official letter

to General Santander,
tive,

W h e n this prop o s a l was

V i c e - P r e s i d e n t in charge of the E x e c u 

a sking for this information.

However,

anxious to

^No additional information was available on Doctors
O s i o and Arvelo.
J u a n Ne p o m u c e n o Azuero was b o r n in Socorro in F e b r u 
ary of 1780.
He studied at the Cole j i o s del Rosario and the
Se m i n a r y of B o g o t a w h e r e he got his orders to serve as a
p r i e s t in the town of Guanare in the Orients l l a n o s . Here
he w o n the h a t r e d of the Spanish Governor Bobadilla for his
love of the Indians and his attempts to h e l p civilize them.
In 1809 he became p a r i s h p r i e s t at Anapoima.
He allowed his
re p u b l i c an and independent ideas to be k n o w n and consequently
w a s r e c a l l e d to Bogota and imprisoned by b o t h the e c c l e s i a s t i 
cal and p o l i t i c a l authorities.
While in Bogota, however, he
w a s still instrumental in formulating the revolution w h i c h
broke out J u l y 20, 1810.
On this d a y w h e n he saw that the
p e o p l e w e r e n o t e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l y su p p o r t i n g the independence
m o v e m e n t out of fear of V i c e r o y Amar, b e l i e v i n g h i m to be
sacred and holy, he forced h i m to go to the top of one of
the p u b l i c buildings and showed h i m to be the h u m a n being he
r e a l l y was.
W h e n M o r i l l o was b a c k in power, A z u e r o fled and
d i d n o t return until after the Battle of Boyaca in 1819.
Then for twenty y e a r s h e served as a m e m b e r of the national
Congresses.
He was o n c e elected to serve as the Bisho p of
Antioquia, but he refu s e d this post.
He d i e d on J u l y 1,
1857.
S c a r p e t t a and Vergara, D i c c i o n a r i o B i o g r a f i c o . 35.
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mediate the affair further, or so General Santander told me
in one of his letters, he did not give the information as
quickly as my accusors wanted it.

In the meantime a very

strong representation from the Municipality of Caracas,
directed to the House,

arrived; and information was once

again demanded from the Executive.

The latter then had to

manifest to the House on February 19,

"that there was no

clear evidence that I had ordered houses to be leveled or
those who refused to be drafted fired upon; that it was not
an infringement of the law to force lazy citizens to obey a
government order as long as they were not mistreated or
forcibly pulled from their homes; and that the accusor had
not proven that I h a d ordered the excesses on which the
accusation was based."
The Executive further stated;
The case requires prudence at all cost today more
than ever;
the common enemies can invade us, for they
have the means.
Venezuela has an infinite number of
points of easy access*
and the Spanish frequently plan
to attack, counting on the fact that there are suffi
cient numbers in their favor.
The immigrants who have
lost their properties come from that territory; and
some enemy guerrillas concert their efforts to multiply
our difficulties and to occupy our attention.
In
these circumstances, if the enemy had the assurance of
n ot finding General P&ez at the head of the Republican
army of Venezuela, their invasion could be quick and
their success less doubtful.
General P&ez enjoys an
unquestionable reputation as a soldier; and the enemy,
because of this, fears him and has half the battle lost.
I do not want to infer by this that we should sacrifice
our laws and rights as citizens for the convenience of
m aintaining a general in the Venezuelan army who,
although of military value, obstructs the march of the
legal regime.
No, indeed; we must save our laws and
save our rights as citizens; but let us not sacrifice a
citizen without the corresponding evidence--especially
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a citizen worthy of public esteem.
Our first obliga
tion is to save ourselves from the Spanish knife, and
the honorable House knows h o w many sacrifices are made
or should be made on the altars of our physical ex i s 
tence.
Despite everything,

the House admitted the accusation.

Then the matter was taken before the Senate which vacillated
the first days on whether to continue the case or wait for
the documents that the Executive offered for its briefing.
Meanwhile a letter was received in the Senate from the Secre
tary of the House asking for complete copies of the official
letters from the Intendant of Caracas, Escalona.

These were

remitted.
In a letter dated May 10 of that year Santander told
me as follows:^
My opinion gathered from everyone with whom I have
talked to about the matter, including your very enemies,
was that the accusation was light and that new proofs
must be awaited, for the personal security and honor of
a citizen, whosoever it might be, should not be at the
m ercy of such destructive information.
The President
of the Senate and Colonel Pinango seem to be very much
against you*
so despite the fact that four Senators
worked to defer the matter, the accusation was admitted
on the terms you may have seen.
According to what they
have told me, this is all that has occurred.
I can
assure you that justice, perhaps even more them friend
ship, has made me take the prudent path I have followed,
for if I h a d not seen the faults they proclaimed in your
procedure and later found them to be so, 1 would have
been the first to speak out against you out of love for
the laws and for public vengeance.
I have had a declara
tion taken from old Gdmez here, which is good, and I
have sent it to the commission familiar with the cause.
I k now you have already risen above this event with the

^What the author cites here are excerpts from a letter
which Santander wrote him from Bogota on the date cited.
A
copy of the entire letter may be found in Archivo Sant a n d e r .
XIII-XIV, 322-24.

500
same serenity with which you have faced death in
battles.
I am certain that you will come out v i c 
torious, and I would be willing to bet m y life on it.
The Senate will have many n e w members this coming
year, and those members w h o do remain, although they
m a y have voted to admit the accusation, are not
malicious men anxious to ruin you.
In part these men
have proceeded as instigated by the vigorous dec l a m a 
tions of almost all the deputies from Caracas, for a
good m a n is easy to deceive and a d v i s e .
I have told you to bring many documents from Caracas
to belie the imputations of the accusation.
You do not
ne ed a lawyer here, for you will find all the means
necessary for making a victorious defense.
After obtain
ing the absolution, there will be time to make an e n e r 
getic, but moderate, manifesto of your conduct, under
the constitutional regime, concerning the origin of
this persecution, your submission to the laws you have
defended with your sword, and all the rest that shall
occur then.
These steps will honor you as much or more
than the glories you have known how to exact from your
enemies.
Nothing you could do could lose you as c o m 
pl etely as any act of disobedience to the Senate.
The
latter would be a blot that would stain your reputation
eternally.
I cannot think you capable of such p r o 
cedure.
I judge you as I do because I k n o w your
character and your heart, and I will be responsible for
your submission to anything that emanates from the
'constituted authorities.'
Almost at this same time, on July 15, General Santander
wrote Bolivar the confidential letter which m a y be seen on
page 210, Volume
L i b e r t a d o r .^

6

of the Documentos de la Vida Pdblica del

This letter was directed entirely to making

the m o st unjust charges against me.

Perhaps he believed he

was fulfilling his duty when he committed an injustice out
of misinformation.

Unfortunately,

frequent in rulers subject,

this is an error rather

as are all men,

to the falli

b i lity of their judgments.

3This letter, referring to P & e z 1s "scandalous and in
subordinate conduct," m a y be found as the author states in
Coleccidn de D o c u m e n t o s .
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When I saw that [Francisco!] Soto and other Representa
tives and Senators who were considered S a n t a n d e r ’s echoes in
both houses were decidedly against me,

1

felt

1

had a strong

argument to accuse Santander of not proceeding with the jus
tice he professed in his letters.^

if Santander had expressed

one sole w o r d in good faith against what they were doing, not
only would they not have taken sides against me,
w o u l d have been for me.

but they

This is especially so when in my

w a y of thinking Santander was obligated to be on my side,
for the accusation against me stemmed from the actions I
took to execute his own decree of the Rules of the Militias

^Francisco Soto was born in 1789 in Cticuta.
He
received his law degree in March of 1807.
While a law stu
dent he h a d become an ardent Republican and joined the revo
lutionary movement in 1810.
In 1813 he presented himself to
Bolivar as a soldier.
The Liberator immediately added him
to his staff as secretary and sent h i m to Tunja to ask C o n 
gressional permission to follow the army to Venezuela.
In
1815 he was Lieutenant Governor of El Soccorro.
During the
emigration after Spanish reoccupation, Soto remained sick
and abandoned the Guasdualito.
There the Spanish General La
Torre, though knowing Soto's affiliation with the revolution,
h ad h i m treated and cured by his personal physician.
He
subsequently served as Secretary in the staff of colonel
Galea, J. A. Romero, and Ramdn N. P 6 rez.
In 1819 he was
named Governor of Pamplona, and he served with the justice
and w isdom for which he was well known.
He was subsequently
elected to be a member of the Congresses of 1823, 1824, 1825,
and 1826.
Later he was Attorney General in the Cundinamarca
Tribunal.
He opposed Bolivar's dictatorship and was exiled
until 1830.
He then became Governor of Pamplona again and
opposed Urdaneta's dictatorship.
In 1832 and 1837 he served
as Secretary of State and as member of Congress again in
1838 and 1839.
Favoring amnesty for the revolutionists of
1839, he was imprisoned.
He was freed by Generals Mosquera
and Herrin and returned to Cdcuta in 1842.
Soto died on
February 1, 1845.
Scarpetta and Vergara, Diccionario
B i o g r A f i c o . 598-600.
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which had encountered opposition in Caracas and which he had
not suspended despite the fact that Congress had passed a
law organizing the militia on a different basis.
Well then, my desire to execute this decree by using
armed patrols on the streets to catch the recalcitrants was
nothing more or less than what was done in Bogota every
Sunday in Santander's very presence without it scandalizing
h i m or anyone else,

and without it appearing as a violation

of public liberties and the rights of the peoples to congress.
Naturally, he should have used all his influence to protect
the provisions

made by a chief who had done nothing more than

obey him.

from having this reasoning, he added insult to

Far

injury by naming Escalona, my accuser,

to succeed me.

According to statute, he should not have even been in the
running for this post when other older generals,
rank,

still h a d no positions.

imprudent measure.

of higher

I was deeply hurt by this

Despite the support I could count on in

m y Department to reject such humiliation,

1 acknowledged my

successor on April 29.
I enter a period now that is painful for m e — a period
of memories that still torment me and that I wish 1 could
erase from the

book of m y life.

that

that could be asked of an honest man after he

1

did all

has committed a fault,

1

say this despite the fact

and that is to sacrifice his pride on

the altars of justice and confess to the whole world, without
m a k i n g excuses,
moments.

the error he committed during some hasty

I said this very thing in 1837.

During the
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Colombian period,

I always held high and dangerous positions,

experiencing along with the Nation the uncertainties and
anxieties of trial and error.

But m y heart and my will

always belonged to my country,

although m y understanding was

subjected,

as is that of all men,

to mistakes and dec e i t s —

mine were understandably so considering that from the occupa
tion and isolation of the llanos I came into a theater of
scenes absolutely unknown to me.

What do the theories of

revolutions and the complicated science of politics have in
common with the simple occupations of the shepherd?
In 1837 I told the Venezuelans as follows.
I have committed a thousand errors whose painful
sensations have been mitigated by the indulgence of
my compatriots.
The events of 1826 to which an unjust
accusation against me in the Colombian Senate and an
even worse interpretation by others led me, still fill
me with bitterness and repentance.
The desire to
separate Venezuela from the centralization of Colombia
was already widespread, and the occurrence of Valencia
seconded by other cities was the first step toward the
great change that was finally verified later.
This
separation was indicated by acts emanating from some
corporations and by the press which is the vehicle of
public opinion.
The protest of the illustrious Mu n i c i 
pality of Caracas on swearing in the Constitution of
1821, and the newspapers in 1824 and 1825 had prepared
those events which enveloped me like a weak straw in
the impetuous winds of a hurricane.
The horror of civil
war, m y love for order, and the happiness of my country
made me submit those events for the consideration of the
Liberator of Colombia.
Thus I showed myself willing to
be the victim and to sacrifice my life and honor before
allowing one drop of blood to be shed for my cause.
The Liberator heard my pleas, realized that his
country was bordering a precipice, and flew to inter
pose his art of government and his powerful influence
to save it.
His presence reestablished public confidence,
and somewhat calmed those desires for separation.
There were no complaints or persecutions, and I sub
m i tted myself happily to obeying the decrees he issued.
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and to the system which seemed necessary to rule the
Republic of Colombia.
My authority was extended to
other d e p a r tments, and all of their inhabitants are
witnesses to the conciliatory spirit which guided my
administration.
Everyone has seen the principles 1
professed and delivered in my Manifesto of February 7,
1829.
Let us return now to the deplorable events which have
caused me so much bitterness and which
m y fellow citizens.

1

lament now before

On the very night that General Escalona

assumed command, disorders of different kinds by various
parties were committed in Valencia.

Among these appeared

Royalists, who perhaps only sought a pretext to confuse the
public tranquility in support of their ideas.
On April 27,

1826 several citizens had asked the

Municipality of Valencia to suspend the order that took my
command away.

That body called the lawyers of the city to

consult with them on this proposal which they felt,
out,

could occasion disturbances and insurrections.

these lawyers.

if carried
One of

Doctor Miguel Pena, with two others, proposed:

"That there was no legal measure which could suspend the
execution of the order and that not even the Executive itself
could do so without openly infringing the C o n s t i t u t i o n . rhe

5 Dr. Miguel Pefla was born in Valencia, Venezuela, on
September 29, 1781.
In 1807 he was Reporter for the Audiencia
of Caracas and later an aide to a prominent English lawyer in
Trinidad.
In 1811 he returned to Caracas to join the Patrio
tic Society in this capital.
He became Miranda's Assessor
and the latter named h i m Governor of La Guaira.
He was serv
ing in this post when General Miranda was imprisoned.
In
1814 he helped Escalona defend Valencia.
In 1821 he was a
member of the Congress of Cticuta.
From 1821 until 1825 he
served as President of the Supreme Court.
The Senate

505
Municipality agreed then that 1 be told the following!
. . . that they felt genuine sorrow knowing that an
accusation had been admitted against me:
that they
were certain 1 would justify myself completely:
that
the entire territory was convinced of the punctuality
and exactness with which I had discharged m y obliga
tions, winning the confidence, respect, and friendship
of all:
and that if there were need to leave the
Department in order to obey the l a w s , they would be
consoled by seeing me absolved satisfactorily again.
In order that the fears they had shown before would
seem well-founded,

those who were not satisfied with such a

declaration resorted to murder.

They killed two poor indi

viduals who had not played any role in the events that were
being debated,

and tossed their bodies at the door of the

Municipal Building.

There were many individuals here anxious

to k n o w the final result of the affair, when the Governor of
the Province,

Fernando Penalver, demanded that Colonel

Francisco Barabaho, Commandant of the troops of the city,
order the military men who were in the building to declare

suspended him from this post when he refused to sign the death
sentence for Colonel Infante.
Pena returned to Venezuela
after its separation from Colombia, and here he was elected
Secretary of the Interior.
He became President of the C o n 
gress of Valencia in 1833.
Pena died in Valencia on February
8 , 1833.
I b i d . . 450.
Madariaga evaluates Pefia as follows:
"He was a mulatto
himself who, as civil Governor of La Guaira, had contrived
w i t h Bolivar to deliver Miranda to the Spaniards; inconstant
in his allegiance during the early days of the Republic; and
known to have made money to the detriment of the State by
speculating with the sum of 500,000 pesos the Government had
entrusted to h i m to convey from Bogota to Caracas."
Bolivar.
524.
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themselves in favor of the m o v e m e n t . 6
their quarters,

Carabano sent them to

and then those who were there came tumul

tously to m y house and carried me on their shoulders before
the Municipality.
It is necessary to have been under similar circ u m 
stances to understand the difficult position in which a public
man finds himself when the people run to h i m begging h i m to
he a d a movement he believes just and reasonable.

Knowledge

^General Fernando Penalver was born in Piritti in 1765.
While living in Valencia, he was chiefly responsible for
having the Municipal Council here recognize the revolutionary
junta of Caracas.
He then became a member of the First C o n 
stitutional Congress and signed the July 5 Declaration of
Independence.
In 1812 he was imprisoned b y General Monteverde
first in La Guaira and then in Puerto Cabello.
He escaped
from here after Bolivar's triumph after the first Battle of
Carabobo.
He was forced to emigrate in 1814 and unable to
return until 1817.
It was then that he brought the first
printing press to Guayana and thus quickly helped spread the
ideals of freedom.
He was named Intendant and then went with
General Vergara to London to seek aid.
In 1821 he was P resi
dent of the Congress of Cticuta, and by 1826 he was Governor
of the Province of Carabobo.
He was elected Senator to the
Venezuelan Congress in 1831.
Unfortunately, Pefialver was
unable to finish his term, for he died in May of 1831.
Scarpetta and Vergara, Diccionario Bi o q r & f i c o . 452-53.
General Francisco Carabano was born in CumanA, V e n e 
zuela.
He was with Bolivar in the Jamaican exile and later
followed h i m back to Venezuela to fight in the Battles of
Quebrada Honda and Alacr&n under Mac Gregor.
He also fought
under General Piar at Juncal and San Felix.
He was Chief of
Staff in Valencia in 1826.
In 1827 Bolivar promoted Carabano
to the rank of General and in 1829 he was a representative to
the Constitutent Congress of Venezuela.
By 1830 he was
Secretary of War and Navy.
While serving as Chief of Opera
tions in 1848, Carabafio was assassinated.
Ibid., 85-66.
DAvila, Diccionario Bi o g r A f i c o . I, 6 8 .
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vacillates between the obedience owed the laws and the
established principles,

and the fear of the great h a r m which

might result if the people take the responsibility of the
act on themselves.

Meanwhile there is no time to think.

people get impatient,
ments.

shout,

The

and invoke the most sacred senti

The public man, without even realizing what he is

doing, yields and allows himself to be carried by the waves
as an inert body that floats on top of a tempestuous ocean.
In a fatal moment for me,
had been suspended so unjustly.
it was
The

I reassumed the command that
With the first step taken,

necessary to follow through with the error committed.

Municipality of Valencia invited the other cities of

Venezuela to approve the movement she had initiated so that
all together they could express the great motives whic h had
made m y replacement in command necessary— a command I should
keep to maintain order and public tranquility until the
Liberator returned and the great Convention m e t in 1831.
However,

they felt this Convention should be held sooner in

view of the difficulties that h a d come to the Republic.

Even

the Municipality of Caracas, which had shown itself so h o s 
tile to me previously,

adhered to the Valencia Act,

and I

found m yself invested with the supreme civil and military
authority.

It was then I directed the following p r o c l a m a 

tion to the provinces.
The peoples' free vote has entrusted me with command
of the army and the civil administration.
Aside from
m y own situation, only the future of the country has
called m y attention.
Our enemies were congratulating
each other, and they thought we were in their power
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once again.
They are mistaken, for they shall find
us ready as always to repel them.
Our own preservation is the supreme law.
It is
what has dictated the measures we have adopted which
are contained in the municipal acts.
The press will
notify the public concerning everything.
Meanwhile it
should be enough to k n o w that the present laws are
binding and that all the guarantees will be respected.
In a word, everything that is not against the step we
have taken will continue as before.
The people were afflicted by a bad administration
and were anxious for a remedy to their evils.
This
very reason gives us an occasion, and we are taking
advantage of it by seeking the remedy in the constitu
tion it s e l f . We are determined to speed up the meeting
of the great convention which was announced for the
year [18]31.
The Liberator President will be our
arbiter and m e d i a t o r , and he will not be deaf to the
clamor of his compatriots.
Our peculiar situation places us in need of arming
ourselves.
Threatened externally by our common enemies,
while subject to the machinations of egoism, we would
be foolish not to assume a practical attitude.
The power you have entrusted in me is not to be
used to oppress you, but rather to protect you and
assure your liberty.
I will always consult the opinion
of sensible men and will carry out their wise delib e r a 
tions .
General Headquarters in Caracas, May 19,

1826.
J. A. PAEZ.

The Executive in Bogota declared "that the occurrence
that took place in Valencia on April 30 was a true armed
insurrection," and General Bermddez,
the Department of Orinoco,

Commandant General of

at first took a hostile attitude

toward the movement and did not act in these circumstances
with any greater prudence and or caution than was to be
expected from his impetuous and excessively violent nature.
However,

Bolivar was not of the same opinion as the Executive.

509
His Secretary General, Jos 6 G. P£rez,

informed the M u n i c i 

p ality of Guayaquil when acknowledging receipt of the Act of
July

6

as f o l l o w s . '

Even though His Excellency has not yet officially
received an account of the events occurring in
Valencia in the last days of April in order to form a
just concept of their character and nature, privately
he has been told by respectable individuals that these
have not caused a mutiny in the Colombian pact.
That
part of the Republic
wants a reform made in the C o n 
stitution, and the very leader who is in command of the
army. General P&ez, has received a provisory commission
to do this until Your Excellency returns to Colombia—
and only with the latter express condition has it been
conferred.
This general has proclaimed that the
Liberator's name is written across his heart, and that
his spirit calls to h i m in every sigh.
We do not
expect further steps nor revolutionary measures to be
taken.
On the contrary, we can surmise that all will
remain as it is until Your Excellency arrives.
Guayaquil also desires reform in the agreement w i t h 
out breaking the ties uniting it to Colombia.
The reasons expounded are grave and powerful and
shall be carefully considered by the national repre
sentation.
His Excellency the Liberator professed his political
ideals in the constitution presented to Bolivia.
In it

7General Josfi Gabriel P4rez was born in Caracas.
In
1814 h e joined Bolivar in the exodus to Oriente and h e n c e 
forward accompanied the Liberator.
He participated in the
seizure of Bogota in 1815.
He emigrated to the Antilles and
in 1816 was part of Bolivar's Haitian expedition.
In 1819
he campaigned in BoyacA as Bolivar's Adjutant General.
Returning to Venezuela in 1820, he signed along with Sucre
and BriceAo M 6 ndez, the armistice and treaty with Morillo
regulating the conduct of the war.
From 1822 until 1826 he
served as Bolivar's Secretary General.
Ill health forced h i m
to leave this post, but he did accept the job as Superior
Chief of the Department of the South later in 1926.
He d i s 
agreed with Santander over Bolivar's dictatorship.
In 1828
he died suddenly while taking a thermal bath.
I b i d .. II,
98-99.
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all the origins and general and particular rights of
the people are e n t r u s t e d , and in it the guarantee of
a government w i t h the most unlimited liberty has been
collected in the most convenient m a n n e r . A greater
summary of social and individual security will never
be achieved under any other political s y s t e m .
God guard V.S.I. m a n y years.
JOSE G. PEREZ
The people began to talk about reforming the constitu
tion and requesting that the Great Convention meet earlier.
The federal system was recommended by many as the most con
venient form of government for the people,

and as the only

one capable of saving the Republic from the anarchy which
threatened it.
federation,

Puerto Cabello on August

8

proclaimed the

and its example was quickly followed by Maracaibo,

Aragua, Cumani,

and finally Quito and Guayaquil,

located at

Colombia's other extreme.
Anarchy threatened on all parts.
of adopting the Bolivian code.

Some were in favor

Others wanted a decentraliza

tion of the government without breaking up the Republic.
Still others favored the establishment of a monarchy.

Then

there were those who were ready to resort to arms to carry
out any of these m o v e m e n t s .
A junta was convoked in Caracas,

and on October 5 and

this junta agreed to adopt a popular representative federal
system of government.

It also agreed to have the deputies

of the municipalities of the province meet on November 1 to
select the representatives to be sent to the Congress so
that w hen the Great Convention met,
reforms to make.

they could agree on what
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On November 7 another meeting was held in the Convent
of San Francisco in Caracas,

since its members hesitated in

malting their decision and since I had already been called to
this reunion.

I proposed that if the will of the people was

to constitute themselves and support the constitution with
their blood,
hands.

those present were to show this by raising their

In this manner the will of the majority was known.

On the thirteenth of the same month I issued a decree
designating December 10 as the meeting day for the electoral
colleges in the respective provinces,

and January 10 of the

following year as the installation date for the constituent
body in Valencia.

This decree is as follows:

JOSE ANTONIO PAEZ, CIVIL AND MILITARY CHIEF OF
THE STATE OF VENEZUELA, ET C E T E R A . ET C E T E R A .
In order to fulfill punctually the deliberations of
the great popular assembly held in the Convent of San
Francisco of this city on the seventh of this month,
whose basic premise it is to create a nation of Ve n e 
zuela, and supporting the constitution which shall be
given it by their legitimate representatives if neces
sary, I come to decree and do decree the following:
Article 1.
The electoral colleges existing n o w shall
meet in the capital cities of their respective provinces
on the following December 10.
In case of death, absence,
or physical impediment of any of the electors, the sub
stitute or substitutes will fill the post.
Article 2. When the electoral colleges meet, they
shall proceed to elect a double number of deputies
from which they will select those for the Congress of
BogotA so that the constituent body will be as numerous
as possible.
The elections for the deputies will be
arranged as is presently done in the Constitution of
Colombia, except that no senators will be named.
Article 3.
In order that the election of these
deputies be freer and so that enlightenment m a y be
united with whatever other good qualities cam be found
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within the state for such an important office, indi
viduals from Colombia m a y be elected even if they are
not natives or citizens of the province holding the
election as long as they possess the other require
ments stipulated by the Constitution of Colombia.
Article 4.
Those who have an absolute plurality of
votes will be deputies, and the electoral college it
self shall give them the credentials to present to the
constituent Congress of the State of Venezuela.
These
credentials should contain a special clause stating
that they were elected and named to assist the con 
stituent Congress of the State of Venezuela and to
frame its Constitution on the basis of a popular repre
sentative federal government.
The President and
Secretary of the aforementioned electoral college will
authorize said credentials, and for this ceremony it
shall have the full faith and credit that is required
by law for such a c t s .
Article 5.
All the elected deputies shall be in the
city of Valencia by this January 10th with their c o r 
responding credentials.
Those not present on the
appointed day without having qualified some physical
impediment in due form, will be immediately liable for
the punishment by an irremissible fine of two hundred
pesos which shall be applied to the expenses of the
Congress and which will not be charged to the con
stituents .
Article 6 . The electoral college of the Province of
Carabobo before dissolving will name a commission of
five of its members to check the credentials of the
first five deputies that arrive.
Later these five will
form a junta to check the credentials of the other
deputies as they arrive.
Article 7. The Constituent Congress of the State of
Venezuela should be installed on January 15 of the
incoming year, with the attendance of at least fourfifths of its members.
The civil and military chief of
said State will install it.
Immediately after. Congress
shall proceed to elect a President and Vice-President
from among its members and two Secretaries who may be
non-members.
Article 8 . The meals for these deputies should come
out of the same funds which provided them for the C o n 
gress of Bogota, providing naturally for those taken on
the trips both coming and going, at the rate of a peso
a league.
The rate for meals during the length of the
sessions should be three pesos daily.

513
Article 9.
All persons, without any exceptions,
w h o directly or indirectly oppose the Acts prior to
the elections, the elections themselves, or the ful
fillment of any of the Articles in this decree, shall
be judged and punished as a traitor to the country.
Article 10.
Let the Secretary communicate this
decree to the intendant of the state for its fulfill
m e n t and circulation among those whom it concerns.
Issued in the city of Caracas,
XVI of independence.

November 13,

1826.—

JOSE ANTONIO P A E Z .
N e w difficulties arose from this measure,
it necessary to enforce the decree.

and I found

Puerto Cabello,

as we

have seen before, had declared in favor of the federation,
and on the

2 1 st

pronounced against the above-mentioned system.

I h a d to send troops to reduce the battalion of grenadiers
that guarded the plaza to obedience.
Captain of the Navy,

They had been led by

Sebasti&n Boguier.

Fighting the different factions i n c e s santly, repress
ing the excitement of the towns anxious for reforms until I
no longer could,

it was my intent to maintain peace and order

until the Liberator came and put an end to the discords with
his presence.

This is what I told h i m in the following

official l e t t e r .8

8 The author inserted a letter he wrote to Bolivar from
Caracas on M a y 24, 1826.
He also included a private letter
he wrote the Liberator on M a y 25, 1826, and letters he r e 
ceived from Bolivar on May 20, 1826 and August 8 , 1826. These
letters have been omitted because they do not add substan
tially to the text and because copies m a y be found in Blanco
and Azpurda (eds.), Documentos para la H i a t o r i a . X, 336-40,
529-31; Coleccldn de D o c u m e n t o s . VI, 85.

CHAPTER XIX
The Liberator's Arrival in Venezuela— Our Cordial
M e e t i n g — Decrees and Proclamations— Triumphal
Entry into Caracas— Gift to the Liberator in this
Capital— The Liberator's Return to BogotA— Advice
He Gave Me Before Leaving.
1827
On September 4 the Liberator left Lima.

After stopping

over in Guayaquil, he arrived in Bogota on November 14.

Here

wi thout changing any of the ministers who tried to resign, he
declared himself reinvested with the extraordinary powers
that the country's state demanded,

threatened as it was by

civil war and a foreign invasion.

After also mak i n g other

provisions that the public economy required, he left for
Maracaibo and arrived there on December 16.

Then he issued

a proclamation that brought the different parties to an agree
ment .
As soon as I k n e w that the Liberator was in Bogota,

I

issued the following proclamation.
VENEZUELANS t
Our troubles have ceased, for the Liberator hea r d our
cries from the heart of Perti and has flown to our aid.
His heart is all Venezuelan and all Caraqueno, and so
he brings you the greatness of his name, his immense
services, and his powerful influence as pledges of his
affection for your security and your union.
As soon
as his native soil called h i m to give his consolation
as a citizen, he tore himself away from the dictatorship
514
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that demanded his services in a foreign country.
O ur brother, our friend comes n o w with open arms
to hold us close.
The c o u n t r y ’s most illustrious
son, Venezuela's glory and first hero as a result of
his military feats, returns out of the purest affec
tion to see his old comrades-in-arms and the places
where monuments to his glory stand.
He comes for
our benefit and not to destroy the civil and military
authority he has received from the peoples he comes
to help us with his counsel, his wisdom, and his consumate experience to perfect the work of the reforms.
Prepare yourselves to receive as does the arid land,
the rich d e w that brings so m a n y benefits, for the
latter are going to exceed your hopes.
Bolivar was
great u p to the point of admirations
from now on
Venezuela owes h i m deification.
Yield to the purest
pleasure without any fear.
I am authorized to promise
you this.
If you want still more, your guarantees
shall be m y life, my honor, and my very blood.
Let
contentment, jubilation, and pleasure reign.
Vene
zuelans, forget yo ur troubless
the great Bolivar is
with us.
Issued at General Headquarters in Valencia on D e c e m 
ber 15, 1826.
JOSE ANTONIO PAEZ.
The last day of the tremendous year of 1826 the
Liberator arrived in Puerto Cabello.*-

In the following

^-PAez inserts this footnote here.
"Bolivar was
detained at Puerto Cabello for the following reason.
Colonel
[William] Ferguson who came in a hostile attitude along the
West, sent Doctor Pefla and Colonel JosA Hilario Cistiago as
prisoners to Trujillo where General Urdaneta was.
X had com
mi s s ioned Cistiago to find Bolivar and inform h i m that I was
w a i t i n g for h i m in Valencia.
In the Araure Villa Ferguson
wa n t e d Colonel Cala and his column of five hundred m e n to
surrender to h i m and demanded the same of Commandant Domingo
Hern&ndez and his column of eight hundred m e n in San Carlos.
These pretensions, whi ch were resisted, alarmed Bolivar as
well as me.
In similar circumstances. General Silva arrived
in Valencia as a prisoner.
Cornelio Mufioz was sending him
to me from Apure, where Bolivar h a d sent h i m from Cdcuta to
settle the differences between the Apureftos and the citizens
of Mantecal who h a d revolted w i t h Echazu under Miguel
Guerrero's orders.
I immediately sent Silva to Puerto
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decree,

issued on January 1, 1827, he confirmed m y title and

authority as civil and military chief.
REPUBLIC OF COLOMBIA

SimOn Bolivar,
cetera

Liberator President,

Et c e t e r a . Et

Consideringi
First, that Venezuela's situation is
m u tually calamitous for the parties that are fighting;
second, that I am authorized to save the country by
extraordinary powers and the national vote; third,
that domestic peace is everyone's well-being and the
Republic's glory, I decreet
First.
No one shall be persecuted nor judged by the
actions, speeches, or opinions that were made or held
in favor of the reforms.

Cabello to assure Bolivar that we were all ready to receive
h i m with open arms, but that the hostile acts Ferguson h a d
committed made us fear that he w o u l d not be a peacefully
i n c l i n e d . 11
N o further information was available on colonel
Cistiago, colonel Cala, Commandant Domingo HernAndez, and
Echazu.
Colonel William Ferguson h a d left a minor position
w i t h a firm in Demerara to enlist as a drummer-boy in the
British Battalion of the Lower Apure.
He was captured and
imprisoned by the Royalists for fourteen months at Puerto
Cabello.
When he managed to escape, he made his way to
M a r g arita Island and joined the Irish Legion.
He became
General Montilla's aide and fought at Rio Hacha, Magdalena,
and Cartagena.
Later h e fought at the Battles of Bombona,
Junln, and Ayacucho.
On one occasion he was tried for breach
of discipline and sentenced to be shot; however, on the
appeal of the Captain of a British man-of-war he was restored
to his command.
From 1824 until his death, he w a s on the
Liberator's personal staff.
One of his most important m i s 
sions was to carry the n e w Bolivian constitution to Sucre at
Chuquisaca.
He accomplished this exhausting feat of covering
eighteen hundred miles leading across the higher Andes in
nineteen days.
In 1828 Colonel Ferguson was killed while
protecting Bolivar from a band of assassins that attacked
the President's Palace in Bogota.
Hasbrouck, Foreign
L e g i o n a r i e s . 262, 279, 296, 333-34.
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S e c o n d . The person, goods, and jobs of those
compromised in the cause of the reforms are
guaranteed without exception.
T h i r d . General-in-Chief Jos£ Antonio P&ez is
to remain in control of the civil and military
authority as Superior Chief of Venezuela with all
its corresponding powers.
General-in-chief Santiago
Marino shall be the Intendant and Commandant General
of Maturin.
F o u r t h . Immediately after notification of this
decree, my authority as President of the Republic
shall be acknowledged and obeyed.
F i f t h . All hostile acts committed after notifica
tion of this decree shall be judged as guilty by the
State and punished according to the laws.
S i x t h . The Great National Convention shall be
convoked according to the December 19 Decree to
decide the fate of the Republic.
Issued at the Liberator's General Headquarters in
Puerto Cabello on January 1, 1827— XVII of Independence
— Signed by m y hand, sealed with the Republic's seal,
and countersigned^by the Secretary of State and General
of my office— SIMON BOLIVAR— By the Liberator P r e s i 
dent, the Secretary of State and His Excellency's
General, J. R[AFAEL] R E V E N G A . 2

2Jose Rafael Revenga was born in Cosejo, Venezuela on
December 24, 1781.
In 1810 the Caracas Revolutionary Junta
sent h i m to the United States to seek aid.
By 1815 he was
Bolivar's secretary in the Magdalena campaign.
He emigrated
to Jamaica with Bolivar.
From here the Liberator sent h i m
back to the United States to win sympathy for the Venezuelan
cause.
In 1819 he became Bolivar's Secretary General in the
campaigns of Venezuela and N e w Granada.
Later he went to
Spain to negotiate for peace.
On his return he became Boli
var's Secretary of Foreign Affairs.
He accompanied the
Liberator to Venezuela in 1826.
In 1828 he was promoted to
Counselor of State.
Because of his opposition to Venezuelan
separation from Colombia, he was exiled in 1829.
This exile
was ended in 1844, and he immediately returned to govern
mental duties.
He became a member of Congress, Director of
the Bank, and eventually President M o n a g a s ' Secretary.
He
died in Caracas in 1852.
Scarpetta and Vergara, Diccionario
B i o a r A f i c o . 506-507.
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Then I issued the following decree.
REPUBLIC OF COLOMBIA
JOSlS ANTONIO P&EZ, SUPERIOR CIVIL AND MILITARY CHIEF OF
VENEZUELA, ET CETERA
I promised the Venezuelan towns in my proclamation
of this past December 15 to guarantee with my life,
honor, and blood, that His Excellency the Liberator
w ould come with open arms to clasp us to his heart;
to bring us peace and reestablish confidence; to calm
our domestic dissensions with his authority, influence,
and power? and to work toward perfecting our lot and
future well being.
Since I received at midnight last
night the January 1 Decree, issued by His Excellency
at his General Headquarters in Puerto Cabello, I come
to decree and do decree the following?
1.
Let the decree he announced by proclamation with
the due pomp and solemnity.
This decree is exactly as
followsi
(Said decree copied.)
2.
From this moment forward. His Excellency the
Liberator's authority in his capacity as President of
the Republic will be completely acknowledged and
recognized.
The previous decree shall be fulfilled
entirely.
3.
Since His Excellency the Liberator President in
his December 19th Decree issued in Maracaibo ordered
the Great National Convention to m e e t in Caracas and
take care of the reforms warnted by the people and
determine the fate of the Republic, m y December 13
Decree ordering the assembling of the Venezuelan repre
sentation in Valencia is revoked.
4.
Since the National Congress decreed triumphal
honors for His Excellency the Liberator President when
he returned from Perd to the heart of the country and
since furthermore it is a sweet and sacred duty for
Venezuela to pay homage to her most illustrious son,
the towns along his path should prepare to receive him
with majestic pomp, according to a ceremony used in
ancient times to demonstrate the national gratitude
justly due the heroes and founders of liberty.
5.
This present decree must be printed and c i r c u 
lated by the Secretary among all the civil and military
authorities so that it m a y be observed and executed
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punctually.
These authorities must have it published
by proclamation in all the cantons, towns, and places
in their respective provinces.
Issued at General Headquarters in Valencia on
January 2, 1827 — XVII.
JOSE ANTONIO P A E Z .
Jos£ Nunez Caceres,

Secretary General.

Then I manifested to Bolivar m y desire to see m y con
duct vindicated.

For this purpose,

I asked h i m to form a

tribunal to evaluate the charge made against me.

My letter

to him was as f o l l o w s . 3
General Headquarters
Valencia, January 3, 1827
TO HIS EXCELLENCY THE LIBERATOR PRESIDENT OF
COLOMBIA, ET CETERA
Most Excellent Seffor:
When on April 25 of this past year I received the
order from the Supreme Executive Power announcing m y
suspension as Commandant General of this Department
and naming General Juan de Escalona m y successor, I
quickly and blindly resigned and h a d the army acknowl
edge the appointed successor.
From that mo m e n t on I
begem to prepare for m y march to Bogota where I was to
suffer the judgment of the tribunal that was to e v a l 
uate m y cause.
This is an act that cannot be doubted,
for it rests on irrefutable documents.
Furthermore,
the series of posterior events prove their authen
ticity.
My march to the capital of the Republic was
the spark that fell on the riverlet of gunpowder that
created the explosion of April 30, and it is from it
that my slanderers have inferred that the political
reaction that started on this date had no other origin
nor any other objective than m y desire not to account
to the nation about my public conduct as commandant
General.
This is not the opportune time to spend m y 
self refuting arbitrary imputations.
I have consulted

3A copy of this letter m a y be found in Blanco and
Azpurda (eds.), Documentos Para la H i s t o r i a , XI, 79.

520
m y conscience and it has left me at peace concerning
the sinister intentions that injustice and ingrati
tude attribute to me.
I foresaw at these turbulent
times that a time of peace would come when, quieting
the cry of exalted passions, I could give the nation
an exact account of h o w I fulfilled my duty.
It was
for this reason that in a manifesto which I issued
concerning the execution of the decree from the E x e c u 
tive Power for the drafting of militias I said to the
whole world:
That X did not fear the judgment of the
n a tion nor of impartial m e n ; that on the c o n t r a r y , if
someday 1 were free from the commitments which tie me
to V e n e z u e l a . X would glory in being judged by the
manner in which X fulfilled m v duties in the Commandancv
G e n e r a l , prior to this past April 3 0 . and I would resign
myself happily to whatever sentence the judges imposed
on m e .
I think, most Excellent Senor, that this happy time
has arrived.
Your Excellency's authority as President
of the Republic is recognized in Venezuela.
1 saved
this very authority for Your Excellency the same day
that I swore never again to obey the government of
Bogota.
Since Your Excellency has assumed the res p o n 
sibility for directing the Republic, order, tranquility,
and confidence have been reborn.
Then, it is my first
duty to beg Your Excellency to immediately name the
judges or tribunal who are going to try my case.
This
case had not been annulled, but rather postponed until
a calmer time, which n o w has happily arrived for the
entire Republic under Your Excellency's command.
I
w o uld not be satisfied to continue exercising the supreme
authority in Venezuela which Your Excellency bestowed on
me in this decree of the first of this month without
first giving this public testimony of m y obedience and
submission to the l a w s .
God keep Your Excellency,

et c e t e r a .
JOSE ANTONIO PAEZ.

The Liberator's Secretary General sent me the follow
ing official letter from Puerto C a b e l l o .4

4 I b i d . , 79-80.
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General Headquarters
Puerto Cabello, January 3, 1827
TO HIS EXCELLENCY GENERAL IN CHIEF J. A. PAEZ, SUPREME
CHIEF OF VENEZUELA, ET CETERA
Sefiori
The Liberator has just jubilantly received Your
Excellency's submission to the government of the
Republic.
With this illustrious testimony of your
dedication to Colombia and your respect for the laws,
Your Excellency has culminated the measure of your own
glory and national happiness.
The Liberator told mei
General P&ez saved the Republic yesterday and has given
it new l i f e . Gathering C o l o m b i a 1s remains.5 General
PAez has preserved the c o u n t r y 1s plank which had ship
wrecked because of the disasters of the w a r , the con
vulsions of n a t u r e . and internal dissensions. He
exposed his life valiantly in one hundred battles to
free the people w h o , reassuminq their sovereignty, have
issued their fundamental l a w s . These are the laws that
have been offended: these are the people who owe him
gratitude and admiration. Today he has given us domestic
p e a c e . Instead of listening to complaints and laments,
let us go like Scipio to thank the heavens for having
destroyed the enemies of the Republic. Only the voice
of iov and the sentiment of generosity should speak on
this d a y . Far from being guilty. General PAez is the
saviour of the c o u n t r y .
His Excellency then orders me to tell Your Excellency
that in keeping with the decree of day before yesterday,
no one in Venezuela shall be considered guilty because
of the reforms.
All judgment on what is past is a viola
tion of a sacred law guaranteeing everyone's health.
Respectfully I am Your Excellency's most obedient
servant.— Secretary of State and the Liberator's General.
— J. R. REVENGA.
Knowing that the Liberator was coming from Puerto

5The author interjects this footnote.
"The Liberator
refers here to the reunion in Trinidad de Arichuna under m y
protection of what remained of Venezuela and New Granada
after Boves's and Monteverde's troops, the Caracas earthquake,
the dissensions in Cartagena, and the loss of N e w Granada
seemed to have dealt the death blow to the patriot cause."
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to Valencia where I was,

I set out to meet him on January 4.

We met at the foot of the Naguanagua Cerro.

We embraced

cordially® and entered Valencia together in the midst of the
rejoicings of the people who gathered to receive us.

1

immediately ordered the veteran and militia troops that
lined the road to file off in front of the Liberator and
retire to their homes or quarters.
Then I issued the following proclamation to the Vene
zuelans t
JOSfi ANTONIO PAEZ, SUPREME CIVIL AND MILITARY CHIEF
OF VENEZUELA, ET CETERA
VENEZUELANS *
Venezuela's days of grandeur will mark day before
yesterday as one of its most fortunate p e r i o d s . The
Liberator President arrived at the foot of the Puerto
Cabello Cerro at two o'clock in the afternoon with o u t 
stretched arms to communicate his love for his comrades
in arms and for all Venezuela.
This embrace was con
secrated with the holy oil of all the virtues, and the
furies of poisonous discord fled terrified to bury
themselves in the eternal abyss of oblivion.
The soil
that witnessed this new scene, almost as if it were
alive, has changed itself into a monument which will
exceed the pyramids and obelisks in grandeur and dura
tion*
it will recall to posterity not the haughtiness
of the conquistadores, but the sublime work of patriotism,
civilization, and friendship.
Venezuelans*

the Liberator made his triumphal entry

6 F4ez inserts this footnote*
"I recall an incident
here which gave Bolivar the opportunity to reveal that genius
of his which was always ready in opportune circumstances.
After embracing, the guards of the swords we were wearing got
so entangled, that it took us some time to disentangle them.
During this time, Bolivar was smiling and telling me, as a
Roman General would have done in similar circumstances*
'This is a good omen. General, revealing the fate which will
befall us in the future.’1'
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into this city at five in the afternoon,
Republic's destinies already rest on his
shoulders.
His star guides itj
it is a
creation that enlivens the land that saw
with its r a y s .

and the
robust
sun of new
his birth

Venezuelans!
I have fulfilled m y promises.
The
genius for good is amongst you, and he has placed your
fate in his hands.
I guaranteed you that your rights
would not be violated, and the Great Convention will
be convoked immediately.
In it you will be able to
exercise the great acts of your sovereign will*
in it
you will give your liberty firm and sure guarantees.
All of these benefits are the recompense for your
heroic conduct*
glory belongs to you, gratitude to me.
General Headquarters in Valencia on January 5, 1827.—
XVII.
JOS& ANTONIO PAEZ.
I must confess that the unlacing of these events were
not completely sufficient to tranquilize m y soul, and I
eagerly awaited the opportunity to give my country a public
testimony of m y disinterested conduct.
the Liberator President,

As a result,

I asked

first by word and later by letter,

for permission to leave Venezuela for whatever time he deemed
convenient.

Even with my limited discernment,

I could see

that the country would be disturbed again because of the con
flict between its interests and the state of public opinion.
I wanted to be away so that this upheaval which I foresaw
could not be attributed to me.
vain,

However, m y desires were in

for the Liberator refused my pleas.

I remained in an

uncertain and compromised position.
Even the most short-sighted political calculation was
sufficient to show that Venezuela's separation was indicated
from the time of Colombia's origin.

Venezuela still did not
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have a government strengthened by time.

On the contrary,

the one that existed h a d been created under the influence of
the necessities of war and with only the guarantee of arms,
and w i th the people being even unable to discuss their inter
ests or balance their institutions between their real c o n 
venience in the course of peace and a lasting tranquility.
The constitution did not offer all the freedom and guarantees
w hich the citizens desired,

and because of it the magistrates

were able to abuse their power

(Article 128).

Finally,

the

rehearsal period was flourishing and the prominent m a n of
the nation,

General Bolivar himself, was not in accord with

the established regime.
for a general confusion:

Everything coincided to prepare us
so when the Convention of Ocana in

1828 declared the reform of the constitution necessary,
thus announced its instability,

and

the catastrophe was already

inevitable.
Despite all of this, order was maintained under the
regime of an organic decree that the Liberator issued and by
announcing the convocation of a constituent Congress in
Colombia.

All m y desires and all m y efforts then were

reduced to maintaining peace in the departments that were
under m y command.

The extraordinary powers that had been

given to me were used only to prevent anarchy from devouring
us.

1 remind my fellow citizens of m y conduct during those

times of differences among the Colombians and when,
greater misfortune, the w a r with Perd broke out.

for even

I flatter

myself with the approval given m y behavior in the difficult
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position in which I was placed.

I can always take pride in

h a ving respected the freedom and all the guarantees of the
Venezuelans.
Bolivar and I went on together to Caracas where we
were received with the same marked enthusiasm that was in
evidence in all the towns along the way.

The Liberator's

entrance into Caracas was truly triumphant.

Everyone jubi

lantly acclaimed F o r t u n e 1s F i r s t - b o r n , the Creator of three
R e p u b l i c s , and the Genius of War and Peace w h o came armed
wi t h the olive branch from the Temple of the Sun to give n e w
life to the c o u n t r y .

This municipality had deputized indi

viduals from its midst to go out and meet him in Victoria and
accompany us to the capital.

We entered the latter under

arches w h i c h . although not comparable to the sumptuous marble
ones that a proud Rome elevated to T r a i a n . nor to those
w hich the humiliation of those conquered built against their
wishes for the fortunate c o n a u istadores. were a thousand
times more demonstrative

o f

affection and g r a t i t u d e .

These

arches were offered from the heart and h a d been built from
y e l l o w palms and green w i l l o w s , beautified with bows of
ribbon and tri-colored streamers on wh i c h were written
eulogies to the h e r o .

Everything which the enthusiasm of a

people can invent to give visible signs of joy and love was
presented before the illustrious caudillo.
republican fiesta,

It was truly a

as was ascertained b y the presence of the

flags of all the new Republics intermingled with the starred
banner of the eagle of the North.

The multitude pressed
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around the elegantly adorned carriage that had been given
the Liberator and in which,
7
seat.

at his insistence,

I took a

We entered the cathedral where a solemn Te D e u m was
sung,

and then we went to the house that had been prepared

previously for the honored guest.
awaited him.

Here a select committee

In order that all those ceremonies would more

e ffectively recall the times of Republican Rome,
y o u n g girls,
virtues,

fifteen

richly attired and symbolizing civic and war

came out then to receive the Liberator.

They p r e 

sented him with two crowns of unwithering laurel, one for
the triumph obtained over tyranny and another for the one he
had attained by preventing civil war.
the Liberator saidt
me these crowns,

“Senores,

On accepting these

two beauties have presented

symbols of victoryt

I value them more than

m y heart, but I must be permitted to dispose of them justly."
A nd w i th the generosity which was proverbial in him, he
placed one on m y temples 8 and dedicated the other one to the
illustrious people of Colombia.
Meanwhile delightful music filled the air,

and young

7This carriage h a d been given to Bolivar b y Jacob
Idler, a Philadelphia merchant who had been supplying the
Venezuelan government with guns.
Idler himself is supposed
to have led the two horses pulling the carriage.
DeGrummond,
“The Jacob Idler C l a i m , “ The Hispanic American Historical
Review. XXXIV (May, 1954), 131-57.
®The author footnotes this as followsi
does not mention this event."

“Larraz&bal
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Caracas girls in chorus sang hymns to the Liberator of the
country.

First,

these wordsi

they presented h i m with Colombia's flag with

This flag shall be an eternal monument of the

h e r o i s m , the c o n s t a n c y , the v a l o r , and the courage wi t h which
you placed it in the temple of glorv.

C o l o m b i a , unit e d by

the strong ring of vour n a m e . receives new life with vour
presence.

Then they presented h i m w i t h the Peruvian flag

with these w o r d s :

y o u

broke the sceptre that Pizarro b u i l t .

and you tore the Lion of Castile to pieces by putting the
Hvdra of discord in c h a i n s .

Your modesty exalts you on the

peaks of Chimborazo, while this flag waves in Perfl under its
shadow.

Finally,

the young girl that held the Bolivian flag

placed it in the hands of the founder of that Republic s a y i n g :
With the resplendent brilliance of vour skills you have
eclipsed the Father of Lights w h o m the Incas adored.

Bolivia

boasts vour name and owes its liberty and good fortune to
vour p e n .

The Liberator then took the pennants which were

inscribed with the military and civic virtues from the young
girl's hands.

The one which had written Disinterest on it

he gave to General [Fernando del] Toro; H o n e s t y , to Don
Critobal Mendozai P o l i t i c s , to Great Britain: G e n e r o s i t y , to
Caracas:

V a l o r , to me:

and C o n s t a n c y , he reserved for

himself.9

^General Fernando del Toro was born in Caracas to one
of its most illustrious families.
He showed an early p r e 
dilection for an army career:
so his family sent h i m to
Spain to get schooled in it.
He quickly became a member of
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The Municipality prepared an evening meal in the
Judicial Building during which tributes of appreciation and
admiration for the Liberator were renewed.

The g i f t s , the

fiestas, the same throngs of citizens continued wherever
Bolivar appeared on the following day.

A temple was built

in the plaza during the night which was crowned with statues
alluding to the music and songs which would be sung in it.
Then on the thirteenth,

the Municipality gave a splendid

banquet which was attended by two hundred of its most select
citizens.

When it came m y turn to propose a toast,

1 said

the following.
Senores,:
Permit me to express a sentiment of
pride.
I cannot contain it within my heart, for it
is a noble pride.
Senoresi
the Liberator has culmi
nated the measure of his favors, of m y glory, and even
that of his power.
He cannot give me any more, for he
has given me the sword that has freed a w o r l d . * 0
If

the Spanish Royal Guards and rose to the rank of Colonel.
With Bolivar, he witnessed Napoleon's coronation in Paris and
later went with Bolivar to Italy.
He returned to Spain to
help free her from the French yoke.
When he returned to C a r 
acas in 1809, however, he quickly identified with his com
patriots and resigned from the Spanish army.
He was immedi
ately named military Governor of Caracas and later its repre
sentative to the first Venezuelan Congress.
When Venezuela
yielded to Monteverde in 1812, Toro was forced to take refuge
on the island of Trinidad.
Here for ten years he suffered
all types of hardships and privations.
After the victory at
Carabobo in 1821, he returned to Caracas a veritable skeleton.
He died in 1823, still one of Bolivar's most intimate and
cherished friends.
Scarpetta and Vergara, Diccionario
BiogrAfico. 622-23.
10p&ez footnotes this as followsi
"On his arrival in
Caracas, Bolivar presented me with a sword; a beautiful lance
with gold engravings; two magnificent Peruvian horses; and a
luxurious dressing-table case to use during military cam
paigns ."
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F r e d e r i c k ’s sword, which did nothing more than defend
his inheritance and u s u r p a foreign one, could be a
priceless present for the sovereign of Europe, then
w h a t can I say when 1 h o l d in m y power the sword w hich
represents terror for tyrants, the sword that redeemed
h u m an i t y ?
Among earthly gifts, has there ever be e n one,
or could there ever be one, of equal value?
Bolivar
h i mself can give me no more.
A n d what use shall I make
of this sword? H o w can I preserve its laurels, its
glories, and its unique honor?
It centuplicates m y
duties and requires strengths from me that only Bolivar
possesses.
It confuses me.
This sword that has r e 
deemed mankind!
But in my hands it will be no more than Bolivar's
sword: his will shall direct it while m y arm wields it.
I will die one hundred times and shed all m y blood
rather than allow this sword to leave m y hand or spill
the blood of those which up to n o w it has helped to
free.
Fellow citizens, Bolivar's sword is in m y hands*
for you and for h i m I shall carry it until eternity.
Toast the inviolability of this oath with me.
The Municipality's Attorney General,
Bolivar's gift,

saidi

"I toast,

then,

referring to

the inviolability of

this m o nument established between the people and their
Liberator,

and the fact that the sword and the lance donated

by this Venezuelan Achilles shall be used only to defend the
rights of the p e o p l e ."
A beautiful ten-year-old girl,

called Maria de la Paz

and the daughter of Senor Joaquin Caraballo and Senora
R omualda Rubi, gave a gracious elocution directed to the
Liberator and placed a p a l m in his hands and a crown of
laurel on his temples.

The Liberator duly answered:

he gave

the p a l m to the army and thrust the crown symbolizing triumph
and p o w er to the people.
In summary,

let m e say that the individual citizens

and the entire town gave the Liberator the greatest and most
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spontaneous proofs of appreciation that any hero has ever
received.

More details concerning these gifts m a y be seen

on page 27 in Volume 9 of the Documentos de la Vida PQblica
del L i b e r t a d o r .^
From Caracas I left for Apure,

accompanied by Colonel

Jos€ Felix Blanco, who later became a general,
h u n dred cavalrymen to put down their arms.

to get fifteen

They h a d refused

to do this until they had seen h o w Bolivar wo u l d deal with
me.

I achieved m y objective simply by appearing there.
Close to the time when the Liberator was due to leave

for N e w Granada, where General Santander was beginning to
show his hostility, he told me in a private conversation that
he believed the separation of Venezuela and Colombia to be
already inevitable.

Expecting that I would be named the

first President of the new Republic, he advised me a thousand
and one times that once the separation was effected,

I should

oppose the adoption of the federal system with all my influ
ence.

In his opinion this system was synonymous with d i s 

order and dissolution.
stitution highly to me.
debt,
made.

the territory,

He recommended the Bolivian co n 
He also requested me to divide the

and the army after the separation was

Then he w o u l d come to live in Venezuela; however,

if

the federal system were adopted, he would not even stay as a
spectator.

iiThese details m a y be found as the author states in
Coleccidn de D o c u m e n t o s .
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When the Liberator left for N e w Granada,

I issued the

following proclamation to the Venezuelans.
VENEZUELANS t
Your good fortune is as certain now as your prudence
is necessary.
The hero that through rough paths has
always led us across the dangers up to the peaks of
glory, came to our soil heeding our call.
He has heard
first hand our complaints against the corrupt adminis
tration of the governmentt
he has felt our hurtsj
and
he has felt the pain of our situation vividly.
New
agitations in the southern part of Colombian territory
hastened his sensible farewell.
In the last moments of
his honorable visit, he left in his proclamation an
illustrious proof that his sublime soul is devoured by
the m o s t ardent desires to foster the prosperity of the
soil where he was b o m .
Venezuelans:
Nearly all the departments have e n 
trusted their fate to the great mem who, with his genius
and valor, has freed us from oppression.
General
Bolivar's power, influence, and name have been invoked
to reform the institutions and calm the discord.
Their
invocation shall not be in vain.
He has offered to use
all his efforts to convoke the convention:
here your
rights will be treated w i t h dignity and circumspection.
From the wisdom of this sovereign corps will come the
guaranteed results of your stability, peace, and
happiness.
Meanwhile, I have remained in charge w i t h extr a o r d i 
nary powers to carry out and execute the existing laws
and decree issued by the Liberator.
In such a dangerous
office I dare recommend union to you as the basis for
order:
reason, prudence and duty force me to pawn all
m y zeal and authority to keep Venezuela on the same
footing it was entrusted to me.
Yes, Venezuelans, you
w h o have always seen me as your compatriot and your
friend, should give me the opportunity to congratulate
m y s e l f and you whe n our days of contentment and joy
arrive for having fulfilled my duties without bitterness,
convinced that only the criminal has felt the wei g h t of
the law.
General Headquarters in Mocundo,

July 16, 1827.— XVII.

J. A. PAEZ.

CHAPTER XX
CUBA
One of the main things that the Liberator talked to
me about in 1827 concerned liberating Cuba and Puerto Rico.
He thought,

and rightfully so, that while the Spaniards still

possessed the best of the Antilles,
rich arsenal at their disposal.

they would have a very

After all,

the remnants of

the immense power that Spain had just lost on the American
continent were n o w assembled on these islands.
could threaten Colombia in particular,

The Spaniards

for her coasts were

open to all attacks and invited expeditions that would be
easy to carry out.
C u b a 1s geographic location and the fact that she was
the m e eting place for all those who h a d emigrated from the
continent when they could not reconcile themselves to the
n e w order of things which the revolution h a d established,
caused Bolivar much concern about the stability of the R e p u b 
lican governments.

This was all the more so because the

sharp instinct of that profound politician already saw his
wo r k crumbling as a result of the anger of one party and the
towns'

lack of preparation for his n e w i n s t i tutions.

If to

these misgivings were to be added the check Spain woul d have
on us while she possessed Cuba,
532

taking advantage of every
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available opportunity to help the discontent and agitate
internal discords,

it could be deduced logically that to

free Cuba and Puerto Rico was not only a part of the task of
independence, but also the most certain and perhaps the only
guarantee we could have against such a tenacious nation— a
courageous and daring nation whose caudillos were tormented
b y the idea of having lost after a good fight.

Even the

powerful aid of the natives who in great part and throughout
the continent were their faithful allies had not been suf
ficient to help them keep the extensive dominion over which
the sovereigns of Castille and Aragon had not seen the sun
set during the centuries of prosperity which the blindeBt
fortune had heaped on them with full hands.
Another reason, to my knowledge,

inspired Bolivar to

organize the expedition to liberate Cuba and Puerto Rico from
Spanish controls

Colombia possessed an army that was inured

to war and was composed almost entirely of men who were
accustomed to camp life.

These men were sons of combat,

only under military discipline,

good

and incapable of leading a

life other than the m i l i t a r y — a life that is made dear by
habit and whose very disappointments are flattering to the
imagination of the m a n who has lost fear.

This is a dangerous

life for society after victory has canceled the need for the
sword and it becomes necessary to hang it up so that the
quiet citizen shall not have to fear military domination
which,

after the tyranny of the revolutions,

all tyrannies.

is the worst of
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It was impossible to maintain Colombia's army, which
h a d leveled Spain's power in the Atlantic on the plains of
Carabobo and had forever broken the Viceroy's sceptre in the
Pacific at Junln and Ayacucho,

for this nation still did not

have a Treasury and its customs resented the evils of
colonialism.

Even more than the latter,

it resented the

reaction produced by the victory that had broken,

it is true,

the chains of slavery, but which in no w a y had formed the
d oubly strong chains of the law which binds the citizen to
his word as much as the other maintains him immobile under
the weight of iron.
public tranquility,

In a word,

the army was a threat to

and Bolivar knew that this would be the

case until the intelligence and knowledge of the people
advanced to the point when civilian life would become a
habit.

This was an arduous enterprise which could not be

accomplished in one day, especially following a period of
revolutions and war w h i c h are the worst school in which to
learn social virtues.
Bolivar's expedition was justified in everyone's
opinion.

In the eyes of the warrior,

plete his conquest.

it was right to c o m 

To the politician,

it was right to free

a society that was beginning to constitute itself from danger.
For the philosopher,

sufficient justification would be found

in the benefits that populations akin to ours would reap
when their prosperity would be boundless after the locks were
broken with which Spain unfortunately suffocated the progress
of her colonies.
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The Liberator's plan consisted of sending me

(begging

the person's pardon w h o made Sucre chief of the expedition
w h e n h e was four thousand leagues away fulfilling the task
of the presidency of Bolivia)

of sending me,

I repeat, with

ten thousand infantrymen and a thousand cavalry to embark on
the Colombian fleet, which was capable of confronting the
forces that the Spaniards had in the heart of Mexico.

We

were to dash over to one of the many magnificent ports,
h i d d e n to the world in the Pearl of the Antilles because of
the suspicions of the Spanish governors,

but k n o w n to all

those considering military disembarkation on that beautiful
island.

That we would take the island was a certainty.

Neither the Liberator, who ordered the undertaking,

nor I,

w h o was to carry it out, ever doubted the success of the
expedition once our ships h a d arrived at the harbor that had
been selected.

In the first place, we relied on the numbers

and valor of our soldiers to whom the Spaniards could never
be invincible,

and for whom

(I shall say it plainly)

become habit to conquer the Spaniards.

it h a d

The type of troops

forming the expedition guaranteed a certain success even if
the natives did not help but just a little.

This h e l p w o u l d

be not so much with men, w h o m they would always give us but
w h i c h we did not really need, but with material aids, w i t h
food provisions, with advice,

and with those other countless

ways in which a friendly people can efficaciously lend a
h a n d to an invading army.
We also relied on Mexico's promise to lend us very
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effective help.

Anyone wanting to find data on this matter

pertaining to Mexico may consult the RecopilaciOn de Leves
compiled by the lawyer, Don Basilio Josfe Arrilaga.

The most

important documents on this matter may be found in this work
— especially the law of May 12, 1828 in which "the departure
of national troops to wage war in Cuba or other points
dependent on the Spanish government was permitted."

This

law was circulated that very day by the Secretary of War and
published by proclamation on the twenty-fourth.
[18]23,

In the year

the Secretary of War, Senor Pedraza, had authorized

Don Pedro de Rojas to license privateers and to reach an
understanding with the inhabitants of Cuba for the purpose
of fomenting the revolution.

This revolution, known on the

island by the name Soles de Bolivar, failed because of the
reasons which we shall partially see later on.^
Once the island of Cuba was taken according to the
Liberator's plans, his fiery heart would not be content with
the conquest alone.

By force, all the inhabitants of the

island and those of Puerto Rico would be free without any
exceptions.

It goes without saying that among these would be

included the unfortunate Africans who still suffered the sum
of human m i s f o rtunes.

To think that we would have thought

^The Soles de Bolivar, or Soles y Ravos de Bolivar
which was its complete name, was the principal revolutionary
organization in Cuba working for independence.
Literally
meaning the "Suns and Rays of Bolivar," it functioned chiefly
during 1823.
Charles E. Chapman, A History of the Cuban
Republic (New York, 1927), 32.
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it feasible or logical to free a country and then leave a
part of its inhabitants sunk in servitude,

is an absurdity

w h i c h the Liberator of Colombia would never have incurred.
With the free Negroes,

the Liberator told me,

I was to

immediately form an army and transport it to Spain to aid
the Liberal Party.

This would be to show Colombia's g r e a t 

ness and to ask for the official recognition of those w h o
wanted the ideals of the century placed on F e r d i n a n d 's t h r o n e .
At this moment I do not k n o w if it would have been
possible to realize all of Bolivar's plans.

1 give m y word

as a soldier that at the time they seemed possible to fulfill
to me,

and that I embraced his thought w i t h the joy and the

blind enthusiasm w i t h which I h a d become accustomed to c o n 
quering always.

1

do not believe that any of m y companions

either doubted the possibility of conquering the Spaniards
simply because the terrain of our common struggles wo u l d vary.
As for me,

I already p ictured myself in the precinct of El

Morro dictating the law to a Captain General from Castile
just as I h a d had the good fortune of dictating to Calzada,
successor of the valiant and gentlemanly La Torre,

at Puerto

Cabello.
The Liberator, persistent in this idea as in all the
great concepts that sprang forth from his ardent imagination,
without taking the time to rest his mind when he ended the
campaign of Perd, directed his attention immediately to the
independence of Cuba.

It was then that he wrote me the two

letters that I shall copy below.

They are precious documents
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to me in more than one sense,

and reveal that when he c o m 

m u n i cated his plan in 1827, he h a d been preparing to fulfill
it for some t i m e .
The first letter states as f o l l o w s . ^
La Paz, August 30,

1825.

M y Dear General:
You w h o have done so much for the glory and peace
of Venezuela will not fail to do the last thing that
is lacking to keep our beloved country completely
fortunate.
You who k n o w the state of affairs there
better than anyone else because you are living them,
will k n o w how important the service we are going to
render Colombia is to her.
1 shall render this
service by sending a brilliant division from the
troops we have in Peril, and you by taking the greatest
care to preserve it in this state, placing it in the
healthiest atmosphere, and in short, looking on these
m e n as your most beloved children.
The Junin Battalion, which is one of the best corps
on foot, n o w marches under the command of Colonel
Ortega, a very good officer, and so does [Ramdn]
Escobar's squadron of grenadiers on horseback with
which you are now familiar.3 The Junin is m a g n i f i 
cent, and it has a thousand four hundred squares,
and the squadron that has two hundred is second to none
in its c l a s s . I find it excusable to recommend this
division, which shall render us such an immense
service, to you again, m y dear General.
1

am affectionately yours.
BOLIVAR

In the other letter he is even more explicit although
he does not mention the true objective for which the troops

Azpurha

2A copy of this letter m a y be found in Blanco and
(eds.), Documentos Para La Historia. X, 125.

^RamOn Escobar was a brilliant cavalry leader who
attained the rank of Colonel after his role in the Battles
of Junin and Ayacucho.
He also took part in the Battle of
Carabobo.
Lecuna, Crdnica R a z o n a d a . I, 158; III, 47.
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are destined.

This was demanded by the prudence with which

it was necessary to proceed in this matter.
This letter states as f o l l o w s .4
Potosi, October 16, 1825.
M y Dear Generals
I have received your valuable letter of March 29
in Achaguas with pleasure.
Thank you, my dear General,
for your congratulations on the successes of the lib
erating army of Pertt.
By m y previous letters, you might have seen that
one thousand six hundred men have marched to Venezuela;
that an equal number will march within three months;
and that probably next year I shall go taking six
thousand men.
I assure you that every day X am more
and more determined to execute this operation from
which Colombia could derive an immense benefit.
I have written General Santander and proposed you
as Intendant in Venezuela.
I do not doubt that he will
fulfill a duty on which the happiness of our beloved
country certainly depends.
To tell the truth, X do not
k n o w another person who is better suited to command it
them you.
You are one of its liberators and have so
m a n y rights to its gratitude.
I expect that you will
not excuse yourself from accepting this task.
Affairs progress very nicely around here, and we
have nothing to fear.
The Chuquisaca Assembly has
recessed after naming the commissioners who must
negotiate with Buenos Aires, Pertl, and Colombia, for
the recognition of the Republic of Bolivar.
Consider me always, m y dear General, your most
affectionate, heart-felt friend.
BOLIVAR.
Bolivar was the perfect m a n to carry out what he
repeatedly recommended to me,

Azpurda

and he would have carried it

4A copy of this letter is to be found in Blanco and
(eds.), Documentos Para la H i s t o r i a . X, 125.
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out h a d it not been for a complication of circumstances
which conspired against our final and grandiose project and
struck it down.

The first unfortunate circumstance was

[colonel Jose] B u s t a m e n t e 's uprising in Perd which forced
the troops which were descending the Andes for the expedition
against Cuba to countermarch.^

The uprising urgently required

the presence of these troops on the Colombian frontier, which
was ungratefully invaded,

if

1

m a y be permitted to say so.

From that moment on, Cuba was not thought of again,
internal needs were such,

for

that they hardly afforded the

opportunity to take care of them from moment to moment.
These needs interlaced themselves and succeeded themselves
with such rapidity,

that even Bolivar's genius and his

untiring perseverance were barely sufficient to accommodate
them.
Bolivar encountered another very grave obstacle,

and

one that was most unexpected for us considering that the
project should have been opposed by the Spaniards only.
Washington government,

The

I say it with sorrow, earnestly

opposed the independence of Cuba.

They gave as their reason,

^Colonel Jose Bustamante h a d fought in 1824 at the
Battles of Junin, Matard, and Ayacucho.
After Bolivar had
liberated Perd from the Spanish, he left Bustamente as Chief
of Staff of the third Colombian division he was leaving in
Perd.
In 1827 Colonel Bustamente led the majority of
Granadino Captains and subalterns to oust the Venezuelan c o m 
manding officers and declared against any attempts at d i c t a 
torship.
This was one of the factors leading to Bolivar's
declaration of war on Perd, which ended victoriously for the
Colombians in 1829.
Madariaga, B o l i v a r . 545, 547, 550. Henao
and Arrubla, History of C o l o m b i a . 394, 406-407.
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among others, one which Hispanic American nations should
always remember, and that was t h a t :&
. . . no power, not even Spain itself, has in such a
variety of forms, so deep an interest in its (Cuba's)
future fortunes, whatever they may happen to be, as
the United States . . . for ourselves (the AngloAmericans) we desire no change in the possession or
political condition of that island; and that we could
not, with indifference, see it transferred from Spain,
to any other European power.
We are unwilling to see
its transfer or annexation to either of the new
American States.
These words, which spelled death for our project, were
written by Henry Clay himself.

His character,

as well as

that of the administration which his talents served, clearly
warned us at the very least to forego any idea contrary to
the convenience which the United States derived from the
continuation of Spanish power in Cuba.

The United States

spoke so explicitly then, that it is so surprising to see
h o w anyone later could sacrifice himself to secure the inde
pendence of this island without counting first on the consent
and unanimous cooperation of its inhabitants.

1 pointed this

out to the unfortunate General Don Narciso LOpez, to whom I
spoke with all the loyalty with which his courage inspired
me, for he had been one of the first Spanish warriors in the

6This quotation was extracted from Henry Clay's
instructions to the commissioners at the Congress of PanamA.
Spanish A m e r i c a . 52-53.
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battles fought on the Venezuelan p l a i n s . 7
With this painful incident ended,

let us return to

the principle question regarding the policy of the united
States with respect to Cuba.**

A l l o w me to refer the reader

to the instructions which Mr. Clay gave in 1828 to the

com

missioners he sent to the Congress of Panama and whic h I

7General Don Narciso Ldpez was a native of Venezuela
who had risen to the rank of General in the Spanish army
because of the services rendered to the mother country in the
Wars of Independence in Venezuela.
He took up residence in
Cuba, married there, and became devoted to the interests of
the Cuban people.
Being a man of liberalist tendencies, he
finally resolved to promote a revolt against the tyranny of
Spanish rule.
He did not want a free Cuba, however, for he
feared it might become a Negro Republic like Haiti.
Instead
he w a nted Cuba annexed to the United States, and he was e n 
couraged in this thought b y the Southern states w h o provided
h i m with arms and ammunition.
He set the date for the revolt
on June 24, 1848.
This proved to be an abortive attempt that
resulted in failure.
LOpez returned to the United States and
organized smother expedition w h i c h left for Cuba in the
spring of 1850 with a force of nearly six hundred men, m o s t l y
Americans.
After win n i n g a preliminary victory, Ldpez r e 
embarked his forces, for the Creoles were not anxious for
annexation to the United States.
In April of 1851 L 6 pez h a d
another expedition ready, but the United States government
discovered the plot and kept h i m from sailing.
In August,
however, Ldpez left for Cuba w i t h four hundred men, again
m o s t l y American.
He was defeated, captured, and executed
this time.
Facing death bravely on the scaffold, Ldpez
became the martyr and rallying point for Cuban independence.
Chapman, History of the Cuban R e p u b l i c , 35-39.
For a more
detailed account of Narciso L 6 pez and his activities see
Herminio Portell Vila, Narciso Ldpez y au E p o c a . 2 vols.
(Habana, 1930); Robert Granville Caldwell, The Ldpez E x p e d i 
tions to C u b a , 1848-1851 (Princeton, 1912).
®For early relations of the United States and C u b a see
Whitaker, The Western Hemisphere I d e a . Later relations b e 
tween these two countries are detailed in Basil Rauch,
American Interest in C u b a t 1848-1855 (New York, 1948).
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will copy completely in this c h a p t e r . 9
The objective of the negotiations between the United
States and Russia mentioned in the instructions was to induce
the Emperor of Russia to intervene w i t h the Spanish go v e r n 
ment to secure its consent for the immediate cessation of
hostilities between her Catholic Majesty and her former
colonies.

The principal argument the Minister was to use

was the great possibility that Spain w o u l d lose not only her
continental possessions,

but also the islands of Cuba and

Puerto Rico which the free Republics would attack.

He was

to make it obvious later that the war on Spain's part would
become defensive instead of offensive and that because of
C o l o m b i a ’s and M e x i c o ’s position,

a swarm of corsairs would

not only destroy Spanish commerce on the Gulf of Mexico and
sea of the Antilles, but also along the coast of the P e n i n 
sula.

After adding that the preservation of Cuba and Puerto

Rico deserved every consideration and should satisfy a r e a s o n 
able ambition, he was to further propound the f o l l o w i n g . ^

Q

7The year 1828 which the author cites in this instance
is incorrect, for the congress of Panama m e t in 1826 and Henry
Clay issued his instructions to the commissioners that same
year.
The a u t h o r ’s translated version of these instructions
has been omitted because the original m a y be found in Clay,
Spanish A m e r i c a . 52-58.
l O p & e z ’s translation of the letter of instructions
from Henry Clay, Secretary of State, to He n r y Middleton,
United States Minister to Russia, has been omitted because
the original m a y be found in William R. Manning, Diplomatic
Correspondence of the United States Concerning the Indepen
dence of the Latin American N a t i o n s . 3 vols (New York,
1925), I, 244-50.
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I relate all this that has occurred without any desire
other than to have everything known.
for Spain,

This is without hatred

for X learned to love her people while fighting

her noble and valiant sons.
God deliver me,

This is also without rancor,

for the United States whose hospitality I

have delightfully enjoyed during the last years of my life.
Finally, this is without any further interest in Cuba than
that of presenting the events and the tendencies of the
government of that period under its true light.
Since I am as interested now as I always was in what
concerns Cuba,

I assumed the task of scanning the documents

on the history of this island while writing this c h a p t e r .^-1
I wanted to investigate the reasons why, when all the Spanish
colonies unanimously raised the cry of emancipation against
the mother country,
cry.

Cuba and Puerto Rico did not echo this

The only reason X could come u p w i t h was that one or

the other island was always the arsenal where Spain kept all
the arms used to subjugate those of us who were fighting,
relying only on the justice of our cause.
On July 17, 1808 Cuba received news from Spain w hich
gave occasion in other points of Spanish America for the
formation of juntas as had been done in several cities of
the Peninsula.

The MarquAs de Someruelos governed the

U p A e z 's role in the independence of Cuba is explored
in more detail in J. A. Cova, P&ez y la independencia de
Cuba (Habana, 1959), 13-31.
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island at the time.

12

When he saw himself forced to permit

the publication of this news, he firmly opposed the forma
tion of juntas,

and in order to avoid the complications which

w o u l d be brought by a free discussion of the state of affairs
in Spain, he recognized the Supreme Junta of Seville as
legitimate.

By means of this coup d *etat Someruelos ended

all the difficulties.

The people directed their attention

then to the pursuit of the French,
naturalized citizens on the island,

for there were many
especially ex-colonials

from Santo Domingo, w h o h a d emigrated to Cuba with their
fortunes as they fled from that theatre of revolutionary
horrors.
During Someruelos's rule, the Spanish cortes m a n i 
fested its plans to emancipate the slaves in Cuba and Puerto
Rico.

This measure greatly alarmed the inhabitants of these

islands,

for they believed that not only were their lives

and haciendas threatened, but also the future of the white
race.

Their fears were not unfounded,

for there were riots

12>rhe Marqufis de Someruelos replaced the Conde de
Santa Clara as Captain General of Cuba in March of 1799 at a
time when Spain feared a war with the United States and
wanted a younger, more vigorous military man in command of
the Pearl of the Antilles.
When the threat of war subsided,
Someruelos allowed the return of commerce between Cuba and
N o r t h America and was instrumental in getting the mother
country to liberalize her policy on the monopoly of t r a d e .
Although General James Wilkinson characterized Someruelos
as "extremely feminine in his exterior and of feeble intel
lect," he successfully fulfilled his charge of temporarily
preserving Cuba for Spain.
Herminio Portell Vila, Historia
de C u b a . 4 vols. (Habana, 1938), 1, 129, 154.
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in several sugar and coffee plantations about that time.

A

conspiracy was even discovered which was led by the Negro
Aponte.

His name is still used on the island to recall the

perversity of an individual.

It is easy to understand h o w

these well-founded fears, promoted by having to deal with a
race which had received terrible instructions from acts
verified on a neighboring island, could work in such a manner
on the soul of the Cubans so as to make them consider any
revolutionary movement as dangerous.
them their own independence,

Even if it could grant

such a movement could also

serve to awaken a spirit of insurrection in the slaves.

It

h a d already been proven that the slaves did have a very p r o 
nounced tendency in this direction.

Nevertheless,

the youth

of the island, w h o were not wont to circumscribe themselves
within the limits of prudence,

could not remain indifferent.

They saw the laurels that the independents gathered in other
places and the proof of their valor in the decimated troops
which arrived in Habana from costa Firme after they had
turned over the fortresses that they defended to the socalled insurgents.
formed.

Consequently,

secret societies were

The outstanding one among them was the one called

Soles de B o l i v a r .

Its name reveals that Bolivar was the

saint and sign of the conspirators.

The infamy of a son of

Cuba exposed the conspiracy to General Don Dionisio Vives,
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and thus the revolutionary spirit was suffocated for the time
being.^
In 1825 several Cubans, who had emigrated from their
country, had organized a patriotic junta in Mexico which
decided to send a commission to Bolivar to encourage h i m to
undertake attacking the Spanish power in the Antilles.

The

Liberator embraced the project with the greatest enthusiasm,
and the reader has already seen that it was not his fault
that his plans encountered invincible obstacles.

These

Cuban patriots had directed the following representation to
the Mexican congress.

This is an unedited document wh i c h I

owe to the generosity of a son of Cuba whose name has figured
in the latest revolutionary plans.
SENORES VOTERS OF THE CHAMBERS OF DEPUTIES
AND SENATORS:
The individuals, some natives of the island of Cuba
and others Mexican citizens, who subscribe to this

^ G e n e r a l Francisco Dionisio Vives was the Spanish
Captain General of Cuba from 1823 until M a y 15, 1832.
While
a stern governor, he did not play the part of a despot and
always sought the support of the wealthy Creole class.
In
1823 and 1824, aided by his spies, he did suppress an insur
rection inspired and led by the revolutionary society known
as El Aguila N e g r a , or the Black Eagle.
Consequently in
1825 he was given unlimited dictatorial powers.
Since Mexico
h a d conspired against Spanish occupation of Cuba, General
Vives sent a military expedition against Mexico in 1828.
He
fully expected the Mexicans to join his soldiers and was
very much surprised when his expedition was forced to sur
render.
William F. Johnson, The History of C u b a . 5 vols.
(New York, 1920), II, 343-64.
Philip S. Foner, A History of
Cuba and its Relations with the united S t a t e s . 2 vols. (New
York, 1962), I, 104, 118-19, 120, 121, 122, 151, 175-76.
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petition are all interested in the happiness of both
countries.
They address the Mexican General Congress,
full of the sacred enthusiasm which the love of liberty
inspires, with the following exposition!
When as the result of the heroic efforts of the
Americans, the entire n e w continent finds itself free
from foreign domination, and especially when the towns
oppressed by the Spaniard have completely shaken the
chains of that barbarous government, the unfortunate
island of Cuba, important and precious part of America,
still finds itself today bent under the terrible yoke
of that ferocious enemy of all liberty.
In these c i r 
cumstances the sons of Cuba, though always united in
desires with their brothers of the continent, but still
isolated in all other senses, have no other recourse
but to wait for the Mexican or Colombian nation to
deliver them their freedom or to pledge themselves to
the desperate course of insurrection which in the midst
of such a heterogeneous population could lead to very
doubtful results.
In the midst of the effervescense
which the desire of being free produces in the public
spirit of that island, a resolution or a party has not
yet been adopted.
Consequently, those most enthusiastic
for independence or those who could most easily do so,
have left their native soil to seek aid where they
believed they h a d reasons to expect it— close to a p o w e r 
ful nation whose interest should impel her to lend a
hand to a people who must necessarily be its ally in all
things and who will fight in the vanguard for the
security of both.
Mutual interest and convenience
demand that the Mexican Republic rush to the aid of the
island of Cuba and assist her to get out of the state
of degradation and slavery in which it is maintained by
the common enemy of the Americas.
This state is due
more to force of habit and other particular ci r c u m 
stances them to moral influence; due more to the inertia
that is natural in all towns enjoying certain commodities
because of the acquiescence of the inhabitants to the
system in effect which dishonors their country; in a
word, due only to that natural inclination of m a n to
maintain himself in a state of peace while sacrificing
even his liberty and most precious rights if the results
of a sudden upheaval can be dismal.
But this state of
peace has ceased to be natural n o w to the island of Cuba.
Her inhabitants are n o w aware of the sanctity of their
rights.
They are surrounded everywhere by brilliant
examples of heroism, and they are taught by the practical
lessons of the many free peoples w i t h w h o m they are in
close contact.
In complete contrast, they find t h e m 
selves under a government whose very name spells d e g r a 
dation in the sight of cultured peoples.
Every day they
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are deprived more and more of the commercial relations
w h ich constitute their riches and fortune, and they
find themselves without confidence because of the fear
produced by a nearby revolution.
Finally, they are
impelled by the forces of enlightenment and civilization
to search for a system more in accord w i t h their
interests and their n e w necessities.
T h e y are already
at the point of staging a revolution which without the
protection of a friendly nation can end dismally for
our unfortunate brothers.
If supported and directed
by this Republic, this revolution could lead to the
complete triumph of liberty and independence for the
island.
These, senores, are not vain theories nor assertions
founded only on sterile wishes and desires.
They are
true axioms extracted from the nature of society and
from the circumstances in which events have placed the
island of Cuba.
He appeal to the judgment of the true
Mexican patriots, to that of the deputies and senators
w h o have had the glory of seeing the birth, growth and
triumph of their country's freedom.
Is there a Mexican
heart that has not been irresistibly drawn to the cause
of independence?
Is there one (Mexican) that did not
ardently desire the destruction of the Spanish go v e r n 
m e n t and did not proclaim the triumph of the nation's
arms?
Still, the inevitable disorder of the revolution
dissuaded some:
fear of an unfortunate end daunted
others:
lack of organization alienated many:
and
certain decorous jobs or commitments held back the
others.
And who would not have wanted an organized
force to appear then and organize the n e w order of things
by extinguishing the fatal discord and untying the sons
of the country under the nation's banner?
Then a voice
w o uld have been heard from Dolores to YucatAn, and the
year Ten would have seen the portents of the year
Twenty-One realized.
H o w much blood, h o w m a n y disasters
would have been spared the c o u n t r y 1 Its prosperity
would have continued in the place of the hatreds, the
killings, the ruins, and the vices produced by a civil
war.
To what degree of riches, abuiidance, and civ iliza
tion the great Mexican people could have been elevated!
Apply these considerations, senores* to the island of
Cuba in its present state.
Everything points out that
a revolution is impending in that country:
everything
stimulates and precipitates it.
Shall the Mexican
nation stand b y indifferently while a part of the
American soil inundates itself in a blood to which it
is closely bound by so m a n y ties of friendship and k i n 
ship?
Shall the congress of a free people look on coolly
without extending a helping hand while a friendly and
sister country submerges itself in the gulf of misfortunes
w h i ch threaten it? We do not speak only to your hearts.
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senores.
We direct ourselves to your reason, and
we argue with those who oppose favoring the Cubans.
We k n o w that governments do not decide to act as
individuals do m a n y times, for the sentiment of com
passion and the desire to favor the unfortunate are
not the qualities which establish the policy of
nations.
This very consideration stimulates us to
ask the Mexican government for the aid that we seek.
Yes, senores, the interests of the Republic are c o m 
mi tted to tnose of the island of Cuba, for as long as
the latter is not independent, Mexico's future cannot
be absolutely assured.
R e c a l l . sefiores. where the
first point of support for the conouistadores w a s .
Then think about where the basis for the hopes of the
Spanish government lies today, and do not forget w h y
the Fort of Ulua is in the hands of the enemy.
Con
sider also the position of this beautiful island at
the mouth of the Gulf of Mexico, and that it is in
contact w i t h one of the more important States of the
federation.
Remember that commercial nations watch
over the destinies of the modern Tiro, and that the
London of America, that rich Habana, shall have a
powerful influence on the future of the states of the
n e w continent:
that a terrible crisis could place
this island under the control of a race of m e n that
for the misfortune of humanity could enter into social
relations with civilized peoples.
The domination of
these men in the Antilles could influence the d e s 
tinies of all America in a disadvantageous manner.
Senores, are not these weighty considerations suf
ficient to incline you to order an expedition to the
island? What reflections could possibly oppose the
irresistible reasons which we have just expounded?
The Liberator Bolivar and the congress of Colombia
decided with less powerful motives and having less
chances of success, to order a liberating army to the
other part of Ecuador to redeem their brothers in Perd
from the oppressive force of another veteran army that
was very sure of itself because of its victories and
the influence these gave it. Nothing can detain the
tutelar genius of South America:
it flies to new
triumphs and crosses rivers, seas, and mountains which
are inaccessible to less patriotic men:
it conquers
seemingly insurmountable obstacles.
The credit of a
nation that has yet to recuperate from its closest m i s 
fortunes is pawned.
Soldiers, officers, and generals
whose arms are still tired of fighting, who have not
recuperated from the fatigues of the past war, whose
wounds have not yet healed, rush to another soil to
fight for their brothers * freedom, to redeem them from
oppression, and to aid them during their times of
anguish.
And what shall we say of the efforts of the
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peoples of Chile and Buenos Aires for -the same objec
tive? Neither distance, nor the sacred obligation of
attending to their own defense, nor the shortage of
resources keeps them from coining to shake hands across
the Andes with their Colombian brothers in order to
free the oppressed Peruvians.
In modern Greece, the inhabitants of Morea and
Peloponeso fight with one hand to defend their soil
from the barbarians, and with the other hand they send
aid to the islands of the Archipelago.
While fighting
on the continent, they simultaneously aid the Cretans
and the Rhodians to shake their oppressors' y o k e . —
These are not examples taken from ancient history and
acts that have come to us disfigured and whose applica
tion is inexact the greater part of the time.
These
are events which have just occurred and which are still
h a p pening before our very eyesi
they are events which
are in the nature of society and result from the sympathy
of principles, equality of opinions, and uniformity of
sentiments and interests.
What reasons can justify the
apathy and indifference of Mexico with respect to the
island of Cuba?
The former is a warring nation that
is full of the sentiments of freedom and which has just
established its independence by having united only its
valiant sons.
It also has greater resources than any
of the other States, and a burning desire to propagate
liberal ideas while enjoying an imperturbable peace
and tranquility.
What obstacles can such a nation
find to prevent it from helping a people that have
expressed in whatever manner is possible to them a
desire to be independent— a people that have announced
everywhere that they are only awaiting some assistance
in order to build on the ruins of the present government
another national one which would be in accordance with
the enlightenments of the century?
Spanish despotism
is already stuffing itself on innumerable victims, for
the prisons are n o w filled with p a t r i o t s . The sons of
Cubanacan are already dispersed through foreign lands
fleeing from persecution while families sob silently for
the absence, banishment, or imprisonment of the son,
brother, husband, or father.14 Espionage engenders

^Cubanacan, which was the Indian name for the island
of Cuba, became the name of the island's first proclaimed
Republic.
This Cubanacan Republic was proclaimed sometime in
the summer, probably in August, of 1823, by a native of
Habana, Jos4 Francisco Lemus.
The "conspiracy” as the Spanish
Captain General Vives termed it, was short-lived, for Lemus
was captured and the movement collapsed.
Foner, History of
C u b a . I, 112-14.
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distrust, and terror in all classes of society p r o 
ducing confusion, disorder, fears, and anxieties.
This is the state of the people that ask for our p r o 
tection and aid— people who shall perhaps be u n f o r 
tunate for m a n y centuries if you do not run to their
aid but which could shortly attain an enviable p r o s 
p e rity if you decree their salvation.
The destinies of two great countries rests in your
hands, Fathers of the country.
The fate of many gene
rations of a country that has half a million free men
depends on you.
To enable the deputies and senators
to talk and vote knowledgably on this important
question, we enclose the documents that we have been
able to get relative to it.
Among other things, what
the Attorney General says about the celebrated con 
spiracy of this past year of 1824 is noteworthy.
We
call Congress's attention to the following wordst
The
Attorney General is convinced that those who appear
here as the conspirators of the association known as
the Soles y. Ravos (he speaks of juntas by this name
whose objective it was to promote independence) are
not alone, for the evil has spread and diffused itself
all through the Island just as an over-flowing river
spreads over many fields along its path.
This idea is
borne out by the incidents which have occurred in
these last days proceeding from Hanaban and the sur
rounding area.
This phrase in the Attorney General's
opinion in all its context shows that the sons of the
island of Cuba, instead of being far removed from
kn owing the noble American cause, were straining to
place themselves on an equal footing with their
brothers of the continent.
There is valor, there is
patriotism in those inhabitants, but there are also
obstacles opposing the attainment of the undertaking
— obstacles of such nature, which when considered well
almost appear insurmountable.
In short, senores, the
considerable numbers of slaves anxious for the freedom
of which they are deprived by a misfortune, if you
wish but inevitable in actuality, serves as a bridle
to hold back the nacent efforts of the patriots who
are opposed by the double force represented by an
established government and this relatively inert mass.
The state of tranquility which the proprietors enjoy
under the present system makes the despotism tolerable.
It is an exchange for not being exposed to the terrible
convulsions experienced by a neighboring island whose
history forms an episode corresponding to the revolu
tion of France, its metropolis.
It is the fear, then,
on the part of the owners of rustic farms of seeing
themselves ruined b y the uprising of their slaves and
deprived of their means of living added to the c o n 
sideration on the part of others that a revolution of
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this nature, instead of being advantageous to the
Creoles and even to the rest of the Americas, could
on the contrary be very prejudicial, that keeps them
in a state of uncertainty which will in the end be
sadder than their very fears.
Listen to the reasons.
The Spanish government loses its moral force on
the island of Cuba more and more each day; consequently
its physical resources are weakened.
This decadence
of the present government in that country is caused by
the opposition, corresponding that of Madrid, to the
progress of civilization and more particularly to the
inevitable tendency which former Spanish colonies have
to secure their emancipation.
From this point on it
is just a step to having the present Administration
lose its vigor and energy and then to establishing a
balance of power and of influence between it and the
party in favor of independence.
Furthermore, since
public opinion gives impetus to public affairs, it
alone is not sufficient to contain the disorders p r o 
duced by anarchy.
It may come to pass that the Spanish
government will be reduced to nullity, and when there
is not another one to take its place after all means
of power have been weakened and all social ties
relaxed, a third force which although unorganized
still has all the elements necessary to an intimate
union, shall instinctively take possession of public
power and give a completely different impetus and
direction to the revolution.
Let us not forget the
events of Santo Domingo which resulted chiefly from
France's oscillations and the state of nullity in
which the government of this island found itself.
The
Creoles were not sufficiently strong to superimpose
themselves on the metropolis, and the metropolis had
lost its power to contain the slaves.
Both became the
victims of the united force created by those who could
not choose by system but only by the instinct possessed
by all men to seek their liberty.
These are the circumstances in which the largest
island of the Archipelago close to Mexico finds itselft
these are the risks which threaten C u b a n a c a n . Trade
between that country and this one, the political rela
tions that naturally should start with independence,
the elucidation, the liberty, the culture of our
fathers— all these are threatened and all are in danger
if the revolution takes on the horrible aspect which
we have announced because the Mexican nation did not
send a force capable of raising the flag of indepen
dence some place on the island and calling all her sons.
Then the Cuban patriots w h o are sighing today and
wa iting for their brothers of the continent on their
beaches will fly to unite under the wings of the
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invincible Eagle.
Spanish pride will then receive
its last b l o w and be forced to retreat and concen
trate on the Peninsula!
then all the Americans will
be able to join in singing about the complete triumph
of our independence and write hymns to liberty.
Habana could serve as the center for the n e w amateurs
of Columbus's continent.
From the assemblies meet i n g
here shall come decrees that will honor the cause of
humanity, which is today the cause of all Americans.
The ships of the Republics shall sail freely on our
seas, and the flags of friendly nations shall be
respected.
There shall be peace, abundance, and p r o s 
perity.
The ships that arrive at the most celebrated
ports of this powerful nation will cease to fear
encountering an enemy who with the opprobium of its
h e r oism dares to maintain itself before and within
sight of its shores.
The plaque of pirates which
infest the Mexican Gulf will disappear forever.
Everything shall change.
The names of the Mexican
heroes will be diffused with those of the liberators
of the island and stir up memories of gratitude even
in the most remote g e n e r a t i o n s .
Let your votes join with those of the inhabitants
of the island of Cuba to move the Mexican Congress to
take a stand which will place it on a plane with that
of the liberators of peoples and of that celebrated
monarch of Sicily who as a reward for his victories
in defeating one hundred and fifty thousand Car t h a 
ginians imposed as a condition for peace that both
enemies cease offering their first-born sons as
sacrifices to their gods.
— -Antonio Abad Yznaga, Lorenzo Zabala, Jos6 Antonio
Mozo, Joaquin Casares y Armas, Manuel Gaul, Jos6
Antonio de Echavarri, Jos6 Teurbe Tolon, Antonio
Vald£z.
The South American people looked upon the cause of
liberty for Cuba with such enthusiasm,
brated Battle of Ayacucho,

that after the c e l e 

according to what General Sucre

w rote me from Chuquisaca on April 27, 1826, the army offered
itself to the government for the purpose of liberating
Habana.

According to that chief, however,

answered only by giving its thanks.

the government

This m a y have been

because it lacked the pecuniary means to sustain a new

555
campaign or because it may not have been convenient to
Colombia's interests to enter into a new dispute whic h might
prove e m b a r r a s s i n g .
The fact is that Bolivar was afraid to give any p u b 
licity to such a worthy undertaking which required great

ISpAez inserts this letter as a footnote here.
Chuquisaca, April 27,
My Dear G e n e r a l t

1826

After the Battle of Ayacucho I had the pleasure of
wr iting you to inform you that the final outcome of the c a m 
paign of Perd was victory, and to thank you in the name of
the conquering army for the efforts that you made in V e n e 
zuela to assist us.
Even though this aid did not arrive in
time, it still had merit, for we consider the efficacy with
which you prepared it and the good intentions you held for
the glorious success of your comrades in this country who were
committed to the most noble cause.
I have not received an answer from you, and I do not
k n o w if it is because my letter did not arrive; because yours
was lost in the return mail as has happened many times; or
because you have not written.
In any case, I write this to
greet you again and reiterate m y feelings.
Recently, from Ayacucho, our array offered itself to
the government for the purpose of liberating Habana.
Whether
it was because there was not the pecuniary means to sustain a
n e w campaign, or because it is not convenient to Colombia's
interests to enter in a dispute which might prove emb arras
sing, the government answered only by giving its thanks.
Our
army's morale is excellent as a result of the discipline,
order, system, and above all, the national and militar y
spirit which doubles its strength.
It w o u l d be capable of
any undertaking worthy of arms.
I have seen in the newspapers that you, continuing
your distinguished services to the country, maintain good
order in Venezuela.
I owe and render you m y gratitude for
this great service to this land which is so beloved to me.
Please, my esteemed General, accept the sentiments of
affection and consideration w i t h which I am your very a tten
tive and obedient servant.
A. de Sucre
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caution and major prudence.

It would truly have been g r a n 

diose and wo r t h y of the American revolution if the conquering
army from Ayacucho,

composed of troops from all the South

American countries,

could have ended its career of triumphs

after having seized the territory on which Pizarro had
planted in other times the proud flag of the castles and
lions, by seizing the most precious of the jewels in the
Castilian crown.

Only those people who have not dealt inti

m ately with the multitude of the sons of Cuba who come in
the summer months to these States to breathe the vivifying
atmosphere of democracy,

can believe that the Cubans are well

satisfied and content with Spanish domination and that they
are satisfied only with the material prosperity made possible
for them by the agricultural riches from the soil of their
country which is exhuberant in valuable and precious p r o d u c 
tions.

In past epochs I have seen wealthy men from that

island generously offer their treasures for liberating
expeditions.

I have seen and still am seeing youths with

talent and a good future, who eat the bitter bread of e migra
tion kneaded with the sweat of their brows,

form patriotic

juntas without freeing themselves from the ridicule with
w hich the positivists look upon all those w h o begin u n d e r 
takings which they do not believe can be carried to a
successful end without the cooperation of those who have
p ecuniary resources at their disposal.

None of this is

sufficient cause for the Cuban patriots to cease working with
faith and enthusiasm for the liberty of their unfortunate
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country.

Similar to the sons of the unhappy Polonius,

they

form associations in foreign countries to echo before the
liberal world the sighs and laments of their comrades who
live under the colonial yoke.

They say and repeat every

i n s t a n t , addressing their country,

Mfosti tu men bella o.

almen piu f o r t e ."^
There is no doubt that the hour of redemption shall
come for Cuba, whether it is as a result of the efforts of
her own sons or due to the aid lent them b y any foreign
nation with which Spain undertakes a prolonged war.
like an A c h i l l e s 1 heel for Spain,
body.

Cuba is

the vulnerable part of its

If the government that reigns in the Peninsula were

not so jealous of what it calls national p r i d e , and if it
would sacrifice the interest and glory of seeing their race
perpetually and solidly established on the American continent
to this vain sentiment,

Spain could leave the Cubans in free

possession of the land on which they were born.
her geographical boundaries,

Limited to

Spain could then reconquer the

Strait by occupying Gibraltar and the opposite coasts of
Africa.

Spain then,

in truth, would not possess dominions

on w h i c h the sun never sets, but in its stead it could set
the law down to all the nations whose ships p l o w the valuable
arm of the sea which bathes the coasts of three continents
of the ancient world.
As for the Cubans,

in the midst of their present

^®*'If only you were less beautiful or at least
st r o n g er."
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misfortunes,

let them seek consolation from the future lot

wh i c h shall befall them as a free and independent nation.
Tutored by the inconveniences and evils with which the people
of the same race that preceded them in the conquest of inde
pendence have had to struggle,

they can avoid making the

same mistakes committed by those who today are atoning p a i n 
fully.

Let the Cubans try to keep the last day of Spanish

domination from becoming the first of a reign of anarchy and
internal dissensions.

Let them keep the first mistakes we

made after attaining our independence before them so that
they do not forget to avoid them.
faults we committed,

Let them remember the

the excesses and defects of our failures,

and thus they will be able to implant the basis of their
future well-being along with their declaration of inde
pendence .
The inhabitants of Cuba shall have in common with us
the evils that follow the Spanish colonial system.

In order

that they do not imitate us in those evils which we ourselves
created, do not let them be blinded by theories which promise
more than they cam give.

Do not let them ever adhere to the

political composition which kills, but rather adhere to the
political spirit which vivifies.

Let them remember that the

social body is similar to the humamt

sometimes its afflic

tions are healed by a simple topical application applied in
time while at other times it is necessary to cure the evil
with hot irons so that the venomous virus cam not be innoculated into the canals of vitality.

And do not ever let them
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forget that a people cannot be free as long as they maintain
slaves in their midst.

l^PAez inserts this footnote. "This opinion is not
ne w to me.
Besides being an axiomatic truth, I put it into
practice when 1 commanded in Apure as chief in 1816.
Many
of the slaves became valiant officers later who distinguished
themselves in the army.— Later I tried to extirpate slavery
in Venezuela.
The proprietors opposed me in 1826, in 1830,
and in 1847.
With one pretext or another they never accepted
an act of justice which would benefit all.
See the following notes I wrote for a delegation to
the Congress of 1848.
If Venezuela's birth as a nation demanded to be marked
wi t h an act of kindness, another act of justice would have
been no less noteworthy.
When the entire Republic breathes
freedom, when it has proclaimed the rights of men, and when
it has declared that no man can be the property of another,
to permit slavery is to contradict oneself in one's own
principles and to conflict with o n e ’s own acts and undermine
one of the principle basis upon which the social edifice
should be built.
With these foundations, Congress should
solicit a small loan of money outside the country to redeem
the slaves and indemnify their owners as is provided for in
the Constitution in Article 208.
The law which Congress
could dictate on this important event could no doubt be
received in Venezuela as well as in foreign countries w a t c h 
ing us, as the wisest and the most philanthropic.
This would
be because it would give the Republic an infinity of citizens
w h i c h n o w do not belong to society but instead are the p r o p 
erty of a few.--Man as a free being cannot be the property of
another.
No obstacles should be placed in the way of the
innocent exercise of his faculties nor should he be deprived
of the great prerogative of his freedom.
Slavery in V e n e 
zuela should be excluded from the midst of properties.
I
have the good fortune of being one of the liberators of m y
country, and 1 would descend to the sepulchre painfully if I
were not inclined to cooperate with seeing to it that justice
is well distributed.
But in order that we cam see h o w we can
exercise this justice without harming the interests which
represent the future of the families supporting themselves
on the work of slaves, let us compare two equal capital sums,
one invested in slaves and the other placed on interest rates.
$15,000.
Capital placed at an interest rate of 12%
annually, which is the rate generally paid in this country,
w o u l d give a profit of . . . $1,800.
$15,000.
Capital invested in slaves, according to the
following manifestations, would only produce . . . $1,400
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Fortunately for Cuba she has neither impenetrable
jungles nor territories which cover vast horizons.

Therefore.

Difference against the capital invested in slaves
. . . $400 .
MANIFESTATIONS
With the capital mentioned, fifty slaves would be
bought at $300.
These slaves, according to the customs already e stab
lished in this country, would only work two hundred days in
the year, for out of the 364 says. 164 must be subtracted in
the following manneri
For Saturdays and S u n d a y s ..........104
For feast d a y s .................
20
For sicknesses, escapes, et
c e t e r a ............................. 40
164
The two hundred days of work at two reales libres
daily would be $2,500.
Ordinary expenses such as clothing, medicines, medical
aid, et c e t e r a , should be deducted at the rate of $10.00
each . . . $500.
The value of two slaves which, according to all p r o b 
abilities would die yearly or become useless, must also be
deducted if only at 4 % ............. 600 SI. 100
$1,400
This manifestations shows that the money invested in
slave proportions a notable loss when compared to that placed
at common interest rates.
If we remember also that one
capital is perishable and the other p e r p e t u a l . the great
void that still remains in this comparison will be seen.
The $10.00 of yearly expenses calculated to each
slave is figured as followsi
A small cloak for w o m e n ......................... $1.00
Twelve yards of hair cue at two r e a l e s .........
3.00
A h a t ...............................................
4.00
Medical aid at the rate of $150 a year for
one doctor amounts to this rate per
s l a v e ............................................
3.00
Food, nurse, et c e t e r a ...........................
5.00

$ 10.00
The presupposed dress differs much from that provided
by law.
There are about twenty thousand slaves in Venezuela
which at two hundred dollars (medium terms) would represent
$4,000,000.
What incalculable advantages the circulation of
such a quantity of money would bring to the c o u n t r y 1
Keep in mind also that the proprietors can lose the
greater part of the capital employed in slaves in an epidemic,
and that that loss cannot be repaired easily, not only in
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it w o u ld not be possible for rebel parties to find shelter—
parties which to the tune of patriotism live off sacking the
towns.

Neither shall they have space for their cavalry

forays which are organized by caudillos who reveal,
its horror,

in all

the European who has regressed to a barbaric

state in the pampas of the Southern hemisphere.
raphical accidents which

1

Those topog

consider as the best means of

defense in my country against a foreign nation, would present
to an emancipated Cuba the same evils we have had to fight
since we expelled our foreign oppressors.
graphic position,

Due to her g e o 

Cuba will be safe from any aggression from

an outside enemy if she dedicates a great part of her t r e a 
sury to defending her coast and establishing a fleet that
someday would be worthy of the honorary title of Tiro del
Nuevo Mundo.
1 pray that I do not die before witnessing the r e p e t i 
tion on the fields of Cuba of the scenes I had the glory of

terms of hands for work, but in terms of credit in the market
where the landowner buys the goods urgently needed on his
properties.
The political events of [18]48 did not permit me to
present the ideas 1 have outlined in these notes before C o n 
gress . "
The figures P&ez gives in this account do not check
out correctly.
This m a y be due to some type of printing or
typographical error.
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seeing on the plains of my c o u n t r y . I

k n o w that in one of

the departments of the island there are inhabitants who need
only to exchange the javelin of the cow-boy for the lance of
the soldier in order to attain the fame of the Venezuelan
llanero.

l®The author footnotes this as follows. "Humboldt in
his Voyages to the Equinoctial Regions states that in 1800
in Turmero there was a reunion of the nation's militia.
Only
its appearance announced that the peace in those valleys h a d
not b e e n interrupted for centuries.
The Captain General,
h oping to give a n e w impetus to the military spirit, had
ordered extensive exercises.
The Turmero Battalion in a
simulated battle h a d fired upon that of La Victoria.
Our
host, a Lieutenant in the local militia, did not tire of
describing the danger of this action to us.
' 1 have seen m y 
self. ' he told me. 'surrounded by rifles that could explode
at any moments
they have kept m e in the sun for four hours
without even permitting my slaves to hold an umbrella over m y
h e a d . 4 H o w rapidly even the most peaceful peoples take to
the customs of Warl
I smiled then at a timidity that was
manifested w i t h such candor.
Twelve years later those very
valleys of Aragua. those same quiet plains of La Victoria and
Turmero. the narrow passage of La Cabrera and the fertile
shores of the lake of Valencia, came to be the scene of the
most bloody and cruel combat between the natives and the
soldiers of the metropolis."
This quotation m a y be found in
Humboldt. Viaie a las Reqiones Eauinoxiales del Nuevo
C o n t l n e n t e . Ill, 84.

CHAPTER XXI
Royalist Conspiracies— Coronado and the Castillos
— Conspiracy in Bar i n a s — Mutiny in Angostura—
Persuit and Extermination of the Rebel Parties.
1827-1828
The historian[s] Baralt [and Diaz],

after relating the

end of the affairs which h a d been agitating other sections of
Colombia,

state in speaking about Venezuelai

"When the a gita

tions and restlessness were calmed on one front
such commotions,
fronts,

open violence,

(Ecuador),

and wars broke out on other

that it seemed as if the disturbing elements had m e t

and agreed at the same time but with diverse m e a n s , to
lacerate the country purposely in order to distribute the
pieces among t h e m s e l v e s .'*1
tors did plot.

In effect,

the Royalist co n s p i r a 

They were animated by proclamations and

excited by m a n y partisans of the king who h a d remained in the
country,

appearing to submit themselves to the n e w order of

things.

I believed it opportune to take precautionary m e a 

sures.

At the same time that I seized persons involved in

the plot,

such as friars Ravelo and Garcia,

I sent m y forces

against several separate parties that had rebelled at

^ h i s quotation m a y be found in Baralt and Diaz,
Resdmen de la Historia, II, 351.
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different points.

Offering a pardon to the guilty b y means

of a proclamation,

I succeeded in getting more than four

hundred individuals to lay down their arms.

Perhaps m i s i n t e r 

p r eting the leniency with which I had treated the rebels in
CumanA,

Pedro Coronado, who had been given a prison sentence

because of his incendiary writings, placed himself at the
head of one hundred and fifty m e n to resist the authorities
w ho had pronounced sentence against him.

1

sent his brother

Bonifacio and Colonel Ramdn Burgos to deal with him and make
h i m understand the grave consequences which would follow his
(

rash actions.

o

Thus 1 was able to get Coronado to abandon

his projects and present himself to me.
On October 24 of this year I was writing the Liberatort
"The country marches along the path that His Excellency the
Liberator tracedi
of your decrees,

towns have gotten used to the execution
order reigns everywhere.

I have some basis

on which to found m y hopes that the situation will remain
unchanged until the sought-after and happy time arrives when

2No additional information is available on Bonifacio
or Pedro Coronado.
Ramdn Burgos was born in G u a n a r e . He was a law
student when the revolution broke out in 1810.
He left his
studies to enlist as a soldier in Caracas.
By 1813, after
fighting at the Battles of Barbula, Puerto Cabello, and
Araure, he had attained the rank of Lieutenant.
In 1814 he
was at San Carlos and emigrated from there as a Captain.
He
w e n t on to fight at Apurito, Barinas, and Carabobo and rose
to the rank of Colonel in 1827.
Burgos served as Commandant
of Arms at MArida, CumanA, and Barinas.
He retired from
military service in 1831.
DAvila, Diccionario B i o a r A f i c o .
I, 54-55.
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the Great Convention dictates the refor m s . "3
A conspiracy was uncovered in Barinas on October 19
in w h i ch the partisans of the Spaniards were involved.

Among

them were ma ny individuals of color who planned to promote
disturbances to steal and sack the national coffers and b e 
h e a d some citizens.

The Governor Commandant of Arms. Jos4

Ignacio Pulido, declared the province under martial law and
started investigations to punish the guilty.^

This co n 

spiracy was suffocated in its origin, which dealt a good
b l o w to the deluded Royalists w h o proposed to sustain the
Spanish flag in a district of Coro,
Captain candelario O l i v a r e s . 5

commanded by militia

The citizens of the Coro

District, who during other times had shown themselves so
favorably inclined to the Royalist cause,

in this instance

rendered the country the service of exterminating the rebels

3A copy of this letter does not appear either in the
Coleccidn de Documentos or Blanco and Azpurda (eds.),
Documentos Para la H i s t o r i a .
^General Jose Ignacio Pulido was born in 1795 in Bravos.
He joined the patriot army in 1814 and took part in the siege
of Carabobo in 1815.
Then he emigrated to Los C a y o s . From
1818 to 1820 he fought unceasingly against the Royalists at
Calabozo, La Puerta, Sombrero, Gamarra, and Cticuta.
He
served with distinction from 1822 to 1626 as Commandant of
Arms in the Orinoco Department, rapidly extinguishing the
conspiracy of 1827.
Pulido died in Barinas on January 28,
1868.
Scarpetta and Vergara, Diccionario B i o a r A f i c o . 489-90.
5Restrepo mentions Olivares and states that he p r o 
claimed in favor of the King in the canton of San Luis.
Revolucidn de la Repflblica de C o l o m b i a , IV, 70.
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who pretended to revive the already-extinguished spirit of
adhesion to the old metropolis.
The Liberator had commissioned Colonel Jos 6 Fdlix
Blanco, who later became a general,** to be intendant of the
province of Guayana.

He was to set ceiling prices to end the

scandalous contraband there,

and to execute some of the

Liberator's decrees relative to the prohibition of the
exportation of mules,
maritime customs.

to sales taxes,

to patents,

and to

To execute any order in which a man of

character and tenacity is needed,
suited than Colonel Blanco.

there was no one better

Thus when he arrived in A n g o s 

tura he proposed to act in keeping with the confidence that
the Liberator h a d placed in him.

Blanco's inflexible c o n 

duct was in great contrast to the weakness shown by General
jos 6 Manuel Olivares,

Governor of the province.

Therefore,

6The author interjects this footnote.
"I transcribe
here with pleasure what El. Federalista of Caracas said about
this veteran of the independence wars on April 19, 1866.
'Blanco, the almost secular soul w h o received the revolution
of 1810, was already full of the echoes of the tempest of
1789.
Strong, honest, a patriot of all epochs; as credulous
in liberty and in the happy future of America at eighty as
he would have been with the ardors of his y o u t h . '
"General Blanco, after his great services to the
country that gave h i m birth, has h a d the patriotic idea of
publishing a reformed edition of Documentos de la Vida
Pdblica del L i b e r t a d o r . Let God grant that this undertaking,
started in other times by eminent men who were interested in
spreading knowledge concerning the history of Colombia to
the world, be finished n o w . "
The correct title of the work by Blanco is Documentos
P ara la Historia de la Vida Pflblica del Libertador de
C o l o m b i a , Parti y B o l i v i a .

567
it is not strange that the inhabitants became displeased
very quickly with the newly-arrived intendant, whose mission
it was to end the illicit markets.
On the night of October 28 a group of men leveled the
I n t e n d a n t 1 a house,

asking for his and the Governor's removal,

for it was the l a t t e r 1s duty to maintain the L i b e r a t o r 1s
Commissioner in office.
mutinied,
day,

A great part of the population

and in an act drafted in assembly the following

they removed colonel Blanco from his post.

They accused

h i m of having committed repeated acts of despotism and
revealing himself to be General Santander's enemy, who then
exercised the executive power.

They were no less severe on

the political Governor of the province,
for they also removed h i m from command.

General Olivares,
The Intendant p r e 

sented himself before the revolutionary authorities.

He was

first sent to prison and later sent to the capital by w a y of
Apure and Barinas.

Fortunately,

this mutiny only had the

character of a personal animosity against the person of
Intendant Blanco.

Consequently, when General Jos 6 Laurencio

Silva was appointed Governor of the province,

everything

became calm again.
With Coronado removed from the rebellion he had
stirred up, his comrades the Castillos continued to abuse
the conciliatory measures I had adopted to avoid the shedding

568
of b l o o d . 7

They remained armed and attacked the troops that

Generals Mar iffo, Bermddez,

and Monagas commanded.

They re

sisted them for six months and committed all sorts of
excesses.

Not even because of this was less clemency shown

the rebels.

As a result some reported to be pardoned,

it still did not conquer the r e b e l s 1 obstinacy.

but

However,

Commandant Juan de Dios Manzaneque and his forces defeated
the rebel elements on February

8

, 1828,

and took possession

of all the means they had used to maintain themselves until
then on the mountain ridge.
The rebel leaders, Francisco Villareal and Jos£ del
Rosario Farias,
ment's clemency.

and their comrades resorted to the gov e r n 
It promised them complete obliteration of

the past if they retired to the life of peaceful citizens.
In another chapter I shall deal w i t h the other
Royalist parties that circulated during these very times in
the territories and spread consternation among the peaceful
i nhabi t ants.

7The Castillo brothers were Isidoro, Luis, and Rosario.
Restrepo states that they h a d a party of seventy armed men.
Revolucidn de la Republica de C o l o m b i a . IV, 70-71.

CHAPTER XXII
Persecution of Several Royalist Parties— Arrival
of Spanish Lieutenant Colonel [jos£ Antonio]
Ariz&balo to Head T h e m — His Pursuit by the Troops
Under M y Com m a n d — ArizAbalo's capitulation—
Instructions Which General La Torre h a d Given Him.
1827-28-29
The parties of bandits under the Royalist banner that
scoured the Venezuelan territory,

committing all sorts of

excesses, kept the troops of the Republic in continuous m o v e 
ment.

It was impossible to exterminate these hordes,

for

they took refuge in the mountains and inaccessible places,
and there challenged the numerically superior forces sent
against them.

The citizens in the rural towns,

afraid of

the damages these bandits could and did inflict on their
farms, not only failed to help the government persecute them,
but instead served as their spies and kept them informed of
the measures taken which were designed to surprise them in
their dens.
Don Jos 6 Domingo Diaz,

from Puerto Rico, exaggerated

all these acts to the King of Spain in an effort to prove to
h i m h o w easy it would be to reconquer the countries of the
mainland if an expeditionary army or at least some officers
were sent out to lead the parties that still defended the
rights of His Catholic Majesty in the American territory.
569
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Spain was not without those w h o would undertake the e n t e r 
prise of fomenting a movement in Colombia in favor of the
King.

It was with such an objective that Lieutenant Colonel

Jos« ArizAbalo disembarked in La Guaira.^
of Vizcaya,
seveni

He was a native

but had been taken to Caracas at the age of

so his family and interests were in that city.

The

revolution had barely started against the metropolis, when
ArizAbalo joined the Royalist ranks.

He rose to the rank of

Lieutenant Colonel in the infantry and Commandant of artil
lery.

and he was commanding the fort at Barra de Maracaibo

when he h a d to abandon the country as a result of M o r a l e s 1

josA Antonio ArizAbalo had been a Lieutenant Colonel
in the Spanish army and h a d fought admirably in the Royalist
army in Venezuela until 1823 when he was forced to yield his
command of La Barra Castle in Maracaibo by Morales's c a p i t u 
lation to the revolutionaries.
He was well known for his
devotion to the Spanish monarch and his adversion to the
revolution.
Despite this, since ArizAbalo's family lived in
Caracas, for he h a d come to Venezuela when he was seven years
old, he was permitted reentry into Venezuela in 1826.
When
Bolivar found out in 1827 h o w vast ArizAbalo's knowledge of
artillery was, he offered h i m the rank of Colonel in the
patriot army and complete command of artillery in the Caracas
province.
ArizAbalo asked for six months to consider the
proposition.
Bolivar, confident that he could be w o n over to
the patriot cause, gave h i m free conduct and passage in
Venezuela.
ArizAbalo used these to help foment and cement a
general Royalist conspiracy in Venezuela.
He even secured
the approval and a promise of assistance from the Captain
General of Puerto Rico to reestablish Spanish control on the
mainland.
In September of 1828 he started an implacable war
against the patriots which lasted until June of 1829.
When
ArizAbalo finally surrendered to PAez, he had only one h u n 
dred and eighty-three men left.
He h a d to return to Spain,
but even on this trip back to his homeland he refused to
acknowledge the rebel flag that flew over the ship on which
he was sailing.
Torrente, Historia de la Revolucidn. Ill,
566-602.
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capitulation.

He promised not to take arms again against

the Republic of Colombia.

In January of 1827 he presented

himself to Bolivar in Caracas.

The latter,

aware of

ArizAbalo's profound knowledge in the field of artillery,
offered h i m the rank of Colonel and command of the artillery
in the entire province of Caracas.
sure, " said Torrente,

"He listened with p l e a 

"to the propositions which offered h i m

the opportunity of cementing his noble plans without obstacle;
and answering these with simulated urbanity, he asked for six
months in w h i c h to make up his mind, certain that said time
w ould be sufficient to give the cry of death against the d i s 
loyal Venezuelans."^
Such a generous reception and such indiscreet proofs
of confidence in his feigned good faith facilitated the
Royalist penetration into the territory.

It also enabled

ArizAbalo to establish relations with the guerrillas Centeno,
Ooroteo,

Inocencio [Rodriguez],

and Cisneros, who commanded

the parties I have already m e n t i o n e d . 3
the latter,
chief.

All of them,

except

revealed themselves ready to recognize h i m as

Then ArizAbalo sent emissaries to General La Torre,

w h o commanded in Puerto Rico,
Majesty's name,

asking him to grant h i m in His

the appointment as chief of the Royalist

2l b l d .. 568.
3 Inocencio Rodriguez was an Indian who had served as
a Captain in the Queen's Battalion since 1814.
He was n amed
second in command of the Lealtad Battalion.
Ibid., 572.
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forces operating on the mainland.
arms,

He also asked for aid in

and asserted that he would quickly assemble a respect

able army.

La Torre sent h i m the title he requested,

including a sheet of instructions which will be seen at the
end of this chapter.

To encourage h i m further.

La Torre

promised that on October 27 of that same year Spanish ships
carrying the assistance he demanded would arrive at the V e n e 
zuelan c o a s t s .

ArizAbalo immediately went to be acknowledged

as chief of the previously-cited guerrillas.

All submitted

themselves to h i m except JosA Dionisio Cisneros who.

accus

tomed to working advantageously on his own recognizance and
at his own risk,

showed himself very jealous of the authority

he exercised over his subordinates.
Centeno, who was chief of the parties that existed in
Los Guires. placed nine hundred m e n under ArizAbalo's orders.
With the assistance of Captain T a z o n 1 a two nephews wh o
assembled the discontent people from the Camatagua ne i g h b o r 
hoods. he very quickly added another four hundred men to that
number.

"Even the married men," says the infamous Torrente

impudently,

"abandoned their wives and sons,

and the old for

got the torpidness of their limbs to participate in the glory
of being the defendors of Altar and T h r o n e . 114
hoods such as these,

With false

the King of Spain was deceived into

thinking that America had been lost against the will of
America itself 1

4 I b i d .. 571.
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To arm all these people well, ArizAbalo demanded that,
the Governor of Puerto Rico hasten sending the ships which
he had promised.

He advised h i m to disembark the troops at

Rio Chico, where it would be easy for him to go and get them.
The first encounters between our forces and those
parties of bandits were of little importance.

In Punteral

on September 7 they surprised forty-five patriots and impris
oned them.

Torrente states:

"This first encounter sustained

by ArizAbalo had the good result which was the best portent
of the happy ending awaiting an undertaking which could not
but be protected by the God of the armies,

from Whom the

purity of the intentions of those pledged in it was not
*

C

hidden.it

is noteworthy to copy Torrente*s words to bring

them to the attention of those w h o have not read the work of
this venal writer.
stitution ominous,

He calls the system of the Spanish c o n 
and defends the rights of that monarch

who is so detested in Spain itself.

He did not hesitate to

slander the most eminent American patriots to w i n the approval
of that despot who trampled underneath his feet the sacred
rights of the generous Spanish public that had given h i m so
m a n y proofs of love and loyalty.
When all the parties were finally assembled, ArizAbalo
dedicated himself to organizing them and naming Juan
Celestino Centeno,

Inocencio Rodriguez,

as their leaders.

Then he selected six hundred m e n to go to

5I b i d .. 572.

and Doroteo Herrera
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the Tamanaco Mountains to till the soil and gather resources
for the parties of m e n that he had left along different
routes to fight the so-called insurgents.
In the town of Lezama, where he routed the small force
of one hundred and seventy m e n that guarded it, Ariz&balo p r o 
claimed the King's government and h a d the Spanish flag
b l e s s e d— a flag which he thought would wave over the other
towns they planned to overrun.

However,

two days later he

was forced to evacuate Lezama when he found out about the
troops we h a d sent against him.

He then went to Maicarita

and from there dispatched parties in different directions.
He himself stayed at the head of the three hundred and sixty
m e n w i th which he surprised Colonel L d p e z 1s column while the
latter was going through a narrow passage.
With the intent of going to Rio Chico, where the
Spanish ships loaded with supplies sent from Puerto Rico
were to arrive, Ariz&balo interned himself in the very dense
Tamanaco Mountains.

There he discovered that Centeno had

been defeated in Macairita.

Joining Inocencio Rodriguez and

later Doroteo Herrera, he determined to make even greater
efforts until the ships arrived with the promised assistance.
Despite his persevering efforts, he was not able to get
Cisneros to join forces with him.

That barbarian even

refused to give the wounded the aid they asked for,

alleging

"that he beheaded his soldiers who had the misfortune of
finding themselves in a similar situation so that they would
not reveal their hiding places if they fell into the
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e n e m i e s ' h a n d s ."
Finally,

I shall conclude by saying that: ArizAbalo,

pursued and accosted on all parts,

and knowing that General

Laborde h a d left the Rio Chico waters with his ships,

saw

himself forced to capitulate in the Tamanaco Mountains,
following the example of his Lieutenants Centeno and Doroteo
Herrera.

He was encouraged in this decision because nothing

indicated to him that the Royalists had won any triumphs in
the interior of the territory,

and because perhaps n o w he

believed that those parties who called themselves Royalists
were only bands of r o b b e r s .
INSTRUCTIONS
For His M a j e s t y 1a Chief of Arms in Venezuela, regarding
the orga n i z a t i o n . d i s c i p l i n e . and conduct that the
corps that are created should observe themselves and
w i t h the towns they occupy and return to the true
government.
Organize all the parties possible, and those which
exist already, giving them the denominations of battalions when they exceed four hundred men and squadrons
w h e n they exceed two hundred men.
Their commandants
shall be proven members of the infantry and cavalry.
W i th the companies divided, captains, subaltern officers,
and other ranks shall be named.
These shall be given
the proper commission titles.
You shall call the officers of the King that there
might be in the country so that they will organize
districts and place themselves in them or other m i l i 
tary jobs.
As soon as possible you will organize the corps under
the method prescribed by Royal ordinances.
You shall inspire the chiefs w i t h the due order,
discipline, and subordination, telling them that their
services shall be advantageously rewarded.
An y chief or officer that comes over with enemy

576
troops and armaments shall be kept in his rank and
his services used without prejudicing other rewards,
depending on the merit and importance of his union
with the Loyalist r a n k s .
As long as the army you organize is divided into
battalions and squadrons, it will be very advantageous
when in service.
It shall be easier to manage and
much more useful in military undertakings.
You must impress on your men that just as the
soldier must be terrible against his enemy in war, if
the latter surrenders, generosity must shine in him
as the proper attribute of courage.
The soldiers must be humane with the towns and
attract its citizens by gentleness and good treatment.
They should treat them as brothers and not censure
them nor mention their previous conduct.
In this
manner they will win gratitude for their services
and admiration for their skills and fidelity.
The Chief of Arms or the Commandant who operates
the retailing of provisions and supplies shall try by
means of proclamations to show the towns that are
occupied, that the objective of his troops is to
unite the territory of His Majesty's soft and paternal
government, to destroy the revolutionary anarchy of
the Republic, to protect the citizens' life and p r o p 
erties, to thrust out the tyrants and reestablish
that happy state the inhabitants enjoyed in 1609, and
to return the enjoyment of the calm, both in property
and justice, which has been wrested from them by the
stupid, the infamous, the ignorant, and the traitors.
They shall make apparent to them that His Majesty
has pardoned all the past deviations up to this point,
and that no accusation made out of vengeance shall be
accepted.
Each individual will also be able to keep
and enjoy the goods he has secured legitimately.
Resentment will have no place.
Finally each word
given by the Chief of Arms on every one of these
points shall be infallible in its fulfillment.
All acts of treason committed after the entrance
of the Royalist troops will be punished immediately
and militarily, maintaining the ordinance rules in so
far as circumstances permit.
Try to annoy the towns as little as possible, k e e p 
ing an account and reason of what they supply with the
proper explanations and formality.
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In all towns in which His Majesty's arms enter,
the corresponding authorities will be reestablished
on the same footing on which they were found in 1809.
Try to give these appointments to persons of most
notable wisdom and conduct.
All public offices and
the Lieutenants Lord Chief Justice will be established
for now in conjunction with the military command
because it will be more convenient in this interim
period when we are proceeding toward pacification.
In this manner the Royal service will be faster.
The civilian employees will be provisionally estab
lished in the same manner.
In case these officers
are presented to property owners, the time they ful
fill these will be especially meritorious for them.
The Royal Treasury shall be placed in clean,
economical, and trustworthy hands, for this branch
holds the key for the opportune and quick recovery of
debts and has the ability to cover the public's needs
without tasking the neighborhood.
An urban militia and its officers shall be organ
ized in all the towns to maintain good order and
police the internal security.
These shall be kept
armed and disciplined.
The following should serve as the basis for pacifi
cation!
1, to manifest that His Majesty's arms know
no parties, resentments, offenses, or vengeances, with
its objective being the true pacification of the
country; 2 , to guarantee the peace of the territory
and the security of all the citizens and the property
each one has legally acquired; 3, to show that, just
as no value will be placed on what transpired during
the unfortunate times of the revolution in which the
provinces have been, they will severely and quickly
punish new crimes of this type which m a y be p e r p e 
trated and to which ingrates may deliver themselves;
4, to grant an armistice under these principles which
will be fulfilled with the greatest religious punc
tiliousness; 5, to provide jobs and duties to the
persons who maintain the good will of the towns because
of their moderation, knowledge, wisdom, and uncensurable conduct; 6 , to place everything in the order in
which it was in 1809; 7, to maintain through the sup
porting hand of the press the publication of past
misfortunes and differences during the time of the
revolution and that which has succeeded it, and the
state of ruin to which the rebels have driven the
provinces, forcing agriculture, commerce, and industry
to disappear, and burdening the towns with enormous
taxes and chains worse than those used by the sultans
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to make their slaves suffer.
Show that from the
prosperous state enjoyed by all the continent in
that period, they have hurriedly reduced it to
nothingness by destroying their capitals, scaring
away their citizens, and placing them in the lament
able situation in which they now find themselves.
D u l y impress the multitude with the number of d o m i n e 
er ing persons that have been created and their
insulting ostentation and insufferable pride while the
people groan in misery; that the happiness they p r o 
claimed h a d only their own sordid interest as an
objective and to these they have sacrificed m a n y
victims and destroyed great quantities of riches.
Remind the people that this sad state of affairs
should be compared w i t h w h a t they had before the revo
lution.
Present them w i t h cases, events, and the
settlement that w o u l d be made in the taxes, removing
the onerous contributions, poll tax, and other unknown
charges w i t h which they attempted to cover their
thefts, wastes, and foreign debts.
Finally, combat the
en emy victoriously w i t h the h e l p of the press and d i s 
cover where public opinion should be augmented, for it
is because of it that the present evils exist which
have promoted the ignorance with which they have c o m 
manded, the barbaric procedures, the scandalous attempts,
the unjust treason, and the horror which the me m o r y of
the revolutionary government must evoke.
The ecclesiastic state must be respected, and the
just considerations corresponding its individuals must
be maintained.
They shall have great weight in forming
public opinion because of the advice given privately,
publicly, and from the pulpit.
With the parties organized under these principles
and conducting themselves accordingly, the happies t
success of the undertakings can be assured.
The
d e sired pacification will be achieved, and for these
services, whether they are verified separately or
collectively, these parties shall be rewarded in every
case as soldiers.
Their leaders shall also be rewarded
in keeping w i t h the political pol i c y they manifes t in
favor of good order and in the manner in w h i c h they
preserve it.
The Commandant General shall give the Captaincy
General of all the operations an account for now.
He
w i l l communicate the details, will make known the
services of h i s subordinates and those of the orga n i z a 
tion he established.
This instruction shall serve h i m
provisionally until he gets the Royal approval, w h i c h
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will be given h i m to observe b y using the powers
which His Majesty has invested in this government.
Puerto Rico, June 30, 1827.
------ Miguel de la Torre.

C HAPTER XXIII
State of Colombia When the Ocana Convention was
Convoked— The Military Party— General Padilla-Installation of the Convention— M y Communique to
the Representatives from the Town of Ocana--My
Opinion with Regard to the First Tasks of the
Convention— Dissolution of the Convention—
Bolivar Dictator— I Recognize the Liberator as
Supreme Chief— Proclamations— Conspiracy of
September 25— My Letter to the Liberator— My
Measures in Venezuela.
1828
The towns anxiously awaited the reforms needed by the
Constitution which had reigned until then.

In reality they

could not truly expect anything flattering or favorable in
view of the hostility of the parties into which the Republic
was divided and in view of the passions which dominated m a n y
of the men that had placed themselves at the head of the socalled liberal group.

The military hoped to see the services

they had rendered their country rewarded with interest.

They

also wanted their rights and exemptions preserved and to
have the State p a y them their claims.

To achieve these

objectives they wanted a strong government established and
headed b y an individual belonging to their class.

The

demagogues that admired the events of the French Revolution
of

'96 and proposed the federal constitution of the United

States of North America as a model, preached to the towns in
580
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the pompous names of liberty and national sovereignty,
theories that could not be realized in a nation still in its
infancy and very ill disposed by customs and education toward
a form of government created for well-educated people that
h e l d these theories traditionally.

Finally,

the men who were

deeply aware of the country's needs and who feared the evils
which had already been glimpsed,

favored the establishment

of a government founded on a solid basis.
unity,

To give them

they wanted the Liberator who represented good in the

country,

to place himself at the head of the Republic until

the government was consolidated and the country free of all
fear of foreign invasion and of the disturbances promoted by
internal factions.

Then it would be possible to proceed to

try to give the nation institutions suitable to its nature,
to its customs,

to its antecedents,

and to its true needs,

and which above all, would guarantee its future.
The Liberator was displeased at seeing Colombia
divided into factions which seemed to await only an oppor
tune moment to destroy her.

Having already lost by virtue

of long experience the illusions of his volcanic genius and
the poetic imagination which had been formed during the early
years of the revolution, he needed to rest.

He was already

exhausted by the fatigues and anxieties suffered in the
marches and in the battlefields; consequently, he witnessed
the agitation of the parties and had no faith whatever in
the movement that was going to begin.

He had become c o n 

vinced that "those who worked for independence had plowed the
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s e a s , " and called the country "an

immense desert peopled

beasts desirous of devouring each

o t h e r , H e

by

also said that

"a very difficult thing h a d been attempted in Colombia, w hich
was to conquer the country with a very liberal constitution
and to make free, wise,

and prudent m e n out of slaves,

for

getting that we had learned much wretchedness from our
owners the Spaniards and from our

comrades the s l a v e s . " 2

Thus Bolivar awaited the promised

reforms with a painful

skepticism.

It was only out of love for the fatherland and

a sentiment of duty, or as he himself said,
desert himself,

in order not to

that he was still on the political scene.

^This quotation is taken from a letter Bolivar wrote
General Juan Josd Flores on November 9, 1830.
Lecuna (ed.).
Cartas del Li b e r t a d o r . IX, 376.
2 P&ez inserts part of the following letter the
Liberator wrote to him.
"I am in the South n o w very busy
fighting the enemies of Perd. who are very strong and most
capable of overrunning everything.
We have sent six thousand
more m e n from the other American States here.
Even with this
force it is still more difficult to conquer the enemy due to
the m a n y difficulties presented by Perd in waging war.
The
government and people of Lima call me to go command them.
I
k n o w there is much difficulty (here the manuscript is not
l e g i b l e ) , but I will go if Congress permits me in order to
keep Colombia from entering a new war in this instance.
Generals Valdes and Sucre are commanding our troops.
The
other Allied Generals are very good leaders, but they do not
understand each other because of r i v a l r i e s , jealousies , and
other miseries we have learned from the Spaniards and our
comrades the s l a v e s . The kings and generals of Europe u n d e r 
stand each other perfectly because they have been born free
while we, although being equal in everything, cannot recon
cile ourselves with each other.
Letter from the Liberator, dated in Guayaquil, M a y 29,
1823."
A copy of this letter m a y be found in i b i d .. Ill,
195-96.
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For m y part,

I did not want to belong to any p o l i t i 

cal p a rty other than the p e o p l e s 1, nor to defend any cause
other than the one they adopted.

Peace and domestic tran

quility are the most invaluable benefits of society, and I
p r o p o s ed to maintain both unless the irresistible force of
events and the need of defending the country's well being
and honor demanded that I alter m y course.

Not trusting m y

own judgment and afraid of ma k i n g a mistake in the difficult
position in which I h a d been placed by a generous fortune
and b y the vote of the people and the will of the Liberator,
1 gathered around me the most able counselors available.

I

selected them from among the m e n who because of their
patriotism,
then,

love of order,

talents,

and virtues seemed to me

and justly so, to be the m o s t intelligent and honest

representatives of the people.
On March 13, by means of a decree,

the Liberator,

aware of the dangers threatening peace and order in Colombia,
reinvested himself w i t h the supreme power of the Republic in
all its departments,

excepting the district of Ocana where

the Great Convention was to be held.

When the election of

the deputies for that assembly began,

the Santander party

unfurled its greatest activity to get individuals known for
their animosity against Bolivar and a Unitarian elected.
Venezuelan communities filed acts asking that Bolivar remain
in command and that the Convention be given no further powers
than to deal with matters of local interest and of little
importance.

Meanwhile,

the deputies w h o h a d arrived at
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Ocafia began to qualify the elections.

They refused to admit

Dr. Miguel Pefia under the pretext that the case against him
for the misapplication of public funds was still pending.
The municipal council of Valencia protested against this
insult proffered its deputy,

and while doing this directed

incriminations against Santander,
guilt with which Pena was charged.

accusing him of the same
The Liberator tried to

defend the latter, but his arguments were to no availt
he substituted Dr. Osio in his place.

so

3

From this point on the military party began to show
itself entirely too arrogant in its pretensions.

It came to

3PAez footnotes this as follows.
"The historians of
Colombia seem to have conspired to present Doctor Miguel
Pefia as an intriguer appearing on the political scene after
Colombia had already attained her independence.
All who knew
this illustrious Venezuelan, can do no less than to acknowl
edge the political tact which made him worthy of occupying
distinguished posts in the nation's councils.
During the
colonial government he served the office of Reporter of
Judicial Causes in the Audiencia for nearly three years, a
laborious task which greatly weakened his health.
Almost the
greater part of the year XII he spent in the forests, fleeing
from Monteverde and suffering unaccustomed fears and labours.
During the years XIII and XIV he contributed important
services to his country.
In the year XIV Boves imprisoned
h i m in Valencia, and then he had to suffer great penalties
with cruel uncertainties about the fate that might befall
him in the clutches of that fierce caudillo.
He escaped from
the prison disguised as a priest, and then he owed his salva
tion to a spirited lady patriot, Vicenta Rodriguez, who
allowed him to take refuge in her home.
From there he went
to the Alto Llano to join General Tadeo Monagas and served in
his ranks for some time until he retreated to the island of
Trinidad.
From this island he left to attend the Congress of
Cdcuta where he distinguished himself for his eloquence and
ability.
In the year 1821 he worked unceasingly, despite
his delicate health, during the sessions of the Congress of
Cticuta. The severity of his character, and perhaps the envy
which his talents aroused caused the good faith of his p r o 
cedures to be questioned more than once."
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such a point,

that General Padilla asked the Ocana deputies

in an exposition to tend to the needs of those who had d i s 
tinguished themselves in military campaigns,

for he co n 

sidered them very worthy of compensation and special p r i v i 
leges.^

if padilla found any officers who opposed said

exposition and refused to sign it, he resorted to action,
threatening peaceful citizens and showing himself ready to
sustain his pretensions through forceful means.
about these events,

Knowing

General Mariano Monti11a marched from

^For early information on General Jos 6 Padilla see
footnote 15 in Chapter XIV of this manuscript.
It is
important to note at this point that Padilla's m e n had not
been paid for some time, and that PAez's judgment of h i m is
rather harsh.
The incidents which PAez describes subse
quently seemed to have stemmed from a personal rivalry
between two protagonistsi
Padilla, who was a Granadine, a
z a m b o , and a Santanderist; and Monti11a, who was a Ven e z u e 
lan, a white, and a Bolivarist.
Both were vying for c o n 
trol of Cartagena while neither actually held command; h o w 
ever, Montilla held a secret order from Bolivar authorizing
h i m to take over the civil and military command of the
department in case of emergency.
This is exactly what
Montilla did when Padilla forced General JosA Montes to
resign.
Padilla aroused the colored populace and had himself
proclaimed civil and military chief.
Realizing Montilla held
the real power, he retreated to Mompox and wrote his own
version of the episode to Bolivar.
When Padilla returned to
Cartagena, Montilla had h i m arrested.
When he was freed from
his prison by Santanderist artillery men and Colonel Bolivar
was killed, it is not certain that he was at all responsible.
Nevertheless, Padilla was tried and judged guilty of this
affair and the Cartagena insurrection.
It is generally felt
that his judicial murder was inexcusable.
Madariaga, B o l i v a r .
523, 528, 529, 543, 555, 556, 557, 559, 567, 571, 573, 574.
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Turbaco to Cartagena where Padilla had promoted his dis
or d e r s .5

Those who did not approve of the seditious plans

joined Montilla,
March

8

to Tolu.

and finally Padilla was forced to embark on
There he interned himself to seek partisans

in the heart of the Republic.

From Mompox he wrote Dr.

Francisco Soto, who was then the Director of the Deputies
who had already assembled in Ocaha,

and painted the events

that had occurred in Cartagena with the colors that plagued
his heated imagination.

Soto,

in the d e p u t i e s 1 name, wanted

to send h i m a tribute of thanks for his zeal in favor of
public o r d e r . observance of l a w s . and the security of the

5General Mariano Montilla was born in Caracas on
September 8 , 1782.
In 1799 he was a bodyguard for the Prince
of Peace during the war between Spain and Portugal.
He was
wounded and returned to Caracas in 1808 where he helped to
organize the revolutionary juntas of 1809 and 1810.
He was
with Bolivar when General Miranda was arrested.
In 1814 he
helped defend La Victoria and fought at San Mateo and
Bocachica.
In 1815 he defended Cartagena from Morillo and
was forced to withdraw in the Battle of Bahia and seek
refuge in the United States.
By 1819 he was able to join
General urdaneta in Margarita as chief of Staff.
In this
year also he prevented the Royalist, Saint Just, from a ssas
sinating Urdaneta.
He left Margarita in 1820 with twelve
hundred soldiers from the Irish Legion and took Rio Hacha.
W h e n the Irish rebelled, he was forced to send them to J a 
maica and follow suit himself by joining Brion's squadron.
Failing in an attempt to besiege Cartagena, he later attended
the first Venezuela Congress in 1821 and saw the "creation"
of Colombia.
He besieged Cartagena again and this time with
his one hundred and eighty-seven soldiers was victorious over
its eight hundred defenders.
In 1828 Montilla put an end to
the Padilla insurrection.
He was Chief in Santa Marta in
1830 and ordered B o l i v a r 's f u n e r a l .
(The Liberator 1s remains
were later mo ved and entombed in 1842 in Caracas.)
In 1831
General Montilla defended Cartagena against General Luque and
forced h i m into exile.
Then he became Venezuela's first
Minister to Europe and made treaties with England.
He died
in Caracas in 1851.
Scarpetta and Vergara, Diccionario
B i o a r A f i c o . 343-45.
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c o n v e n t i o n ; but he finally consoled himself by answering
Padilla that the delegation h a d seen with appreciation the
sentiments of respect for the Great Convention that Padilla
manifested in the document he had sent.

From this document,

it was very clear to that assembly that his objective was
not to deal impartially with the state of Colombia, but
rather to head a faction that wanted to take possession of
the Republic and govern it according to the ideas and plans
they had formulated beforehand.
Finally,

on April 9 the Convention was installed with

only sixty-four members present out of the one hundred and
eight which were to represent all the Republic.
first session,

From the

signs of great animosity against the person

of the Liberator were evident,
provisional president,

despite the fact that the

Francisco Soto,

said in his opening

speech that "no altars should be raised in the temple of the
fatherland,

but rather sepulchres should be opened to bury

discord."
I was very much surprised by the Liberator's pro c l a m a 
tion, dated in Bogota on March 3, in which he called the
Convention the hope of the country.
that the legislators,

In it he also stated

that is to say the Congress,

should be

praised for having started to remedy our weaknesses,
w i t h the public will.

complying

This was after all Venezuela had

declared that body unable to convoke the Convention then,
basing itself on the very letter of the Constitution that
deferred it until the year XXXI; and that then only the
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Liberator, because of the acclamation of the majority of the
towns and to avoid greater evils, would be able to convoke
it.

In the proclamation it was also stated that the d e l e 

gates would fill the nation with confidence.

This was after

all of Venezuela had protested against the nullity of the
Convention basing itself first, on the unconstitutional
manner of convocation by Congress;

second, on what was

vicious in the ordinance as much because of its origin as
because of the doctrines it contained which destroyed equality
of representation by excluding the right of suffrage as well
as that of being elected to a portion of citizens w h o m the
constitution did not exclude; and third,

for many other r e a 

sons that have been published extensively in the newspapers.^
In my letter of April 10 to the Liberator I stated:
"If the Ocana convention makes a mockery of your hopes and
decrees the subdivision of Colombia, we will have to obey
its resolution,

for by the contents of your proclamation,

you have sanctioned it beforehand.

In the same manner,

the

^P&ez was not alone in this evaluation of the Ocana
Convention.
Henao and Arubla state:
"But there human w e a k 
ness was even greater and passions fed the blaze which was
to consume everything . . . the convention had scarcely begun
its serious deliberations when army officers, magistrates,
and corporations, all with one accord and as if obeying the
same impulse, pronounced themselves against the reforms they
had solicited, and n o w urged that Bolivar continue his a b s o 
lute rule.
Some desired that the convention, turning aside
from its constitutional mission, should limit itself to the
passage of unimportant laws; . . . and in some of the n e w
petitions it was even revealed that Bolivar was given author
ity to dissolve the Convention.
In brief, it was a sad page
in our history."
History of C o l o m b i a . 397.
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Colombians who do not belong to New Granada become rebels.
H o w many dangers I see in these contradictions 1 1,7
The Liberator's recommendations that a firm and p o w e r 
ful government be a d o p t e d , because this is what the country
was crying for, were interpreted as the desires of ambition.
These gave a basis for S a n t a n d e r 's partisans to consider the
Republic in danger of becoming the victim of a monarchical
tyranny.
heated.

The first sessions of the convention were very
Exaltation by the Federalists made pale that of the

Jacobines of the French Revolution, w h o m it seems they had
set u p as their model.
Obeying the wishes of the municipalities in my D e p a r t 
ment,

those of the militia corps,

and those of the greater

part of the military chiefs and m e n of letters in Venezuela,
I proposed that our opinion be to centralize the power and
place the supreme command of the State in the Liberator's
hands.

The people would call h i m to this task by unanimous

acclamation until the time when the independence of the
nation and tranquillity of the government could implant the
form of government that would be acceptable to the general
public.

This, more or less, was also the opinion of the

departments in Central and Southern Colombia.
The following communication that I directed to the

Azpurda

7A copy of this letter is not included in Blanco and
(eds.), Documentos Para la H i s t o r i a .
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people's representatives in the national Convention is of
vital importance to me.

O

HONORABLE MEMBERS OF THE GREAT CONVENTIONt
A sacred duty places me in the position of bringing
to the attention of the convention a legalized testi
m o n y sent to me by several representatives from the
civilian and military corporations and the heads of
families and respectable property owners in these d e 
partments , showing the desires that motivate them in
the present crisis during which the independence of
the Republic is threatened by internal factions and
incursions b y the enemy, and which would place it on
the border of ruin if the tasks of the Convention are
not limited to the centralization of its power and to
placing the supreme command of the State to which the
towns have elected h i m by unanimous acclamation in the
hands of the Liberator President until such a time as
when the independence of the nation and tranquillity of
the territory is assured, and a form of government
acceptable to the general public can be established*
On relaying the wishes of these inhabitants to this
honorable corporation, I feel possessed with the noble
enthusiasm which inspired the motivation for their
petitions.
These are supported by the general and
w e 1 1 -pronounced clamor of some people who, after the
immense sacrifices made to win their independence from
foreign domination, and was t i n g their blood in battles,
have reason to fear that the work of their h e r o i s m and
the anxieties of their supporters will be annulled.
They are made fearful by positive acts that convince
one that in no other time since the establishment of
the Republic, has there been such a danger of becoming
the captive of a foreign p o w e r or of a devastating
anarchy.
Aided b y the weak institutions for w h i c h the
people are not ready, they fear being led into a p o l i t 
ical
dissolution fomented by insidious parties.
Finally they have the experience of eighteen years in
their favor, during which time they have witnessed
during the last seven years the demoralization, d i s 
order, and imperium of all vices as the only fruits of
the Constitution of Cdcuta.
I shall present w i t h difficulty an unfinished picture
of the condition in which these departments find

XXI,

8 a copy of this proclamation may be found in i b i d .,
223-24.
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themselves.
The spirit of sedition is disseminated
everywhere, and arms in hand it disturbs the public
tranquillity at each step and keeps the provinces in
continuous agitation.
It m a y be said that there is not
a department that maintains the calm which is needed to
accept the reforms that are not adapted to the strong
repression of crimes and the firm support of inde
pendence.
Spain has observed these political dis s e n 
sions, and h e r agents stir up the discord and c i r c u 
late incendiary papers belittling the Liberator's
moral force as the sole means of subjecting the
country to her domination.
During these moments of
anguish, an expedition appears at our coasts whic h will
gain advantages while the towns tear themselves apart
in internal w a r — advantages which it could not attain
if a vigorous government were directing the n a t i o n 's
efforts, and the m a n who has given it life were at the
h e ad of public affairs to make it respected, to c o n 
solidate its vacillating existence, to regenerate the
morale, and to, in a word, save it from its ultimate
end.
It is this honorable corporation's turn n o w to
fathom the c o u n t r y 's true interests and to provide
accordingly the remedy for so many evils.
The forms
of government should be adapted to the places that are
going to receive them and not the latter to themi
this sublime truth, which is proven now more than ever,
will enable the Convention to see that while brilliant
theories dazzle momentarily, they are the sad danger
which serve as a sepulchre for men and actions.
I
have no doubt that the Deputies who compose this
honorable corporation will consult the means of p r e 
serving their dearest interests.
If sight is lost of
this painful picture on which the unanimous opinion of
the people is based and the salvation of the State is
risked in the disasters of anarchy, I shall not answer
to the nation for the sad consequences which will follow.
Caracas, March 15, 1828.— XVIII.
The Superior Chief,
JosA A. P&ez.
Deputies to the Convention looked upon all these
esqpositions with the utmost disdain,

and decided to proceed

wi t h the plans they h a d formulated beforehand.

All agreed

that the Constitution should be reformed; however, w h e n a
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proposal was made to adopt the federal system,

it was

rejected toy a majority of forty-four votes against thirtytwo.

Then l proposed that the government of Colombia unite

its three powers.

Dr. Azuero drafted a constitution which

was named for him and which, without consulting local inter
ests of the Colombian sections, divided Colombia into twenty
departments.

Each one was to have its respective assembly to

take care of local interests.

In this Constitution,

the

executive lost all its power.
When the Liberator informed me from Bucaramanga about
these early works of the Convention,

I answered h i m in the

following manner on M a y 15.9
I imagine that Colombia is at the edge of a p r e c i 
pice and that in such a state, she will owe her salva
tion not to theories, but to the combined calculations
of a superior genius.
These shall be calculations born
out of the circumstances, not daughters of these same
theories, and similar to those of a general who in a
battlefield moves his troops as the enemy attacks h i m
in directions not foreseen in his general campaign
plan.
I see Colombia rushing to that very precipice,
w i t h her fatal destiny guiding her uncertain steps,
and discovering a considerable number of her children
at a distance planting flowers on her tomb and p r e 
p a r i n g h e r funeral.
I also see her turning her face to
her most beloved children and asking them for support
and protection in a penetrating voice.
F i n a l l y . I see
C o l o m b i a , m v dear G e n e r a l , fix her eves on y o u — on you
w h o are her fa t h e r , her c r e a t o r . and to whom she owes
the glory of her n a m e — and ask you with painful cries
to save h e r , to wrest her from the hands of her enemies
and from those of her more ungrateful sons, and place
her at the point that your sword signaled out to her in
the llanura of Apure and on the battlefields of Vargas
and BoyacA. . . . Witness, then, Colombia actually
fixing her languid sight on y o u , asking you on bended
knees to save her at any cost, and that as if she had
never existed, place her at the level you h a d pointed

9A copy of this letter m a y be found in i b i d .. 224-25.
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out when you traced her boundaries with your sword
in the luxuriant forests of Orinoco.
The clamors
are the cries of the people who call you their father
and governor.
In m y o p i n i o n , you cannot disengage
yourself from the people without becoming responsible
for their future repose.
The majority of them is
sovereign.
If you seek legitimacy in the representa
tion of a revolutionary assembly, divided as it is by
passions and agitated by individual interests, you will
only find that anarchy which will fall on the country,
on liberty, on independence, and on you yourself.
On this same date the Liberator was writing the follow
ing lines to General Lino C l e m e n t e . 10
You must k n o w that the Convention has decreed a
central government and agreed to preserve the C o n 
stitution with few alterations.
This is to say that
after so m a n y contentions for reforms, we remain as
we were before or perhaps even worse.
They expect
m a n y things; but I do not share the same hope,
con
sequently, I have decided to go to Venezuela and
contribute to the happiness of m y poor country.
Herrera came from Ocana, and the Great Convention
wrote to me sending me Venezuela's representations,
adding that it did so because it was in charge of
m aintaining public order.
This is to say that the
representations have disturbed i t . and I do not k n o w
what to do or say about this state of affairs.
I
sent Herrera back to Ocana with my latest ideas; but,
regardless of whether they accept these or not, I plan
to continue m y march to try with the aid of m y friends
to save our poor c o u n t r y .
This was Colombia's epitaph written b y its Liberator.
I was of the opinion that the Republic should be
divided into three great sections,
rudiments of its economy,

leaving each one with the

and concentrating on the force that

w o u l d give life and movement to the political body in order
that the extremities could receive the respective warmth

copy of this letter m a y be found in Lecuna (ed.).
Cartas del Libert a d o r . VII, 254.
PAez erred in citing M a y
15 as the date Bolivar wrote this letter, for it was written
on M a y 4.
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that was owed them.

Xn m y opinion, what could calm down all

the factions and unite them at one point was a strong govern
ment in the center of the Republic, with the power to do
good and repress the abuses of those entrusted with the
administration of justice; a small representative body in
each one of the sections to promote the municipal and
economic laws according to each one's character; and a small
senate in each one also whose members were to be selected by
strict judgment, knowledge,

and unstainable patriotism,

enforce these laws, prior to the Executive's report.

to

The

latter group would simultaneously serve as a governmental
council.

Above all, what seemed most necessary to me if we

w a n t e d to avoid the evils caused b y past legislatures and
the debts which suffocated the Republic, was to formulate
codes to remove the complication of the laws.
of assembling a congress,

In the case

for only four or five-year periods

for the purpose of remaking or amending the laws, only those
that the Executive deemed suitable should be sanctioned.
Experience h a d taught me that the government which we should
adopt should be the simplest and most vigorous one in order
to repress the insolence of the riotous people in the towns
w h o were accustomed to obey by force or disobey by habit.
Deputy Dr. JosA M a r i a Castillo [i Rada] proposed that
the Liberator go to OcaHa and settle the differences between
the deputies; however, without even permitting a discussion
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on this,

the greater part of them refused this p r o p o s a l . ^

It was then that the Bolivians,

seeing their voices suffo

cated by an insulting majority which,

according to them,

made a great to-do over their triumph, decided to leave Ocana
in order not to sanction by their presence what they believed
w o u l d be the country's ruin.

They carried this decision out

on June 10, and they published a manifesto in the province
of Santa Cruz which explained the reasons that had forced
them to take such a step.
Cundinamarca,

On June 13 the Intendant of

General Pedro Antonio [s i c . Alcantara] HerrAn,

called a meeting of heads of families in Bogota to discuss

1 1 Jos« Maria del Castillo i Rada was born in Ca r t a 
gena on December 21, 1776, and embraced the Republican cause
in 1810.
By 1813 he was Governor of Tunja, and in 1814 he
served temporarily as the Executive Power in N e w Granada.
He went into hiding with the arrival of Morillo and his
troops in 1814, but figured prominently again in national
affairs after the Battle of BoyacA in 1819.
He became a
member of the Congress of Ctlcuta and conflicted with Bolivar
when he himself refused to accept the Vice-Presidency of the
nation, for he felt the time was not ripe yet for a civilian
to assume this office.
However, he was responsible for
getting Santander named Vice-President and then served as
his Secretary of State from 1821 until 1828 when he left to
attend the Ocaha Convention.
Later he became President of
the Council of Ministers that Bolivar created.
In reality
this post amounted to being Vice-President of the Republic.
When he died on February 23, 1825, he was so poor that his
former students from the Colegio del Rosario, where he had
taught and lectured on political economic theories, h a d to
p a y for his funeral.
Scarpetta and Vergara, Diccionario
B i o g r A fico. 99-100.
Lecuna and Bierck (eds.), Selected
W r i t i n g s . II, 545, 687, 700, 715.
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the state of the R e p u b l i c .^

From here came an act which

discredited the C o n v e n t i o n ( revoked the powers given the
Deputies,

and entrusted the Liberator with the supreme

command.

Consequently,

the Liberator entered Bogota on June

24 in the midst of the people's hurrahs and acclamations.
Believing the Republic in great danger,

the same heroic

means were resorted to that the Roman Republic adopted w h e n 
ever it became necessary to prevent evils and impede d i s 
orders.

Bolivar was given dictatorial power which he was to

maintain until the national representation could meet and
attempt to write the constitution which the state of the
country demanded.

This measure was held in very bad esteem

by the party that called itself Liberal.

Henceforth,

the

Brutuses and Cassiuses began to sharpen the daggers they

^ G e n e r a l Pedro Alcantara HerrAn was born in Bogota
in 1800.
He joined the patriot army in 1814 and fought at
the Battle of Cuchilla del Tambo where he was captured and
imprisoned.
When he managed to free himself in 1821, he re
joined the patriots.
From 1821 to 1823, he fought in the
Southern campaign; from 1824 to 1825, in the Peruvian c a m 
paign; from 1839 to 1841, in the Northern campaign; from
1841 to 1842, in the Magdalena campaign; and in 1854 and
1859, in the Guaranda campaign.
He fought with exceptional
bravery in the Battles of Junin and Ayacucho.
In 1828, while
serving as Intendant of Cundimarca, he assembled the junta
in Bogota which dissolved the Ocafla Convention and gave
Bolivar extraordinary powers.
During the Northern campaign
against the revolutionaries, HerrAn was elected President of
N e w Granada, but he resigned his post after only two months
in order to continue his campaign against the revoluti o n a r i e s .
After he defeated the insurgents, he resumed charge of the
government.
In addition to the Presidency, he served his
country as Minister to Washington, Senator, Secretary of War,
and General-in-Chief of the armies.
He died in Bogota on
April 26, 1872.
Scarpetta and Vergara, Diccionario BioarAfico.
221-22.
Henao and Arubla, History of C o l o m b i a . 444-46, 471,
478, 479, 481.
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thought to sink in the heart of the one that had given them
a country and whom they accused of harboring the same p r o 
jects as the conqueror of P o m p e y .
On September 2 1 # I swore to recognize Bolivar as
supreme chief of Colombia before Archbishop RamOn Ignacio
Mendez.

I did this in the great plaza before the people.

The municipalities,

tribunals, military chiefs,

which assembled came close to six thousand men,
same oath.

and the army,
all took the

Then I delivered the following oration to the

town.
Caraquenosi
Transported by joy, I come to guarantee with the
most sacred religious ties, my sincere and heart-felt
wishes.
You were the first who, seeing our country
close to its ruin, searched for the remedy to its
grave ills in the person of the American hero, illus
trious because of his deeds, more illustrious because
of his geniusi
your fortunate election conferred the
supreme magistracy on Colombia's first soldier.
Familiar w i t h victory, he will always carry us to
triumpht
privileged by nature with an admirable d i s 
p o sition for reason, he shall make our Republic united,
stable, and blessed.
Caraquenosi
The Liberator heard your call and came
from PerO.
Your echoes were repeated when the Great
Convention wa n t e d to deviate the national opinion.
If
he seemed indifferent to your ardent desires then, it
wa s to get to k n o w better with the calm of prudence, if
passions h a d been mixed w i t h your pure zeal.
Quickly
you came to him from all p a r t s — South, Central, and
N o r t h — and knew that his great virtues would revitalize
ours.
Bogota, the capital, made the most solemn invoca
tion, charging h i m exclusively with the destinies of the
country.
The Liberator received with indulgence the
weight of such a grave charge, offering his energetic
services to save his own work.
To such a laudable objective, you have repeated
your cries in acts subscribed to by the municipalities
and heads of families.
I have brought this to his atten
tion.
The vote of the nation is uniform!
he is
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proclaimed supreme chief of the Republic w i t h limit
less powers to do good.
Such an elevated magistracy demands our respect and
our obedience.
Listen attentively to what I offer:
on m y part, I recognize General simdn Bolivar as
supreme and exclusive chief of the Republic of Colombia,
and I promise under oath to obey, guard, and execute
the decrees that he dispatches as the Republic's laws.
Heaven, a witness to m y oath, will reward the fidelity
w i t h w h i c h I fulfill m y promise.
Caraquenos:
Live peacefully:
let unity be the
guarantee of your tranquillity.
Under a respectable
government, the country will very quickly forget its
troubles.
That very afternoon,

in the Marte Camp there were

assembled six thousand soldiers; ten thousand spectators of
all classes,

ages, and conditions; and multitudes of h a n d 

somely-dressed ladies.

Then I delivered the following oration

to the t r o o p s .
Soldiers 1 Your lances pulled Colombia out of
nothingness, glory promulgated its name on earth,
the Almighty inscribed it on the tablet of life.

and

Soldiers 1 An insulted Spain returns again to invade
the sacred soil of your fatherland:
it wants to d o m i 
nate its illustrious conquerors.
Let her come:
the
son of glory presides over us:
the vanguard is mine.
Those bayonets shall severely punish her stubborn
ness.
Even our cadavers will serve as a barricade to
her ambition.
Comrades 1 What will Spain bring to our land?
Chiefs
and soldiers fatigued from imploring your clemency. That
flag that you have trampled on so m a n y times, will it
come to dominate Colombia?
Before this happens, the sun
will fail to shed its light on America:
before this
happens, let death snatch every living thing.
When
nothing exists, neither shall tyrants.
Determination was that indispensable at that time when, w i t h
the departments threatened by the Spanish,

it was necessary

to recognize the Chief of State after the Convention was
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dissolved and the Constitution of Cttcuta had fallen into
ridicule.
After receiving the L i b e r a t o r ’s communication of
August 26, which was the organic decree that was to serve as
C o l o m b i a ’s provisional constitution,

and his proclamation to

the Colombians in which he tried to simplify and abridge the
essential principles of the government,

I had them published

in the capital with the proper solemnity.

I also had them

circulated among the other authorities so that they could
follow suit.

Many were sorry that the Liberator had by-passed

the power that the towns h a d conferred on him in order to
constitute them in the most analagous manner in keepin g with
their habits and interests.

I saw a positive evil in the

proximity of the convocation of the national representation,
even if it did not get to meet.

This was because the towns

were resting quietly now, blindly confiding in the complete
authority with which they h a d invested Bolivar.
all dedicated n o w to their own undertakings,
confidence was being restored once again.

They were

and public

No one thought n o w

about forms of government while under the protection of the
chief to w h o m they h a d entrusted their lot.

N o w in vi e w of

the decree, public richess and speculations of all kind had
to necessarily suffer,

if not a retrogression,

at least a

paralization.
With regard to m y taking charge of the Prefecture of
N, l told the Liberator that I would endure the pain of
renouncing it, for I could not give the very detailed
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attention demanded by the public taxes.

No good could come

to the government or to the country by m y assuming such a
h e a v y charge.
Meanwhile,

the Liberator's enemies were plotting con

spiracies to treacherously assassinate him.

The leaders were

Juan Francisco A r g a n i l , Agustin Horment, both French,
the Venezuelan Pedro C a r u j o . T h e

and

conspiracy was to break

out October 28, on Saint Simdn's Day.

The Liberator could

have been assassinated in a ride he made to the town of
Soacha accompanied by very few men.

General Santander k n e w

about the plan and opposed it; however, he failed to notify
the Liberator of the danger that threatened him.

Finally,

the government got the news that a conspiracy was being
hatched and precautionary measures were taken.

These alarmed

the conspirators and decided them to act on the night of
September 25.

Relying on the artillery corps,

sins headed toward the Liberator's house,
guard,

forced the doors open,

thought he was then.

a few assas

surprised the

and went to the room where they

Not finding him,

for he h a d already

l^No additional information was available on Juan
Francisco Arganil.
Madariaga has this to say about the other
two conspirators]
“The leaders of the conspiracy were a
Frenchman aged 29, Augustin Horment, and a Venezuelan officer,
Carujo.
This Carujo was a man of some parts, a linguist, and
a mathematician.
He was then C d r d o b a 's teacher in French,
English, and military topography.
He was an ardent repub
lican and seems to have been the moving spirit behind the
plot."
B o l i v a r , 569.
Pedro Carujo obtained a commutation
of his death sentence by revealing the names of the other
conspirators.
Henao andArrubla, History of C o l o m b i a . 404.
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jumped out through a window and was hiding on the banks of a
stream, the assassins satisfied their rage by knifing
Bolivar's p i l l o w . ^

Bolivar's aide-de-camp,

[Diego] Andres

Ibarra, was wounded when he defended the entrance to his
chief's room on the steps,

and the faithful Ferguson was

k illed by a bullet fired by the infamous Carujo.

General

Urdaneta then placed himself at the head of the troops he
was able to assemble, pursued the rebels,

and imprisoned

those who were not killed by the government troops.
where he was hiding,

From

the Liberator heard one of the parties

of the valiant and faithful Vargas Battalion announce the
defeat of the conspirators.
public plaza,

He joined them, appeared in the

and was received with great signs of jubilation

by the troops and the multitude congregated there.
A tribunal was named under General Urdaneta*s p r e s i 
dency to punish criminals.

The death penalty was quickly

pronounced against General Padilla.
in which he had been placed,

Freed from the prison

Padilla had witnessed the

■^P&ez omits the role played by Manuel S&enz in this
instance.
Bolivar's first impulse had been not to flee, but
rather to defend himself from the intruders.
"When he heard
the turmoil, he grasped his sword and pistol and started to
oppose the invaders who were violating the sanctity of his
apartments, but from this hazardous attempt he was fortu
nately dissuaded by Manuel S&enz, a native of Quito and a
w oman of rare beauty, intelligence and valor, ostensibly his
housekeeper but said to have been his mistress.
Showing him
the balcony which gave upon the side street and entreating
h i m not to waste precious moments but escape while it was
y e t possible, she then turned her attention to the intruders,
w h o m she endeavored to delay."
L e m l y , B o l i v a r . 347-48.
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treacherous assassination of his guard. Colonel jos 6
Bolivar. ^ 5

Dr. Azuero and many other conspirators were also

given the death penalty.
for an impeachment.

Carujo was pardoned in exchange

The severity of the law was also p r o 

nounced against General Santander w h o knew about the c o n 
spirators ' p l a n s . 1 6
Well now, what would have resulted if the assassins
h a d succeeded in their perverse intent?

When Caesar was

k i l l e d after it had been only suspected that he wanted to
exchange his crown of laurel for the crown of a dictator,
his Lieutenant Mark Anthony had picked up the d i c t a t o r 's
b loody tunic and,

showing it to the people,

against the assassins.

claimed vengeance

The crime was punished and Octavius

was able after the Battle of Actium to place the crown of the

^ C o l o n e l Bolivar was not kin to the Liberator.
Madariaga gives this account of his assassination.
"Mean
while a party of artillery men had leapt over the wall b e 
tween their barracks and the yard of the building where
Padilla was imprisoned under the custody of Colonel Jo s 6
Bolivar.
Suddenly Padilla heard Colonel Bolivar shouti
'General, X am being k i l l e d . 1 Colonel Bolivar, naked, was
endeavouring to shelter himself behind Padilla while the
soldiers and the officer threatened to kill Padilla if he
stood in the way.
Colonel Bolivar was seized, dragged down
and shot dead."
B o l i v a r . 571.
^ G e n e r a l
Santander was tried and actually sentenced
to death for his role in the conspiracy.
However, since it
could not be definitely proven that he h a d taken part in the
affair, the council of government commuted his sentence to
banishment.
Bolivar accepted this decisions
so Santander
was imprisoned at Bocachica for a few months until he was
allowed to proceed to Europe.
Henao and Arrubla, History of
C o l o m b i a . 404.
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Caesars on his forehead without any opposition.

In Colombia

there would not have been lacking those w h o would have
followed Mark Anthony's example in demanding vengeance for
the death of their chief,
torrents.

and blood would have been shed in

The hatreds between Venezuelans and Granadines

w o u l d have been carried to the point of cruelty.

If the

common enemy would have taken advantage then of such favor
able moments, who knows if in the end the work of so much
heroism,

of so many labors,

and of so m u c h bloodshed, would

have been lost.
Bolivar's death would have been the horrible murder
of someone who was due reverence.
terrible in its consequences,

It would have been

and fatal for all factions.

It might have even been the ruin of the very institutions
they wanted to consolidate w i t h his death.

Those crimes of

exaggerated Republicanism, which perhaps admired pagan
antiquity and rejected Christian civilization, have never
produced the results that its perpetrators proposed.
It was not very long ago that a theatre actor,

a

fanatical admirer of Brutus, while in the midst of a numerous
gathering that rejoiced in the return to peace of a country
that had been desolated by a terrible four-year conflict,
assassinated one of the most innocent m e n who had led the
destinies of a nation.

Brandishing a homicidal arm before

the terrified multitude, he exclaimed with theatrical
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entonation:
achieve?

"Sic semper t y r a n n i s . " ^ 7

What results did he

He gave the victim a martyr's crown, brought

unanimous disapproval on himself,

and increased the catalogue

of crimes w i t h an execrable name.
When I received the notices of the horrible attempt
of September 25, I wrote Bolivar the following letter.^"®
TO THE MOST EXCELLENT SENOR LIBERATOR PRESIDENT
Valencia,

October 30, 1828.

M y very beloved General and Friend:
It would have been impossible to imagine that there
w o u ld be room in the heart of even the most perverse
Colombian to commit such a great crime as that p r o 
posed by the conspiracy of September 25 which broke
out in that city against your life and the existence
of the Republic.
The assassins ma r k e d their first
steps with blood, and in their fury did not search but
for victims whose horror would diminish the iniquity
of their black infamy.
From the first moments, they
let the character of their contrivance be known:
they proposed to destroy you in order to annihilate
later all your party, talent, valor, and patriotism.
W h a t a sad and at the same time happy eventI
The
criminals have been discovered and you have been
saved.
The country is preserved in your person, and
the evils shall be remedied.
What punishment can be
sufficient for the ferocious ones who conceived and
pe rpetrated such an enormous attempt?
Justice should
leave it to indignation to exercise its rage for some
moments.
You have worked more effectively and have
sent them to be judged.
We should expect justice to
be severe until society is well satisfied.
H o w many
evils Colombia would have experienced if you had
perished at the hands of your enemies!— Well, let them
suffer these without any mercy.
Blood would have

1 7 "Thus always to tyrants."
These were the words
uttered b y John Wilkes Booth W h e n he assassinated Abraham
Lincoln.
18A copy of this letter m a y be found in Blanco and
Azpurda (eds.), Documentos Para la H i s t o r i a . XIII, 153-55.
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flowed in torrents, and reorganization would have been
impossible; therefore, their blood should not remain
within their veins, nor should there be enough of them
left so that they can assemble again to conspire.
If
there is any conspirator in this country and he is
discovered, he will p a y w i t h the same penalty that the
enemies of the country d o .
In m y previous letter I spoke to you about the
motives which had forced me to proceed against General
Gdmez as a seditious person.
Because of what you tell
me in your esteemed letter of the 30th of this past
month, I see that m y judgment was not wrong:
I am
determined to execute the sentence which was pronounced.
If it were not merited, I shall suspend it until I
find out if this General is included in the suit filed
in that city against the conspirators.
Since I have
already given an official account, I expect that in
your reply, you will send me some documents, if they
exist, that will serve as proof to add to the process.
You also tell me in your letter to expel all the
representatives w h o took part in approving the Padilla
insurrection in Cartagena.
In an official letter you
order me to expel only those who, because of their
h eated opinions in OcafEa, can be prejudicial to the
country.
I would not want any to remain, and by the
faith I have promised you, none shall remain but the
ones I am not aware of or those whom you want to be
employed such as Gdmez, the Commandant of the Antioqui
Battalion, and the always memorable Mr. Boguier.
M a y Providence watch over you.
You are exceptional
even in your luck, for to escape from a band of armed
assassins searching for you in your own palace who had
already defeated the forces guarding you, should prove
that Heaven is your best custodian and that we still
have not become unworthy of its benedictions.
The
assassins pretended to rob us of our greatest treasure,
wh i ch is peace, and we have k e p t it in you.
Such a
fortunate escape is much to the admiration and c o n 
gratulation of all your friends and of all patriots.
The details of the event, contained in the G a z e t t e ,
came to us the evening before Saint Simdn's feast.
This contributed to ma k i n g us enjoy that day with
greater jubilation and h a p p i n e s s — that day in which
Valencia showed herself with a martial spirit while at
the same time revealing enthusiasm for your life.
In
the morning the flags of the Fifth Battalion, which
h a d twelve hundred well-uniformed squares, were blessed.
W i t h this function terminated, all the authorities and
the people swore acknowledgment of your authority.
During the afternoon I received the oath from all the
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cavalry troops, of which there were more than a
thousand scxuares.
The entire city was out in the
streetsi
the jubilation and happiness of the people
could be seen on all their faces.
You would have been
very happy to witness this scene and to consider that
while there are some vile assassins who conspire
against your life, there are entire towns interested
in preserving it.
The voices of "Long Live the
L i b e r a t o r ” resounded everywhere.
The imminent danger
you escaped has only served to augment our joy.
M y beloved Generali
I embrace you from here and
congratulate you fervently on the preservation of your
life.
Had it been lost, Santander would not have
reaped the fruit of his infamous work, for I would
have avenged it, or he would have multiplied the n u m 
ber of his victims.
I am always your sincere friend.
jos

£

a

.
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While the events I have referred to were occurring in
H e w Granada,

1 continued struggling in Venezuela w i t h the

parties led by Ariz&balo and Cisneros.

I also maintained a

w a t c h over the coast, which was threatened by a disembarka
tion of Spanish troops destined to assist them.

Furthermore,

I contained the rebel factions that were little satisfied
w i t h the political state of the Republic.

To maintain a

vigil over the rebellious ones and prevent the Royalists who
had remained in the territory after the retirement of the
Spanish troops from disturbing the public order,

I formed a

police regiment and named the active General Arismendi as
chief.

Despite all these preoccupations,

occupy

myself with the needs of the towns and put t i n g an end

to the

evils w h i c h afflicted them.
Obeying the

to investigate the

I did not fail to

order that the Liberator sent me to try
cause of the mis e r y which afflicted

Venezuela and to propose the measures to remedy it, X
assembled the landholders,
chants.

farm employees,

lawyers,

and m e r 

The principal observations they made in the meeting

were with respect to the currency which Bolivar had ordered
out of circulation.

The commissioned merchants found profit

in it, and the landholders saw an increase in the value of
their crops,

even if it were momentary.

When I saw that the

discussion was getting heated in the meeting,

I presented my

ideas on the matter in a small memorandum written hastily
and without sufficient time to project my calculations.
However,

this measure was opposed chiefly because of the

difficulty of getting thirty thousand pesos monthly to put
the plan I proposed into effect, even though some merchants
told me they would get u p that sum of money if the currency
were put in circulation according to m y ideas.

It seemed

fair to them for commerce to protect the government if govern
ment protected c o m m e r c e .
It was impossible to remedy in a moment the poverty
of which the towns complained.

It was the result of the lack

of commerce and the low price of the crops,

could the

government increase these when they were in the same state
of dejection in the European markets?
sal!

The evil was u n i v e r 

its remedy would be time and the consolidation of the

government until confidence was reborn.

Then there would be

n e w agricultural and commercial undertakings.

I wo r k e d on

this point incessantly and believed it very convenient and
powerful in public opinion to agree on an exemption of the
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duties on corn,

rice,

and other articles of primary neces

sity to the subsistence of the needy, which were the product
of the work of the greater part of our men in the fields.
These unfortunate people,

after the great expenses they sus

tained to transport their crops to market, h a d to pay a duty
making their condition even sadder.

On the other hand,

the

income from the provisional taxes in this department was
insignificant.

By this means,

would be stimulated,

I thought that cultivation

the stipend would be more acceptable,

and these items of primary necessity would be cheaper.
Agriculture is going to suffer a great set back with
the spreading of the cultivation of coffee.
will not offer its harvesters any advantage.

Its low price
Since our

country abounds in different branches of agriculture,

as

soon as the people become convinced that it is impossible to
raise the price of coffee,

they should dedicate themselves to

other branches such as the cochineal which abound in Coro,
Carora, Tocuyo and other places and which no one cultivates
due to lack of stimulation.

This is also the case with the

w a x which has given other countries immense riches.

A

foreigner had introduced some beehives which had progressed
quite a bit; however,

these would remain similarly abandoned

if the government did not aid them.

With this objective,

X

thought to grant some tax exemptions with the g o v e r n m e n t 1s
approval.

Indigo and cotton could not replace coffee because

both are cultivated in m a n y places where they are produced in
infinitely greater quantities than in ours because of the
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ease and low cost, with which they are cultivated there.
Because of the remonstrances of the landholders and
heads of families in the town of Ocumare on the coast, the
Liberator ordered me to suppress the municipalities and s u b 
stitute an authority similar to that of the old mayors or
lord chief justices.

This was to be in accordance with the

opinion of respectable men.

I was also to establish an

ordinance which seemed most appropriate to me,
send it on for his approval.

and I was to

I was trying to fulfill this

order when 1 received another official communication in which
Bolivar told me that he had asked the Intendants in V e n e 
zuela, Maturin,

and Orinoco to give information on the matter

and also ask the superior court of justice for information
and send this on to h i m so that he could make the suitable
reforms.
1 hesitated for some moments to suspend the plan 1
h a d started,

satisfying myself by remitting the information

I would have collected to the Liberator so that the reforms
could come from there if they were to be put into practice.
If m y objective had been solely to place obstacles in the
p a t h of these undertakings,
in these two communications.

I would have found enough motive
Since my desire was to help

Bolivar with all m y efforts in everything possible,

I called

a meeting of the landholders and citizens in the different
districts of the province under my command,

and some from

Carabobo who were in Caracas, who along w i t h some lawyers,
gave their opinion on the elimination of the municipalities.
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All w e re convinced that theae corporations were useless
because they did not have the means w i t h which to fulfill
their duties,

did not have public spirit,

and did not k n o w

h o w to discharge their duties.
It was difficult to find m e n who wanted to give their
opinion and sign their name.
himself in the slightest,
out discernment.

No one wanted to compromise

for everyone feared everyone w i t h 

At times men feared to compromise t h e m 

selves with the government and at others, with their friends
or the town.

Each one aspired to be an Egoist in approving

or censuring everything that was done.
everyone

To this effect,

found it convenient to hide his ideas in order to

give favorable or unfavorable opinions in different circles
and according to the persons in the group.
the act was signed,

Nevertheless,

and I sent it to the Liberator.

The evils caused by the superior government treasury
were what I wanted to be
lution.

remedied by a quick and vigorous r e s o 

The creditors of the State had increased p r o d i g i o u s l y ,

animated by the power to complete supplementary proofs and to
find witnesses disposed to declare and certify
with their wishes.
corruption,

Meanwhile,

in accordance

the Attorney General because of

according to some, or because of negligence,

because of lack of means,

or

did not execute against the proofs

nor oppose their pretensions.

Thus the Superior Junta was

w r iting great quantities weekly against the government,
quantities so excessive that they scandalized everyone who
k n e w about them.

The State was assuming a debt which it
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c ould never pay, and if this continued,
to think of balancing the treasury.

it would be useless

All that was economized

on one h a n d would be drained off through this wide channel.
In the end,

the multitude of n e w creditors,

seeing the

impossibility of payment, would confuse the public tra n 
quillity to secure private convenience.

I judged that t r i 

bunal then as the font of future dissensions.
desire for a stable peace,

Because of my

I wanted the Liberator to find

the means to limit its authority or to delineate such type
of checks,

that the government could not be prejudiced nor

obligated to satisfy anything but what it really owed.
At this time I also conceived a plan to divide the
Republic into n e w departments.

It was then that I manifested

m y ideas on this project and those which I believed most
suitable.

The plan consisted of dividing the Republic in six

departments w i t h equal forces to serve as a check for the
other sections,

and whose total force would belong to the

government and thus help to temper the basis of the as s ocia
tion.

I thought this plan to be very just, even though when

it was put into effect some provinces might feel wrong e d by
the terms assigned them and by being annexed to capitals to
w h i c h they had not belonged previously.
It did not seem very natural to me that the Barinas
province be added to the n e w department whose capital was to
be the Rosario de Cdcuta Villa.

Instead,

I thought a p a r t of

it could be extended u p to G u a n a r e , which could run from
Coro u p to Tocuyo,

and from this point to this city of

612
Guanare or at least to that of Portuguese*

Otherwise,

Vene

zuela would penetrate too far into the Tocuyo and its
boundary would be stretched too much,
beyond Aruare.

Then,

running from that point

too, with the Cdcuta Department e x e r 

cising its jurisdiction as far as Guanare,

the jealousies

and discussions between Venezuelans and Granadines could be
dissipated.
Finally,

it would take too long to enumerate all the

works and attentive acts which occupied me during the p eriod
we are discussing in this narration.

This was a period,

as

the reader has seen, which was fertile in events of great
transcendency.

Above all it was a period of great danger

for the Republic that was beginning to organize itself.
In view of all the disturbances that occurred in this
epoch,

and of the great risks which threatened the Republic's

existence, who could find it strange that many eminent m e n
desired the establishment of a firm and vigorous government?
M a n y did not desire it under the Liberator's presidency as I
did, but under the sceptre of a monarch,

even if it were

necessary to go to the old European dynasties to find this
monarch.

CHAPTER X X I V
Projects for the Establishment of a Constitu
tional Monarchy in Colom b i a — Unjust Charges
Directed Against M e — My Opinions Concerning
Forms of G o v e r n m e n t .

1829
Dating from the time we h a d won our independence and
even before this,

the anarchy existing in the Hispanic-

American countries made the need for establishing a vigorous
government apparent.

Many of the wisest men in these

countries h a d pronounced in favor of a constitutional
monarchy.

This trend was seen in the United Provinces of

the Rio de la Plata in 1816 when the Congress of Tucumdn
declared that "despite the ultra democratic ideas whic h have
been manifested in the entire revolution,

the Congress,

as

representative of the most seme and wise section of the
people and truly of the community,
moderate constitutional monarchy,

is ready to favor a
adapted to the condition

and circumstances of the country."
In a conference the French Foreign Minister h a d with
[jos 6 Valentin] Gdanez, envoy from the United Provinces, he
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told h i m t 1
. . . that reflecting on the true interests of those
countries, he was convinced that their interests
depended entirely on the establishment of a government
under whose influence the advantages of peace could be
enjoyed.
He firmly believed that said form of gov e r n 
ment could only be a constitutional monarchy with a
European prince at the head, whose relations could
inspire and augment respect for the State and facili
tate the recognition of national independence.
The Duke of Luca, heir to the kingdom of Etruria and a B o u r 
bon on his mother's side, was recommended for the post.

It

was added that the Austrian and Russian Emperors would p r o 
tect him,

and that England would not oppose his elevation to

the throne.

France would facilitate the naval and land

forces necessary to enforce respect for this prince,

and

Luca would marry a Brazilian princess if the government of

^The author reveals later in this chapter that the
French Foreign Minister he refers to here was in reality a
special French Minister sent to investigate Spanish American
affairs.
His name was Charles Bresson.
Lemly, B o l i v a r . 362.
Jos4 Valentin Gdmez was born in Buenos Aires on
November 8, 1774.
He studied at the San Carlos College and
received his Doctorate in Theology from the University of
Cdrdoba.
He was pastor of Our Lady of Guadalupe Parish in
the Banda Oriental, and it was here that he began his revo
lutionary career.
At the Battle of Piedras, he distin 
guished himself as a military chaplain.
Following this, he
was transferred to Buenos Aires,
In 1813 and in 1821 h e was
Vicar General and Governor of this bishopric.
He figures
prominently as an educator, serving as rector of the u n i v e r 
sity from 1826 until 1830.
Politically, his services were
also eminent, for he served as a member of the famous
Argentine National Assembly of 1813 and as Argentine repre
sentative in the peace overtures in Montevideo in 1814.
From 1818 until 1821 he was envoy extraordinary to the Courts
of France and England.
GOmez was also a member of the A r g e n 
tine National Constituent Congress from 1825 to 1827.
He
died in 1833.
Julio A. Muzzio, Diccionario Histdrico
Biogr&fico de la Republica Argentina (Buenos Aires, 1920),
204.
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this Empire would cede the territory situated East of the La
Plata River to the United Provinces.
much in accord with what,

This advice was very

by disposition of the Congress of

TucumAn, the Argentine government had charged a commissioner
it sent to Brazil to propose the coronation of one of the
Brazilian infantas in those Provi n c e s . under a constitution
that the Congress would f r a m e .
In the secret session on November 12, the Congress
approved France's project, but under n e w conditions.

The

n e w conditions were chiefly that H. M. Cristianisima had to
obtain the consent of the five great European powers to
facilitate the marriage of the Duke of Luca with the
Brazilian Princess;
viously be effected;

that the land session mentioned p r e 
that France give the Duke all the

support necessary to defend and consolidate the monarchy
whose boundaries should include all the Eastern part,
including Montevideo and Paraguay;

and that France lend four

million pesos to give the country a means of defense against
Spain to assure its independence.2
In 1818, the Chilean Senate authorized the Supreme
Director,

[Bernardo] 0 'Higgins,

to promote in Europe the

2Ricardo Levene (William Spence Robertson, t n a n s . and
e d . ) , A History of Argentina (Chapel Hill, 1937), 331.
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establishment of a monarchy in Chile and PerO.
sent commissioners to London with this objective.

Even Peril
In Mexico

and in Guatemala independence from the metropolis was
d e c l a r e d , and a moderate monarchy was established as a result
of the emancipation.

There were projects afloat sometimes

to place a Spanish prince on the Mexican throne and at other
times,

to crown the Duke of Sussex, youngest son of George

III of England.

The latter asked if there would be sufficent

means in this country [Mexico] to give a suitable luncheon
for a European prince.

There were also those who proposed

bringing and crowning the Inca Don Dionisio Yupanqui, who
resided in Madrid and h a d represented Peril in the Spanish
cortes.

In addition to him,

zuma to consider.

there was the Count of Mocte-

The latter,

a Spanish grandee of the

first order and descendent on his maternal side of the last
emperor of Mexico,

presented himself in London and solicited

to be declared Emperor of that country.

Moctezuma addressed

the Chilean government and asked for assistance to carry out
this undertaking.

That government answered him,

addressing

^Bernardo O'Higgins became the Supreme Director of the
Chilean Republic after the Battle of Chacabuco, which
occurred on February 12, 1817.
Primarily chosen for this
office because of his military reputation, he demonstrated
executive ability from the outset.
Since he never affiliated
w i t h the aristocratic oligarchy that tried to rule Chile from
Santiago, he was finally ousted from his post in 1823.
The
Chilean aristocracy h a d changed little since the winni n g of
independence and “in early Chile, as in Rome, the word
'republic* means little except the absence of a dynasty in
the state."
A. Curtis Wilgus, A r g e n t i n a , B r a z i l . and Chile
Since Independence (New York, 1963), 294.
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h i m as Imperial Majesty,

and authorized its representatives

in England and France to guarantee a small loan of a million
pesos which the pretender Emperor stated he needed to effect
h is move to Mexico.
There were also many foreigners,
the m o s t liberal ideas,
Americans,

even those holding

that believed as did many South

that a constitutional monarchy was the system of

government most suitable to Spanish America.

[Henry M.]

Breckenridge [s i c , Brackenridge] w h o was secretary of the
United States mission sent in 1817 to collect information on
the state of the South American countries, manifested in
his account of the trip that he hadi^
. . . heard it expressed by persons of some pr e t e n 
sions, that nothing is necessary but the introduction
into any country, of the forms of free government, and
that the people will at once be free as a matter of
course.
This is a great mistake.
A people must be
educated and prepared for freedom.
It is true that
despotic forms will soon extinguish the flame of lib
erty; but a different kind of government, such as we
enjoy, would be useless and inoperative among a
slavish ignorant people.
The following illustrious m e n thought in a similar
manner:

^Henry M. Brackenridge, Vovaae to South America
Performed bv Order of the American Government in the Years
1817 and 1 8 1 8 . 2 vols. (London, 1820), I, 47.
It is
interesting to note that P&ez misquoted B r a c k e n r i d g e 's last
sentence in this instance, writing instead, "the u n d e r 
taking was quimerical, that a type of government as that of
the United States was useless and embarrassing in the
Spanish c o l o n i e s ."
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San Martin,^ Pueyrredon, Monteagudo,
the Balcarces,
Larrea,

Sarratea,

Posadas,

0 'Higgins,

Guido, Moreno,

Belgrano,
Vieites,

and many others in Buenos Aires;

P6rez, Vicufia, Lazo de la Vega, Salas Rosas,

Lecaros, Canas,
Cienfuegos,

Alvear,

GOmez,

Rivadavia,

Lecavarrenes, ErrAzuris, Echeverrla,

the priest Larrain, Rodriguez Aldea, Encalada,

Tagle, Alcalde and m a n y important men in Chile; Torre Tagle,
U n a n u e , CarriOn,

Pando,

Pardo, Rivaguero,

Perd; General Juan Josd Flores,
de Sucre in Ecuador;

Pombo, Restrepo,

the Ibarras,

in

and the Great Marshal A. J.
Garcia del Rio and

some others in N e w Granada; the Urdanetas,
the Montillas,

Rivadaurre,

Archbishop Mdndez,

General Pedro Briceno MAndez and

^The author footnotes this as follows.
"When General
San Martin put Viceroy Laserna in Perd in a tight spot in
1811, the latter proposed a friendly agreement at this time
with. Don Manuel Abreu, commissioned by the constitutional
government to negotiate an agreement with the patriot chiefs,
w h e n he arrived from Spain.
Nothing was achieved by the
leaders on either side in the conferences heldt
so San
M artin then invited Viceroy Laserna to an interview in
Punchauca.
San Martin believed at the time that the means
of pacifying Perd lay in establishing a government that was
independent from the Peninsula.
B u t , states the record that
was written then, the experience of an eleven-year revolu
tion h a d revealed that the government most suited to the
c l a s s e s , c u s t o m s , vices, p r e o c c u p a t i o n s . character of the
p e o p l e , and education in P e r d . was a constitutional monar c h y
that would guarantee its independence. lib e r t y , s e c u r i t y .
and p r o s p e r i t y . In His Excellency's [San Martin'si c o n c e p t .
the most worthwhile work of those who held the public *s c o n 
fidence was to lav the foundations of this principle on a
solid basis and assure peace with S p a i n . General San Martin
offered to go to Spain to solicit a prince of the ruling
dvnastv in Spain to come and head a constitutional monarchy.
See Restrepo, Volume III, page 121."
This citation m a y be found as the author states in the
Josd Jacquin edition of Restrepo, RevoluciOn de la Repdblica
de Colombia.
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some of the mantuanos in Venezuela.®
It is not strange,

then,

that Bolivar could have c o n 

ceived the idea that the Spanish colonies could live in
peace under a moderate monarchical government and progress
as their political infancy allowed them.

Bolivar, who

repeatedly said that Spanish America presented a chaos which
threatened a most complete anarchy constantly, was convinced
that these people needed a firm,
ment.

stable,

and strong g overn

The Liberator had manifested this in his message to

the Congress of Guayana,

and in his predilection for the

Bolivian Constitution, which he always recommended and

®P4ez interjects this footnote.
"When I went with
the Liberator in the year XXVI from Valencia to Caracas, we
stopped in the San Pedro Parish.
Don Martin Tovar [Ponte]
arrived there from the capital, and a little later, he r e 
tired with Bolivar to a room.
They remained there for over
an hour in a seemingly-interesting conference.
When we
began our march anew, as we started to climb the hill, the
Liberator told met
'Would you believe that in the conference
I have just h a d with Tovar, that man, known for his ultrademocratic ideas, has told me that I should take advantage
of these moments to forge a crown for myself, for everything
is propicious and favorable to this.
It is delirium to
think about monarchies when we ourselves have so ridiculed
crowns.
If it were necessary to adopt such a system, we
should consider the Bolivian constitution, which is nothing
more than a monarchy without a crown.'"
M artin Tovar Ponte was one of the leaders of the
Caracas Junta in 1810 that removed Spanish Captain General
Emparan from power.
He belonged to the wealthy, white
Spanish aristocracy at a time when this class was living in
a "kind of twilight of loyalties."
He was a brother of
Manuel Felipe Tovar, w h o served as President of Venezuela
from 1860 to 1861.
(P&ez served as his Minister of War and
Navy.)
Madariaga, B o l i v a r . 18, 124, 126, 232.
Mordn,
History of V e n e z u e l a . 169, 170.
The mantuanos were that half of the creole class c o m 
p osed of city men who were the owners of large estates which
they might visit on occasion.
The lower classes referred to
them as the grandes c a c a o s . Ibid., 59.
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called a monarchy without a crown.7
I can hear n o w the cry of excommunication that the
ultra liberals will raise on reading the lines 1 have just
written.

1 seem to see them collecting diatribes and invec

tives against me in order to defend the memory of the
Liberator, w h o m they will say is being slandered by one of
his friends.

Let those scandalized k n o w that I do not p r e 

tend in these Memoirs, which I am writing now when the length
of time 1 have already lived serves to remind me of the
little time I have left in which to account to God for the
actions of my life;

let them know,

I repeat,

that Z do not

pretend to praise anyone, but to utter the truth as others
have already done before the tribunal of history.

I shall

confess the errors which m y inexperience made me incur; h o w 
ever,

this will not stop me from believing that it is just

for me to defend myself from the calumnies which have been
propagated against me by bad faith and especially by those
passions foreign to party spirit.
I venerate the memory of the Liberator of Colombia as

^P&ez footnotes this as follows.
"Several of his
friends had heard the Liberator say, according to Restrepo,
IV, 207, 'that Colombia and all Spanish America had no remedy
other than to establish constitutional monarchies, and that
if the people of Columbia would decide in favor of this sys
tem of government and would call a foreign prince to rule,
he w o u l d be the first to submit to his authority and use his
influence to support h i m . ' He repeated this same thing
la t e r . "
This quotation may be found as P&ez cites in the Jos6
Jacquin edition of Restrepo, Revolucidn de la Reotiblica de
Colombia.
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that of a benefactor of my country,
rneui and a very favorite friend.

and as that of a great

I am convinced that 1 am

not belittling the glory of his name in any w a y with what I
have just written about his ideas.

"The project of changing

republican institutions for monarchical ones," says Restrepo,
"might have been extemporaneous,

unadaptable,

and almost

destructive for Colombia, but it was not criminal."®
Let those who call themselves liberals k n o w that I
believe in the good faith of men, even though they might
preach what others recognize to be in error.

Let them k n o w

also that it was possible to be a partisan of the monarchical
form without ceasing to love the country and take an interest
in its future.
a monarchy,

I was not a partisan of the establishment of

and 1 am going to prove it despite the fact that

it has already been proven.

Nevertheless,

I do not believe

that those who advocated it were enemies of the country.
belong,

and have always belonged,

However,

I

to the Republican school.

I have never belonged to that school for which

liberty is the goddess who is worshipped with a knife and
incendiary torch, whose altars are purified with human blood,
and whose worshippers must purge the land of those who do
not think as they do concerning the country's interests.

I

do not belong to that sect who hold those horrible words of
Voltaire as a motto*®

®It was not possible to locate this citation.
®"The last king must hang
From the bowels of the last priest."

Ibid.
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Du Bovau du dernier pretre
II faut pendre le dernie r o i .
I am, and always have been,

on the side of those who believe

that each individual has the right to manifest what he
believes and what his reason dictates to him concerning the
interests of the land on which he was born.
It would be an infamous calumny,

and one which no one

could support with any remnants of truth, to suppose that
General Bolivar ever entertained the desire to exchange his
imperishable laurels as Liberator for the ephemeral crown of
an American E m p i r e . I
this,

do not stop to give reasons for

for he gave more than enough in all the occasions

which were offered to h i m to speak on the matter.

However,

that he believed that a monarchical government or one similar
to it would be suitable for the country,

is something that

cannot be denied by those who dealt with him closely and k n e w

^ T h e author footnotes this as follows.
"The h i s 
torian Cesar Cantu in his history One Hundred Y e a r s . says in
speaking of B o l l v a n
'His adversaries pretended that this
renunciation (of the presidency) was not real as the others,
and made only so that his powers could be returned to him.
Happy is the man who cannot be calumned except in his inten
tions 1 The historians in their preoccupation recognize
aspiration to a throne as the center of all ambition; however,
illustrious men with superior nobility can have many others.
A sceptre could not have made Bolivar as great as his own
sword, to which an entire continent owed its freedom.'"
For information on Cantu, please see footnote 19 in
Chapter XVI of this manuscript.
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h o w disillusioned he was with democracy,1 ^- and what pain
Colombia's sad situation caused him.

The struggle he

11The author interjects the following footnote.
"The
following are the Liberator's words, which show h o w little
faith he had in the future of the Spanish American countries.
(This is copied from a bulletin which was published in Cuenca
in 1828 under the title 'A Look Toward Spanish America.')
There is no faith in America, not among men, nor among
nations.
Treaties are papers; constitutions, books;
elections, battles; liberty, anarchy; and life, a torment.
This is, Americans, our deplorable situation; if we
do not change it, death is better;
anything is better
than indefinable struggles whose malignancy is increased
by the violence of movement and the prolongation of time;
let us not doubt it, the evil multiplies every moment
and threatens us with complete destruction.
Colombians I You have suffered much, and sacrificed
m u c h without benefit, for you have not h i t upon a
healthy path.
You fell in love with Liberty, dazzled by
its attractive powers; but since Liberty is as dangerous
as beauty in women, w h o seduce and claim everything in
the name of love or vanity, you have not kept it pure
and innocent as when it descended from the h e a v e n s .
Let us hear the cry of the country, of the m a g i s 
trates and citizens, and of the provinces and armies,
so that forming together a corps impenetrable to the
violence of the parties, we can redeem the national
representation w i t h virtue, force, and the enlightenment
of Colombia.
Predictions made by the Liberator himself on November
9, 1830, thirty-eight days before his death, are as follows.
'America is ungovernable.
Those who have served the
revolution have plowed the s e a s . The only thing that can
be done in America is to emigrate.
These countries will
m o s t certainly fall into the hands of the frenzied
multitude in order to pass on later into those of small,
almost imperceptible, tyrants, of all colors and races,
devoured by every crime, and extinguished by ferocity.
The Europeans, perhaps, will not deign to conquer them.
If it were possible for a part of the world to return to
primitive chaos, this would be America's final period.'"
This last quotation is taken from a letter Bolivar
wrote to General Juan Jos6 Flores, November 9, 1830.
Simdn
Bolivar, Obras C o m p l e t a s . 3 vols. (Habana, 1950), III, 501502.
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maintained between his own convictions and the fear of
opposing the multitude's wishes, which were nourished on
m o dern ideas imported from France and the United States and
did not agree with h i m with respect to Colombia's needs,
mu s t have been horrible.

There is not one document of the

Liberator's in which this struggle is not observed.
If Bolivar had not had the conscience of his glory,
or if he had been an ambitious,

common person, he could have

unscrupulously crowned himself King of Colombia,
with the best intentions.

seemingly

There were many people in the

Republic that desired this.

Even Lord Aberdeen, Her Britanic

Majesty's Secretary of Foreign Affairs, when he was consulted
about a European prince,

gave assurances that the English

government would not place any objections at all if the
Colombian people proposed the Liberator as their monarch.
As in all the other American states,

there was public

talk in Colombia about changing the system of government and
establishing a monarchy.

There was a meeting in BogotA of

persons known for their talents and virtues and who occupied
high positions,
system.

to discuss the adoption of the monarchical

As a result of what was resolved here, the ministers

agreed on September 3, 1829 to open negotiations w i t h the
diplomatic agents from France and England.

They wanted to

know if Congress were to decree a constitutional monarchy,
if their respective governments wo u l d look favorably on such
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a tremendous change.-*'2

They also wanted to k n o w if they

could rely on the cooperation of France and England in case
the United States and other Republics became alarmed and
opposed the project.
The counselors of state s a i d i ^
The habits of our people are monarchical, for a
m o n archy is the system of government they have had
for centuries.
They decided in favor of indepen
dence, and in the intoxication of the triumphs
obtained in destroying Spanish power, they persuaded
themselves that a boundless liberty was suitable for
them; however, experience has made them recognize
that it was harmful to them:
so today a general
tendency toward monarchical institutions is noted.
Dr. Labastida [or La Bastida] writing to Marino in
name of the Bishop of Tricala, Dr. Mariano Talavera,

whom

that General had asked for information concerning what was
happening in Bogota,

told h i m among other things that:1^

12The diplomatic agents from France and England were
Charles Bresson and Patrick Campbell.
Lemly, B o l i v a r . 362.
Although Gil Fortoul does not include this particular
quotation, he does cite m a n y direct quotations which reveal
the pro-monarchy sentiments in Colombia at this t i m e . H i s toria Constitucional de V e n e z u e l a . I, 624-47.
l^Dr. La Bastida along with BriceAo, Delgado, and
others helped to write the Merida Constitution which abounded
in high ideals and ardent patriotism.
Parra-Pdrez, Historia
de la Primera Repflblica. II, 154.
Dr. Mariano Talavera, one of the most enlightened and
enthusiastic members of the clergy in Venezuela, was in favor
of the independence movement.
He helped to eradicate the
qualms of the clergy w h o had taken an oath to support the
government of Ferdinand VII b y stating that the oath had
been invalidated by Ferdinand's renunciation.
Ibid., 150,
151, 152.
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. . . he (the Bishop) informed me in detail concerning
w h a t occurred in a friendly meeting held in BogotA
this past March [1829*1 at Dr. C a s t i l l o ’s house in which
the Minister Restrepo secretly proposed the establ i s h 
ment of a monarchy in Colombia.
This project, although
ill-received by several of those attending, had no
opposition other than that of the Bishop himself and
two lawyers from the city.
Although our party worked
actively to diffuse opinions, it barely found any
support, particularly among the learned youth of the
country and among the women, w h o profess an implacable
hatred of General Bolivar.
Mr. Charles Bresson,

the French commissioner,

sent the

Duke of Montebello, who was traveling through our countries,
to notify King Charles X that Colombia, wanting to free h e r 
self from demagoguery, was planning to adopt the monarchical
system.

Furthermore, he stated that she was ready to accept

a prince of the House of Orleans as king.
M. Palacios,

Colombian ministers,

General Madrid and

received instructions to

negotiate on this matter with the Tuileries and St. James
cabinets.^

The council of ministers said that the Liberator

had not issued his opinion on this matter,

but that since his

inviolable principle was to support what Congress did, they
expected that he would approve the plan when a majority
adopted it.
Many letters were written to Bolivar asking h i m to
frankly state his opinion, but he answered none of them.
This proves that he was not entirely opposed to the m i n i s t e r s 1

ISQeneral Madrid succeeded in establishing relations
with Holland from his p o s t in London.
He negotiated a
treaty of peace, navigation, and commerce with Baron Falk
in 1829.
Restrepo, Revolucidn de la Repdblica de C o l o m b i a ,
iV, 216-17.
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p l a n s , for if he h a d been,

surely he would not have left

letters unanswered that dealt with such a vital affair for
the Republic.

The ministers,

then, were not officially

authorized to do anything but seek the protection,
mediation,
Spain.

influence,

or safeguard of a European nation other than

This greatly displeased the admirers of the United

States of North America whose minister in Colombia, Mr.
[william] Harrison,

counseled Bolivar on the establishment

of a government similar to that of his country.16
In the month of August,

Bolivar wrote to [Patrick]

Campbell, who was in charge of Her Britannic Majesty's
affairs.
published.

This is the letter that no Colombian historian has
Since the Secretary of Foreign Affairs received

a copy of it, the ministers supposed that Bolivar approved
of their projects.

The letter is as follows.17

TO COLONEL PATRICIO CAMPBELL, HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S
CHARGE D'AFFAIRS
Guayaquil, August 5, 1829.
M y Esteemed Colonel and Friendi

16Wil l i a m Harrison had been appointed minister to
Colombia b y the John Quincy Adams administration and given
specific instructions not to meddle in the internal affairs
of the country.
Judging by the United States' actions in
Mexico under Poinsett, the Colombians seriously doubted that
he w o u l d carry out these instructions.
Harrison immediately
plunged into the country's political affairs and declared
himself to be the Liberator's enemy when the latter did not
advocate a system of government similar to that of the United
States for Colombia.
When Harrison was replaced by colonel
Thomas Moore in 1828 after Jackson's victory, Colombians
sighed a sigh of relief.
I b i d .. 203, 217-18.
17A copy of this letter m a y be found in Bolivar,
Obras C o m p l e t e s . Ill, 278-79.
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I have the honor of informing you that I received
your esteemed letter of M a y 31, dated in Bogota.
I
cannot but begin by thanking you for the multitude of
kindnesses that you pour toward Colombia and me in
your letter.
H o w many claims do you have on our
gratitude?
I am humbled when I consider what you have
thought and done since you have been among us in order
to support the country and the glory of your chief.
The English minister residing in the United States
honors me greatly when he says:
that he has hopes for
Colombia only because there is a Bolivar here.
But he
does not know that his physical and political existence
are very weakened and will fail soon.
What you tell me with respect to the n e w project of
naming a European prince as m y successor, does not
surprise me.
I had been broached on this topic some
what, a little mysteriously and a little fearfully,
for my way of thinking is known.
I do not know what to tell you about this idea
which encompasses a thousand difficulties.
You must
k n o w that there would be no obstacles presented by me,
determined as I am to leave the command to this next
congress; but, who can mitigate the ambition of our
chiefs and the fear of inequality in the common people?
Do you not think that England would feel jealousy at
the election of a Bourbon? H o w much would the new
American States oppose this? And the United States,
which seem destined to plague the Americas with
miseries in the name of liberty, h o w much would they
oppose this also?
It seems to me that I already see a
general conspiracy against this poor Colombia (already
envied too much by as m a n y Republics as there are in
A m e r i c a ) . All the press would launch a n e w crusade
against the accomplices of treason to Liberty, against
the proponents of the Bourbons, and against the v i o 
lators of the American system.
On the south, the
Peruvians would light the flame of discord, while on the
Isthmus the people of Guatemala and Mexico would follow
suit.
Throughout the Antilles, the Americans and l i b 
erals from all parts would rebel.
Santo Domingo would
not remain inactive, but would call her brothers to
wage a common cause against a prince of France.
Every
one would be converted into enemies, and Europe would
do nothing to support us, for the H e w World does not
merit the expenses of a Holy Alliance.
At any rate,
we have reason to think this is h o w Europe would react
because of the indifference with which she saw us start
to fight for the emancipation of half the w o r l d — a
world which will very soon become the most productive
fount of European prosperities.
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Finally, I am very far from opposing the reor
ganization of Colombia according to the institu
tions experimented with by a wise Europe.
On the
contrary, 1 would be infinitely happy and would
enliven my forces to assist a task which might be
called one of salvation and which would be achieved
only with difficulty even when supported by England
and by France.
With the powerful aid of these two
countries, we would be capable of anything; but w i t h 
out it, we would not.
Because of this, 1 hesitate to
give my definite opinion until we k n o w what the
English and French governments think about the afore
mentioned change of system and the election of a
dynasty.
I assure you most sincerely, m y worthy friend,
that I have told you all m y thoughts and held back
nothing.
You m a y use these thoughts as you find
convenient to your duty and the well-being of C o l o m 
bia*
this is the natural state of my thought.
Please receive the affectionate heart of your atten
tive and obedient servant.— BOLlVAR.
This is a private copy.
The above letter is a copy of the one General Urdaneta
included in his letter directed to General P&ez on September
16,

1829,

to whose care he entrusted it.— Caracas,

October 1,

1841.
JOSfi [Hilario] De Sistiaga.*®
The above letter is a copy of the one Urdaneta in
cluded in his letter directed to General P&ez on September
16,

1829,

to whose care he entrusted this copy.— Caracas,

November 2, 1841.
MANUEL CEREZO.

18Colonel Jos6 Hilario de Sistiaga, a native of Valen
cia, was issued a Cavalry Colonel's commission in 1830 by
General P&ez, which back-dated to 1826.
This fact is offered
as an indication of the services he rendered the independence
cause.
In 1828 P&ez had named h i m Governor of the Carabobo
Province, and in 1834 he appointed h i m to serve as a Judge of
the Central Court Martial Court.
DAvila, Diccionario
B i o o r A fico. II, 280.
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Whether it was because the Liberator feared to assume
the responsibility for adopting a measure of uncertain success,
or because he feared the youth who were enthusiastically s u p 
porting the modern ideas and would involve the country in
n e w dissensions, he disapproved all the plans in favor of a
monarchy in an official letter dated November 22.

Restrepo

states that the ministers became indignant on reading this
note and a d d s i ^
. . . the Liberator could have and should have made
them avoid the risks and multitude of displeasures
b y speaking to them frankly from the beginning so
that they would not have counted on his support in
that difficult undertaking.
No later than the month
of May, they had told him about the plan they were
entertaining concerning a monarchy.
Four months went
by before the celebrated agreement of September 3 was
reached.
There was more than enough time to have told
them expressly that he could not support such a goal.
This was something that he should have done at least
out of friendship.
Nevertheless, he remained silent
an additional three months, at the end of which he
sent his gruff official disapproval.
The language of
events is eloquent.
On December 3 the ministers answered B o l i v a r ’s note
telling him that in order to carry out the orders he had
given them to secure the protections of a European nation,
they had felt it was necessary to show the latter that an
attempt was being made to establish a lasting,
permanent government.

Furthermore,

stable,

and

they stated that they

had done even less than their instructions decreed,

for

these ordered them to solicit a protectorate for all of

l^This citation is not found in the Jos6 Jacquin e d i 
tion of Restrepo, Revolucidn de la Republica de C o l o m b i a .
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America, and that they had only asked for Colombia's protec
tion.

Finally, since the counselors were hurt,

they said

that if they had to retract the propositions they had made,
their ministry should be changed "so that those who enter
negotiations will not have had any part in the project,

and

therefore will be able, without muffling or embarrassment,
to manifest that we have changed our mind."

Undoubtedly,

much valor and a strong conviction was needed to take on
such a tremendous responsibility as that which the ministers
assumed in putting their projects into practice.
In Bolivar's opinion,

the most efficacious means to

prevent the annihilation of his efforts, was to elect a
President for life and to have a hereditary senate.
proposed this in Guayana in 1819.

He had

It can easily be seen

that this system is very close to a constitutional monarchy,
and that if Bolivar did not openly promote this type of
government,

it was due to an excess of prudence.

He knew

that he would have to reckon with violent parties,

among

which there would surely be those who would attribute ideas
unworthy of his glory and of his genius to him.

In an

attempt to find out what the Liberator's opinion was on this
matter of great interest being discussed in Colombia,

I sent
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the following letter with Commandant Jos6 [de] Austria.20
HIS EXCELLENCY THE LIBERATOR PRESIDENT,
BOLlVAR

GENERAL SIM6N

Mayquetia, July 22, 1829.
My Beloved General and Friendt
Since my return from Apure, I have written you a
letter in every outgoing mail about all the issues
which I have considered worthy of your attention,
and which could lend wisdom to your deliberations.
These considerations, which have always been an
inviolable precept for me and the norm of my actions,
lead me now with more reason than ever before to seek
orders from you in order to bind myself to these as
the only rule to guide the path of my political ship
in the midst of the conflict presented by the opinion
of some respectable and friendly people.
I also want
to delineate the observations I have made so far from
your communications as well as from public opinion.
Since the results will be of major transcendency and
gravity, I shall not deviate one iota from your reso
lution. In order to obtain the latter with the prompt
ness and security I have felt necessary, I am sending
Commandant Josfi Lde] Austria to bring this letter.
He
will be able to explain verbally all those things which
are not easy to write, and I shall limit myself to
making some general suggestions.
I have received a letter from General Urdaneta
informing me of his opinion, as well as that of the
most notable persons in the middle, concerning the

2°A copy of this letter may be found in Blanco and
(eds.), Documentos Para La H i s t o r i a . XIII, 590-91.
General jos6 de Austria was born in Caracas in 1791.
He enlisted in the independence army in 1810 and served under
Miranda in 1811 and 1812.
In 1821 he served with General
Bermudez in the Caracas campaign and by 1828 he was with
Bolivar in Southern Colombia.
He was promoted to the rank
of General.
He wrote the important Bosque1o de la Historia
Militar de Venezuela en la Guerra de su Independencia.
Austria died in Caracas in 1863.
D&vila, Diccionario
B i o q r & f ico, X, 24-25.
Lecuna, Crdnica Razonada. I, 37, 137,
163.
Jos6 de Austria, Bosaueio de la Historia Militar de
Venezuela en la Guerra de su Independencia (Caracas, 1855),
v-xlvii.
Azpurda
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reforms on the governmental system.
He has also
d e manded that I reveal my feelings to him.
The
sincerity of m y character, the true friendship X
profess for you, and the interest I take in your
glory, have all made me think seriously about this
arduous question which is vital for Colombia no
m atter h o w it is considered.
This is because it is
the heart of all the other branches of public admin
istration and shall form either a monster that will
destroy itself, or a moral being marching in harm o n y
with its proper elements to create general happiness.
I have had recourse to your letters, especially the
one in which you entrusted me to give the people an
energetic manifesto to belie the calumnies with which
your name was being maligned, and the one in which
you told me to give the deputies the instructions
that were in accord with the general will.
In these
I found that you stand for no other form of go v e r n 
m e n t but a liberal one which is firm and vigorous,
and which is capable of destroying anarchy forever
and repelling federation and monarchy as foreign to
public opinion.
With these facts in mind, I frankly
informed General Urdaneta about what you shall see in
the copy I am including.
Although in your reply you
agree with me on everything, X understand from General
Ibarra that you have written to h i m as well as to
Ur daneta concurring w i t h the opinions that they had
manifested to you previously.
Perplexity concerning
your feelings has replaced certainty.
You know, m y
dear General, that my desire is to do the correct
thing, and I am certain that you cannot guide me
except along the p a t h that leads to C o l o m b i a 's general
well-being.
This pleasant thought helps create the
sincerity in me which essentially make me speak to you
from my heart and never disguise the truth.
Since not
even a moment can be lost in these matters, I expect
that you shall resolve this question which only you can
conclude.
Certain of m y unchanging attachment to you,
you m a y rest assured that I shall always be at your
side as I have always told you.
Austria's efficacy and the speed with which he h a d
discharged his previous commissions, afford me no
anxiety regarding the promptness and other considera
tions demanded by prudence.
Your most faithful friend and obedient servant who
loves you with all his heart says goodbye.
JOS& A. PAEZ.
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In reply to this letter,

the Liberator sent me the

following instructions by Austria.

These may be seen in

Volume 30CII, page 15, of Documentos de la Vida Pftblica del
Libert a d o r .^
When His Excellency the Liberator sent me from
Popay&n on this past December 15, after I had ful
filled the commission which His Excellency the
Superior Chief of Venezuela saw fit to confide in me,
he reduced his instructions and special charges to
two principal points.
First:
to manifest to His Excellency the Superior
Chief and his other friends, the unsurmountable
obstacles that existed opposing the establishment of
a monarchy in Colombia.
Consequently, those persons
w h o desired a change in our political form as the
only means to improve the critical situation the
country demanded, were very much in error.
Public
opinion has said nothing about this transformation.
One had to be of the opinion that the people, whose
will would serve as the only guide, would not change
their republican forms for a mona r c h y — a w o r d which
w o uld only serve to alarm them and to revive the
patriotic enthusiasm which was b o m with the first
cry of liberty.
Uttered on the first day of our
revolution, this cry inspired immense sacrifices from
the people and heroic efforts from the citizens.
That if at other times His Excellency h a d indicated
that he was in favor of a more or less energetic and
stable government, it should never have been deduced
that this was in the sense of this violent a change.
Judging from the customs, morals, and enlightenment
of the country, he has been able to assign the
criteria of his thoughts to his fellow citizens and
use as his only guide at all times the protection of
the public liberties and the granting of the greatest
number of individual guarantees possible.
That the day has arrived in which the people in

21since Documentos Para la Historia contains only
fourteen volumes, P&ez m u s t refer here to the Coleccidn de
D o c u m e n t o s . It contains only twenty-one volumes, however,
and these instructions were not included in Volume XXI.
A
copy of these instructions are included in Bolivar, Obras
C o m p l e t e s . Ill, 384, 385 ff.
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general, and men in particular, could freely and
legally pronounce the forms of government which
should be established, or the improvements that
the country demanded.
This was as a result of the
October 16 Decree, which should serve as the norm
for the deliberations by the constituent congress.
Because of this. His Excellency had abstained from
giving any opinion on the matter so that the
deputies would recognize no other principles but
those which emanated from the pure force of the
nation.
That His Excellency has said previously that he
w o u l d never exchange his title of Liberator for that
of emperor or king, and that this has been, and still
is, his heart's most sincere desire.
Finally, even
if all of Colombia, in a most determined and resolved
manner, should w a n t a king, His Excellency would not
be the monarch.
Secondly*
To persuade His Excellency the Superior
Chief about the advantages which would accrue to
Colombia from the L i b e r a t o r 's separation from the
Republic's supreme command.
His Excellency hesitated
quite a bit at this point and demonstrated insurmount
able reasons.
He made the advantages which the country
w o u l d report from this alienation very evident.
These
w o u l d be so much more useful and necessary when the
august and formidable tribunal of opinions of the Old
and H e w World h a d opened their judgments on His E x c e l 
lency's political conduct, and after Colombia and
other sister towns h a d disturbed the peace and altered
their institutions.
They would be influenced apparently
b y the immense power that a conflagration of unheard
of evils and fortuitous circumstances h a d forced the
people to deposit in His Excellency's hands, and which
he had been forced to accept and exercise despite a
thousand conspiracies.
That the opinions that were evidently in favor of a
political change to bring a monarchical form of go v e r n 
m e n t to the country made his resolution to rush from
the Presidency of the State and mingle with his fellow
citizens, more irrevocable.
It also made him want to
fling himself first before the Constituent Congress
that was going to assemble and swear his obedience
before the n e w magistrate they would elect.
He would
offer h i m all his influence and all his resources in
order to buttress his authority and to secure the
triumph and stability of this regeneration which would
be based exclusively on the people's most spontaneous
free will.
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That this great moral act on His Excellency's
behalf was necessary as the most splendid end to
his public life after suppressing a thousand internal
revolutions that h a d recognized different and contra
dictory p r i n c i p l e s , after celebrating an honorable
peace with Peril which satisfied the vindication of
Colombia's honor, and after completely reuniting the
national sovereignty.
After this eloquent example,
who could possible intend to usurp the rights of the
people? Tyrants could never exist in Colombia.
Complying with the opinion generally held that he
n ot leave the country, he would be satisfied for n o w
to renounce his supreme command and lend his services
as a general, if they were thought to be necessary.
He would redouble his zeal and his efforts until he
saw that the Constitution and the laws ruled, and that
the ferocious Hydra of anarchy had left forever.
His
Excellency repeated a thousand times to me that his
resolution was irrevocable, that he wanted to raise
h is head u p high one day without being aggravated by
atrocious and incessant calumny.
That the good or the evil produced by his adminis
tration in Colombia has fallen exclusively on him,
w h e n perhaps some of this had originated elsewhere
since he h a d never been absolute in his country's
administration.
He h a d always been surrounded by a
ministry.
Listening to the voice of a council, he
could never credit himself with being the exclusive
author of either the good or the bad.
Although his
name presided over a thousand acts, he had neither
had, nor wanted to have, a part in some of them.
Finally, he begged His Excellency General PAez, and
all his fellow citizens to cooperate with h i m to save
his glory, for this glory was not his exclusive p r o p 
erty.
Rather, it belonged to Colombia, and being
Colombia's, it should be preserved intact.
In order to alienate the will of the people and find
some means to satisfy their wrath, m y enemies have forged
the calumny that I was an instrument in south America to
prepare the fall of the Republican system and the establish-
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ment of a m o n a r c h y . 22
other times,

Once again,

as I have already done at

I challenge them before a tribunal of those who

were contemporary to the events to present the testimony of
a w o rthy Venezuelan

out of those

in the period which

we are n o w

h ad any part in the projects

that still live and figured

narrating,

to prove that I

for a monarchy in Colombia.

Do

not think that m y efforts to prove the contrary arise out of
a need to vindicate

myself

Noi

to confuse a calumny that was forged by

I only propose

dislike.

for

acrime of which I am accused.

If I had propagated for a monarchical government,

I would confess it today without blushing.

This has already

been done by many of Colombia's eminent men who ended their
great services to the nation's independence cause at a time
when others began to vociferate,
of the press,

in the plazas and by means

their love for a land which the former h a d

22on October 1, 1825 P&ez wrote a letter to Bolivar in
PertS
in which he compared the state of Colombia to that of
France when Napoleon was in Egypt.
At the beginning of this
letter, P&ez stated that he was sending this message by
Briceno "who can tell you everything that is not expressed
in this writing."
Blanco and Azpurda <eds.), Documentos
Para
la H i s t o r i a . X, 119. On December 11, 1826 Bolivar wrote
PAez from San Josd de cdcutai
"You know very well that
Guzm&n did not come to Lima except to offer me your pr o p o s i 
tion that I destroy the Republic, imitating Bonaparte. . . .
By Colonels Ibarra and Urbaneja you have proposed a crown for
me which I have duly rejected."
Lecuna (ed.), gartas del
L i b e r t a d o r , VI, 116.
Although P&ez cites Briceno as the
bearer of his October 1 letter, Bolivar mentions QuzmAn
repeatedly as the messenger w h o delivered this particular
epistle.
The reason for this deviation is that Briceno
MAndez was forced to stay in Bogota as a deputy to Congress,
and so he gave the correspondence to Quzm&n.
Gil Fortoul,
Historia Constitucional de V e n e z u e l a . I, 627.
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given them at the coat of m a n y sacrifices.

The only d o c u 

m e n t they have dared to present to prove their accusation is
a letter concerning which I shall copy what can be seen in
Numbers 6 and 7 of the R e v i s o r . a newspaper edited in Curazao
b y SefEor D[on] A[ntonio] j[os4 de]

Irisarri in the year

1849.23
In the Re p u b l i c a n o . number 214, m a y be found
another article on Flores, P&ez, and irisarri, w h i c h
contains only the most solemn document concerning
the fraud with which General P A e z 's enemies try to
deceive the Venezuelan people.
The letter which is
copied in the cited number of the R e p u b l i c a n o , r e 
portedly sent b y General PAez to Bolivar by General
Bricefio, is not the letter that General PAez sent,
but one which was forged by the malevolence of this
G e n e r a l 's e n e m i e s . This has been proven most
solemnly on the nineteenth of this month in the
presence of forty-five persons assembled casually
to witness the evil of those letter-forgers who
today govern Venezuela.
The following men were assembled on this cited
day in Senor TomA Naar's country house in the vicinity
of Curazao for the purpose of celebrating the anni 
versary of April 19, 1810:
the home owners; Seftores
TomA Naar, Jr., jacabo Naar, Jacobo Henriquez, josA
Dacosta GOmez, and Pedro cranveld, a Dutchman;
Seflores Clemente Barclay, Samuel M. Jarvis, and
Nathaniel Jarvis, North Americans; Seftores General
PAez, D o n Angel Quintero, Dr. Hilario Nada.
Dr. Pedro
JosA Estoquera, General Domingo HernAndez, Minister
JosA Ayala, Colonel JosA F. castejon. Colonel Dolores
HernAndez; and Sefiores Mariano Ustaris, J. A. Serrano,
J. A. Izquierdo, J. E. Gallegos, Jaime Harris, JosA de
J. Villasmil, Antonio Tinoco Ayala, Juan R. Marcucci,

23Antonio JosA de Irisarri had served as Chilean
ambassador in London in the 1 8 2 0 's and had been able to
secure a loan for the purchase of ammunition and supplies.
Lecuna, CrOnica R a z o n a d a . Ill, 267.
In 1849 PAez, who h a d broken w i t h President JosA
Tadeo Monagas, h a d been defeated by the Monaguistas and was
in Saint Thomas, en route to his exile in the United States
which began in 1850.
Cunninghame Graham, PAez, 290.
Mordn,
Hi story of V e n e z u e l a . 163.
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Jr., J. B. Marcucci, Jr., Luis Marcucci, Diego Sutil,
Francisco Ustariz, Teofilo Celis, Eliodoro Montilla,
Jos6 Manuel Molero, Jaime Pocaterra, Licenciado R.
Martinez, Juan C. Las Casas, Commandant Joaquin
Chassin, Guillermo Leiva, J. A. Montobio, Inocente
Lovera, Antonio Carmona, Antonio Maria Monsanto, and
the editor of the R e v i s o r .
Senor Pedro Cranveld, one of those attending, p r e 
sented at this gathering Number 214 of the R e p u b l i c a n o .
w h i ch he had gotten in the mail, and began to read the
letter found there from General P&ez to Bolivar.
Gen
eral P&ez immediately said that he remembered having
written something similar to that, but that it was
n ot the same.
In order to convince everyone present
of the truth, he ordered the b o x that contained the
correspondence with Generals Bolivar and Urdaneta
brought from his house.
The box was brought in effect,
and someone started to read B r u z u a l 's printing and I,
the editor of the Revisor, read the carbon of the letter
in the presence of all those there.
We found that
entire sentences h a d been suppressed, that large s e c 
tions had been added, and that passages h a d been altered
to make the letter contain the opposite of what General
P&ez wrote.
All the world shall also see what we, the
forty-five witnesses, have seen in General Urdaneta's
letters.
This is to say that if the project for a
m o n archy which the Duke of Montebello brought was not
carried into effect, it was due to General P&ez's
oppos i t i o n .24
In later years a letter had been published which it is
claimed Bolivar directed to me in answer to this one.
there is talk that Colombia is not France,

In it

nor the Liberator,

24The author footnotes this as follows.
"On different
occasions malicious people have forged my signature to autho
rize some document.
In 1835 the Reformists falsified it to
deceive and compromise General Manuel Vald6s, Commandant of
Arms of the Cumana Province.
By means of a false letter
they led h i m to believe that I supported the reforms.
Later
in 1840, a Venezuelan colonel, also by means of a false
letter of mine, defrauded General Santa Anna of ten thousand
pesos.
A little later SefEor Sayors, of La Guaira, was the
victim of another deceit and paid three thousand pesos to a
certain 'Lucas G d m e z 1 in compliance with another forged
letter of mine.
The person the public pointed out as the
thief is still living."
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Napoleon,

et

c e t e r a .

ceived this letter,

25

j

which

n o t remember ever having r e 
is not to be found in the Docu26

mentos de la Vida Pdblica de B o l i v a r .

it has more of the

characteristic of a manifesto to the nation,

than a reply to

a private communication.
There are those who have written that Senor [Antonio]
Leocadio GuzmAn was commissioned by me to take this letter in
which I was supposed to have proposed the establishment of a
m o n a r c hy in Columbia to the Liberator.27

Fortunately,

SerSor

2^This is a letter the Liberator is supposed to have
written PAez from Magdalena on March 6, 1826.
In it Bolivar
statest
"I have received your very important letter of
October 1 of this past year which you sent by Senor GuzmAn,
w h o m I have seen and heard not without surprise, for his m i s 
sion is extraordinary.
You tell me that the situation in
Colombia is very similar to that of France when Napoleon was
in Egypt. . . . Nor is Colombia, France, nor I, Napoleon."
Lecuna (ed.), Cartas del L i b e r t a d o r , V, 230-40.
2®in effect, PAez never received this letter, for
Santander intercepted it in BogotA and kept it, claiming to
Bolivar later that the letter had arrived at a time when
PAez was being called before the Senate, and he feared
Bolivar's letter might arouse PAez to further insubordina
tion.
Gil Fortoul, Historia Constitucional de V e n e z u e l a . I,
629.
Contrary to what the author states, however, this
letter is included in Blanco and Azpurtla, Documentos Para la
H i s t o r i a . X, 211-12.
27£nt:onio Leocadio GuzmAn was a Paecista at one time.
In 1840, when the names of Venezuela's two historic parties.
Conservative and Liberal, came into use, he founded the
Liberal Party.
Since he h a d fallen out of favor with PAez
because of a personal clash with a stronger Paecista, GuzmAn
founded this party as the one in opposition to the reigning
conservatives.
In fact, GuzmAn followed a conservative
philosophy.
In 1846 he led a Liberal revolt which was
quashed, and in 1847 GuzmAn was condemned to death, but later
this sentence was commuted to exile.
He left the country,
but returned soon to collaborate with JosA Tadeo Monagas,
the Conservative President-elect.
Then in 1857 GuzmAn led
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GuzmAn still lives and still boasts about b e i n g m y enemy.
Nevertheless,

I appeal to his testimony to state if I gave

h i m the aforem e n t i o n e d letter,

or if he ever recei v e d funds

e i t h e r o ut of m i n e or Venezuela's to go on this c o m m is s i o n
to Perd w h e r e the Liberator was.

I also w a n t h i m to state

if his v oyage h a d as its objective p r o p o s i n g any p l a n of
m o n a r c h y to him.
The p e r s o n w h o w r o t e in
"Monarchy in Colombia,"

"The Order of Caracas" on

should k n o w that General U r d a n e t a

w a s the chief instigator of the esta b l i s h m e n t of a m o n a r c h i 
cal form of government,
this a g a inst him,

and not I . 28

N o one should h o l d

for he b e l i e v e d that his ideas w o u l d save

the c o u n t r y from the anarchy w h i c h threatened to deso l a t e

it.

N o b a s t a r d p r o j e c t could animate that General w h e n he p o s 
se s s e d the

idea that the r e a l i zation of his p l a n could end

all the d i f f i culties w i t h w h i c h the Liberator struggled.
illustrious name,

His

acquired at the c o s t of great sacrifices

the Liberal op p o s i t i o n to Monagas w h i c h b y 1859 had become
F e d e r a l i s t u n d e r Zamora.
In 1863 Falcdn became p r o v i 
sional p r e s i d e n t of the V e n e z u e l a n federation, and GuzmAn
Blanco, G u z m A n 's son, became Vice-President.
F r o m this
p o i n t on, GuzmAn Blanco assumed his father's leadershi p over
the "Liberal" Party.
Mordn, H i s t o r y of V e n e z u e l a . 158, 159,
160, 161, 164, 165, 167, 168, 170-71, 175, 176, 179.
28Gil Fortoul, n o t e d expert on the constitution a l h i s 
tory o f Venezuela, does n o t m e n t i o n General U r d a n e t a once in
c o n n e c t i o n w i t h the p r o p o s e d plans for the e s t a b l i s h m e n t of
a monarchy.
However, he does d i s c u s s at length PAez's
"Caesaristic p r o j e c t of 1825."
H i s t o r i a C o n s t i t u c i o n a l de
V e n e z u e l a , I, 626-30.
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and great deeds,

cannot suffer any detriment simply because

the ultra-republicans of the day might choose to believe
that the ideas he held are a sin against the Holy Spirit.
It is very painful for me today to have it appear that I
want to obscure in the slightest the glory acquired by a
comrade in arms, who was a worthy general and an illustrious
patriot; however,

these and other bitter tests have to be

survived by those who have to defend themselves against the
attacks of malevolence.

in the name of honesty,

I want to

assert again that it is not my desire to attack the memory
of Bolivar's illustrious friend.

I am only forced to make

this protest by the intolerant spirit of the pseudo-liberals
who believe today that one can be a patriot only by being
ultra-republican.
As a result of the letters I had written h i m p r e 
viously, urdaneta wrote me on M a y 30, 1829 telling me he had
desisted from his project in favor of an idea that had been
generally accepted by m a n y notable and very eminent m e n in
Colombia.

Despite his promise not to speak about the matter

again, he sent me the Liberator's letter to Campbell in
September.

At this time he wrote me again about the plan,

fearing that I had not understood it well.

Finally,

on

November 23, he promised definitely not to think about the
matter again.

He stated this in a manner which is the best

recommendation that can be made concerning his character,
and the best proof of the good faith with which he had been
working on this project.
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Well now:

if I had thought differently than what I

h a d written Urdaneta in m y letters, w h y does he not refer
to this,

throw my inconstancy in m y face, and remind me of

m y previous commitments?

The letter which cites the article

that I am concerned with,

does not exist in my archives,

and

I do not remember having received it.

If it was written,

never received it.

it is sufficient to

To prove all this,

compare that sole letter with all the others.
not adequate,

I

If this is

I copy in continuation here fragments of other

letters from Urdaneta, which I do not copy in their entirety
because they also deal with other matters.
On April 23,

1829, urdaneta wrote me:

"I am anxiously

awaiting a letter from you after Austria's arrival.

It is

necessary that we take charge of C o l o m b i a ’s future.

All my

measures are partial,

as you say, until I hear from y o u . " 43

On February 9, 1830 he wrote the following.

30

Do not find it strange that I speak to you again
about the injustice with which the Liberator has been
attacked.— Read my correspondence again and you shall
see in all of it that the Liberator has been very far
from having a part in the project.
I always told you
that m a n y men, supposedly patriots, and very much the
patriots, desired a change in the form of government.
I, too, have deemed it necessary.
These ideas have
been born out of the horrors with which the parties

29General Rafael Urdaneta wrote Memorias del General
Rafael U r d a n e t a .
(See footnote 3 in Chapter V of this
manuscript
for additional information on Urdaneta.)
He
included m a n y important letters he wrote and received in this
work.
It is significant to note that he did not include
this one to P A e z .
^ U r d a n e t a did not include this letter to PAez either
in his M e m o r i a s .

644
have distinguished themselves, and out of the h o p e 
lessness for peace and order left to us after the
events of the year XXVII until the conspiracy of
September 25 and the later ones.
Not being able to
count on the Liberator's support for it, the project
could not be achieved unless the nation forced h i m
to admit it and sacrifice his glory for Colombia's
stability.— You told me in one of your letters that
you would do nothing until the Liberator commanded
you because you did not want to do anything without
his consent.
I replied to you that the Liberator
could not tell you anything concerning a matter of
which he disapproved.
If it were believed to be
suitable for Colombia, it should be done by the
nation, completely separate from the Liberator, who
would never approve it, and because of this, could
never advise you to do it. _I invited you to join
in this p r o j e c t , for there was no opposition h e r e .
If Venezuela adhered to i t , it could all be d o n e .
If, then, from all my correspondence it can be seen
that the Liberator has been opposed to the project,
why is he attacked? W h y so much offense?
If only
they would write against me and against those of us
who have held these opinions.
It would never be
just because I have done nothing more than to seek
your support and that of a few friends from there in
favor of am idea which in my eyes, could save us
from the horrors we have witnessed in these later
times and from the general anarchy which has condemned
America up till today.
However, I have not hurt a n y 
one .
To those who have written that the objective of the
commission which I gave [Diego Bautista] Urbaneja when I

sent

h i m to the Liberator in Perti was to offer h i m a crown on his
return to Colombia,

I direct the following letter which I

demanded from Urbaneja when this infamous calumny began to
be propagated.

3^Diego Bautista Urbaneja was born in Barcelona, V e n e 
zuela in 1785.
By 1810 he was in Caracas, an ardent proponent
of the revolution and liberty.
He was forced to emigrate in
1814 when Monteverde reestablished Spanish control in V e n e 
zuela.
In 1819 he was a member of the Congress that m e t in
Angostura and signed the Constitution.
He was immediately
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Senor General Josd Antonio PAez.
Caracas,

September 9, 1841.

M y esteemed friend and sir:
In your esteemed letter of the sixth, you demand
m y testimony concerning the purpose of the commission
wh i ch you conferred on me in the year XXVI for His
Excellency the Liberator.
You tell me expressly not
to omit any detail from it, even if it were c o n f i 
dential .
Immediately following the political changes of the
year XXVI, Dr. Cristobal Mendoza revealed your desire
to me that I accompany Senor Diego Ibarra on the m i s 
sion you were thinking about sending to the Liberator
concerning the troubles we were experiencing in those
times.
He outlined its objectives somewhat, and I
d id not hesitate to take charge.
It followed, then,
that I should approach you to receive your orders and
instructions.
You told me briefly then that the
objective of the mission was to instruct the Liberator
about what had occurred and show h i m the urgent need
for his return to Colombia to take charge of its
government.
You considered this the only means of
avoiding the civil w a r which could engulf the Republic.
Nevertheless, you added that it might be wise to
listen to the opinions of some employees and notable
persons on this matter:
so a junta was celebrated in
effect.
Its result was what you had indicated to me
it would be.
I limited the fulfillment of the c o n f i 
dence you saw fit to deposit in me to this.
The
m i s sion contained no other objective, public or private.

named Secretary of Internal and Foreign Affairs.
Later he
became a Supreme Court Justice.
In 1831 he was elected
Vice-President of Venezuela and served in this capacity
until 1835.
When Piez was reelected to the presidency in
1839, Urbaneja was a me m b e r of his cabinet.
In 1847, under
JosA Tadeo M o n a g a s ' Presidency, he served as Vice-President
of Venezuela again.
Urbaneja died in Caracas in 1855.
Scarpetta and Vergara, Diccionario B i o a r & f i c o . 640-41.
Mordn, History of V e n e z u e l a . 127, 141, 153, 154, 156, 158,
162.
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With the greatest consideration,
attentive and obedient servant.

I am your very

Q . B . S . M . 32
D. B. URBANEJA.
If m y profession of faith is desired,

I shall make it

anew here and in this manner relegate it to history.

I am

certain that it is not possible for me to change my opinion,
for I have reached that period in life when error is wont to
be tenacious and impenitent.
In keeping with my background, my character,
impressions of m y youth, m y love for the people,
enemies choose, my own ambition,
of the monarchical system.

the

and if my

I could not be a partisan

The disorders that followed

independence would have been sufficient to make me a m o n 
archist if I had not been convinced that those evils arose,
not out of the principles we had adopted, but out of stupid
egotism and evil ambition— two mortal enemies of n a t i o n s '
well-being.

The ravages these have caused includei

falsi

fying the most sacred beliefs,* placing the principles of
political and private morals in difficult straits;

and

flattering the evil instincts of bad passions with fawning
just as in other times Caesar's courtesans flattered the
tyrant's bad instincts and passions in order to dominate h i m
better after he was corrupted.

These evils are certainly

32These initials stand for Quien Besa Su M a n o . "who
kisses your hand."

647
not circumscribed only to the unfortunate South American
Republics.
From time to time there will appear among all the
people of the earth similar deluges in the political order.
These will be more or less prolonged,

in keeping with the

degree of enlightenment and disposition of the people i n 
volved.

In the final analysis, we see these deluges in all

countries,

in all zones, under all systems of government,

with more or less just diverse pretexts.

These invoke

exaggerated and flattering principles difficult to realize
which announce themselves,
later.

appear,

and eclipse themselves

Then these principles leave behind them the stamp of

destruction and the bitter me m o r y of an experience dearly
acquired.
Europe,

A century has not yet elapsed since illustrious

both monarchical and republican,

felt the most p r o 

found shaking that any people on earth can experience.
Liberty, morals,

religion,

and humanity fled for some time

from that Old W o r l d — a world old with years and experience
in the practice of social life,

and always proud of its

illustrious and powerful titles.
period passed,

Still that unfortunate

and the European towns knotted the chain of

progress and continued advancing in the path of civilization.
At the cost of terrible tests,

Europe has acquired a wealth

of expensive experience for the future and the certainty
that, despite every effort,
themselves later on.

the same scenes will repeat

Meanwhile the people shall always be

the spectators and the victims.

Stupid egotism and evil
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a m b i t i o n , the two untiring executioners, will be repaid in
infamy and the opprobium of many years,

and conceded only

the hour of triumph by the ignorance of the mass of h a l l u c i 
nated p e o p l e .
The simple enunciation of these historical truths and
these contemporary events, which are repeated at certain
times in all countries,

regardless of the form of government

and homogeneity of its population,

authorize me to conclude

w i t h sane logic that America's misfortunes,
those of Venezuela,

and particularly

do not stem from the institutions nor the

political principles adopted, nor from the heterogeneity or
diverse colors of the population,
evils which I have mentioned.
hearts,

but from those endemic

These sprouts exist in all

and when their growth is stimulated by turbulent

geniuses,

they blossom out and necessarily cause misfortunes,

m a n y times irreparable.

Universal phenomena should also

recognize universal causesi

man is susceptible to demoralize

himself everywhere with more or less ease,

in keeping with

the degree of his learning, his disposition, his station in
life,

and even the climate and air that he breathes.

this is true,

If

it is no less true that the American people who

are more innocent, more simple,

less learned, placed under

climates propicious to the development of passions,
out over an immense and almost deserted territory,

spread
and with

difficult means of communication, would also lend themselves
more readily to serve as an instrument for the ambitious
demagogues in exchange for flattering promises which are
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never attainable.

It is for these reasons that scenes of

bloodshed and desolation which prevent progress and the
consolidation of these young Republics [regardless of their
governmental form, of the kindness of their political p r i n c i 
ples,

or of the strict and sane intentions of their good

sons] are repeated more frequently among us.

This is w h y

there have been and still are Republics in America that are
h a p p y w ith these elements and have progressed with astonish
ing rapidity among their sisters who are victims of the most
unchecked anarchy.

In Chile essentially the same principles

reign that have been adopted in all Spanish America,
population is also heterogeneous.

and its

Yet Chile's progress is

to be envied and worthy of being presented as a model to the
other Republics sharing the same origin.
For a period of sixteen years Venezuela also enjoyed
the same advantages.

Her credit in the world market was

superior to that of this very Chile.
developed in a portentous manner.
morality, work,

Her industry h a d been

The habits of order,

and submission to the law had been d i s s e m i 

nated among the people in such a manner,

that I did not need

bayonets to govern the Republic peacefully both times it fell
my lot to guide her destinies.

I barely maintained insig

nificant garrisons to guard the chief prisons and the
national parka.

Everyone possessed confidence in public

opinion and national security,

and these were the object of

admiration and praise from all learned foreigners who visited
our country.

All the citizens enjoyed the most ample and
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boundless right of voting, being elected,
thoughts in word and writing.
individual guarantees.
asylum were held sacred.
able on all scales,

and revealing their

There were always complete

Property and the Venezuelan right of
Free public instruction was avail

and without any exceptions.

Perhaps we

dedicated to this important branch greater quantities of
m oney than our finances permitted.

Industrial freedom, w i t h 

out any catches or privileges of any kind, was guaranteed to
all persons who were interested.

Never was any Venezuelan

excluded from participation in these pleasures.

Equality

before the law was an effective principle in the Republic.
Religious freedom was respected.

From 1830 until 1846 the

people were free to elect whom they wanted.

F e w Venezuelans

of some merit have failed to fill some public post.

Those

who did not must remember that there was not sufficient
positions in any country to satisfy the ambition of all those
who can aspire to them.

Then some of these men might have

lacked the moral aptitude to guarantee the proper discharge
of their duties, which is what creates happiness for the
people.
I shall not deny that it is the people's fault if
demagogues find in them a passion they can easily seduce,
flatter,

and convert into harm for society.

Because of this,

I shall always place among the friends of humanity those who
use all their influence to destroy these vulgar p r e o c c u p a 
tions,

leave behind all ideas of division,

interests homogeneous.

and make all

For the man of talent,

regardless of
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his o r i g i n , color does not grant or take titles to merit.
Color shall always be an accident,

as is the greatest or

slightest perfection of the configuration of the human body.
God has established a more noble inequality which is c o n 
venient to k n o w because it is an individual justice and a
social stimulus.

Appreciate the man because of his soul,

because of his capacity, because of his heart,
of his virtues.

and because

The most capable and the most virtuous

shall be the most distinguished citizens in a State,
less of whether they are white,

black, or mottled.

have been the principles I have held all m y life,

regard
These

and I have

professed them with sincerity, publicly as well as privately.
Finally,

I must declare this*

no anti-republican

tendency in South America has ever merited my support or
approval.

I have stated this,

and 1 have proven it repeatedly

in the course of my long public career.

Hy enemies in bad

faith have proposed to attribute to me tendencies contrary
to the Republican form.

I have challenged them, and I

challenge them again to present an authentic document or at
least an event to justify their calumny.

Vain declamations

and free suppositions are not sufficient to stain the public
life of a citizen.

Proofs admissible to sane criticism are

necessary.
Out of moderation and respect for memories w h i c h are
sacred to me,

1

had not wanted to publish documents which

the reader has seen; however, m y enemies have made it n e c e s 
sary for me to take this step.

Meanwhile,

they are the ones
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w h o should prove the imputation of what they have made them
selves responsible for if they do not want to be labeled
before the impartial tribunal of opinion with the deserved
title of liars.

1 leave them in possession of this.

I have

always believed,

and I have always maintained with profound

conviction that the Spanish American States should not and
cannot admit any form of government but the republican one.
To think the opposite would be delirious in m y opinion.

Yes,

an h o nest republic sooner or later will create the happiness
of these nations.

Before achieving this, however, they will

h a v e endured many painful tests as daughters of inexperience,
which is inherent to all periods of infancy and to all
systems which are being tried out.

This is especially true

when they have not been preceded by a preparatory period.
However,

true liberty shall finally triumph in America.

All

tyrannies, whether one or many, will be equally execrated.
Columbus's world will attain the high destinies which nature
has assigned to it with so much predilection.
These have been the beliefs 1 have held all of my
life.

Today these are m y legitimate hopes,

Providence keeps me alive,

and as long as

I shall dedicate myself un r e 

servedly to the triumph of the same principles w h i c h I have
maintained since 1810.

Age and the ingratitude of men have

not made the ardor and pu r i t y with which I have always lived
lukewarm.

The events of m y life have well proven this.

General [Joaquin] Posada [or Posada Gutierrez]
Memoirs which he has just published,

in the

and even others before
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this w o r t h y soldier of independence,

affirm that I was

responsible for preventing the projects of monarchy in
Colombia from being successfully carried o u t . 33

It becomes

difficult to conciliate the opinions of some with the calumnies
of others.

As for me,

I am content.

33(5eneral Joaquin Posada Gutiferrez was born in C a r t a 
gena in 1797 and entered the Republican army as a Lieutenant
in 1821.
He fought in the Battles of Coro, Quiciro, and
Barranquilla.
He was forced to retreat to Maracaibo when the
Royalist Army occupied the Coro Province.
Wounded at both
the Battles of Casiguano and Juritiva, he went on to fight
at the Battles of Molino and Cienaga which kept Morales's
forces from dominating this territory.
Prom 1824 until 1826
he was in Cartagena.
By 1826 he h a d been promoted to the
rank of Colonel, and then helped to draw up a boundary treaty
w i t h Ecuador.
A member of the Granadine Congress at various
times, he supported the established government in the r e v o 
lutions of 1840, 1854, and 1860.
He wrote and published
Memorias Histdrico-Poilticas del General Joaauln Posada
Guti 6 r r e z . 4 vols. (Bogota, 1929).
Scarpetta and Vergara,
Diccionario B i o g r & f i c o . 485.
Madariaga, B o l i v a r . 532, 569,
584, 613, 621, 622, 624, 640.

CHAPTER XXV
Internal Situation of Colombia— Manifesto to
the Northern C o l o m b i a n s .
1829
The year we are now in our narration revealed h o w
grave Colombia's situation was.
presented themselves.

Very complicated questions

A study of them should serve the

judicious historian as an explanation of the events which
would verify themselves in later years.
which afflicted the Republic,
of the least important . 1

Among the evils

the war with Perd was not one

Aside from the scandal presented

the world by the fraticidal war among people that h a d yet to
organize themselves,

sending troops and ships to the terri

tory and coasts of Perd cost more them the Colombian treasury

^This was a short struggle that started in 1828 and
ended in 1829 over the ownership of part of the province of
Mainas and the whole of Jadn.
The former had come under the
Viceroyalty of Perd in 1802, and the latter in 1821.
This
area which had once been under Peruvian political jurisdic
tion, came under Colombian control in 1824.
When the
friction between Colombia and Perd reached a climax in 1828,
Perd sent forces north with the aim of annexing Guayaquil.
The Colombian troops led by General Sucre decisively defeated
the Peruvians; consequently, in February of 1829 Perd agreed
to a withdrawal from the soil claimed by Colombia, the s u r 
render of a war vessel, and the payment of $150,000 to
Colombia.
Mary Wilhelmine Williams, The People and Politics
of Latin America (Boston, 1945), 605.
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could afford.

Even then, our coasts and territory remained

exposed to the threats of the Spaniards who did not desist
from the projects of reconquest and who,

according to public

r u m o r s , were preparing a new expeditionary army against
Costa F i r m e .
The laurels gathered by some military men in the war
with PertS and the luxury with which they returned from that
country,

excited the jealousies and animosities of the

veterans who had stayed in Colombia and had not yet been paid
for their services.
in their demands.

However,

the latter were too pretentious

The heroes of Pertl and the military men of

Colombia formed the sane external contrast that the comrades
of [SebastiAn de] Benalcazar and the soldiers of [NicolAs]
Frederman [s i c . Federmann] did when both conquistadores
encountered [Gonzalo Jimenez de] Quesada on the plain of
B o g o t a .2

2Henao and Arrubla statei
"Quesada's men wore cotton
clothes made by the Indians, F e d e r m a n n 1s were dressed in
hides, while B e n a l c a z a r 's wore fine scarlet and silk."
History of C o l o m b i a . 53.
Sebastian de Benalcazar (or Belalcazar, depending on
the writer) was born probably between 1478 and 1480 in the
village of Belalcazar, Spain.
His family name was Moyano,
and his parents, of humble origin, worked their own small
farm.
When Columbus was getting ready in Seville in 1498 to
make his third voyage to the N e w World, young Sebastian made
his way to that city and obtained passage with the idea of
settling in Santo Domingo.
During the conquest of this
island, he served in the ranks, distinguishing himself until
he became an experienced captain.
Santo Domingo proved too
small for his ambitionsi so he went to Darien to serve under
Balboa in the exploration of the Pacific Coast.
Under
Pedrarias orders, he accompanied Francisco de Cdrdoba in the
expedition to Nicaragua and won the appointment as alcalde of
the city of LeOn.
He returned to Panami and joined his
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The Liberator's absence at a time when a sordid agita
tion and conjectures of a nearing tempest were beginning to

former friends, the Pissarros, in the conquest of Perd.
He
even founded Quito, capital of the Republic of Ecuador.
Benalcazar was not content, however, with being a subaltern,
and he decided to push northward beyond P e r Q 's frontiers to
discover n e w lands.
While doing this he heard Luis de Daza
speak about a tale an Indian h a d told h i m relating the
peculiar ceremony in which the chief of one of the Indian
villages would cover his body with gold dust and then bathe
himself in a small lake into which the jewels offered the
gods were thrown.
From this came the name El. Dorado given
to the region, in search of which the Spaniards suffered so
m a n y hardships.
To find this "gilded mem," Benalcazar
ordered explorations across the southern frontier of Colombia
and was responsible for founding several cities.
In 1541
Benalcazar returned from Spain with the title of adelantado
and an appointment as life-governor of Popay&n, which he had
founded.
In 1546 he had Jorge Robledo, one of his lieuten
ants, killed because of insubordination.
He then served
under Pedro de la Gasca in the pacification of Perd.
In
1550, due mainly to the complaints of Robledo's widow,
Benalcazar was tried, deposed, and sentenced to death.
The
sentence was commuted, however, and Benalcazar was sent to
Spain.
He died in Cartagena on April 30, 1551 of a fever he
contracted on the voyage.
I b i d ., 35-41, 52-53, 68-69, 73-75,
77, 80.
Nicol&s Federmann was the most celebrated of the
Germans who explored for the Welsers.
He was a native of
the city of Ulm.
In 1530 Federmann was in Venezuela at the
head of an expedition and wrote Narracidn del Primer Viaie
de Federmann a Venezuela (Caracas, 1916), to describe it.
Early in 1535, [jorge de] Spira (who had been appointed to
succeed Federmann) and Federmann met in Coro and agreed to
divide the men and each go his own way in search of gold. In
1539 F e d e r m a n n 1s forces encountered those of Quesada in the
Bosa fields.
Quesada and Federmann pledged mutual friendship
and support.
Then Quesada sent his brother to the unknown
force camped on the Magdalena, which consisted of B e n a l c a z a r ’s
men, to secure information on their objective.
Benalcazar
received the emissary courteously and told him he did not
intend to contest Quesada's rights, but wished only u n o b 
structed passage to continue search for El. D o r a d o . However,
when Benalcazar learned of Federmann's proximity, he tried
to get h i m to align with h i m against Quesada and force the
latter to surrender the territory, claiming it was under
Pizarro's jurisdiction.
Federmann refused to go along with
this; consequently, the chaplains were able to get Benalcazar
to yield on this point and submit the claim to Spain.
Father
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be felt in Colombia placed m e in great conf l i c t , for it
deprived me of his advice when

1

needed it most.

On February 7 I issued the following manifesto to the
Northern C o l o m b i a n s .3
It is in this unexpected and satisfactory manner
for you, that Colombia shall see assembled the
august representation of its towns within a short
period of eleven months.
in this national assembly
the principles of our happiness and the glory of
the Republic will be fixed forever.
You shall see

Las Casas returned to Spain with the three conquerors. Feder
mann died in Madrid in February, 1542.
I b i d . . 32-33, 51-52,
84, 102.
Gonzalo Jim 6 nez de Quesada was born in Granada, Spain,
about 1499.
He came from a good family and, like his father,
was a lawyer.
He exercised his profession before the royal
chancellery of Granada until he came to the N e w World with
FernAndez de Lugo.
In 1536 General Quesada left Santa Marta
with his land forces.
Part of his expedition was to go in
seven boats to the mouth of the Magdalena River and then up
the river to join Quesada.
When his forces finally reunited,
Quesada had to impose his authority to keep his men from
turning back.
His explorations and discoveries now led him
to become the most noted among the conquerors of Colombia
and finally to found the capital of the Republic.
An
unquenchable thirst for gold, however, led him to extreme
cruelties which tarnished his image as it did that of the
other Spanish e x p l o r e r s . After his meeting with Benalcazar
and Federmann and his return from Spain, he obtained the
title of marshall of the N e w Kingdom and the post of councilor
for life of Santa Ffi. In 1569 he undertook a large and
brilliant expedition which crossed the San Martin plains and
finally reached the junction of the Guavire and Orinoco
rivers.
Instead of finding gold, however, Jimdnez de Quesada
lost money.
Then he wrote the history of his discoveries
known as Compendio Historial or Historial C o m p e n d i u m . U n f o r 
tunately, this priceless manuscript was lost.
Quesada died
a poor man on February 16, 1579, when he was over eighty
years old.
Ibid., 43-54, 89, 95, 101-102.
^The greater part of this manifesto has been deleted,
for it is a flowery repetition of preceding events and p r o c 
lamations.
The entire manifesto m a y also be seen in Blanco
and Azpurda (eds.), Documentos Para la H i s t o r i a . XIII,
376-86.
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the Liberator in this sovereign Areopagus present
himself once more as a plain citizen to render his
h omage to the only Colombian monarch, which is the
people assembled legitimately.
Then cruel
remorse,
shame, and eternal opprobium shall cover his
impious detractors w i t h terror and horror.
At the
same time, just Colombians shall see the Father of
the Republic with venerable respect mingle among us
— more glorious and triumphant them in BoyacA,
C a r a b o b o , and j u n l n .
Let us prepare ourselves, then, to enjoy n o w a
delightful and ineffable period.
Let even the
slightest vestige of discord disappear from among us.
Since the district under m y command has been purged
of those stray sons who attempted to alter its peace,
let us all embrace w i t h the ties of complete and
sincere national reconciliation.
Let the perturber
of public order perish as a result of our love of
country:
let us submit ourselves with a pure
p a triotism to the constituted authorities:
and let
us banish from our homes the wicked ones who dare to
disobey them.
Recognizing the great man we owe our
independence and liberty to, let us regard anyone who
even imagines that the Liberator of Colombia could
ever cease being that, as an enemy of the country.
It is time to conclude this exposition now.
On
ending it, I solemnly declare to you once more that
m y life, my blood, and all of me are the burnt sacrafice with which I pay tribute to your happiness and
your glories.
Is it not sweet to perish, Colombians
of the North, for such noble interests?
I shall
repeat to you, then, the same concepts that you
heard on another occasion, and with which I shall
seal m y lips.
"The sword redemptoress of h u m a n i t y I I In m y hands
it shall never be anything but Bolivar's swordi
his
will directs it, while my arm wields it.
I shall
p erish a hundred times, and m y blood shall be shed
before I allow this sword to leave m y hand or attempt
to shed the blood that it has liberated until now.
Fellow citizens 1 Bolivar's sword is in m y hands:
for you and for him, I shall go to eternity with it."
Caracas, February 7, 1829— XIX.
JOSE A. PAEZ.

CHAPTER XXVI
Difficulties of My Position in Venezuela—
General C d r d o v a 's Insurrection— Letter He Wrote
Inviting Me to Take Part in It— General Santan
der's Arrival in Venezuela as a Prisoner.
My
Correspondence with H i m During These Circumstances
— Judgment on General Santander— Difficulties With
Which I Would Have to Struggle if the Liberator
Abandoned Colombia— His October 14 Circular to the
Colombian Departments— Its Res u l t s — Junta of
Citizens in the San Francisco Convent in Caraca s —
My communication to the Minister of Interior— My
Defense of the Liberator— Letter to the Liberator
— I Convoke a Junta in the Caracas Theatre— M a n i 
festo of the Town of Caracas to the Liberator—
General Soublette's Letter to General Urdaneta—
Reply to Some Charges that Restrepo Makes Against
Me.
1829
All the events of these last years had made me u n d e r 
stand the great responsibility that accompanied command in
Venezuela; con s e q u e n t l y , my greatest desire was to retire to
private life to tend to my affairs.
the Liberator's letters that he,
same desire,

Since I could tell from

too, was animated by the

I offered h i m my fortune and invited h i m to come

to his country to live and retire with me in m y home,

far

from the turbulences and displeasures which embittered his
e x i s t e n c e .^

The author interjects this footnote here.
“In his
reply (September 13, Guayaquil) to m y invitation, Bolivar
told me*
'I am your appreciative friend, m y beloved
659
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I had not learned the intrigues of court on the battle
fields , nor did I k n o w the power of ambition and of
Machiavelism.

I thought that courage and virtue were the

only means to attain good fortune,

and for six years

1

still

considered them the poles on which the earth revolved.
thought the majority thought as I did.

I

But even the govern

ment which I was consecrated to obey and which I had as my
only support, had mediated and concerted plans for m y d e s t r u c 
tion since the beginning of my elevation to power.
thousand hurdles were stretched out before me.

A

X was

delivered from these either by m y good faith or fortune.
Nevertheless,

the measure of perfidy had to be fulfilled:

so the August 30 Decree was dispatched.^
in a cruel alternative:
X would be judged.

I was then placed

to carry it out or not.

Either way,

I did w h a t m y duty advised me, and I

general.
I say appreciative, for this letter which I am
answering is very noble and generous to m e . I have been
moved by the idea you have given me, and I hope I m a y enjoy
private life and intimate companionship with you. (Volume
XXI, page 74, Documentos de la^ Vida Pdblica del L i b e r t a d o r .)"
A copy of the entire letter m a y be found in Blanco and
Azpurtka (eds.), Documentos Para la H i s t o r i a . XXI, 74.
2paez must be referring to the August 31, 1829 Decree
w h i c h the Liberator issued from Guayaquil.
Bolivar, aware
of his failing health and apparently sincerely wan t i n g to
relieve himself of all power and responsibility, dispatched
his celebrated circular asking the people to "freely express
their opinions on the type of government and constitution
w hich the next constituent congress should adopt and about
the chief of administration that was to be elected." Felipe
Larraz&bal, La Vida de B o l i v a r , Libertador de Colombia y del
P e r d . Padre y Fundador de B o l i v i a . 2 vols. (New York,
1871), II, 484.
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executed it.

As a result,

called to Bogot&.

I was accused,

suspended,

and

It was well known that Venezuela would

not consent to having me obey this order,
not fail in my duty to her.

and that I would

This very data, however,

influ

enced m y moral enemies to promote a revolution by means of a
sheet of paper.

Nevertheless,

I was faithful, even despite

the indignation of m a n y and to the point of injuring m y
dearest interests, Venezuela's,

and the Liberator's.

The

latter k n o w h o w to save us, however.
It was then that I should have abandoned the field of
politics.

As a candid and faithful soldier,

p assed m y zenith.

I should have retired.

I had already

1 wanted to

retire, and I persistently asked the Liberator about this;
however, he opposed m y retirement tenaciously.

Renewing m y

gratitude and duties even further, he entrusted Venezuela to
m y ine^qperience.

I obeyed,

as I always did,

for I was

certain that I had the Liberator in Bogota at the head of
the Republic backing me with his authority and directing me
with his advice.
government,

and I continued with difficulty,

plete confidence.
leaving,

I relied on a reciprocal faith in the
but with c o m 

At these very moments the Liberator was

and I was being left without a guide,

Council was not Bolivar*

for the

I was not certain of the govern

ment's good faith, dexterity, or good accord.
Since April of this year.

General Jos 6 Maria Cdrdova

h a d been tracing a conspiracy to oppose what he called
Bolivar's ambitious desires.

To achieve it, he proposed to
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excite the jealousies and animosities between the Venezue
lans and the Granadines.

When he believed that his plans

were very a d v a n c e d , he wrote me the letter which I copy
below.^
MOST EXCELLENT SENOR GENERAL IN CHIEF JOSfi A. PAEZ .
Medellin
September 18,

1829.

Senori
I had been persuaded by the reiterated oaths with
which General Bolivar promised so many times to sus
tain and respect Colombia's liberty, by the liberal
opinions he manifested in his writings, by the v e n e 
ration he seemed to hold for the rights of the people
during other times, and by the fact that the glorious
title of Liberator of his country is more worthy than
all the crowns of the universe, and that no man would
want to renounce it in order to dominate his brothers,
that it was not possible for General Bolivar to
depreciate honor and glory and aspire to dominate his
country.
I saw the alarm of free men who had p e n e 
trated his ambitious desires while examining his c o n 
duct, as the deliriums of an excessive zeal.
Furthermore, I thought I saw in the public writings
that clearly outlined his criminal projects either an
alleviation from envy, or an expression of fear or
fearful temperaments that created phantoms to scare
t h e m s e l v e s . When I saw that his acts were contrary to
the constitution and laws, I thought that he did this
dragged by the force of circumstances, or that his
reason had deviated momentarily without his heart taking
any part in these deviations.
I expected later acts to
erase these stains which were eclipsing his reputation.
Sensitive to honor, I thought he would retrace his
stepss
ashamed of having abandoned the path of his
duty, he would correct his deviations.
With his
repentance, I k n e w he would again win the people's
esteem and affection; however, I have waited a long
time in vain.
Finally, after meditating slowly on his
proceedings and comparing his acts, I have come to
penetrate his desires.
My reason becomes indignant at
the aspect of the scandalous attempts which form the
series of his conduct in these last years.
Seeing

^This letter is in Blanco and Azpurda
m e n t o r para la H i s t o r i a . XIII, 638-39.

(eds.), D o c u 
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clearly now, moat excellent Sefior, that far from
seeking the road of correction, he removes his mask
without shame to allow his base pretensions to be
seen, m y patriotism is inflamed against this General
— this General who has deceived his country with vain
oaths and who had the impudence of offering it an
ignominious yoke as a reward for its sacrifices. . . .
1 am stimulated by the liberal sentiments which
have never left my heart.
1 am tired of waiting for
General Bolivar, moved by the unanimous clamor of the
people, and sensitive to the glory of which he has
been deprived by his ambition, to renounce his criminal
projects and restore to Colombia the liberty which he
has usurped from it.
Finally, undeceived by his latest
actions that he is thinking less about anything than
restoring liberty, and that all his desires are on the
path of cementing tyranny, I have yielded to the cries
of m y compatriots and the instigations of my heart.
I have raised the standard of liberty in this province,
and all the people have enthusiastically declared for
such a just cause.
Free men run to join us from all
parts.
All of us proclaim to die a thousand times
rather than suffer tyranny.
Yes, most excellent
Senor, this is our resolution, and there is nothing
which can make us desist from it.
The decision and
ardor which is manifested everywhere for liberty,
convince me that from one end of the Republic to the
other, the people will take advantage of this occasion
to allow their hatred for tyranny to be seen and to
shake the yoke that oppresses them. . . .
It is not possible for Your Excellency to want the
degrading title of vassal of a monarch as recompense
for your heroism, sacrifices, and triumphs.
We all
rely on the fact that Your Excellency will no longer
acknowledge General Bolivar's arbitrary government and
will place yourself at the head of the free men in
those departments.
Then we expect you will establish
relations with me, reach an agreement, and then to
gether we shall destroy despotism forever.
Let us
unite and liberty will most certainly t r i u m p h . . . .
I end my letter by begging Your Excellency to hear
the cry of the people who implore our protection, and
that reaching an agreement with me, we lend our arms
to shake the chaims of slavery.
Please remove from
your side all those men w h o m General Bolivar has brought
to surround you always, for knowing Your Excellency's
heart, he fears each instant that with you at the head
of the republicans of Venezuela, his tyranny will end.
Please search the heart of all honest citizens, and you
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will find that they all harbor the sentiments
which I have manifested to you.
Please accept the sentiments of esteem and affec
tion with which I have the honor of being Your
Excellency's most attentive and obedient servant.
JOS6
If I had had,

mar

Ia

c6r d o v a

as some malevolent writer has supposed,

.

any

preconcerted plan against Bolivar's authority and Colombia's
integrity,

I would not have allowed the occasion offered me

by Cdrdova's insurrection to pass.

This chief had attained

quite a bit of fame in Perti, but was ruined by the speed
with which he wanted to carry his plans into effect.
In August of this year,

the frigate of war Cund i n a -

marca entered Puerto Cabello carrying General Santander, whom
the government had imprisoned in the Bocachica Fortress and
was n o w sending to receive my orders.

General Santander had

written me from that fortress telling me about the m i s f o r 
tune he suffered and of the hopes he had of finding good
treatment with me which would be compatible with security.
He claimed this right as a man who had gone without sleep to
second the worthy and magnificent projects of General Bolivar
whose life he h a d saved at a time when his existence depended
on his w i l l .

I answered this letter with the following one.4

To Seftor General Francisco de P. Santander
Caracas
April 22, 1829.
Senor General:

4 I b i d ., 514-15.
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When your letter written in Bocachica on this
past February 19th reached m y hands, I already had
news of your coming to Venezuela by disposition of
the government.
1 also k n e w about the misfortunes
prepared for you by a series of unfortunate h a p p e n 
ings and events.
In opportune time also, X learned
about the attempt of September 25 in Bogota, and
later about everything published with respect to
your accomplices.
It is not m y place to analyze the government's
reasons for suspending the Liberator's beneficious
providence, who according to what you tell me,
opposed your banishment from the country.
However,
it is very satisfactory for me to assure you that as
soon as I learned of your confinement in Venezuela,
I prepared to correspond to the government's confi 
dence and your hopes.
Rest assured, Senor General, that I have the best
intentions to favor you, always conciliating the
duties of my position with m y natural inclinations.
Come to Venezuela confident that you will find the
best hospitality and consideration with which I am
your obedient servant, General.

josfi
Arriving in Puerto Cabello,

a

.

p Ae z

Santander sent me a

testimonial in which he tried to vindicate himself of the
crimes of which he was accused,

and he begged me to free h i m

from privations and sufferings by granting h i m a passport to
a foreign country.
citations,

This document abounds in historical

and it is well known that he wrote it under the

veil of a profound sadness.

He terminated it with these

wordsi5
If Your Excellency's sword has given life and
fortune to many Colombians, a feeling of humanity
and even of justice on your part, will give in this
instance a less bitter existence to an old Colombian;

5Roberto Cortazar (ed.), Cartas y Menaaqes de S a n 
tander . 8 vols. (Bogota, 1953-55), VIII, 29-30.
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health, to a sick man; and consolation,
family inundated in tears.

to a

In 1816 Your Excellency gave me protection
against the oppressors of my native land;
do the
same in 1829 against the adversity and anger of my
ignoble e n e m i e s .
Santander added the following letter to this testi
monial .6
To His Excellency,

General in Chief JOs£ Antonio
P&ez.
Bay of Puerto Cabello
August 19, 1829

Senor Generali
In Bocachica I opportunely received your very
attentive letter in reply to the one I sent you from
that fortress.
This answer has corresponded
entirely with m y hopes and has filled me with con
solation.
As much for what it promises me for the
future, as for having sent it, I thank you most
expressively and sincerely.
M y situation does not permit me to bestow any favor
w h ich would contribute to improving it.
Since you
have generously offered me all your services in my m i s 
fortune, I have thought it suitable to present you the
testimonial accompanying this letter, which the c o m 
mandant of this ship is delivering.
I know that a
magistrate always has to protect himself, sometimes
before his superiors, and sometimes before sane public
opinion.
I have no doubt that I shall secure from you,
or through your mediation, what I asked for in this
paper.
I k n o w your heart and character well, and I
also k n o w well what influence you have in the gove r n 
ment.
Since the public voice occupies itself today
w i th nothing other than to praise and bless the k i n d 
nesses you have used with the banished and those
confined to the territory under your command, h o w can
I not expect relief, consolation, and my freedom from
your powerful hand? Confident of this, I have reached
this port.
in the midst of the tribulations, of the
penalties of sixty days of navigation, and of my cruel

Azpurda

^A copy of this letter m a y be found in Blanco and
(eds.), Documentos Para la H i s t o r i a , XIII, 605-606.
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infirmities, I am consoled and vivified by the
thought of being under your custody.
Overlook my impertinences.
A sick man, who is
absent from his family, pursued, and confined, has
m a n y necessities to consider, and a thousand reasons
for being impertinent.
Nevertheless, you can be sure
that I will not demand anything which will compromise
your honor or minex
for this is the only jewel left
me by my superiors.
Out of m y long public career in
m y country's service, I am determined to preserve it
at all cost and in the midst of misfortunes and
bitterness.
The enclosed certificate which General
Montilla has given me will show you that I have c o n 
ducted myself with honor in the prisons, as I shall
always conduct myself in any c i r c u m s t a n c e . I beg you
to please return said document to me and keep a copy,
or if you keep the original, please send me an
authentic copy.
1 remain, Senor General,
obedient, humble servant.

a most acknowledged,
Q.B.S.M.
F. de P. Santander.

W h e n I received this letter,

I answered with the following.

To Sehor Francisco de Paula Santander
Puerto Cabello
August 20, 1829
M y Esteemed S e n o r :
I have read your letter dated yesterday aboard the
frigate of war, C u n d i n a m a r c a . in which you honor me with
the hopes of relief from your present misfortune.
You
do justice to m y sentiments, which are always inclined
to make the lot of an unfortunate person leas bitter.
I thank you most sincerely for this belief.
Even if I
will flatter myself by considering myself worthy of it,
I shall always be honored by your conviction.
Fortunately you have arrived at Venezuelan shores at
a time when I am competently authorized by the govern
ment to make your situation more bearable.
The desires
which you manifested to me in your first letter from

7 I b i d .. 606.
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the Bocachica fortress in Cartagena will be satis
fied, and 1 shall have the pleasure of simultaneously
fulfilling m y duties to the government and to you.
By chance I arrived at this port three days ago.
If m y proximity can be useful to you in anything c o n 
ducive to relieving your afflictions and making your
stay and the trip on which you are going to embark less
painful, please tell me, confident that I shall do
everything possible.
I remain your obedient servant.
JOSfi A. p Ae z .
Today,

as I review the letters that General Santander

wrote me at various times,

I cannot understand h o w this mam

has come to appear in Colombian history as one of my worst
enemies.

In all those letters and in the ones that I sent

him in reply,

there is not the slightest animosity.

one or in another we manifest some resentment,

If in

it may be

seen by the dates that we were satisfied very quickly b y the
explanations we gave each other.

Santander continued to

write me from New York and Hamburg.

Those who read this

correspondence cannot believe that this is the same Santander
who wrote Bolivar the confidential letter which I have m e n 
tioned previously.
General Santander is a historic personage who has been
judged in two diametrically opposed manners.

Undoubtedly,

is still very difficult to justly place h i m in his proper
niche.

As a patriot in the early years of the revolution,

he is unquestionably one of Colombia's heroesi

as adminis

trator of her interests, he cannot be denied great talent
and ability if the grave obstacles with which he had to

it
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struggle are taken into consideration.

Sometimes moderate

in his conduct while exaggerated in his principles at others,
his administration hurt itself because of the lack of harmony
between its deeds and its principles.

Thus it is that while

appearing to defend Colombia's integrity,

Santander was p e r 

haps the most powerful instrument preparing for the necessary
separation of the three sections.

Much to the contrary of

what has always happened to controversial men in republics,
Santander returned to his country,
again,

directed its destinies

and died in the land where he was born.

When he

declared himself Bolivar's enemy, posterity believed itself
with the right to accuse him of ambitious desires and excessive
presumption.

It falls to the future historians of Colombia,

when they are able to write without the impressions of the
moment,

to place this exalted personage of the American

independence movement in the position pointed out by his
civic virtues and his e r r o r s .
When the Liberator saw the war in Perd ended satis
factorily and was preparing to return here,

I manifested my

desire to retire to private life to h i m once m o r e — the
private life which was my element and which promised me the
inestimable joys of which I was deprived.

If the Liberator

left Colombia and left the reins of government, my obligation
would be ended,

for I thought it useless and perhaps dangerous

for me to occupy such a precarious position.

I feared that

the government council, which frequently revealed itself most
satisfied with me, would not have the same inclination in
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Bolivar's absence.
lacking

1 did not trust m y forces if I were

the support of a friend who k n e w the needs of his

native state,

the character of its inhabitants,

moral strength and prestige which it enjoyed.

and the
There would

be many

and repeated occasions when it would

be imperative

to work

in favor of the public good when the

government

would not see the need.

There would be other times when a

measure selected by the government to provide for the needs
at hand, would be funeral for Venezuela,
sight.

so far from its

At still other times it would be indispensable to

m odify the resolutions whose extensive character would clash,
either with the decrees issued by the Liberator in the
departments,

or with other statutes agreed upon and approved

by the local government itself and which might not be c o n 
sidered.

in any case,

the responsibility of those who

governed would be endangered at each step, either because
they would detain execution of a decree to avoid harm, or
because they would allow the latter to come without being
able to prevent it.

In a country where calumnies against

the government and those who governed were fomented by c e r 
tain disorganized men, who were enemies of Colombia,

all

resolutions would be exposed to their detractions and even
*

their accusations.

In a country subject to this calamity,

it was indispensable to maintain the government,

especially

that of the Liberator.
There was no hope that the Constituent Congress could
make provisions for these evils or that later the structure
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of the great political machine they created could resolve
these difficulties.

This was because without the Liberator's

immediate instructions to the d e p u t i e s , without his enlight
enments given by time and experience,

nothing could be done,

or what was done would necessarily have omissions.
latter was something which a stable constitution,

The
to which

the future of Colombians would be entrusted forever,
not possess.

It fell to the Liberator,

then,

should

to resolve the

difficult political problems which would be considered by
the national representation!

the latter,

although selected

from the best that our countries could offer, would find
itself consumed by a thousand perplexities unless the
Liberator guided its course and aided its efforts.
Finally,

I believed that Bolivar's presence in

Colombia was vital to her organization.

I also believed

that my duration in the command of Venezuela was marked by
that of the Liberator in the Presidency and his stay in that
territory.

I told him all this in my letters.

Colombia's souli

his genius gave it life:

Bolivar was

without him,

only a cadaver would remain.
On October 14 of this year,

the Liberator directed a

circular to the departments of Colombia authorizing them to
express their views frankly on the type of political regime
Q

that would best suit them.

. If I failed to publish the

®This circular was first issued on August 31, 1829.
See footnote 2 in this chapter.
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c i r c u l a r , 1 would be considered a tyrant who oppressed the
liberty of the people when the Liberator had ordered them to
express their desires openly.

If I published it,

I would be

in open battle with the party that did not believe its
publication opportune.
sequences,

Finally,

I decided to face the c o n 

and I published the circular.

their wishes known.

Then the towns make

These were so irreconcilable,

was impossible to take any definite action.

that it

The citizens of

Manavi and other points desired a moderate monarchy under
Bolivar's sceptre.

In Maracaibo,

some of the people requested

that this life-time leader be named the head of a republic
with the authority to select a successor from among the three
m en that the citizens selected.
this program was varied somewhat.

In the village of Perija
These citizens wanted the

vice-president to succeed the supreme chief of the republic
until the nation could name a successor.
Valencia,

The city of

by the unanimous vote of its most notable men,

pronounced against the monarchical form and favored the d i s 
solution of the three states which formed Colombia.

They

requested that this petition be sent to Congress.
On November 26 a junta of Caracas's best citizens
assembled in the San Francisco Convent.

It resolvedi

(1)

to separate from the Bogota government and disallow General
Bolivar's authority, but to maintain peace,

friendship,

and

concordance with their brothers from the central and southern
departments of Colombia; to draw u p a treaty and establish
what would suit their common interests,

and this was
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applauded and greeted with extraordinary enthusiasm;
send the act justifying the procedure,
tions,

to the general superior chief,

(2) to

including the resolu
asking h i m to consult

the will of the departments which comprised the old Venezuela,
and convoke primary assemblies in all the territory under
his command as quickly as possible so that,
with the known regulations,

in accordance

electors could be nominated and

successively representatives to compose a Venezuelan c onven
tion; taking this basis into consideration,

it would proceed

immediately to establish a republican government— representa
tive,

alternative,

and responsible;

(3) to extend the m a n i 

festo which was directed to their Colombian brothers and to
the whole sphere,

stating the reasons which imperiously

demanded its resolution;

{4) to maintain the worthy General

Jose Antonio PAez as chief of these departments,

and that

holding the people's confidence as he did, he was to maintain
public order and keep all the branches of the administration
under the existing forms until the convention was installed;
(5) to keep its commitments to foreign countries and private
individuals who *had granted aids to consolidate her political
existence,

even though Venezuela had adopted measures rela

tive to her security by separating from the government that
h a d governed until then,

it was expected that the convention

would arrange these just obligations in the most suitable
manner.9

XIII,

9Blanco and Azpurda
719.

(eds.), Documentos Para la H i s t o r i a .
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When I received this junta's act in Valencia,

I

directed the following communication to the Minister of
I n t e r i o r .10
REPUBLIC OF COLOMBIA
JOSfi ANTONIO PAEZ, SUPERIOR CIVIL AND MILITARY CHIEF
OF VENEZUELA, ET CETERA, ET CETERA.
General Headquarters, Valencia
December 8, 1829.-No. 98.
To the Minister of State in the Department of the
Interior.
I received your official communique of this past
October 16 containing the resolution of the government
council e>q>edited in accordance with the decree of His
Excellency, the Liberator President, to have the people
freely express their wishes with regard to the form of
their government, a decree which should be sanctioned,
and to name the chief of the nation, wh i c h should be
communicated directly to the departmental prefects.
I had this published by proclamation, and the
citizens of each town have assembled and manifested
their wishes, but not in a similar manner.
In some
cities, villages, and parishes, they have taken the
form of a petition directed to the constituent c o n 
gress:
in others, they have taken the form of resolu
tions.
All ask for or desire the separation of
Venezuela from the rest of the Republic and to have
her constituted as a sovereign state, leaving the
relations which should be established with the other
states which have been within C o l o m b i a 1s territory
to the consideration of its government. ■ The town which
has most exceeded the terms of the decree has been
Caracas.
Here popular assemblies were held on the
twenty-fifth and the twenty-sixth of this past month
where it was resolved by act to separate Venezuela and
disallow His Excellency the Liberator's authority,
arranging beforehand to proceed immediately to form a
constituent congress with representatives selected for
this, and for me to take charge of the new order and
direct the movement.
I h a d come from Caracas to this city in order to

10I b i d ., XIV,

29-30.
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maintain peace and quiet in the surrounding areas of
the valleys and towns in the West, for I was alarmed
by the news that was spreading that the people were
considering organizing the Republic under a monarchical
system.
1 received the Caracas Act in this city.
It
was delivered to me by three secretaries and two addi
tional citizens w h o were substituting for Doctor Andres
Narvarte, another commissioned secretary who had become
i l l . T h e commissioners demanded that I march to
Caracas immediately to take charge of the n e w adminis
tration and issue the decrees needed for the execution
of their projects.
However, I let them k n o w that the
nature of my commitments and the obedience I had sworn
to the provisional organization, did not permit me to
do this in any way.
Nevertheless, since I was pressed
urgently, and since I considered on the other hand that
the desperate state in which that town found itself
m i ght induce it to take other measures of action which
might be capable of causing confusion and perhaps even
leading us to anarchy, I promised them that they would
not be molested because of their opinions.
I have also
promised them that their wishes shall have effect
through the resolutions of the constituent congress—
the legal font to which they should direct their act
for a decision.
Meanwhile, I ask to be permitted to
govern, as is m y duty, in the name and under the
authority of His Excellency the Liberator President.
In this manner I have managed to maintain order, and
quiet the p e o p l e 's agitation and alarm, for they have
been and still are very restless.
Since on the first day of this month when the mail
arrived in this capital, I was occupied all morning and
part of the afternoon receiving the commissioners who
brought the Caracas Act, I barely had time to inform
His Excellency the Liberator President and the Most
Excellent Minister of War by private letters about this
event.
I take advantage now of this first opportunity
to inform you so that you can tell the government
council, adding that if the separation of Venezuela is
an evil, it n o w seems inevitable.
Everyone seems to
desire it vehemently, and I believe this occasion will
not be allowed to pass except at the cost of bloody,
horrible, .aid unfortunate sacrifices.
This opinion is
general and superior to the influence of any man*
In
reality, it is the public opinion.
I have not wanted
to participate in any of it because His Excellency

H-Dr. Andrfis Narvarte had been one of the three p r o v i s 
ional members of the triumvirate which composed the national
executive in 1811.
Morbn, History of V e n e z u e l a . 103.
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the Liberator forewarned me to allow the people to
act and say what they wanted to with complete frank
ness and freedom.
They have done this.
As for me,
I shall believe that I have fulfilled my duties if I
can maintain order, tranquility, and the administra
tion of the present regime to which I have sworn
allegiance, until the constituent congress resolves
this matter.
These are the recommendations X have
made to all the authorities that are under my command
in these provinces, giving them orders at the same
time to maintain respect, veneration, and obedience
to His Excellency the Liberator President.
May God keep you.
JOS& ANTONIO PAEZ.
In those days lampoons appeared in Caracas which were
injurious to the L i b e r a t o r 's person and which made violent
allusions to his government.

I sent orders then from V alen

cia to the authorities so that they would punish these
excesses.

I said the following to the i n h a b itants.^ 2

. . . the liberty which the governmental decrees has
given the people to request what would be most suit
able for their future and prosperity does not auth
orize them to write abuses and threats against the
first magistrate, who was simultaneously the most
notable hero of this part of the N e w World, and to
wh o m immense services were owed.
These excesses
could only be the work of some violent persons who
in a delirous moment had written what not even their
own hearts, much less those of the rest of the
Venezuelans, desired; that in any case such conduct
was always painful and dishonorable for the country;
and finally, that freedom of the press and the right
of petition gave no cause to resort to such base
means.
All the Venezuelan towns manifested the same desires
as the capital city did to separate peacefully from Bogota

l2These are excerpts from a decree P&ez sent from his
general headquarters in Valencia on November 30, 1829 to the
Departmental Prefect.
A complete copy of this decree m a y be
found in Blanco and Azpurda (eds.), Documentos Para la
Historia, XIII, 727-28.
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and form an independent state.
position,

Mine was a most difficult

for I was struggling between my considerations for

the Liberator and the unanimous will of the people.

On

December 1, I wrote the following letter to the Liberator
from Valencia.13
To His Excellency the Liberator SimOn Bolivar, Et C e t e r a .
Et C e t e r a .
M y Beloved General and Friend:
Today the commissioners from Caracas arrived to
deliver the act they have recorded asking for
V e n e z u e l a ’s separation by act, and to be constituted
u nder republican forms.
If they had limited them
selves to this, I would not have found it strange,
for the opinions of these towns were known to me.
However, the part in which they address you person 
ally has caused me grief.
The commissioners have come
determined to demand that I go to Caracas to take
charge of and direct this movement; however, I have
excused myself because of my commitments.
I have
promised them wholeheartedly that this love which they
have manifested for liberty shall have no painful c o n 
sequences for them.
I have not seen anything in the
act but the realization of the fears which I expressed
to you in the letter I sent yesterday.
I k n e w that
the Venezuelans wholeheartedly opposed the union with
Bogota and were determined to make any sacrifice to
achieve this separation; but I believed that the
reason for their doing this forces me to dissimulate it.
The commissioners are satisfied with the offer I have
made to t h e m — an offer which I had to make to them
because I could not leave that town in desperation and
exposed to taking other disastrous and disorganizing
measures.
Thus I have continued to command on the same
footing I h a d before and until such time as the reso
lution of the constituent congress is known.
If the separation is an evil, it is already inevit
able, and I hope that far from opposing it, you will
recommend it to the congress.
In this manner you will
contribute greatly to the well-being and contentment of
your countrymen and compatriots.
On the other hand, if
you or the government council attempt to suffocate it,

13I b i d .. XIV,

5-6.

678
I cannot account for anything, for daily I see
nothing but violence to contain.
This is an opinion
w h i ch is superior to the influence of any man.
Fur
thermore, I shall tell you that 1 am not certain that
the moderation with which 1 am acting will be enough
to maintain affairs in the order they still have.
I
say this because there is already talk, almost b a r e 
faced, of seeking another chief to guide Venezuela in
this movement.
1 recommend this cause to your prudence.
Reflect on it calmly, for those involved are your
friends, and your brothers.
If the lance is engaged,
very precious blood shall be spilled.
A war shall be
started which we shall not see ended.
Give the Ve n e 
zuelans their peace, and add this to the many benefits
you have already given them.
I work to maintain your glory and reputation as m y
chief and m y friend.
This is the one task I perform
with pleasure at this time, for I am very tired of
commanding.
I do not have a moment's peace.
Dis
pleasures have taken away my sleep and even m y
appetite.
It grieves me to tell you what I have to in this
letter; however, it would grieve me even more if you
did not know about it or if someone else told you
before I did.
I do not know what course these events
shall take, but regardless of what they may be, and
even if destiny carries me to misfortune, I shall
always prove that I am your heart-felt friend.
JOSE A. PAEZ.
On December 21, I again wrote the Liberator from
Caracas in the following t e r m s .
Caracas
December 21,

1829

My Beloved General and Friendi
After I received the pronouncement from this city,
I remained in Valencia until I was forced to come by
the agitation I observed in this town.
I arrived here
on the twelfth.
Caracas was truly in a lamentable
state, for there was no trusting anything or anyone.
Only thoughts about extreme revolution were comtem 
pi ated as protection from any attempt which might be

14I b i d ., 54-55.
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made against the pronouncements.
I tried to see
everyone, and I have succeeded in inspiring co n f i 
dence; however, the people still are not quiet. The
provisions I take with every precaution to calm
resentments and passions disturb them in such a
manner, that I am chagrined at each step because I
fail to go crazy.
I am suffocated, and 1 feel in
capable of keeping the people quiet:
prudence
appears to be timidity; any job appointment excites
jealousies; and everything that is not inflamatory,
is considered contrary to their movement.
I have not proposed any idea, but I have tried to
moderate the existing ones without opposing the general
will of the public.
It would be impossible for me to
do otherwise.
Moreover, it would be harmful and c o n 
trary to my own ideas, for desiring Venezuela's for
tune and prosperity as much as most, I am determined
to maintain her wishes while trying by every means
possible to prevent civil war, and internal dissen 
sions and persecutions from devouring her.
I am
determined to do this because I see very clearly that
there is no other path left open to us:
not you, nor
I, nor anyone can contain this movement.
The person
w h o attempts this will achieve nothing more than to
ruin himself and destroy the country.
A show of arms,
or the first rifle shot, would be the sign for a
general uprising.
If the Venezuelan troops were
defeated, the uprising would be even more devouring,
for a chieftain would arise in each canton, in each
t o w n . Then the country would be divided at the very
least into guerrilla factions which would be impossible
to ever bring to any accord.
We would die like savages,
without the hope of ever seeing any social organization
again.
Perhaps this soil will get to be Spanish because
those engaged in the conflict would fling themselves
into the arms of anyone offering p r o t e ction.15

15The author footnotes this as follows.
"Senor
Restrepo, w h o undoubtedly did not see this letter, states in
Volume IV, page 269:
'He (P&ez) wrote a private letter to
Bolivar at the same time manifesting his resolution to him
and u rging h i m not to insist on going against the determined
will of the Venezuelans; that if he attacked them, the entire
country would be covered with guerrillas that w o u l d destroy
him; and that in the final analysis they would rather deliver
themselves to the Spanish.
We do not believe that P&ez and
his partisans would ever have thought of fulfilling this
criminal t h r e a t . 1 I beg the reader to compare these expres
sions with the contents of m y letter, and thus keep me from
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We have arrived at the worst imaginable state, for
I have never seen myself in a more difficult and d a n 
gerous situation.
M y future and m y reputation are c o m 
promised, and I believe it not only necessary, but
indispensable, to assemble a Venezuelan congress for
the purpose of deliberating and organizing the country.
If this mee t i n g is held without contradiction from you,
without snares, and without any instigations on a n y 
one's part to introduce discord and foment lack of
confidence, we can still expect days of peace and
tranquility.
Convince yourself of this, my dear G e n 
eral.
Believe, believe me that I speak the truth, and
the pure truth, without any other interest than the
well-being of the country.
I have no personal goal,
and much less, any intention of contradicting you.
Believe me for the good of the country, and believe
me for our f r i e n d s h i p 1s s a k e .
Goodbye, m y dear General.
I wish you the skill
necessary to untie this knot, and I hope that you do
not make any mistakes in your resolutions or in your
actions.
I also hope that you believe I am animated
by the sentiments of consideration and friendship with
w h ich X am your affectionate servant and friend.
JOSfi A. PAEZ.
On December 24, with the object of determining the
opinion of the citizens of Caracas for myself,

I convoked a

junta of its most select citizens at the public theatre in
order that the inhabitants of the city in which the Liberator
had been born could express their opinion anew.

More than

two thousand persons came to this junta, which was in session
from 11:00 a.m. until 4:00 a.m. the following day.
the orators,

Among

there were some w h o started to upbraid the

Liberator's conduct.

Among these was Sefior Juli&n Garcia

w h o w e nt to the extreme of calling h i m unjust and ty r a n n i c a l .

commenting on the accusation of the Granadine historian."
This citation may be found where the author states in
the Jos6 Jacquin edition of Restrepo, Revolucidn de la
Repdblica de C o l o m b i a .
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Presiding over this assembly,

I rose,

interrupted the orator,

and addressed him in the following manner.
Senor Garcia, you are out of order.
We have not
come here to discuss what the Liberator has been or
is.
The Liberator has sent an authorization to all
the departments in Colombia so that they may express
their wishes concerning the type of political regime
they consider most suitable for the Republic.
There
fore, I declare that 1 shall not allow one sole word
to be uttered against the Liberator.
A deep silence followed this short discourse,

and the d i s c u s 

sion ended with the reading of the resolution adopted by the
assembly and which follows below.

It may also be found in

Volume X X I , page 91, Documentos Relativos a .la Vida Ptiblica
del L i b e r t a d o r .16
EXPOSITION OF THE TOWN OF CARACAS TO HIS EXCELLENCY
THE LIBERATOR PRESIDENT
Most Excellent Seflor:
We the priests, heads of families, and notable
citizens of the city of Caracas to which we subscribe,
while assembled in the presence of His Excellency the
Superior Chief, accompanied by the wisdom and mod e r a 
tion which the desire for peace and justice of our
cause inspires, have determined to manifest to His
Excellency that this town on this past November 25 and
26, and the other towns on different days, have
expressed their unanimous desire to separate the old
Venezuela from the union with the rest of the territory
forming the Republic of Colombia.
In this manner
Venezuela would regain her sovereignty and the power to
create a republican, popular, representative, alterna
tive, responsible and elective government, which is
considered the most suitable to her customs, climate,
and circumstances.
These people want to proceed with
this task involving their future repose and well-being
motivated only by their own meditation and conscience.
Th e y fear that the shadow of the height that Your

toria.

^ B l a n c o and Azpuarda (eds.) , Documentos Para la HisThe rest of the author's citation is correct.
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Excellency has attained might prevent free rein to your
reflections, or that the execution of your ardent wishes
might find obstacles in the councils of BogotA.
It was
not without agitation and pain that Venezuela tore h e r 
self from her sovereignty.
N o w she works for her future
well-being without placing limits or price on the love
of liberty.
We recommend most earnestly that you. Your Excellency,
w ho has been so interested in the independence and glory
of this soil where you were b o m , and where your rela
tives, friends, and the respectable ashes of your
parents are, exercise your powerful influence so that
our separation and organization m a y be made peacefully,
and so that no one will alter our union or pretend to
oppose our precious and laudable undertaking.
There
is no justifiable motive before humanity that can arm
Your Excellency nor the Bogota government to invade our
rights so long as Your Excellency realizes that we are
permitted to defend ourselves and resist.
The world
will investigate the cause of the misfortunes, deaths,
and horrors which will come, and not the pretexts
sought to wreak these upon u s . We shall leave the
victim's sepulchres open so that their descendants may
see the blood their fathers shed, and the sounds they
received at the hands of those w h o uselessly wanted to
suffocate their heroic patriotism.
Caracas, December 24, 1829— X I X . — Jose A. P&ez,
Rafael Ortega, priest Luis Acosta, priest Joaquin Rada,
p riest Ramdn Calzadilla, priest Dr. Juan Hilario Bocett,
Diacono Ramdn Bermfldez, priest Dr. Francisco Javier
Narvarte, priest Listo Freites, priest Josd Marla
Hurtado, priest Juan Francisco Atencio, Diacono Pedro
Osio, Dr. TomAs Francisco Vicente Parejo, Diego B.
Urbaneja, Carlos Soublette, Rafael Revenga, Mariano
Herrera, Alejo Fortique, Angel Quintero, Ramdn Ayala,
Pedro Machado, Caludio Viana, josA F61ix Salas, TomAs
Antero, Raimundo R. Sarmiento.
An additional fifteen
hundred signatures follow.
I shall not close this chapter without answering some
of the unjust and malicious charges that have been directed
against me and the Venezuelans as a result of the events of
this year.

I shall reply to those who accuse Venezuela of

having been the center from which sprung the projects of
monarchy,

and those who believe that it was planned beforehand
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to divide the Republic in the territory which I commanded,
b y including the following letter from the worthy General
Soublette to Urdaneta when the latter was trying to fulfill
his monarchical s c h e m e s . ^

No one will refuse to admit

General S o u b l e t t e 's authorized word,

for he was a veteran

patriot and most republican in feeling.

On April 19 of this

year 1866, a Caracas newspaper has justly written the follow
ing words about himt
Soublette, Miranda's, and Rivas's aide-de-camp,
was a general of the sword and a brilliant person who
inspired.
More than once he was the leader in the
famous retreat from Ocumare.
He was also the defendor
of Cartagena, Bolivar's loyal friend, author and
witness of all our glories and administrator with
Santander.
Today he possesses the respect and
sympathies of all parties in South America.
General S o u b l e t t e *s Letter to General Urdaneta.
Caracas
October 13,

1819 [1829].

M y dear General and friendi
Your letter of September 9 and the copy you
enclosed for me of the one you wrote General P&ez on
this same day, have sickened me and reduced me to a
miserable state.
From the very first time you had the
kindness to speak to me about the great affair which
occupies you, I manifested my opinion frankly to you.
You have mistrusted your ground-work, thought us to be
seeing phantoms, have continued working along these
lines, and insist that we co-operate in fulfilling the
project.
What hope remains for me then? None, and
this is the thought that destroys m y spirit.
Each day I have further reasons to realize that
these departments will resist a monarchy, and that civil
war shall result from the adoption of this form of

17it is interesting to note that this letter is not
included in Urdaneta, Memoriae or in Blanco and Azpurda
(eds.), Documentos Para la Historia.
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government— a civil war which shall return us to
Spanish domination after a thousand horrors and di s 
asters.
I do not seem to have the power to convince
you of this, for my words reach you without efficacy.
You do not believe me, and attribute m y opposition to
varied fears.
All of this causes me a mortal agony.
I am your friend and a friend to all who are in this
undertaking.
1 k n o w the purity of your intentions,
and because of this my torments increase.
I see that
with the best intentions in the world, you all have
adopted the only means that can ruin us without remedy.
Forgive me this frankness, my friend; however, I c o n 
sider it a duty to tell you things as I see them.
After the letters of September 9 were received, the
project has been publicized.
Already everyone in this
city knows about it, and very quickly all Venezuela
will be aware of it.
You have only surprised your
friends and confirmed eternal doubts in others who
already celebrate their triumph and relish Venezuela's
sighed-for separation and the fall of the Liberator and
all his f r i e n d s . Those friends he has here are as sad
as I am.
We get together to sigh and deplore the fate
that awaits us.
We ask ourselves h o w can it be possible
for you, Castillo, and the other important citizens
involved, to have such little knowledge of Venezuela's
true state and condition as to give this direction to
t h i n g s . No one can answer t h i s . We go to see General
P&ez, and we find him in b e d — pale, sleepless, and
unable to occupy himself with anything since the arrival
of the September 9 mail.
All this considered, can it
be expected that any of these deputies will support the
monarchy in Congress?
If, as I understand it, you all do not have any p e r 
sonal goals in this matter, but rather are animated b y
the desire to give the nation stability and order, w h y
have you not modified the plan since you learned there
was opposition in Venezuela?
This is because you have
not believed us and as a result you are going to cause
a revolution in the country whose consequences neither
of us can calculate.
If until n o w it has been easy to
prove that the Liberator opposed a monarchy, it may not
be so easy to do later.
If it is judged that Venezuela
is not worth much and will be oppressed by the weight
of the other parts of the Republic, allow me to tell
you that this is an incorrect judgment.
Venezuela has
war materials, more so than any other people in Colombia,
and her state of poverty prepares her for revolution.
After the latter has broken out here, opposition will
reveal itself throughout all that territory and in that
army on which you rely so securely.
Ah 1 If you all
w o u ld abate just a little, I could still expect good
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fortune for the country.
Perhaps my friends are going to become angry with
me as a result of m y constant opposition to this p r o 
ject, but it shall be one of the many misfortunes 1
expect and which I shall endure in silence.
You can be
certain that I shall never be m u t i n u o u s .
I am.
C. Soublette.
Senor Restrepo states that the Venezuelans were d i s 
content with m y administration during this p e r i o d . 1®

He for

gets that it was exactly at this time that they gave me the
greatest proof of confidence and the greatest sign of affec
tion that a citizen can receive.

By their free and spon

taneous will, the Venezuelans kept me at the head of the
national party.

When they constituted a new state into its

political existence,

they entrusted me with the direction of

their interests and gave me all the authority I needed to
defend them.
With reference to the ordinances I decreed for policing
the nation,

the results they produced answer the accusations

made by the Granadine historian.

What he calls "intruding

into even the worker's most hidden hovel to prescribe r egula
tions for h i m concerning the raising of his cattle and domes
tic animals," represented nothing more than the proper p r o 
visions for preserving some elements of the wealth of m y

18See Restrepo,
b i a . IV, 200.
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country.

1Q

I understood the value of this wealth since I

had been a shepherd in m y early youth and chief of military
operations in those areas where possession of these elements
was of great interest to the Republic.
Regarding the meat trade where he presents me with a
personal interest in the sale of young bulls from m y f a r m s ,
Restrepo errs in supposing me the owner of a sufficient
number of heads of cattle to establish a monopoly at the
time to which he ref e r s . ^0

i remember that a merchant from

Puerto Cabello committed the same error then, proposing
deals to me which I could not accept because m y pecuniary
means could not satisfy his solicitations.

l^I b i d .

20I b i d .. 201.
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